

Florian Hessdörfer, Andrea Pabst, Peter Ullrich (Ed.)

# Prevent and Tame. Protest under (Self)Control

Manuskripte

Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung  
Manuskripte 88



Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung

FLORIAN HEBDÖRFER, ANDREA PABST,  
PETER ULLRICH (EDS.)

**Prevent and Tame.  
Protest under (Self-)Control**

Karl Dietz Verlag Berlin

Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung, Reihe: Manuskripte, 88

ISBN 978-3-320-02246-4

Karl Dietz Verlag Berlin GmbH 2010

Satz: Beate Lunze

Druck und Verarbeitung: Mediaservice GmbH Bärenruck und Werbung

Printed in Germany

# Inhalt

*Stephen Gill*

Preface:

Political Protest in the Age of Neoliberal Austerity 7

*Peter Ullrich, Andrea Pabst, and Florian Heßdörfer*

Introduction: Prevent and Tame.

Ideas for a New Perspective on Social Movements and Protest 11

*Peter Ullrich*

Preventionism and Obstacles for Protest in Neoliberalism.

Linking Governmentality Studies and Protest Research 14

*Florian Heßdörfer*

Anti-Social or Childish: Protest and Youth under the Eye of Prevention 24

*Marco Tullney*

Organizing Employees Under Surveillance:

My Boss is Spying on Me, So I Better Keep My Mouth Shut 35

*Andrej Holm and Anne Roth*

Anti-Terror Investigations against Social Movements—

A Personal Experience of a Preventive Threat 49

*Michael Shane Boyle*

The Criminalization of Dissent: Protest Violence, Activist Performance,  
and the Curious Case of the VolxTheaterKarawane in Genoa

55

<i>Darcy K. Leach and Sebastian Haunss</i> »Wichtig ist der Widerstand«: Rituals of Taming and Tolerance in Movement Responses to the Violence Question	73
<i>Nick Montgomery</i> Beyond Civil Disobedience and Counter-hegemony: Legitimacy, Strategy and Tactics in the 2010 Anti-Olympics Movement	99
The Authors	119

Stephen Gill

**Preface:**  
**Political Protest in the Age of Neoliberal Austerity**

The publication of »Prevent and Tame« comes at a crucial moment or turning point in world order. It reveals some of the essential governing features that are associated with the contradictions of contemporary capitalism – a system that I call disciplinary neoliberalism. This system involves the individualization of society allied to the extended surveillance, regulation and criminalization of dissent and protest in order to sustain a social order premised on the social reproduction of the affluent strata and the securitization of extended capital accumulation over time.

At the same time what seems to be under construction is a dystopian life-world—what Karl Polanyi called a ›stark utopia‹—in which social problems and questions of deviance (as well as problems of public health) are reduced to individual pathologies, and where collective action—even for purposes of legitimate protest—is construed by important elements of the ruling authorities as an attack not only on the state but also on society. To use Margaret Thatcher’s phrase, what is being constructed is a self-help society of atomized individuals, placing the responsibility on the shoulders of the individual for his or her fate, downgrading the importance of social or collective institutions to solve social problems. If this discursive shift towards individualization is successful, it would constitute a decisive victory for the neoliberal ruling classes, which, in Europe, include New Labour and many Social Democrats who believe, perhaps paradoxically, in the deep regulation of society, whilst reserving for capital, particularly financial capital, its capacity for self-regulation.

However many in society are concerned not only with the crises and dislocations associated with contemporary capitalism but also with the way in which neoliberal reforms not only discipline and render insecure the traditional working classes, but also the way in which they undermine the security of many of the professional middle classes. As such disciplinary neoliberalism is resisted. One form of resistance is political protest, and, particularly when protest is informed by not only a critique but also by the imagining of an alternative form of society, then the authorities will seek to prevent such protest, or indeed to tame it. What the authorities seem to also wish to prevent when tackling such protest or dissent, is the possibility of a more democratic, public and socially accountable surveillance of the activities, forms of regulation, and indeed the social and political links between ruling classes and the upper echelons of capital—as has been illustrated in the cascading financial and economic crises that have erupted across the globe since 2007. This then is some of the contemporary terrain of this book.

With such issues in mind, this collection analyzes the new doctrines and ideologies of ›preventionism‹, and assesses the degree to which it is able to prevent or to tame protest, and indeed to isolate political dissent—in the context of the intersecting crises of contemporary capitalist development, society and ecology. This book is a necessary read for all of us who are interested in questions of civil liberty, in the freedom to express one’s political views, and in the basic right to tolerance of dissent and freedom of association and expression, all of which must be fully guaranteed rights in any democratic society. What is at issue is the degree to which formal constitutional rights are being subverted and supervened by ideologies of ›the emergency‹, or of ›the exception‹, justifying the deeper policing of social order, for example associating left wing political activism with terrorism, and by criminalizing such behavior.

Indeed, ›preventionism‹ involves far more than the simple surveillance of immediate protest since it is a concept that engages the idea of a deeper regulation of society—one that seeks to cast a shadow of the present deep into the future. One case in point, discussed in this collection, is New Labour’s Britain, where youth deviance and dissent is associated with ›anti-social behavior‹. In Britain ›zero tolerance policies‹ are part of a moral panic which is used as a justification for policies that constitute minor offences as criminal activity. Social legislation, moral panics and new technologies of surveillance and panopticism (the UK’s National Children’s Database can also serve as a tool of policing) are therefore used to deeply regulate the present and to ›order‹ the future. In Britain, the surveillance of public space and society has gone much further than in most parts of the capitalist world: surveillance/video cameras are found on many public housing estates as well as in innumerable locations in British cities.

It is perhaps no accident that the birthplace of Foucault’s dystopian vision of the Panopticon and the surveillance society was in Britain, with Jeremy Bentham as its architect. Bentham sought to construct the perfect prison which would not only incarcerate but also transform the behavior of its inmates so that they became more integrated members of the functioning and productive capitalist society. His design was also intended as an all-purpose institutional and architectural model for factories, schools, mental health institutions and hospitals. The Panopticon was never built. Bentham tried unsuccessfully to float his idea on the English stock exchange to raise the capital to construct a national system of Industry Houses, each of which would have put 250,000 idle workers and prisoners to productive work, thereby solving not only the problem of unemployment but also avoiding the need for the forced transportation of political prisoners and Irish dissenters to the penal colonies of Australia, whilst making a profit for his shareholders in the process.

In a similar manner, the ideologies of ›preventionism‹ that are explored in this volume seem to tolerate little in the form of deviance or make few distinctions between dissent, protest and terrorism. Moreover the governing technique of the

›anti-social‹ involves not only the public face of power but also its private dimensions: surveillance not only in the prison, but also in the family, in the home and in the workplace. These elements of capitalist ruling strategy were identified by Antonio Gramsci in his notes on ›Americanism and Fordism‹ in the 1930s. To put this theoretically it means that strategies of preventionism are not simply productive of a certain type of society; they form important aspects of capital accumulation. Henry Ford's strategy was not only to create a mass production/mass consumption form of capitalism so that all workers would be able to own a model T Ford but also to discipline the workers so they became effective appendages of the mass production assembly-line. Expanded consumerism was paradoxically dependent on the moral regulation of workers and their families. The Ford Motor company tended to recruit its employees from the ranks of new immigrants to prevent them from communicating with each other (they spoke many different languages and thus in a sense were atomized and less likely to engage in collective action). It was also partly to encourage them to observe sobriety and sexual abstinence at home. These forms of ›preventionism‹ were buttressed by the scientific management of the production process along the lines of Taylorism (the rhythms of the assembly-line were tuned to the body rhythms of the workers so that they always tended to work at the maximum speed possible at different times of day) as well as through batteries of industrial and social psychologists, all of which were intended to produce the compliant, productive and morally regulated worker-families. Such dystopian efforts continue and, as in the time of Henry Ford, they are intended to stifle worker organization and protest, to maximize productivity, as well as to indirectly limit worker rights.

Nevertheless, when organized protest does occur, as it did at the recent G8/G20 economic summits in Toronto, it seems consistently to be met by paramilitary policing strategies, in which innocent onlookers as well as protesters are incarcerated, often without charge, denied their political and legal rights, and clearly in many cases with no apparent reason and in an arbitrary and often brutal manner. These policing strategies, which caused considerable public disquiet in Canada in June 2010, however are not new since they have been consistently deployed at many G8 summits over the past decade, and in many different national locations, such as Gothenburg, Genoa, Edinburgh and Heiligendamm. Indeed at the 2001 summit in Genoa, even cultural protest was not tolerated: a theatre company involved in the demonstrations was subjected to harsh treatment and detainment by the Italian police. In the public representation of these moments, which normally show shop windows and other property being damaged and sometimes police cars bursting into flames, protest is associated in the eyes of the onlooker, mediated through the gaze of television, with acts of violence and is thereby delegitimized. It may be that these strategies of representation could themselves help to tame the nature of protest by causing factions within political movements to self regulate, so that some factions or groups ›tame‹ the others.

This volume is therefore very timely and important. It addresses—from a variety of different critical perspectives—some of the governmentalities, strategies of representation and forms of action that mutually constitute the relations between rulers and ruled, or the forces of order and the forces of dissent. It addresses a moment when global capitalism, and the political systems that govern it, have entered into a period of deep and intersecting crises, all of which are provoking questions about not only the stability of capitalist societies, but also their legitimation. Capitalism is premised upon an extrapolation of present values and activities into future flows of profit and revenue, refracted through the prices of stocks and bonds in the financial markets. For such a calculus of the future to take place, contemporary capitalism, in the vein of Bentham, has developed a series of mechanisms to define, assess, contain and if possible to eliminate risks. For capital, risk means an opportunity for higher profits, but it also means danger of loss. Indeed the calculus of risk, reflected for example in the activities of the credit rating agencies, is itself an activity that generates profits. The credit rating agencies assess the likelihood that individuals, firms, local governments and sovereign states will continue to be able to service their debts over time and repay what is owed, with interest, to creditors. Of course, given the vast and complex scale of industrial production and its interface with society and the environment, societies are always open to catastrophic risk, such as those risks associated with the meltdown of nuclear reactors, the collapse of deep sea oil wells beneath the oceans, and the growing and cumulative risks associated with ever-increasing levels of consumption premised upon fossil fuels, and thus with the threat of climate change and other forms of ecological catastrophe. These examples, however, as well as the specific G8/G20 macroeconomic responses to the financial implosion of global capitalism since 2007 show that the crisis management structures of contemporary government are principally premised upon socializing the risks of the most powerful corporations. At the same time, capitalist restructuring under disciplinary neoliberalism has involved consistent efforts to create more flexible labor markets and greater workplace surveillance—different aspects of the individuation of subjects, the privatization of their social risks, and increasing insecurity.

This is why many of the protest movements are asking the question: »who pays for the crisis?« The dominant neoliberal response is that the people will pay for the crisis. In order to pay for the gigantic bailouts of wealthy banks and powerful corporations this will mean higher taxes, the privatization of public services, reduced pensions and lower public sector salaries. This indicates that the present moment is one of supremacy rather than of hegemony, and it is a moment when we can expect protest and contestation to intensify. The question is can it be preempted and contained, and if so by whom and with what results? This volume provides some invaluable clues and guides us as we look at this question in the immediate future.

Toronto, August 31, 2010.

## Introduction: Prevent and Tame. Ideas for a New Perspective on Social Movements and Protest

This book is a product of a conference on »Shaping Europe in a Globalized World. Protest Movements and the Rise of a Transnational Civil Society« which took place in Zurich in the summer of 2009. It brings together some of the empirical and theoretical papers presented in two panels, entitled »Preventionism and Obstacles for Protest in the Era of Neoliberalism—Linking Protest Research and Governmentality Studies« (organized by *Peter Ullrich*) and »Taming Protest: The Rituals of Violence« (organized by *Andrea Pabst*). The scope of these panels and the interconnectedness of the addressed issues are expressed in the book's title.

This book can also be seen as a result of our attempts to find new perspectives for researching social movements and protest in light of recent developments in social theory. No matter how different these perspectives and their subjects are in detail, they follow a similar analytical intuition that is spelled out in Foucault's concepts of ›governmentality‹ and ›subjectivation‹. They aim to overcome the common dualistic approach that predominantly sees movements and power (the state, government and others) as independent antagonists and thereby often ignores their entanglement. This assumption leads to an approach to understanding protest that departs from the usual questions of »Who are they?«, »What do they want?«, and most importantly »What are the most successful movement strategies?«. To these, we would like to add »To what degree can aspects of power, the state, and the structures of government also be found within movements themselves?« This perspective, we think, enables us to see movements more as part of the societal whole than as the ›other‹ or ›outside‹.

With this book we do not claim to offer a comprehensive overview of all of the implications which governmentality and subjectivation studies may have for protest research, but all of the papers collected here do, in one way or another, try to establish and conceptualize such a link. Given that commonality, however, one can distinguish among these contributions quite a range of different starting points and foci of analysis.

Of course the state still is a core actor. On this level, the demarcation between legal/illegal is still the primary mode shaping basic forms of conduct. Criminalization is a basic tactic for dealing with unwanted behavior like protest. This strongly affects activists' opportunities, behavior, and thinking, thereby fundamentally changing the interrelatedness of activism and power. The paper by *Andrej Holm* and *Anne Roth* describes a case of the criminalization of protest by constructing associations between left wing activists and terrorism. The allegations in this case could not be sustained, but gave authorities the chance to conduct extensive investigations into the left wing scene, generating intelligence to be used for the further

policing of protest. As *Holm/Roth* make remarkably clear, what the alleged ›terrorist‹ activists had to go through while being subjected to massive police surveillance, imprisonment, and interrogation is hard to overestimate and will leave a lasting imprint in their minds. Besides the repressive aspects one must also ask what preventive effects such practices may have. To what degree will this constant threat of ›special treatment‹ inhibit activists from engaging in protest and activism in the future?

*Michael Shane Boyle* analyzes the criminalization of the VolxTheaterKarawane following their participation in the demonstrations against the 2001 G8 summit in Genoa, Italy. As part of a carnivalesque activist tour for migrant rights, the group had been performing in Europe for a month prior to being arrested just outside of Genoa. Similar to the case described by Holm and Roth the group was charged with forming a criminal organization and subjected to indefinite detainment, harsh interrogation, and even torture by Italian authorities.

While criminalization is clearly a very authoritative act of governmental institutions, there are ›softer‹ or more subtle techniques, especially different forms of surveillance, the use and effects of which are important to recognize. Compared to open criminalization, practices of surveillance work not only on the state level but by spreading pandemically throughout the social body, into public space, workplaces, the media, and our homes. Based on this diagnosis, *Florian Heßdörfer's* paper sketches a fundamental link between the process of subjectivation and experiences of visibility. While visibility plays an increasingly important role in the social field—from media technologies to public security efforts—protest actions and strategies also transform themselves according to the changing conditions of visual culture. But on this spectacular field protest/movements tend to conceptualize themselves as a mediatized public event and are in danger of forgetting about their work of negation and its articulation.

While this can be read as an unintended consequence of taming the potential powers of protest, the book also deals with more specific forms of subtly hindering resistance. This is the focus of *Marco Tullney's* contribution. He shows that surveillance technology in the workplace is not only a means of effectively organizing production and optimizing the workforce. It *can* also be used to hinder employee protest, and it is *intended* to have this effect. Most importantly, workplace surveillance *is perceived* by employees as a means of suppressing their labor rights and thereby limits their opportunities to organize.

The preventionist aspects of protest policing have a social background that goes far beyond the field of political activism. Prevention, *Peter Ullrich* explains in his initial paper, has become an issue in all areas of life, especially in the health care sector. Gaining legitimacy from this field, preventive thinking (e.g. »Have I gotten enough exercise this week?«), supported by extensive apparatuses of surveillance and control, has a tendency to infect all areas of life with an instrumental rationality aimed at optimizing the personal self. One major effect of this rationa-

lity is that it makes people think that their grievances result from individual misbehavior rather than social structures. This, *Ulrich* argues, may have the effect of delegitimizing protest by undermining one of its basic preconditions: the legitimacy of social critique.

The preventionist perspective can also be incorporated by social movements themselves. *Darcy K. Leach* and *Sebastian Haunss* trace the implicit impact of criminalization in the context of two multi-day protests in Germany, specifically actions against a nuclear waste transport to Gorleben in March 2001 and against the G8 meetings in Heiligendamm in 2007. In their two case studies they analyze how the »violence question« affects the capacity for cooperation among diverse movement groups. The spotlight is thus not on criminalization strategies by state officials or journalists but on the question how activists, in navigating complex debates about the (il)legitimate use of violence, activists themselves often attempt to tame other factions/groups within their own movement. In examining these processes, *Leach/Haunss* demonstrate the effects of intra-movement taming rituals and highlight conditions that facilitate sustainable cooperation among diverse activist groups, despite the state's efforts at criminalization.

Against the background of these developments, the aims and means of protest seem to change. But perhaps the whole logic of acting against something should be called into question? This at least is the concern of *Nick Montgomery's* contribution. He focuses on the recent actions and discourses around the 2010 Anti-Olympics Movement in Canada and analyzes two major approaches taken in this oppositional field: the »classic« one of civil disobedience and the one of counter-hegemony following the work of Gramsci and Laclau/Mouffe. In analyzing the Anti-Olympics movement, the author recognizes the emergence of new forms of protest that cannot adequately be conceptualized within the framework of these two logics of protest, and suggests that we transcend them. Building on the concept of »minoritarian politics« proposed by Deleuze and Guattari and Richard Day's notion of a »politics of the act«, Montgomery asks if the framework and focus of »prevent and tame« simply ignores modes of resistance that exist outside of this governmentality, such as that which Foucault terms »counter-conduct«.

Last but not least, we wish to thank the organizers of the Zurich conference and all those who took part in the discussions. Without them this book would not have been possible. We are also indebted to those who helped the non-native speakers with some language issues, especially Michael Shane Boyle, Petra Knorr, Darcy K. Leach and Nick Montgomery.

*Peter Ulrich, Andrea Pabst, and Florian Heßdörfer*  
Leipzig/Hamburg, June 2010

## **Preventionism and Obstacles for Protest in Neoliberalism. Linking Governmentality Studies and Protest Research**

### **Introduction<sup>1</sup>**

In a recent article in the »Handbook of Social Movements Across Disciplines«, Smith and Fetner (2007, 15) differentiate on a general level between structural and cultural approaches to social movement research. While the former showed interest in material resources, organizations and institutions (what Smith/Fetner consider in a somewhat narrow sense as structure), the latter shared an interest in processes of reception and interpretation of these (what they consider as culture). So in their view social movement research's interest is restricted to the movements' strategic, organizational and interpretational questions. This is typical for a research sector whose standard repertoire of theories (resource mobilization, political opportunities, framing) prefers micro- and meso-perspectives while virtually ignoring (new developments in) social theory and conceptions of social change.

It might be fruitful to confront protest research<sup>2</sup> with such relatively new ideas and insights. This especially applies to theories that explicitly deal with core questions social movements are also concerned with, like questions of power and the struggle for persistence and/or change in society, which is by definition *the* criterion *per se* for social movements (Raschke 1991). The mainstream of social movement research understandably focused on the movement side of the movement-power-coin. Being interested in movements' identities, action repertoires, resources and communicative (framing) strategies and especially in their success or resonance, scholars of protest did not shed much light on the power side. Within protest research only the theory of »political opportunity structures« (POS) systematically deals with the political system, which is the main societal subsystem associated with power. But these theories that »analyze the environment of social movements as a set of conditions which facilitate or restrict mobilization and movement success« (Rucht/Neidhardt 2002, 9) are deadlocked in a basically »situational« concept of contextual conditions. This situational restriction is partly transgressed by the so-called »European current« of POS-theory, which focuses on long-term conditions of the political system (Kitschelt 1986). Another aspect in overcoming this situational restriction was added by the POS offshoot-concepts »cultural opportunity structures« and »discursive opportunity structures«. While

1 I am indebted to Anja Lê, Florian Heßdörfer and Andrea Pabst for their helpful comments on the paper.

2 The terms »protest research« and »social movement research« will be used synonymously here.

they can also be conceptualized as situational factors, they have had their strongest impact in explaining deeply rooted long term causes of movement ideas and frames. This, for example, applies to the fact that (independent of the protest issue they are concerned with) social movements in Germany are culturally bound to frames which have to take the German Nazi past into consideration, as it has been shown by Ferree et al. (2002) and Ullrich (2008). Similarly, Koopmans/Kriesi (1997) explained the success of extreme right wing parties in several European countries by the varying degree of inclusiveness of the respective concept of nationality, which can be seen as a cultural opportunity structure for the resonance of right wing radicals.

Besides these deep-rooted and long lasting cultural issues and their institutional manifestations, social movement research has to take into account the effects of societal change. And it has to focus on the issue, which Görg (1999, 17) calls *the* central problem of critical theory: the question of the mediation of social structure and subjectivity. Protest research's concentration on the contestator side of the interdependent protest-power relation could be overcome, for example, by introducing aspects of governmentality studies into protest research.

Which subjectivities and systems of movement knowledge are being formed in relation to changing forms of the regulation of power—be they conventional and affirmative or resistant or hybrid—has been a guiding question of Michel Foucault's work and is still in governmentality studies (Bröckling et al. 2000). This field of research has been deeply inspired by Foucault's books »Discipline and Punish« (Foucault 1995) and especially by the »Lectures at the Collège de France« (Foucault 2008, 2009). They strongly focus on the formation of subjectivities under »neoliberal discursive dominance« or »economization« or »commodification« of the social and the politics of responsabilization and activation of the citizen-subjects (Lessenich 2008).

This paper shall explore one specific facet of neoliberal governmentality and its possible impact on protest research: the question of the preventionist politics of self-activation. This approach is conducted by mutual enrichment of two virtually unconnected fields of research under the common focus of the formation of subjectivities, i.e. political sociology (especially social movement and protest research) and the field of medical prevention and public health. The first chapter will explore medical prevention and its problems and aporias and ask for their impact on the formation of neoliberal activation-subjectivities. The second chapter outlines theoretical considerations, while the third and final part is to sketch perspectives for social movement research resulting from the ideas considered before.

## Prevention and Preventionism<sup>3</sup>

Prevention is one of the key words of contemporary zeitgeist. Ubiquitous are the attempts to prevent crime, diseases, crises, wars, obesity, cancer, drug addiction and even running amok. And of course one is likely to appreciate prevention because everybody knows: it is better to prevent than to cure. But the matter is a bit more complicated. Prevention also has something of a religious promise. It promises a good future that must be taken care of in the present. The wish for more and more prevention can also be seen as the desire to master an uncertain future.

And as the discourse of prevention suggests that there really is the opportunity to control future events this can quickly turn into an obsession. Whoever wants to control the future must know everything about the present, which is likely to have an impact on the future. So prevention necessarily means data collection, surveillance, and control.

There have been preventionist developments of that kind especially in the security sector and in criminology. They have come in the shape of the broken-windows-theory, preventive CCTV, data retention (the preventive law allowing the governments to store personal telecommunication data), and all the other new security laws and restrictions of personal freedoms and basic rights western societies had to face after 9/11—all contributing to what Garland (2001) called the »culture of control«. I use the term preventionism, which I borrowed from Ulrich Bröckling's (2008) »preventionists«, to mark the paradigm shift to unlimited prevention, the infinite desire to subordinate everything under the idea of prevention. The core area of prevention becoming an uncontrollable growing preventionism is—besides security—the health sector.

Especially the dismantling of the welfare state in the health sector, which could be seen in many western countries, has very often come in the shape of disease prevention. Two examples of many from Germany shall illustrate that. Firstly, laws oblige people to make additional financial contributions for dental prostheses if they have not regularly taken part in screenings and medical checkups. Having once missed the annual check-up can easily result in some hundred Euros extra for a necessary prosthesis. Secondly, chronically ill patients in Germany normally have to contribute only up to 1 % of their annual income for health care—unless they have missed regular screenings. In that unfortunate case the percentage to be paid increases to 2 %.

That development is problematic for many reasons. Prevention is used as an indirect means to dismantle the welfare state in ways that seem highly legitimate, because it is so easy to argue that those who do not care should be taken care of; that those who do not obey the preventive demands should be held responsible.

3 For a more detailed version of the ideas presented in this section, see Ullrich (2009; cf. Bröckling 2008, Bartens 2008).

Mediated through class and education related inequalities, inequality in the health sector is thereby also increased. The better educated are less likely to fail in that system, which forces people to take part in medical examinations or, in some cases, to at least get counsel on preventive measures and seriously consider what kind of behavior is expected from them or is economically and medically most efficient. The people's freedom to decide concerning their own bodies is significantly restricted.

And there is much criticism of the often compulsory prevention programs even from a medical point of view. Without going too much into medical details, two examples shall illustrate the general problem of this uncertainty and the basic ambiguity of many preventive measures.

The intestinal coloscopy is suggested for the prevention of intestinal cancer. On the one hand the number of deaths from cancer is minimized. Unfortunately, it has been shown that, on the other hand, the risk of this screening injuring the bowel is high. The examination may result in mental or physical distress. There may be hygienic problems. And sometimes there are unintended side effects of the necessary pre-examination zero-diet and anesthesia, which may result in serious injuries, accidents and even deaths. The death toll of these side effects equals the number of those benefitting from the screening (Mühlhäuser 2007).

There is a bit more common knowledge about the problems of mammography, the cancer screening of the female breast. This is—like the coloscopy—an often painful procedure. It might even be the source of cancer due to the radiation exposure. The biggest problem is the low specificity and the low sensitivity of the screening methods used. This results in serious problems. A recent systematic Cochrane Review of several randomized clinical trials showed that screening leads to a reduction in breast cancer mortality of 15 % and at the same time to 30 % over-diagnosis and overtreatment. In other words (or numbers): »This means that for every 2000 women invited for screening throughout 10 years, one will have her life prolonged. In addition, 10 healthy women, who would not have been diagnosed if there had not been screening, will be diagnosed as breast cancer patients and will be treated unnecessarily. Furthermore, more than 200 women will experience important psychological distress for many months because of false positive findings.« (Gøtzsche/Nielsen 2009)

So the screening is useful only for a few women; for many it is mental and physical distress. The authors of the Cochrane review see this as a clear ambiguity, which can only lead to the need to give extensive information to women who consider taking part in the screening or are invited to. But no scientific result can ease the burden of the decision they have to take.

This leads us to another point. Most of the preventive programs—be they compulsory or not—have ambiguities that cannot be easily overcome. But prevention is quite often propagated as a magnificent promise and a kind of salvation. In public discourse and in popular belief many of these ambiguities are not well

known or even ignored. One of the worst examples is a campaign by German health insurance providers to convince women to take part in their screening program. Their widely distributed leaflet even mentions some ›disadvantages‹ of the screening. The risks pointed out are in fact the minor ones like radiation exposure and the possibility of not detecting an existing tumor. The main problem and the biggest argument against taking part in screening, the (extremely high) risk of receiving an over-diagnosis and overtreatment, is not even mentioned.

Based on this pro-prevention biased discourse, preventionism has the tendency to occupy all areas of life, or in Habermasian terms to colonize the lifeworld (Lebenswelt) with instrumental rationality of the bureaucratic and market system. We all might know the reflection about »Should I eat that steak or should I rather eat the healthy salad?«, »Should I take butter or cholesterol-free spread?« A German TV station provided us with an example of the ominous aspects of the preventive approach. They reported that »Kissing prevents wrinkles and dental plaque«, »kissing prolongs life«, »stimulates the immune system« and »makes you slim«.<sup>4</sup>

These examples should illustrate the potential infinity of preventionism. It can be applied everywhere. Everything we do can be evaluated in terms of whether it is healthy or not. As a matter of fact, there is never a definite right answer to the question, what the best preventive behavior or measure is. What counts more? Is it the relaxing anti-stress effect of snowboarding (which is seen as something positive) or the risk of an injury (which is negative)? What about the glass of wine? The cigarette? In that sense preventionism in the end becomes an enemy of lust and joy. And all that almost inevitably leads to the necessity of surveillance systems and data bases to record all the check-ups. So prevention means control (Decker 2005).

Many of the questions prevention poses cannot be easily answered, many of the preventive demands cannot be easily met. Whatever one decides, either way one will often be right and wrong at the same time. There are almost always advantages and disadvantages of the specific preventive measures. The one right answer is not available. Seen from that perspective, preventionism is a kind of general and quite unspecific demand of society towards the people. And it is an endless demand that cannot ultimately be met. Preventionism makes you think about society and what society wants from you. It makes you think about how to behave well by thinking about what might be good for you. In the idea of care for oneself the social and the individual are mediated, because it is an almost general individual interest to care for oneself, but this can be thought of only in the concepts and along the criteria of a given social order.

The dispositive of prevention is an omnipresent phenomenon that makes people think preventionism-like without being forced to do so. Preventionism therefore can be seen as a means of individualising and subjectifying societal demands.

4 <http://www.heute.de/ZDFheute/inhalt/19/0,3672,7262675,00.html> [2008-07-06].

Seen from that perspective, preventionism is a productive way of government, activating people to govern themselves through the formation of ›preventive selves‹ (see Mathar 2010).

## **Foucaultian Perspectives**

Before explaining what all this has got to do with social movements, I would like to point out some theoretical ideas, mainly based in Michel Foucault's works, that might help us understand the developments described.

The first association one may have considering the above mentioned techniques of surveilling and regulating health is Foucault's (2008, 2009) concept of biopower. This concept captures modern states' practices of productively organizing and regulating bodies and populations, which go far beyond the old power of sovereignty that merely decided who will live and who will not. Foucault and other theorists had in mind public health practices of optimizing people's health by preventive measures. This has to be mentioned to point out that it is neither natural nor an eternal idea that states decide on how people regulate their physical and mental well-being. It is an aspect of modern societies and even more so under the aegis of neoliberal self-activation politics.

The second concept one may think of, and this one is of greater interest here, is the metaphor of the panopticon and the type of subjectifying processes described by it. The Panopticon (designed firstly by Jeremy Bentham in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century) was an architectural solution for institutions to control many people. Foucault took up Bentham's idea, turning it from a normative into an analytical tool, to better describe the functioning of disciplining institutions of modern societies, many of which are based on an asymmetric distribution of seeing and being seen, like Bentham's panopticon. It is *the* special feature of the panopticon, that those under scrutiny (prisoners, pupils, workers, shoppers) can never be quite certain whether they are being watched or not at a given moment.

The important aspect of the panopticon is the subjectifying process, which Foucault saw as typical for all modern societies' institutions and which is linked to this feature of uncertainty. Any behavior therefore poses questions about its possible results, depending on the answer to the question: Am I under surveillance momentarily? And, if so, am I behaving well? What should I do to achieve that goal or at least to avoid punishment for failure or misbehavior? These kinds of institutional arrangements that elicit thoughts like the ones described always imply a productive power of a self-activating kind. These institutional arrangements initiate a process of incorporating the demands of the surveillant by initiating a specific subjectivation resulting in specific subject positions.

Processes of this kind and especially their changes under neoliberal conditions have strongly inspired surveillance studies. But the panopticon is a relatively

fixed arrangement. It may be helpful to understand the functioning of CCTV systems. Preventionism, as described above and its control mechanisms (like e-health cards, medical registers and files), reflect a more subtle, more incoherent, more complex, more infinite, more productive type of government and related states of mind or perceptions. These kinds of logic of governing through self governance are exactly what governmentality studies are concerned with (cf. Bröckling et al. 2000). Because preventionism, like other activating strategies, often leaves you in relative uncertainty about the demands<sup>5</sup> of power, it makes you think and act on your own. The ambiguities of the cancer screening, for example, and the fact that the individual has to face these facts and is forced to make decisions in a situation of uncertainty shows the subtle and activating character of preventionism. ›Activating‹ does not necessarily mean that it makes you act materially, but that an atmosphere of uncertainty, unrest, or tension is produced that makes one think about strategies, at least. That is why it is a productive technique of government. It is like a panopticon without a centre, an omnipresent panopticon ›embodied‹ in the individuals' minds as well as in discourse and social practices.

The term governmentality is often described as having the two constituents ›government‹ and ›mentality‹, which cover two basic aspects of the concept. Governmentality studies, as inspired by Foucault, strongly emphasize the individual, subjective aspect of governing. They focus on governing becoming self-control or, let us say: mentality.

Governmentality studies have been successfully applied to the health care sector. They are prominent in critical criminology and many other fields of research. Interestingly, they have not yet had any influence on the study of social movements and protest, although they deal with core areas concerned: they are interested in processes of power and especially in changes of power relations under current (neoliberal) conditions.

## **Preventionism and Protest**

Governmentality studies pose new questions, questions protest research has not yet asked nor answered. One could expect that the neoliberally activated subject tends not to articulate discontent and unhappiness as a demand towards society. One might expect that social attribution of problem causes is substituted by individual attribution. The preventionist and neoliberally activated subject might prefer to ask »What have I done wrong?« instead of »What's wrong with society?« In that sense, preventionism can be seen as a tool to attack the legitimacy of *social critique* protest, as a tool to delegitimize demands people have.

5 In that respect, it is worth mentioning the observation of Heßdörfer/Bachmann (2009, cf. Heßdörfer in this volume) that such demands may be restricted to only signal to the individual that ›society exists‹, that they are not alone, that they cannot do whatever they want—without clearly telling what they *shall* do.

That development can be compared with the process of delegitimizing social critique by means of artistic critique as described by Boltanski and Chiapello (2001).

Considering these ideas, some propositions can be formulated and connected: Changes in governing and related mentality from more direct ways of control to preventionist and self-activating governing strategies are massive. Within this development, new subjectivities are being formed. These subjectivities do not consider protest to be legitimate, as their predecessors did.

This is a very strong and quite abstract hypothesis. We can also imagine counter-tendencies. For example, neoliberalism also produces new reasons and may thereby increase the likelihood of protest. Also, neo-liberal society's demands could be seen as unreasonable, as impertinence by the people.

Before we can answer these questions, some more conceptual and empirical research has to be carried out. Social movement theory and protest research has not yet incorporated governmentality studies at all. Foucault, for example, is hardly mentioned in the relevant German or international journals. In the references sections of the international journal *Mobilization* and the most important German journal on movements and protest *Forschungsjournal Neue Soziale Bewegungen*, Foucault is virtually nonexistent!

One reason might be that the main focus of social movement scholars in the previous, say, 20 years has always been the above-mentioned strategic one on factors for movement success. So one analyses resources and framing. Only the political opportunity structures approach strongly emphasized the role of the other side, the side of power, and its effects. But POS theory focuses on continuities and changes in movement's current environmental conditions. It is not particularly interested in intergenerational changes and its underlying subjectifying processes.

Thus there is wide potential for research. It can be conducted within this general question on a quite abstract level. The question to be answered would be: Does preventionism reduce the likelihood of protest by attacking the legitimacy of social attribution of problems?

But research can also focus on more specific aspects of that general model. So one could examine if aspects of the preventionist mode of subjectivity appear in different currents of the movement sector or in relation to specific questions. How, one may ask with Marco Tullney (in this volume), does surveillance of the workplace influence organizing and industrial relations? How does it influence the subjectivities of workers who are not trusted (generally and preventively)? The outlined theoretical perspective may also change the views on protest policing and repression. It is not only interesting to know if repression works and hinders protest, but also in what specific way this occurs. The governmentality focus allows for the realization of the more subtle aspects of self-control as self-management or: the everyday weighing of risks and how it becomes habitual in a (potential) activist's life. What is clearly needed is more research into the effects

of the surveillance of activists like in the anti-terror-investigations in Germany (Holm/Roth, in this volume). Also, the mass phenomenon of videotaping protest and protesters needs more investigation concerning its direct and long-term effects on protest participation, action repertoires and conflict dynamics (Ulrich/Wollinger 2010). The ubiquitous apparatuses and networks of the surveillant assemblage (Haggerty/Ericson 2000) that protesters and social movements get in touch with (sometimes indirectly, sometimes the hard way) should be taken into account and related to their behavior and thinking.

## References

- Bartens, Werner (2008): Vorsicht Vorsorge. Wenn Prävention nutzlos oder gefährlich wird, Frankfurt/M.
- Boltanski, Luc and Chiapello, Eve (2001): Die Rolle der Kritik in der Dynamik des Kapitalismus und der normative Wandel. *Berliner Journal für Soziologie*, 11, pp. 459-477.
- Bröckling, Ulrich (2007): Das unternehmerische Selbst. Soziologie einer Subjektivierungsform, Frankfurt/M.
- Bröckling, Ulrich (2008): Vorbeugen ist besser ... Zur Soziologie der Prävention. *Behemoth. A Journal on Civilisation* 1, pp. 38-48.
- Bröckling, Ulrich; Krasmann, Susanne and Lemke, Thomas (2000): *Gouvernementalität der Gegenwart*, Frankfurt/M.
- Decker, Oliver (2005): Alles auf eine Karte setzen. Elektronisches Regieren und die Gesundheitskarte. *Psychotherapeutenjournal* Nr. 4, pp. 338-347.
- Ferree, Myra Marx; Gamson, William A.; Gerhards, Jürgen and Rucht, Dieter (2002): *Shaping Abortion Discourse: Democracy and the Public Sphere in Germany and the United States*, Cambridge.
- Foucault, Michel (1995): *Discipline & Punish. The Birth of the Prison*, New York.
- Foucault, Michel (2008): *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979*, New York.
- Foucault, Michel (2009): *Security, Territory, Population. Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-1978*, New York.
- Garland, David (2001): *The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society*. Chicago.
- Görg, Christoph (1999): *Gesellschaftliche Naturverhältnisse*, Münster.
- Götzsche, P.C. and Nielsen, M. (2009): Screening for breast cancer with mammography. *Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews* 2009, Issue 4. Art. No.: CD001877. DOI: 10.1002/14651858.CD001877.pub3.
- Haggerty, Kevin D. and Ericson, Richard V. (2000): The surveillant assemblage. *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 51, No. 4, pp. 605-622.
- Heßdörfer, Florian and Bachmann, Jan (2009): ASBO. Die Gesellschaft existiert. In: *Leipziger Kamera* (ed.): *Kontrollverluste. Interventionen gegen Überwachung*, Münster, pp. 168-173.
- Kitschelt, Herbert P. (1986): Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest. *Anti-Nuclear-Movements in Four Democracies*, *British Journal of Political Science* 16, pp. 57-85.
- Koopmans Ruud and Statham, Paul (1999): Ethnic and Civic Conceptions of Nationhood and the Differential Success of the Extreme Right in Germany and Italy. In: Giugni, Marco et al. (eds.), *How Social Movement Matter*, Minneapolis, pp. 225-251.
- Koopmans, Ruud and Kriesi, Hanspeter (1997): *Citizenship, National Identity and the Mobilisation of the Extreme Right*, Berlin.
- Lessenich, Stefan (2008): *Die Neuerfindung des Sozialen. Der Sozialstaat im flexiblen Kapitalismus*, Bielefeld.
- Mathar, Tom (2010): *Body-Identity Trajectories of Preventive Selves*. In: Mathar, Tom and Jansen, Yvonne J. F. M. (eds.): *Health Promotion and Prevention Programmes in Practice. How Patients' Health Practices are Rationalised, Reconceptualised and Reorganised*, Bielefeld, pp. 171-193.
- Mühlhäuser, Ingrid (2007): Ist Vorbeugen besser als Heilen? *Deutsches Ärzteblatt* 104 (25), pp. B 1589 - B 1591.
- Raschke, Joachim (1991): *Zum Begriff der sozialen Bewegung*, in: Roland Roth and Dieter Rucht (eds.): *Neue soziale Bewegungen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, 2nd edition, Bonn.
- Rucht, Dieter (1998): *Komplexe Phänomene – komplexe Erklärungen. Die politische Gelegenheitsstrukturen neuer sozialer Bewegungen*. In: Hellmann, Kai-Uwe and Koopmans, Ruud (eds.), *Paradigmen der Bewegungsforschung*, Opladen, pp. 109-127.
- Rucht, Dieter and Neidhardt, Friedhelm (2002): *Towards a ›Movement Society? On the possibilities of institutionalizing social movements*, *Social Movement Studies* 1 (1), pp. 7-30.

- Smith, Jackie and Fetner, Tina (2007): Structural Approaches in the Sociology of Social Movements, in: Klandermans, Bert and Roggeband, Conny (eds.): Handbook of Social Movements Across Disciplines, New York, pp. 13-58.
- Ullrich, Peter (2008): Die Linke, Israel und Palästina. Nahostdiskurse in Großbritannien und Deutschland, Berlin.
- Ullrich, Peter (2009): Überwachung und Prävention. Oder: Das Ende der Kritik, in: Leipziger Kamera (ed.): Kontrollverluste. Interventionen gegen Überwachung, Münster, pp. 57-67.
- Ullrich, Peter; Wollinger, Gina-Rosa 2010 (forthcomming): Videüberwachung von Versammlungen und Demonstrationen. Blick auf ein verwaistes Forschungsfeld, in: Zurawski, Nils (ed.): Alltag der Überwachung, Opladen.

## **Anti-Social or Childish: Protest and Youth under the Eye of Prevention**

*»Call us childish or adolescent if you like,  
but this is our starting point: we scream.«*

John Holloway

*Don't be childish! Get down-to-earth! Stop that noise! Get a life! Look around you! We understand your anger, but ...* Actions of protest seem to activate a variety of responses and objections, while other forms of opposition fade into the unnoticed or the sociopathic, because they don't comply with the usual concept of protest and its common characteristics. Therefore the following article will suggest that in our so-called ›post-ideological‹ age and within proliferating logics of prevention protest should be mapped as a new plateau of conflict. I will try to displace the common definition of protest that links it to the state toward a concept of protest that puts it close to John Holloway's concept of the ›scream‹ (Holloway 2002). This ›screaming‹ is an act of negativity, it negates something given and indicates the desire of something that is not (yet). In a stricter sense protest would be the articulation of the scream that thinks and focuses its social conditions, the very potential and need to scream that leads out of the private, into the sphere of the common. Against and within the background of this concept my text will analyze some connections between current landmarks of protest: between the topics of youth, protest, prevention and visibility.

I will show how youth is on the one hand a resource of protest, but also a sphere of multiple governmental measures and legislation. Measures, which aim to embrace or regulate the critical powers of the cultural institutions we call youth and protest. This common link between youth and protest is written into the process of modern socialization, while the same link also turns up as a problem of governmentality, as states worry about a rapidly growing group of people outside and within the traditional institutions of family, school and work. This problem can be traced back to 1899 with the Juvenile Court Act in Illinois, which for the first time authorized the institution of a separate juvenile court (Savage 2008, 64), or to the famous case of the fourteen year old Jesse Pomeroy in 1875 that forced the public ›to recognize that the existing rituals between childhood and adulthood were obsolete‹ (Savage 2008, 12).

Since many of us believe we are young and may share the notion of being in opposition to something, we should take a closer look here.<sup>1</sup> Maybe we are al-

1 When this text uses ›we‹ it is not meant to impose the author's view to the readers, but: ›In so far as writing/reading is a creative act, it is inevitably the act of a ›we‹. To start in the third person is not a neutral starting

ready old and have become silent friends of the current, while we hide this from ourselves under the guise of our own youthfulness. I will take this possibility seriously.

I will start with some remarks concerning the link between youth and protest and explain how the psychosocial state we call youth can also be understood as the time in life when one is able to figure out the object we so easily call ›society‹—and without being able to think within the horizon of the social, actions of protest will tend to appear as childish stubbornness. Then I will touch on the actual practice and discourse of the British Anti-Social Behavior Order (ASBO) to give an impression of preventive measures and to sketch their relation to the logic of protest. At the end I will switch to the question of surveillance and visibility and show how they concern all of our previous topics: socialization, protest and politics of prevention.

## Subjects of protest

A child is screaming at the checkout in a supermarket. It is denied some sweets in reach. Usually we will not call this screaming protest in the full sense of the word. We are used to the meaning of protest as opposition aiming at a higher level, somehow aiming at the vague thing named society.

The child however only knows its parents, who embody the order of the social to him. Only if such immediate power can later be made questionable and be reflected upon, we tend to speak of protest, instead of childish disobedience. Right here multiple potentials of possible protest seem to dry up, by the child's development but also by our own view: we are grown up, we have our own money in our pockets to buy sweets. The scream ceases, the roles reverse, the play goes on.

This means there is a basic condition of protest that refers to the individual's development. We often and implicitly refer to it, when we discard certain forms of protest by labeling them ›childish‹—seemingly a child is not supposed to be a possible subject of protest. In other words: a subject of protest must be sufficiently able to take the role of the other, must be sufficiently self-distanced, integrated in the symbolic order—usually the final process of this decentration is called adolescence. By the deposition of the parents or other figures of primary authority we gain distance to our surroundings and, as the flip-side of this process, we gain distance to something that until now was embedded in these surroundings. We find ourselves bumping into something, which is suddenly as outstanding as it is doubtful, into the scene of a question, into ourselves. A place that knows its limitations as exactly that vague thing, that it is not, as the other—the

point, since it already presupposes the suppression of the ›we‹, of the subject of the writing and reading. ›We‹ are here as a starting point because we cannot start honestly anywhere else« (Holloway 2002, 1/3). The citation of this book refers to the number of the chapter and the paragraph: chapter/paragraph.

word that from now on enriches our critical vocabulary and structures our grammar of opposition: society. In our context youth can be understood as the achievement of the psychosocial ability to reflect ourselves within a social horizon: *Don't blame us, blame society*.

This unhinging experience can be seen as the end of childhood, as the central cognitive shift of youth. A more or less conscious insight that allows dealing with society not just as something outside, something you are thrown into, but dealing with it as a sort of relation, that you can relate to. An unsure, risky, open condition.

So youth is not somehow close to protest. Youth has been the name of the risky but flexible way of socialization western societies deal with, for at least the last century. While its flexibility extends, it is accompanied and enabled by new ways of (self-)control, woven into what is perceived as the growth of personal freedom and choices, working as an ambivalent ingredient in this transformational process.

You could even say youth is two-headed from its very beginning: at the same time born as an object of governmental worry and as the twisted psychosocial state that spreads between the Neverland of »Peter Pan« and »The picture of Dorian Gray.«<sup>2</sup>

Two sides of the same coin: seeing like a state you'll start to call it a moral, educational, crime-preventional problem—but if someone reclaims this problem as his or her very own and articulates it, the problem changes its face, it will be called protest.<sup>3</sup>

So to widen our perspective on protest and in order to avoid a concept of protest that tends to see like a state,<sup>4</sup> placing it on the macroscale »relationship between the rulers and the ruled« (Andrain/Apter 1995, 2), we will try to connect it to John Holloway's concept of the »scream« as he unfolds it in the first chapter of his book »Change the world, without taking the power«. This scream is a fundamental expression of being discontent, of being restricted, of being subjected to conditions that you haven't chosen. This screaming in Holloway's sense is an act of negativity, it negates something given and indicates the desire for something that is not (yet). It's the sign of an antagonistic world, it »implies a two-dimensionality which insists on the conjunction of tension between the two dimensions.

2 These books illustrate the impact of the new ways of growing up. They not only show the problems and obstacles in this process, they formulate a new attitude: the refusal of growing up as such. Childhood is defended against something which is experienced as its hostile negation, no more as its destination.

3 To avoid a simplifying misreading: This practice of articulation should not be understood as the simple possibility to tell what you feel (which also may not be as easy as it sounds...). I refer to the concept of articulation and discourse as it is developed in chapter 3 of »Hegemony and Socialist Strategy« (pp. 105-122): Articulating a problem would mean to point into the direction of the antagonism of the given order. »Antagonism as the negation of a given order is, quite simply, the limit of that order [...]. We must consider this »experience« of the limit of the social from two different points of view. On the one hand, as an experience of failure. [...] But, on the other hand, this experience of failure is not an access to a diverse ontological order, to a something beyond differences, simply because ... there is no beyond« (Laclau/Mouffe 2002, 126).

4 I explicitly refer to the title of the book of James C. Scott (1998): »Seeing like a state«.

We are, but we exist in an arc of tension towards that we are not, are not yet« (Holloway 2002, 1/4).<sup>5</sup>

Protest, in a stricter sense, therefore would be an articulation of the scream that thinks and focuses its social conditions, the very potential and need to scream, that leads out of the private, into the sphere of the common, of the ›we‹.

## The negation of youth

Screaming subjects are subjects of desire. And within our current cultural setting we can experience youth as a phase that unleashes a quite formless potential of desire. In our context it doesn't matter so much how we analyze the nature of its origins: we may read it as a setting of strong interpellations, based on a given social language and grammar, establishing the language in which youth think about and relate to themselves—or we may conceptualize it in more psychological terms, reading it as desire, which had been tied into strong attachments and identifications during the child's latency phase. Our important point here is the aspect of failure, the aspect that youth is confronted with desire and idealized hopes, which, especially under the current conditions, will mostly remain unfulfilled in the end. But at the same time the common way of interpreting these experiences of frustration is a mainly individualizing one: *Actually the world is alright—If you haven't yet found the right place it must be something about you, your choices, your decisions, your abilities. If one option doesn't work, it must have been the wrong one, at least for yourself or for the moment.*

Being young and already self-focused enough, these individualizing modes of coping with the lack of the good life will be welcome, as they promise fundamental self-control and flatter your narcissistic drive. As a result discomfort is mainly privatized, its experience is separated from the social field. Individualized frustration prevents the frustrated subjects from looking into the direction from which their frustration came, it prevents them from using it as a negative power of protest. Looking a bit further, frustration is often seen as nearly pathological, as a kind of disease—and the search for its causes will lead the patient deep into himself, into the hidden history of his own or into the incomprehensible weakness of his will. Failure and frustration hide in the dark and the private, while we find the ›good life‹ in the very light of the day, crystallized in a multitude of offers and images, that seem to fit any of the wishes, make them communicable and confirm their righteousness.

Under such circumstances I want to conceptualize protest as a way of dealing with unease and frustration that holds on to the fundamental negativity of desire and therefore doesn't reconcile it with the offers given. Protest doesn't privatize

5 So ›one-dimensionality‹ is a constitutive part of the ›defeated logic of protest‹ (Marcuse 2002, 127).

the absence of fortune but returns it to the sender, back to the common. There remains a persistent and profound NO to the offers. *NO, I'm not too dumb to play the game. NO, I don't want to sell my human capital, NO, I don't want to choose between 27 kinds of this. NO, I don't have a picture of it, a name for it. NO, thank you—this ain't it either.*

Protest—in this wide but strict sense—also means to defend the scream that Holloway puts at the beginning of any commitment, to defend it against its objectifying interpretation by the social sciences.

Now we've already come to the strategies that try to reintegrate protest into that society, which it once wanted to oppose. In one of these strategies we are involved right now: in the work of interpretation. Therefore I would suggest that collecting and analyzing the different forms of screaming or protest apparently means having to quit protest as such. The researcher's protest may cease with the protest research. So within the social sciences our need to scream may be explained very well, but if you feel like screaming you may hear its polite echo and request to go outside. *Please.*

»And a strange thing happens. The more we study society, the more our negativity is dissipated or sidelined as being irrelevant. There is no room for the scream in academic discourse. More than that: academic study provides us with a language and a way of thinking that makes it very difficult for us to express our scream. The scream, if it appears at all, appears as something to be explained, not as something to be articulated. The scream, from being the subject of our questions about society, becomes the object of analysis. Why is it that we scream? Or rather, since we are now social scientists, why is it that they scream?« (Holloway 2002, 1/2)

## **Prevention and the anti-social**

Now we will have to switch perspectives: So far we tried to avoid to »see like a state«—now we are allowed to step into the logics of governmentality. We will concentrate on a current preventional measure—the British ASBO—and see how prevention and protest can be understood as struggles on an overlapping terrain.

In Great Britain the decade of New Labour was and still is accompanied by a series of governmental programs and legislations, which focus on childhood and youth. One of these programs—the so-called ›Children's Plan‹—states its intentions as follows: »The Children's Plan is about putting children and families at the centre of everything government does.« This may sound scary, but looks nice, if you look at the plan's colorful front page: helicopters building up rainbows for children playing beneath (Department for children, school and families 2007). Another program tells us already by its name how concentrated and individualizing the government's view on people's life is meant and executed: the Green Paper is called »Every child matters« (Green Paper 2003). Though every child

should matter, the government's concern and its immediate action mainly concentrates on children and youth, who seem to deviate from the official aim of ›happy and healthy lives‹.

And once this deviation »causes harassment, alarm or distress to one or more people not in the same household as the perpetrator«—this is the official definition—anti-social behavior is being born.

It is born as a new kind of offence, which the government, the communities, the executives will no longer tolerate. The ASBO was established through the »Crime and disorder act« in 1998 and soon did prosper to one of the nodal points in the discourse about deviance. The crucial point of its practice is: the breach of a given ASBO constitutes a criminal offence even though the act that caused the ASBO may have been only a minor delinquency. By the term »minor delinquency« one can imagine everything that may cause anyone feel disturbed or annoyed. The long list of given ASBOs seeming like the joke of a mediocre comedian is long and expanding. Some examples:

- A Berkshire man who puts up a display of Christmas lights each year to raise money for a local children's charity has been threatened with an order by police because of the anti-social behavior of the large numbers of people who come to see the spectacle (Schnews, 529).
- A woman was given a four-year ASBO banning her from making excessive noise during sex anywhere in England (BBC News, 27.04.2009).
- A 13-year-old was served an order banning him from using the word »grass« anywhere in England and Wales. (19. Memorandum 2005)
- A 23-year-old woman who repeatedly threw herself into the Avon was served with an ASBO banning her from jumping into rivers or canals.
- A man with mental health problems was banned from sniffing petrol anywhere in Teesside.
- »A woman living on an estate in East Kilbride was given an ASBO ordering her not to be seen wearing her underwear at her window or in her garden. The local ASBO unit handed out diaries to her neighbors to record when she was seen in her underwear, giving a new meaning to neighborhood watch« (The Guardian, 05.04.2005).
- A two-year-old boy is the youngest Britain to be threatened with an ASBO after he was accused of kicking his plastic ball too loudly and verbally abusing adults (Daily Mail, 20.03.2009).

Such examples are like the colorful tip of the iceberg, but their exaggeration tends to hide the underlying everyday discourse and fear of the anti-social, which made them possible.

I think this very popular discourse about the ›anti-social behavior‹ can be linked to my former definition of protest. The heavy moral panic towards the anti-social subjects seems to point at the fearful assumption that there are people living in strange places, somehow beyond the edge of the thing we call society. The com-

mon boulevard-term »kids from hell« points directly at this phantasmatic place beyond. People acting against society, but from an outside of the social, from the anti-social.<sup>6</sup> »There is no such thing as society«—says Margret Thatcher’s famous neoliberal quote. Twenty years later the »kids from hell« seem as if they heard Thatcher’s bonmot out of the past, believe it and therefore act like it—at least in the eyes of the public, trembling with fear.

So, if protest positively reclaims that there must be something beyond the current, a beyond sketched in the colors of stubborn hope, the dark image of the anti-social occupies exactly this space. The protest’s NO is living from its negativity, while the images of the phantasmic anti-social are putting this NO into a concrete shape of fear. Ideology at work: beneath the well-known claim that there is no alternative to the given order of things lies the unspoken, obscene message, that of course there is something like it, but in a dark and excessive way. Having chopped off utopia’s head, the promise of heaven has unimpressively fallen into the man-given present—together with the fear of its opposite, the »kids from hell« figuring as its messengers.

Looking at the actual practice of the ASBO, we can see that nearly half of them are given to people *under* the age of 18 (Home Office 2008). Since most of the behavior, which can be regulated and punished by an ASBO, is not criminal in the common sense of the word, we can also read this phenomenon as an effect of the neoliberal politics of prevention. And children and the youth are amongst its best objects. They evolve, their future is uncertain and open, their way into it is to be guided. In terms of Deleuze’s »Postscript on the Societies of Control« (Deleuze 1992): When education has been one of the central principles within disciplinary societies, the change towards societies of control seems to put prevention in that eroding place—both deal with the fact of development. Education worked in »environments of enclosure«, prevention is a set of techniques of control that spreads into the whole body of the social, it works in the open. But unlike education, which had an inherent aim and ending, prevention is an infinite task—»in the societies of control one is never finished with anything«.

Thinking within this perspective of prevention, any sign of deviance in the present can be read as a symptom of future delinquencies. Zero-tolerance policies are results of this view and the fear in which it is embedded. In order to be able to

6 This discourse of the anti-social puts a new political perspective to a problem that a little bit earlier had been described in different terms and images: In 1997 for example Nick Davies published a quite popular book, revealing »the shocking truth about Great Britain«. There this place of the anti-social was explored and shown in ways that explicitly reminded one of reports about adventurous colonial expeditions – the book’s title was »Dark Heart«: »It is the place where the poor gather. Unlike any other country, it has no borders nor even any name, it doesn’t show up on maps or fly a flag, but the more I came to know it, the more I came to see it as a country in its own right, nestling within the country of the affluent but utterly different in its way of life.« (Davies 1998, ivv) You can read this book as a lesson on the effects of globalization: as the distinctions and relations between the so called First and Third World start to transform, the Third World doesn’t simply vanish—it appears in the middle of the First.

control the future by regulating the present, this present must be read and registered as closely, as deeply and as completely as possible—by gathering data and by setting up statistics such as the national children database. The latter registers every British child and data which is considered as relevant—like school-problems, contacts to social services and many other data, which could be useful in the future. The other instrument I want to focus on at the end is more obvious and more widely discussed—the surveillance of the public space.

Of course the topic of public space and its control is also related to the ASBO practice itself. Many of the ASBOs include the prohibition of entering a particular geographic area like public parks, shopping malls or interdict to meet with certain people in public. Obviously many constituent parts of protest culture lie in the target area of ASBOs. Therefore it is no surprise that they are also a direct tool to deal with protest and protesters. One concluding example: a leading animal rights activist has been given a five-year anti-social behavior order to keep her away from animal research laboratories (BBC News, 20.01.2005).

### »Nowhere to hide«: Socialize with visibility

The fact and feeling of being watched is one of the primary human experiences. It seems, that it is only preceded by one other primordial fact, the experience of being fundamentally exposed to the other, as Judith Butler often puts it: right from the beginning I am overwhelmed and determined by the existence of the other and its threatening presence, that I crave to understand—to understand that and who I am. One well-studied mechanism to gain control of this situation is to identify with the other. This basically means trying to see with his/her eyes, I start to see myself as something within the field of the other's gaze. So from now on, the relation to myself is fundamentally mediated through the other, its desires, its fears, its truth. Even if you are alone, you will not get rid of the feeling of being watched, because it's yourself that watches you with the other's eyes. So one of the basic lessons of socialization is: you are never alone.

With this rough ontogenetic sketch of visibility and subjectivation in mind, the epidemic of cameras in public space can also be read as a crisis or transformation of the other's authority. They seem to be a technical implementation of the other's view, which is not sufficiently introjected anymore.

If this primary lesson of control has not been learned sufficiently in the variety of educational institutions, it must spread into public space. One of the outstanding examples is the »Operation Leopard« by the Essex Police Department. It shows what can happen, when even the surveillance by CCTV loses its intended impact on behavior and self control.<sup>7</sup> Jacqui Smith, British Home Secretary praises

7 That the use of cameras and the normal surveillance through CCTV can lose its effect on the surveilled subjects can be understood by the split between knowledge and belief. In Lacanian terms: While knowledge

method and means of this operation in her speech »Anti-Social Behavior: We're Not Having It« in May 2008 : »Operation Leopard is exactly the sort of intensive policing [...]. It creates an environment where those responsible for anti-social behavior have no room for maneuver and nowhere to hide.«

To create this space of total visibility the Essex Police Department created teams of police officers personally hounding suspicious youth people at home and following them as soon as they leave their homes, whereas all of their actions are permanently recorded on video. The Annual Report of the Essex Police sounds proud and describes the procedure:<sup>8</sup>

»Officers involved in Operation Leopard knocked on the doors of known offenders, warned them that their behavior wouldn't be tolerated and then photographed them and their associates as they wandered around an estate for the next four days. [...] As the operation got under way, targeted suspects and their friends laughed and joked at being photographed and being asked to give their personal details. But they quickly realised it was no laughing matter as the officers followed them, filmed them as they sat in quiet alleyways and continued to ask questions« (Annual Report 2008, 8).<sup>9</sup>

The Surveillance Studies invented the right term for the aim of these kinds of measures: »The disappearance of disappearance« (Hagerty/Ericson 2005, 613).<sup>10</sup>

The basic aim of surveillance technology is not to control and enforce a specific set of already given norms and rules—this would be a frequently called »totalitarian« use of it, its critics usually refer to Orwell's 1984—no, at first it is to put the subject in a relation to itself. So at a very basic level the effect of these technical eyes is a form of self-relation which reminds us that society and its demands exist.<sup>11</sup> If you listen closely to the camera, it whispers: *NO, dear child of deviance, Margaret Thatcher was not right, society still exists, please believe me, otherwise I will ›help‹ you with your life and your beliefs—cause I know you need help.* Tony Blair put this more directly than this very polite camera: »Everyone can change: if people, who need help, will not take it, we will make them« (Home Office 2006, 1).

refers to the real, belief is symbolic and always minimally »reflective«, »belief in the belief of the other« (Žižek 2000). So the fact that you know you are being watched, while this knowledge has no effect on your conduct, because you somehow don't believe in it, points again at the lack of identification with the other, at its constrained authority.

- 8 There is a video report from The Guardian that shows this practice in action—you can see by yourself how the incredible gets hauntingly banal: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/video/2008/may/30/operation.leopard> [2010-01-10].
- 9 One might think that if the actions of opposition don't use the powers of the absurd—like the Situationist International project proposed—even local police departments end up taking over this toolbox of the surreal.
- 10 So invisibility seems to become a governmental problem and a margin of precarious societies. Consequentially disappearance can be experienced and enjoyed as an act of practical deviance. Antonia Melechi analysed the early British rave-movement in exactly these terms: »Where the ecstasy of disappearance resists the imperative to reveal one's self.« (Melechi 1993, 38).
- 11 The camera's gaze could be understood in analogy to Althusser's concept of interpellation through the voice. With a fundamental difference: While the authority's call in Althusser's famous example of the police officer is a call that can lead to a dialogue, the knowledge of being watched is in no way dialogic, one cannot respond to the camera. The awareness of the camera's gaze can only lead to an enforced self-awareness.

So we had a look on two measures which govern the public space in contemporary Great Britain—two measures, which support each other. The production of visibility and the preventive discourse and social technique of the anti-social. Both affect the possibility of protest.

On the one hand, there is the problem of protest which wants to produce itself as an event; as an event, taking place in a given situation, but wanting to articulate something, which, in this situation, can't be heard or seen, because it shapes the very limits of this situation. Protest, in this sense, must appear as anti-social, must act improperly—because it reveals the antagonism of the given and the lack of the proper order. Protest must work with the danger of not being heard or not being seen—because its intention is to change the field of what can be said and be shown. Right there we see the twist: not just to appear as a problem—this is easy—but at one time to be it, to articulate it and to resist it.

The logics of protest and prevention therefore are strictly antagonistic: protest reminds us of the future's unwritten-ness in view of a false present—prevention generates images of threatened futures to fortify the present in and against their light.

At last protest seems to face an aesthetic problem. It knows about media and the economies of its attention, it tends to design and think itself as an event of visibility, it cares about the good picture, into which it will dissolve. But if we say protest is about articulating the small or big NO of the »Great Refusal« (Marcuse 2002, 66), moving the limits of what can be heard and seen, these strategies of visibility are at least dangerous—regarding the »dialectic of compliance and opposition that takes into account the concealed as well as the visible [...]« (Fox/Starn 1997, 3). To the expression of the fundamental scream the process of becoming an image is like a wall of cotton wool. »Our anger is constantly fired by experience, but any attempt to express that anger is met by a wall of absorbent cotton wool« (Holloway 2002, 1/2). The spectacular, globalized world of images functions like the hegemonic formation Laclau/Mouffe (2002, 139) describe as follows: »A hegemonic formation also embraces what opposes it, insofar as the opposing force accepts the system of basic articulations [...] as something it negates, but the place of negation is defined by the internal parameters of the formation itself.«

Protest may produce successful images of itself, but it should be aware that it doesn't have control about the frames. The framing will embrace it, so the protest will have its place of negation. *Sit down please*. So the critical challenge for the life of protest would be if we resist the embrace of a hegemonic formation and do not share its system of articulation, we will be heard as noise, seen as stains. But how to embrace the stain and the noise, so we can resist the embrace of the formation? Embracing the opposition, opposing the embrace. The speech and the noise. The image and the stain. Choosing nothing, but the struggles of between.

## Sources

19. Memorandum submitted by Napo. Anti-social behaviour orders . Analysis of the first six years: <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmhaff/80/80we20.htm> [2009-08-20].
- BBC News, 20.01.2005: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk\\_news/england/suffolk/4190393.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/suffolk/4190393.stm) [2010-01-10].
- Crime and disorder act (1998): [http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/ukpga\\_19980037\\_en\\_1#1](http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/ukpga_19980037_en_1#1) [2009-08-20].
- Daily Mail, 20.03.2009: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1163528/Boy-aged-TWO-youngest-Briton-threatened-Asbo-accused-verbally-abusing-adults.html> [2010-01-10].
- Department for children, schools and families (2007): The children's plan – building brighter futures. [http://publications.dcsf.gov.uk/eOrderingDownload/The\\_Childrens\\_Plan.pdf](http://publications.dcsf.gov.uk/eOrderingDownload/The_Childrens_Plan.pdf) [2008-11-02].
- Green Paper (2003): Every child matters. <http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/everychildmatters/about/background/background/> [2008-11-02].
- Home Office (2006): Respect Action Plan. <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/respect-action-plan?view=Binary> [2008-11-02].
- Home Office (2008): ASBO statistics. <http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk/asbos/asbos02-090713.xls> [2010-01-10].
- Policing Essex (2008): Policing Essex. The annual report of Essex Police Authority and the Chief Constable for 2007/08. [www.essex.police.uk/cms/global/documents/ar0708.pdf](http://www.essex.police.uk/cms/global/documents/ar0708.pdf) [2010-01-10].
- The Guardian, 05.04.2005: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2005/apr/05/ukcrime.prisonsandprobation> [2010-01-10].
- Schnews 592: <http://www.schnews.org.uk/archive/news529.htm#2> [2010-01-20].

## References

- Andrain, Charles and Apter, David (1995): *Political Protest and Social Change*. London: Macmillan Press.
- Davies, Nick (1998): *Dark Heart: The Shocking Truth About Hidden Britain*. London: Vintage.
- Deleuze, Gilles (1992): *Postscript on the Societies of Control*. <http://www.n5m.org/n5m2/media/texts/deleuze.htm> [2010-07-06].
- Fox, Richard and Starn, Orin (1997): Introduction. In: Fox and Starn (ed.) (1997): *Between Resistance and Revolution. Cultural Politics and Social Protest*. New Brunswick, New Jersey, London: Rutgers University Press.
- Hagerty, Kevin and Ericson, Richard V. (2005): *The Surveillant Assemblage*. *British Journal of Sociology*, 51(4), S. 605-622.
- Holloway, John (2002): *Change the world without taking the power*. <http://libcom.org/library/change-world-without-taking-power-john-holloway> [2008-07-02].
- Laclau, Ernesto and Mouffe, Chantal (2002): *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. A Radical Democratic Politics*. London; New York.
- Marcuse, Herbert (2002): *One-dimensional man: Studies in the ideology of advanced industrial society*. New York.
- Melechi, Antonio (1993): *The Ecstasy of Disappearance*. In: Redhead, Steve (ed.): *Rave Off: Politics and deviance in contemporary youth culture*, Aldershot and Brookfield.
- Savage, John (2008): *Teenage. The creation of youth 1875 – 1945*. London.
- Scott, James C. (1998): *Seeing like a state. How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. New Haven and London.
- Žižek, Slavoj (2000): *The Interpassive Subject*. <http://www.egs.edu/faculty/zizek/zizek-the-interpassive-subject.html> [2008-05-07].

Marco Tullney<sup>1</sup>

## **Organizing Employees Under Surveillance: My Boss Is Spying on Me, So I Better Keep My Mouth Shut**

### **Introduction**

Over the last few months German media has repeatedly reported on various scandals on workplace surveillance. For years renowned companies had been spying excessively on their employees in order to expose whistle-blowers or to discover suspicious connections between employees and business-partners of the respective employer. Private investigators gathered data on employees' off-hour activities and general behavior.<sup>2</sup> Unsurprisingly, these measures included and in some cases particularly targeted employee representatives and union leaders as well as members of the press.

Obviously, workplace-connected surveillance is an issue. In this paper I would like to draw attention to how surveillance interferes with labor rights, and especially affects opportunities to organize and protest. I will show that surveillance technology *can* be used to hinder employees' protest and that it is *intended* to have this effect. But most importantly, workplace surveillance *is perceived* by employees as a means of affecting their labor rights adversely. In a final chapter I will discuss the impact of workplace surveillance on society.

### **Surveillance technology suitable for hindering protest**

Technological progress has brought new means of monitoring<sup>3</sup> and surveillance to the workplace, especially to the office workplace: »[A]dvances in science and technology have facilitated the collection of employees' personal information and the monitoring of employees' performance and behavior. Volumes of valuable

- 1 Many thanks for helpful comments to Bärbel Reißmann. Most of the arguments and research data in this paper build upon the work on my PhD project dealing with workplace surveillance. I presented an earlier version of this paper at the conference *Shaping Europe in a Globalized World? Protest Movements and the Rise of a Transnational Civil Society* (2009). Many thanks to the organizers, the panel chair and the panel participants for their support and comments.
- 2 Measures included private investigators listening to employees talking to each other about their private lives (and commenting on what was being said in written reports), reports on employee clothing and appearance, the forced search of private cars, monitoring employees going to the lavatory and many cases of covert camera surveillance (see Boyes 2008, Grill/Arnsperger 2008, mic 2009).
- 3 The term most widely used in scientific and popular debate to describe the techniques in question is ›monitoring‹. In this paper, I will also use the term ›surveillance‹ in order to emphasize the general and unrestrained manner in which these measures are employed today. The term ›control‹ is used to describe the actual management or regulation of actions and behavior.

personal information can be collected and scrutinized by employers through job interviews, references, background checks, psychological and intelligence tests, drug, medical and genetic tests, software programs, and workplace surveillance« (Klein/Gates 2005, 136).

### **Traditional means**

A great range of devices for monitoring workers and employees existed even before computerization and is still in place in elaborated forms and connected to other, new devices and techniques (see below). Most visible are those means of surveillance situated at the boundaries of company premises, like CCTV, which is often installed for security reasons and for performance monitoring, security staff controlling access to the perimeter, or time-punch machines. Machines that monitor their own operations can deliver data on the production process which then can be combined with other data e.g., from Human Resources, that make it possible to monitor the performance of the worker who operated that very machine at a given time. Also, machines can be programmed in a way that workers are bound to a particular cycle, e.g., at an assembly line.

But a surveillance technique possibly as old as labor itself is also still in use: the observation of the workforce by a supervisor or other type of observer, either operating in plain view, e.g., from a supervisor's office,<sup>4</sup> or secretly.<sup>5</sup> Even private investigators are commonly hired (see Tobien 2007, Grill 2008) to gather information on employees the employer distrusts, on employees who report in sick, or on job applicants.

### **Spatial surveillance**

Spatial surveillance, i.e., the tracking of workers and employees, is influenced by the aforementioned means of video surveillance, security staff and different forms of access control. Magnetic strip cards are regularly used to identify people requesting access to a company's premises or to particular areas (e.g., a research lab). Since physical contact is required with this kind of access control, the person carrying the card knows when the identifying data stored on the card is being read. In recent years, those cards have been replaced by RFID (radio-frequency identification) tags that can be read using radio waves. These tags can be placed in active badges<sup>6</sup> that employees put on and can then be read from a distance of up to a few meters, thus no longer enabling employees to control when their passage is being registered. Surely they notice that certain doors only open for those whose RFID tag matches the requirements, but devices that merely monitor the routes

4 The pulpit-like supervisor's office in early factories bears a remarkable resemblance to Bentham's design of a panoptic prison.

5 A drug-store discounter in Germany is reported to have hidden human observers in tiny spaces behind a wall with spyholes (see Peters/Sirleschtov 2008). Obviously, they had to sneak in before the employees of that branch arrived and leave after they had all gone.

6 Prior to RFID, active badges used to be equipped with infrared LED.

taken inside the building or register who is staying where for how long can operate without the tag carriers noticing. Another method of tracking staff is GPS (global positioning system). GPS devices are built into hand-held units of any sort, e.g., the scanners parcel delivery staff are carrying, and into vehicles. They are useful to schedulers in transportation, making it possible to determine which driver is in the best geographical position to take on a new job, as well as to customers, who can follow their parcels almost in real time via the internet. However, they also allow employers to monitor every route and every break an employee takes. Mobile phone tracking that uses different signal strengths to locate a mobile phone has similar effects (for employees).

### **Communication surveillance<sup>7</sup>**

Since the end of the 1980s, software described as ›Computer Based Performance Monitoring‹ or ›Electronic Performance Monitoring‹ has allowed employers to conduct investigations on individual employees' performance, e.g., by measuring how many characters per minute someone types, the duration of telephone calls or absence from the desk, etc. (see Fairweather 1999, 41; Office of Technology Assessment 1987).

However, communication surveillance includes much more than just counting keystrokes. Computerization of the workplace has introduced extensive opportunities for employers to learn about facts that otherwise would probably have gone unnoticed. Especially in office workplaces, almost every action of the employees is in some way connected with or dependent on communication facilities like phones or computers. Since these devices are often connected via communication networks, e.g., an intranet or the internet, they can be accessed from a distance, thus allowing for remote monitoring.

With regard to phones, the repertoire of employee monitoring includes listening in on phone calls, mystery callers (in order to evaluate the employee's dealing with customers), calculation of number and duration of calls, and—most important in the scope of this paper—identifying the communication counterparts. The same holds true for computer network based communication like e-mail or messaging software, with the additional feature that the content of this kind of communication can be read and analyzed automatically.

The use of the world wide web is also subjected to employee surveillance: the websites you go to and the search terms you enter into your search engines can be monitored. This of course includes employees' visits to websites of trade unions, employee representation, lawyers, job offers from other companies, etc. Since more and more services are transferred to the world wide web (e.g., office software, storage of private files, banking), there are more and more pieces of infor-

7 For a more detailed description see Tullney (2009) and Lane (2003).

mation an employer can possibly get to know, as employees might do their electronic banking or log into any other personalized service on the web.<sup>8</sup>

Automated analysis, presentation and control of data gathered by all these means (and more of the same kind) is what has lately turned traditional observation into general, preventive surveillance. There is a still emerging market for specialized software for this purpose. Both fascinating (to employers) and frightening (to employees), software of this kind delivers management-ready reports on nearly everything happening in a company's network. Who talks to whom, who regularly visits certain kinds of websites, who is looking for a new job, and so on. Analysis software may look for predefined keywords (e.g., the name of a competitor or a union) or for (according to autonomous calculation done by the software) suspicious content and can react accordingly. Options include dropping—incoming or outgoing—messages without any notice to sender nor recipient, re-routing messages to a supervisor, or simply blocking access to certain websites based on general or specific rules<sup>9</sup>. This kind of spyware can be installed on the employees' computers without their knowledge and can then operate completely without them noticing it. As it is installed on the local computer, it can even intercept key strokes—which allows for recording of data, that never reaches the network, e.g., unsent e-mail, or personal notes only typed into the computer in order to print it once instead of saving it. If the employer runs such software without the knowledge of the employees, there is no chance of escaping it, even in breaks. That means that even if employees are allowed to use the communication facilities for their own purposes during breaks, their data can still be recorded and analyzed.

The preventive approach is also supported by the ability to store data that is of no immediate use, but may later be analyzed, combined with other data, and used when needed, e.g., in order to provide evidence to legally fire an employee.

### **Chapter conclusion**

The employers' arsenal of surveillance technology<sup>10</sup> is suitable for monitoring all employee activities. It potentially infringes heavily on employees' labor and human rights by eliminating workplace privacy. If your employer knows about your every action and communication, he/she may also know about an individual

8 A rising number of people seem to do their 1-on-1-communication at social network sites—they would rather send a personal message from their account at a social network than send an e-mail or SMS. With the employer observing the web usage of his/her employees, he/she will monitor those messages, too.

9 It is some companies' business model to rate and classify websites, so that employers can regulate access to different types of information based on branch or any other criteria. Categories of websites include ›Employment‹, ›Work Related‹, but also ›Gay/Lesbian Topics‹ and ›Government‹. Preselected blocking preferences can be combined with manually composed blacklists in order to block internet access to a competitor's or a union's website.

10 It should be noted that surveillance technology and devices are closely bound up with the social constituents of surveillance. Firstly, every action taken with regard to this technology including decisions on who is going to be monitored and who will be allowed to violate certain workplace rules is embedded in social power rela-

employee's contact to a union, about him/her organizing a protest, about his/her opinion on working conditions.

Whether the information an employer receives from different forms of surveillance can eventually be used in court or in public, is of secondary importance. The information itself can be valuable for the business, since those in control of the monitoring facilities can identify employees they might better get rid of—whatever the reason. This may be seen as another advantage (in terms of preventing ›trouble‹) of the preventive approach: Even if the information resulting in the wish to fire someone was illegally acquired or states no legal reason to discipline someone, chances are high that one can find some useful data in the enormous pile of information one has gathered on this employee. A short look at a website not related to business during work hours or a private e-mail sent after the break ended could be enough.

The techniques described above form part of a new quality of surveillance:<sup>11</sup> not only are there more and better ways of monitoring employees, they also are employed according to different technological approaches, i.e. that of dragnet investigations. New technology is creating a new setting including decentralized surveillance with many observers.<sup>12</sup> Driven by a general suspicion of all employees, every piece of information that is available is collected—even if there seems to be no use for it at the time. Automatically analyzed by computers, this data could hint at correlations (e.g., of performance issues, but also regarding networks of employees) no one would have thought of before. It also could indicate misbehavior that would otherwise have gone undetected. Employers no longer have to trust their own eyes and judgment alone, information gathered by more or less elaborate types of surveillance add to the picture—or replace it completely (see below).

## **Intentionally spying on employees**

### **The employer wants to know**

By monitoring their employees, employers try to counter an information deficit: They want to know what is happening after office doors are shut—are the employees working well enough, are they using their working hours according to directives (see Ariss 2002)? By recording time and counting characters typed on a computer keyboard, employers try to figure out individual performance. And by systemat-

tions in an organization or company (see Edwards 1981, 29 f.). Secondly, social means of monitoring and controlling—the most prominent among which are self-governing and mutual observation of employees—add to operation and results of surveillance.

- 11 This new quality constitutes the crucial difference in comparison to the situation a few decades ago. However, the quantitative development is impressive, too, with most of the workplaces being under surveillance today.
- 12 See Hoven/Vermaas (2007) for a discussion of how nano-technology, e.g., RFID tags inserted in clothes and artifacts, is changing privacy issues.

ically gathering such data on every single employee, they may compare and calculate the average performance even in service and office jobs, a field in which it is traditionally difficult to measure output and performance.

Also, the alleged widespread use of communication devices for private purposes by employees, like private phone calls or internet access, is perceived as a factor that unnecessarily reduces a company's profits: »employers may simply want to reduce the amount of work time lost to online shopping, chat, and playing of online games« (Henderson 2006, 30).<sup>13</sup> Extending surveillance measures to the most comprehensive amount possible is supposed to help increase efficiency and productivity, both by pushing employees to work harder and by identifying sub-optimal processes and policies.<sup>14</sup>

### **Employees as a risk**

Besides looking into performance-related issues, employee surveillance is also supposed to fight inappropriate or unwanted employee behavior of any other kind. Allegations of wide spread and massive theft of office supplies, selling of company data to competitors, misuse of communication facilities, etc. are often repeated. By monitoring employees, employers seek »a way to reduce theft, embezzlement, or sabotage by employees« (Henderson 2006, 30). In addition, the employer may seek to prevent private use of company property in order to safeguard the security of computers and networks (from computer viruses and other malware, see Erler 2003, 33).

Another reason for having a close eye on office activities is the employers' fear that they may be made liable for their employees' actions. This is especially significant concerning sexual harassment (see Townsend et al. 2000, Lane 2003, 16 ff.), which according to courts includes forwarding e-mails with offensive content or looking at websites that others object to. Lane (see 2003, 18 ff.) also mentions several incidents where (former or current) employees started a shooting at their workplaces and states that US employers could be found liable for hiring someone who later turns out to be violent. Attempts to keep people out of a company (see Zugelder et al. 2000) who could someday present a danger may include psychological testing (that can be very biased), gathering background information on job applicants, location tracking and monitoring off-hour activities.

13 See Loch et al. (1998, 655 ff.) for a discussion of the ethical questions involved, e.g., weighing up the freedom of creative employees and the waste of company resources or the claim of employers that communication devices are used for merely professional reasons and the claim of employees to respect their privacy.

14 Various studies on the impact of employee monitoring on performance and output could not give a clear answer to the question (see e.g., Belfield/Marsden 2003). There were some indications that simple tasks that required no special skills were performed faster or better when the participants in the study thought they were monitored, whereas more complex tasks that demanded creativity or particular skills were not or negatively influenced by the assumption of monitoring.

### **Be proactive: Preventionism**

Such measures do more than just monitor forms of pre-defined illegitimate behavior. They follow an approach that corresponds to the paradigm of preventionism. Their purpose is not so much to identify the persons responsible for past breaches of regulations but to prevent future unwanted behavior, including protest. There is no logical end to a task like »let's collect all information we have access to«, no domain that needs to be left out. In fact, it would be a violation of the preventive paradigm to leave anything out since purpose and meaning of data gatherings are only determined after it has taken place. This preventive approach works well with the predominant view of »knowledge management« as one of the most important tasks of modern day business (see Chan/Garrick 2003). Everything is (labeled) information that one day could turn out to be useful.

A control system in the workplace (see Beniger 1986) consists not only of a command system (e.g., giving orders, setting business objectives) and a review system (e.g., measuring performance, monitoring staff, comparing actual processes to given orders, identifying low-performing employees), but, according to Edwards (see 1981, 27), also comprises some kind of discipline system that ensures employees' submission to the employer's orders and provides rewards (e.g., performance pay) for those complying with the rules. It is a result of the current detailed nature of employee surveillance and of following the preventive approach that makes data on employees life and work available in greater detail than ever before—and every piece of this data can be consulted to discover unwanted behavior or circumstances and to justify disciplining measures.

However, the most important aspect of preventive surveillance is that there is no need to actually *do* such comprehensive monitoring. It may be sufficient to have the ability to do it (and to let others know or assume accordingly), since employees will have to deal with it alike. The employees' uncertainty and their assumption that the employer *might* be monitoring work out well enough for the employer (see below). If it should be necessary to deliver evidence for legal actions, the company can always switch from random sampling to a complete monitoring and analysis. The escalating regulation of behavior covers areas that have little to do with the employer's running of his or her business, e.g., activities during breaks, but also off-hour activity. In a growing number of organizations and companies the employer tries to regulate health (e.g., smoking) or even their employees' dating habits (e.g., prohibit relations to co-workers or to employees of competing companies).

## Employees' perception<sup>15</sup>

### **Distrust and respect**

Employees perceive the implementation of workplace surveillance as a sign of not being respected by their employer: >they should see/know how well I work without monitoring<. Computer based monitoring is regarded as blind to individuality and as delivering only part of the picture of performance and behavior.<sup>16</sup> Thus judgment based solely on computer gathered data is considered to be unfair.

Often employees feel they don't know what is going on. Since employers don't communicate their use of surveillance technology (see Chociey 1997), employees don't feel well-informed and have adjust to possible scenarios. This is equally true for trust in the employer's handling of sensitive data that he/she may obtain by using surveillance technology (see Karat/Karat 2008).

The attitudes towards employee monitoring depend partly on organizational culture and on the general perception of the employer's treatment of employees and information (see Alder 2001). So, it is not surprising that employees who think of their employer as someone who does not trust them and who might be looking for reasons to lay them off consider employee monitoring to be harmful and hostile towards them.<sup>17</sup>

Since they do not know what their employer is looking for when analyzing the data, employees may refrain from any action that *they* can think of as possibly unwanted by their employer. Protest and stating a (negative) opinion on workplace conditions clearly belong in this area, especially because of a tendency to over-estimate the degree of surveillance when there is no accurate information.<sup>18</sup>

### **Employee representation and participation**

The role of worker and employee representatives differs from country to country, in particular regarding whether the consent of such representatives is needed if an employer wants to implement measures of workplace surveillance (see Fragale Filho/Jeffery 2002, Thibault Aranda 2002). Under German work law, for example, workers' representatives have to be notified and must consent to the installation of any equipment that might be used for monitoring of behavior and performance. Employee representation and trade unions are also institutions employees turn to

15 The arguments presented in the following chapter are mostly based on qualitative interviews I conducted with employees during my research project. Existing studies dealing with the effects of employee monitoring concentrate on performance issues, whereas studies on >good work<, >healthy work< or >dignified work< often neglect to include the effects of surveillance.

16 The >blindness< of computer based performance monitoring to any surrounding social setting is a common reason for objecting to it (see Introna 2003, Ball 2001).

17 Involving employees in the implementation of monitoring systems is regarded as a way of increasing consent to monitoring and to ensure positive (i.e. profit maximizing) results (see Alder/Tompkins 1997).

18 In fact, employees are doing some sort of risk calculation; they try to figure out at which degree of unwanted behavior sanctions are to be expected and how their own behavior compares to an >average of misbehavior<.

for support when they feel they are treated unfairly and are put under (too much) surveillance.<sup>19</sup> Also, unions might be the right address to go to.

My research shows that the perception of employee representatives regarding their determination and their ability to do something about workplace surveillance is a very pessimistic one. Often employees assume that their representatives are practicing some kind of co-management. According to this suspicion, they might identify with business principles and support management<sup>20</sup> and may therefore not be willing to oppose workplace surveillance. But even if the representatives are willing to defend the employees' right to privacy or to protect them from increasing workloads as a result of implementation of monitoring, they often lack the necessary knowledge, do not see all the consequences of some new technology and often are informed late by the employer.

### **Work relations and the broader view**

When employees try to figure out which consequences to expect from workplace monitoring, they not only think of privacy concerns and personal attitudes (e.g., dignity of work) but they (have to) think of the general development of work relations. With the unemployment rates high, work relations deregulated and labor rights diminishing, there is less protection against being laid off, and there are less chances of finding a new job. And even if they manage to keep their job or find another, there are still more low wage jobs and a global competition between enterprises, which employees are expected to react to with understanding and renouncement.

Their employers' opposition to organizing and giving an opinion on workplace conditions is something that employees keep in mind and link quite closely to workplace surveillance.

In uncertain times and without an effective form of collective action or solidarity, workers and employees have to deal with competing with each other and with an ideology that makes them personally responsible for any low performance. They are supposed to internalize what is expected of them, to not only submit to any demands of their employer, but also to actively take responsibility for individual development. Especially in office jobs this is justified by an alleged increase in autonomy: ›you are allowed to make your own decisions, now take responsibility for your actions.« This transfer of risks for employees is one important constituent of the effects of individualization and subjectivation in the workplace.

19 Especially in Germany, with a long tradition of co-determination, this would be some kind of employee representation, a Betriebsrat or Personalrat.

20 Especially in times of global competition when, for some reason, the company's profit margin seems to correlate to its further existence, a view is prevalent in which it is in the employees' own interest to submit to any plans that promise increasing both company profit and staff workload. This kind of internalization of business objectives is not only popular in theory but is in fact important in the whole context of workplace surveillance, especially regarding the combination of technological and social means of control.

In some jobs, control (and monitoring supporting this control) has become more indirect and aims at work results, not processes (see Candeias 2007)—although this is an idealistic picture, since most ›normal‹ means of monitoring and disciplining stay in place.

## **Workplace surveillance and inequality**

### **Surveillance and inequality**

Since surveillance measures are closely connected to power relations, one has to keep in mind that employees are not targeted equally by those measures. Accordingly, the perception of surveillance at the workplace depends on the individual position in the organization. Employees not only have to think about whether it is possible and likely that they are under surveillance but also about potential consequences of detection or allegation of misbehavior. Especially those employed in low wage jobs requiring no advanced skills who can be replaced easily have to take this into account—e.g., in supermarkets or in the security industry.<sup>21</sup> This holds true for job applicants, but also for employees who might have particular reasons to believe that their employer wants to lay them off: employees who are known as having a political agenda, who try to organize or to protest at the workplace (e.g., against working conditions), who are union members or activists. But also staff who collaborates with the media, e.g., in order to bring to light the illegal or unethical actions of their employer, can become a victim of omnipresent surveillance.

### **Subjects with limited autonomy**

In recent years, the computerization of the workplace has enabled employers to measure their employees' output more detailed than ever before—especially in office workplaces where it has been traditionally difficult to tell how efficiently particular employees are working. The downside of counting keystrokes and measuring every action is a worsening of work conditions: Low levels of trust lead to low performances, to stress and alienation from the job. This is counterproductive for business (because employees who feel that they are being distrusted may keep from sharing information and may just stick to standard procedures, since this is what electronic performance monitoring forces them to do), but is particularly bad for employees. They have to do the work, but they also have to take care of regulating themselves. Human Resources departments and staff and the external control that they stand for is more or less substituted by internal control.

21 In Germany there has been an increase in cases of employers trying to fire employees for minimal damage they might have done to the business, e.g., for eating leftover food that otherwise would have been dumped or for charging their mobile phone's batteries. It is in cases like these that dragnet surveillance measures prove their effectiveness. One may find out some things about everybody.

This development goes along with other forms of self-governance and of employees with individual responsibility that management literature and Foucauldian studies building upon this literature alike are fondly interested in. But employees still struggle, even if they have flexible work hours, work at their homes or have entrepreneurial elements included in their job description. Regarding work performance and surveillance of their work, they now have to struggle with themselves instead of with an employer who states more or less clear objectives and who can be made responsible, e.g., for a workload that is too big.

The individualization at the workplace presents a backlash to solidarity. Colleagues who might endanger the business or influence the achievement of work goals are being blamed for standing in the way or being selfish.<sup>22</sup> In addition, employees are constantly told that organizing is not in their best interest.<sup>23</sup>

### **The Stakes of society**

The ways in which surveillance is carried out give an impression of how the employers view their employees: as people who do not have the right to free speech and to cooperate with others who are sharing their views. The part of employees' lives their employer can control is increasing, both by an expansion of working hours through home and tele-work and by more and more rules that concern private living conditions. By distrusting employees and by trying to keep them from expressing their opinions, employers have a part in the creation of disenfranchised citizens who value smooth functioning over self-determination, creating a new moral regime of individual responsibility.

Society is also affected by the fear of potential whistle-blowers to be identified. If there seems to be no way of telling others without being detected and punished what only insiders can know, there will be fewer people willing to take the risk.<sup>24</sup> Since it is often only through whistle-blowing that the public gains knowledge of certain business crimes (e.g., corruption, breach of hygiene and safety regulations), this will have an important social effect.<sup>25</sup> Workplace surveillance not only

22 One example I came across several times was the acceptance of the employer's surveillance of communication facilities, especially internet traffic, in order to prevent others from using the internet for private purposes. The logic presented in all of these interviews was: people are slowing down my internet connection for illegitimate reasons and by that they are hindering me to work efficiently.

23 In 2009, the Economic Policy Institute published a study carried out by Kate Bronfenbrenner (2009) on the intensification of employers' opposition to organizing. It was stated that surveillance was one of the means used (besides interrogation, harassment, threats, infiltrating organizing committees) to keep employees from organizing, both threatening them in order to keep them from doing anything unwanted (self-discipline, chilling effect) and in order to learn about activities—e.g., videotaping employees as they spoke to union representatives. In addition, one third of the businesses in the sample interrogated workers in one-on-one meetings about their support for a union.

24 This is also keeping people from getting into contact with employees from outside the business: whether it is a journalist trying to get information, a labor activist willing to form an alliance or a competitor offering a new job, they all have to fear that their communication will be observed and analyzed.

25 Whistle-blowing is becoming more and more risky not only because of increased workplace surveillance but also because of the surveillance of communication nets by the state, e.g., through data retention.

has an influence on working conditions and labor rights, but it also influences society: by teaching people only to follow but never to question the rules, by getting them used to constant surveillance and by minimizing the public's insight of what is going on in businesses.

## **Conclusion**

To conclude, workplace surveillance is in fact interfering with labor rights: the various means of monitoring and observing are not only suitable and intended for extensive employee surveillance including prevention of protest and employee organization, they are also perceived by employees as such. Increasing workplace surveillance is both a source and effect of a power shift in favor of employers. Both the technological potential and the search for information on employees allow for an almost boundless monitoring that is not necessarily finished at the end of the workday or does not stop at the gates of the employer's premises. The preventive approach makes for a new quality of surveillance.<sup>26</sup>

It is particularly alarming that this is not only effecting on-duty activities, but also the private lives of employees who feel that their off-duty activities might endanger their job. Thus the employer is regulating an increasing part of their lives.

Work place surveillance aims not only at individual misbehavior, but also at the very center of labor and human rights: freedom of expression, freedom of information, collaborating with others. The mere potential of surveillance can keep employees from any behavior that might be interpreted as a neglect of duty. Especially organizing with others, collaborating with unions or employee representation are activities that they (might) refrain from under such circumstances.

26 For an introduction into the general development of surveillance, its aims and methods, and into the efforts to analyze today's surveillance, see Lyon (2007).

## References

- Alder, G. Stoney (2001): Employee reactions to electronic performance monitoring: A consequence of organizational culture. *The Journal of High Technology Management Research*, vol. 12, pp. 323-342.
- Alder, G. Stoney and Tompkins, Phillip K. (1997): Electronic Performance Monitoring: An Organizational Justice and Concertive Control Perspective. *Management Communication Quarterly*, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 259-288.
- Ariss, Sonny S. (2002): Computer monitoring: benefits and pitfalls facing management. *Information & Management*, vol. 39, pp. 553-558.
- Amick, B. C. III and Smith, M. J. (1992): Stress, computer-based work monitoring and measurement systems: a conceptual overview. *Applied Ergonomics*, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 6-16.
- Ball, Kirstie S. (2001): Situating workplace surveillance: Ethics and computer based performance monitoring. *Ethics and Information Technology*, vol. 3, pp. 211-223.
- Belfield, Richard and Marsden, David (2003): Performance pay, monitoring environments, and establishment performance. *International Journal of Manpower*, vol. 24 no. 4, pp. 452-471.
- Beniger, J. R. (1986): *The Control Revolution. Technological and Economic Origins of the Information Society*, Cambridge MA.
- Blanpain, Roger and van Gestel, Marc (2004): *Use and Monitoring of E-mail, Intranet and Internet Facilities at Work*. Law and Practice, Den Haag.
- Boyes, Roger (2008): Lidl, the Big Brother supermarket, is watching you, *The Times*, 2008-03-27, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article3628660.ece> [2010-01-20].
- Bronfenbrenner, Kate (2009): No Holds Barred. The Intensification of Employer Opposition to Organizing, *Economic Policy Institute Briefing Paper 235*, <http://www.epi.org/publications/entry/bp235/> [2010-01-20].
- Candeias, Mario (2007): High-Tech, Hartz und Hegemonie, in: Kaindl, Christina (ed.): *Subjekte im Neoliberalismus*, Marburg, pp. 49-57.
- Chan, Andrew and Garrick, John (2003): The Moral ›Technologies‹ of Knowledge Management. *Information, Communication & Society*, vol. 6 (3), pp. 291-306.
- Chociej, Patricia A. (1997): »Who's Reading My E-Mail?«: A Study of Professionals' E-Mail Usage and Privacy Perceptions in the Workplace. *IEEE Transactions on professional communication*, vol. 40 (1), pp. 34-40.
- Edwards, Richard (1981): *Herrschaft im modernen Produktionsprozeß*, Frankfurt am Main; New York (engl.: *Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century*, 1979).
- Erler, Andreas (2003): *Die private Nutzung neuer Medien am Arbeitsplatz*, München.
- Fairweather, N. Ben (1999): Surveillance in Employment: The Case of Teleworking. *Journal of Business Ethics*, vol. 22, pp. 39-49.
- Fragale Filho, Roberto and Jeffery, Mark (2002): Information Technology and Workers' Privacy: Notice and Consent. *Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal*, vol. 23 (4), pp. 551-568.
- Gill, Stephen (2003): Power and resistance in the new world order, *Houndsmills*.
- Grill, Markus (2008): Systematische Bespitzelung im Handel, *stern.de*, 2008-04-16, <http://www.stern.de/wirtschaft/news/unternehmen/ueberwachung-systematische-bespitzelung-im-handel-617392.html> [2010-01-20].
- Grill, Markus and Arnsperger, Malte (2008): Lidl gibt Bespitzelung zu, *stern.de*, 2008-03-26, <http://www.stern.de/wirtschaft/news/unternehmen/ueberwachungsskandal-lidl-gibt-bespitzelung-zu-615031.html> [2010-01-20].
- Henderson, Harry (2006): *Privacy in the information age*, 2nd edition, New York.
- Hoven, Jeroen Van Den and Vermaas, Pieter E. (2007): Nano-Technology and Privacy: On Continuous Surveillance Outside the Panopticon. *Journal of Medicine and Philosophy*, vol. 32 (3), pp. 283-297.
- Introna, Lucas D. (2003): Opinion. Workplace Surveillance ›is‹ Unethical and Unfair. *Surveillance & Society*, vol. 1 (2), pp. 210-216.
- Karat, John and Karat, Clare-Marie (2008): An Organizational View of Pervasive Computing. Policy Implications for Information Exchange. *Social Science Computer Review*, vol. 26 (1), pp. 13-18.
- Klein, Kris and Gates, Vivian (2005): *Privacy in Employment. Control of personal information in the workplace*, Toronto.
- Lane III, Frederick S. (2003): *The naked employee. How technology is compromising workplace privacy*, New York.
- Loch, Karen D.; Conger, Sue and Oz, Effy (1998): Ownership. Privacy and Monitoring in the Workplace: A Debate on Technology and Ethics. *Journal of Business Ethics*, vol. 17 (6), pp. 653-663.
- Lucore, Robert E. (2002): Challenges and opportunities: Unions confront the new information technologies, in: *Journal of Labor Research*, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 201-214.
- Lyon, David (2007): *Surveillance Studies. An Overview*, Cambridge.
- mic (2009): Mitarbeiterüberwachung: Edeka-Simmel spioniert Angestellte seit Jahren aus, *Focus*, 2009-11-29, [http://www.focus.de/finanzen/news/mitarbeiterueberwachung-edeka-simmel-spioniert-angestellte-seit-jahren-aus\\_aid\\_458438.html](http://www.focus.de/finanzen/news/mitarbeiterueberwachung-edeka-simmel-spioniert-angestellte-seit-jahren-aus_aid_458438.html) [2010-01-20].

- Office of Technology Assessment of the U.S. Congress (1987): *The Electronic Supervisor: New Technology, New Tensions*, Washington, D.C.
- Peters, Maren and Sirlschtov, Antje (2008): Der Spion, der aus der Lochwand kam, *Der Tagesspiegel*, 2008-04-04, <http://www.tagesspiegel.de/wirtschaft/Unternehmen-Ueberwachung-Einzelhandel;art129,2512589> [2010-01-20].
- Thibault Aranda, Javier (2002): Information Technology and Workers' Privacy: The Role of Worker Representatives. *Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal*, vol. 23 (4), pp. 533-550.
- Tobien, Jenny (2007): Feind in den eigenen Reihen, *Manager Magazin*, 2007-02-28, <http://www.manager-magazin.de/koepfe/karriere/0,2828,439469,00.html> [2010-01-20].
- Townsend, Anthony M.; Aalberts, Robert J. and Whitman, Michael E. (2000): Employer Liability Under the Communications Decency Act: Developing an Effective Policy Response. *Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal*, vol. 12 (1), pp. 39-46.
- Tullney, Marco (2009): Digitale Überwachung im Büro – neue Risiken für Beschäftigte, in: Bisky, Lothar; Kriese, Konstanze and Scheele, Jürgen (eds): *Medien – Macht – Demokratie. Neue Perspektiven*, Berlin, pp. 295-316 (available at [http://www.rosalux.de/cms/fileadmin/rls\\_uploads/pdfs/Texte-54.pdf](http://www.rosalux.de/cms/fileadmin/rls_uploads/pdfs/Texte-54.pdf)).
- Zugelder, Michael T.; Champagne, Paul and Maurer, Steven D. (2000): Balancing Civil Rights With Safety at Work: Workplace Violence and the ADA, in: *Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal*, vol. 12 (2), pp. 93-104 .

## **Anti-terror Investigations against Social Movements— A Personal Experience of a Preventive Threat**

On the morning of July 31<sup>st</sup>, 2007, a squad of special police forces raided our apartment. It was searched for the next 15 hours, and Andrej was arrested and kept in preliminary detention for the next three weeks. The reason given was an anti-terror investigation according to §129a of the German Criminal Code. Andrej and six other men were accused of being members of a terrorist organisation, the so-called ›militant group (mg)‹.

Days later, when we had access to the case files for the first time, it became clear that approximately one year of surveillance measures had preceded the arrests. A terrorism accusation in Germany allows extensive surveillance options: phones were tapped, emails read, access to websites registered and evaluated. GPS devices were installed in private cars to exactly monitor their movements. Video cameras pointed to house entrances, and police teams followed the accused to observe their daily life. Portable microphones recorded conversations in bars.

The investigation first targeted four men and later extended to include three more, initially because of alleged ›conspiratorial behaviour‹. It is conspiratorial, for example, to turn off mobile phones during meetings or to arrange a date by phone without explicitly naming time, place and reason to meet. We found out about this when the three who were later included in the case were arrested after trying to set fire to several military vehicles in July 2007. One had met with Andrej twice several months before. Because of this, the houses of the four men initially accused were also searched, and Andrej was arrested and flown to Germany's Federal Court of Justice in Karlsruhe by helicopter. A federal judge signed an arrest warrant for all four. To understand what we call ›guilt by association‹ one must look closer at the construction of the accusations:

The background of the massive surveillance operation was and still is somewhat obstructed in the files even today. According to them, the federal investigators, who were investigating the so-called ›militant group (mg)‹, noticed linguistic similarities between their (the mg's) texts on the one hand and political and academic texts that were published online on the other. The case is based on the comparison of search words ›via internet‹ (no details given). This led to the initial suspicion directed against Andrej and three of his friends. A linguistic analysis done by the Federal Police themselves later determined that it is most unlikely that the compared texts have the same authors—this was months before the arrests and did not change the investigation. The ›conspicuous terms‹—which, according to the police, can also be found in texts by the ›militant group‹

claiming responsibility for different arson attacks—resulted in a wave of public protest, which in the end led to the quick release of Andrej. The reason for the public outcry was the knowledge about the crude basis of the investigation. Researchers became afraid that the (frequent) use of specific academic terms or even words from everyday life, such as ›framework‹, ›political practice‹, ›reproduction‹, ›precarisation‹, and ›gentrification‹, could endanger their thinking, writing and political freedom.

The points made in the arrest warrant increased this feeling. Focal points in the construction of the investigation were—next to typical reasons given in such cases such as conspiratorial behavior and specific political views—»access to libraries« (to research inconspicuously for the texts used to claim responsibility for attacks) and the »ability to write complex texts«.

But the idea of critical research being criminalized is only one of the several possible explanations for the unchained surveillance activities. Having thought about this investigation for nearly two years, we see two tendencies concerning social movements and protest: first, the desire to gather comprehensive information and, secondly, intimidation. Especially the fact that police investigations focus on identifying possible moments of suspicion increases the number of possible suspects. Suspicion, previously the initial moment of investigations, now becomes the result of police work in the frame of preventive anti-terror investigations. Surveillance is legitimised not by a clear indication of someone's participation in a crime or offence but instead by someone fitting vague patterns such as being an activist, being educated and/or having no prior police record. Security policies are oriented increasingly towards prevention, which goes along with the widening of those circles of the population to be controlled.

### **Surveillance of protest movements within a framework of criminal investigations**

Andrej's arrest with the accompanying international protests for his release initiated public debates on the issue of anti-terror investigations against the political left and social movements. During the different activities supporting the seven accused men in this case, we learned quickly that this case was not the only investigation against activists from different social movements. To our knowledge, there were at least four cases, according to the German §129a in the realm of the mobilisations against the G8 summit in Germany in 2007. The impression from the (still incomplete) files is that one central goal of such investigations is to collect information about activists.

## Measures of surveillance used in four cases in numbers

The so-called »G8 case« became known through house searches carried out in 40 places six weeks before the summit targeting 18 people whose only crime was involvement in different protest activities against the summit. One year later we organised a press conference protesting the four lingering cases and presented some numbers extracted from the files known to us at that point. In May of 2008, in four §129a cases, 41 people were accused (with one exception all men), more than 70 houses and work places had been searched, about 200 court orders for different surveillance measures had been signed by federal judges, a minimum of 90 phones had been tapped, 20 homes had been monitored by video cameras, 10 GPS devices had been attached to cars, 2000 people's names were mentioned and thus monitored by the police. Four men had been arrested and later released. As of today, three of these four cases have been dismissed altogether for lack of evidence, and for the fourth no further evidence has been produced. Three men face up to 5 years of imprisonment after a scandalous court case, and the four men initially accused, one is Andrej, are still waiting for the Federal Prosecutor's evidence against them.

Typical for investigations against terrorist organisations is a drastic discrepancy between the number of investigations started on the one hand and the number of cases that are actually taken to court and end up in convictions on the other. According to numbers issued by the Federal government of Germany, only 5-10 % of the investigations in the past years landed in court. In most cases, the people never know about the extensive surveillance measures applied against them. If you do find something out, this usually happens years later. Then you may understand unexpected cancellations of bank accounts, work or rent contracts, etc. from the past. Nobody has ever heard of compensation.

These last four investigations mentioned against political activists (according to §129a) that became known are related—if only during the time they were carried out—to the mobilizations against the G8 summit in the summer of 2007 in Heiligendamm (Germany). A significant number of those accused actively participated in protest preparations. In one of the four cases the police assumed this, even though those accused clearly indicated they were not interested in the protests. In the course of the investigations, local, national and sometimes international preparatory meetings were monitored. This did not lead to any further proof of the believed terrorism suspicion. However, the security institutions were able to obtain a detailed overview of network structures of people and organisations involved, political debates and planned activities during the summit.

The German constitution indisputably states that police and intelligence services be clearly separated. Despite this constitutional norm, terrorism investigations according to criminal law were carried out in a secret service manner. The case files make it quite clear that the »Federal Office for the Protection of the

Constitution« (the German intelligence service for internal affairs) was involved in all these cases, partly with a leading role. It initiated certain paths of investigative activities, provided technical and informational assistance and was included in the evaluation of parts of material confiscated during the house searches (this especially concerns written material, data on portable drives and hard disks).

### **Strategy of fear — Intimidation as a result of anti-terror investigations**

When surveillance, house searches or even arrests takes place, they always have an intimidating effect on the people concerned, on their friends, family and the political organisations they are involved in. Formerly abstract ideas of a big brother state seem to become real, and many activists wonder who is next. Chanting, »We are all terrorists« at demonstrations is not only an expression of solidarity, but also the recognition of the possibility of coming under scrutiny oneself. Current knowledge on the extent of surveillance indicates that a greater part of activist scenes may be subjected to it. Confrontation with such forms of repression alters even how simple daily routines are conducted, and it can influence the way political communication takes place.

In our specific case we realized that we primarily changed forms of communication after we learned about the investigation against Andrej:

- There is a change in the way phone calls are conducted: to avoid appearing suspicious or conspiratorial to the authorities, we always named details of place, time and reason for any meeting, even if only watching a soccer game.
- We were constantly aware of the danger of endangering others, and so were they. Being in touch with us meant (and still means) being included in the scope of surveillance measures at least for a while. To our knowledge, avoiding contacting us hardly occurred with Andrej's case. We did voluntarily leave it up to everyone to choose to contact us; we did not initiate contact after Andrej's arrest and release.
- For months we discussed any form of written or oral expressions with a lawyer beforehand (e.g. interviews or public statements).
- We always thought twice about participating in public events (because we anticipated possible perceptions of them by the police).

Even the most ordinary actions in your life can be affected by these experiences. We even found ourselves thinking that stooping down to tie your shoelaces might be seen as something suspicious, which we should avoid. Nevertheless, we wanted to deal with the case and its consequences in the most public and political way possible. This was facilitated mainly by very broad public solidarity and support of friends. Yet even today we cannot participate in any political activities without

thinking twice (or more)—if we have any spare time. Dealing with such an investigation and leading a somewhat normal family and professional life leaves almost no time for anything else.

For us as well as for many friends, the case made us drop our former political interests and activities for activities focusing on the anti-terror investigation.

### **Political marginalisation through repression**

Political movements face the danger of marginalization when anti-terror investigations against them become known. Collaboration in broader political alliances can especially be endangered by the stigma of terrorism suspicion. This was different in our case, primarily because of the substantial public criticism of the construction and execution of the investigation. It sometimes actually had the opposite effect. For example, public interest in Andrej's original field of research, gentrification, increased. This is not a typical effect, though.

The course of the investigation, and especially the initial suspicion supported by texts from the accused that they published under their own name, can separate political activism, journalism and academic research increasingly, marginalizing critical voices in public debates even more.

Thousands of researchers rejected the criminalization of critical academic writings in the course of the investigation as a categorical criminalization of scientific work. However, it cannot be overseen that many individual decisions for future choices of subjects came as a reaction to the investigation in our case, in spite of the collective reactions by different academic associations. In his department alone, Andrej noticed several bewildered inquiries by students, whether it might be advisable to reconsider the subject of their theses.

### **Conclusion**

Security policies are increasingly oriented to prevention, especially in anti-terror investigations. Similarly, the sources of suspicion as well as the number of people under suspicion have been broadened. Protest movements suffer from this not only because of the increasing insecurity for individual activists, but also because of the threat of political marginalisation.

Public reactions in our case have shown that an open and public handling of accusations and methods of the investigation can be a useful strategy against the constant growth of the secu-society. Not only does this uncover the hidden aspects of investigations. It is also possible to avoid the political stigmatization of a terrorism accusation. In the course of the case, the tightened security laws themselves increasingly became the subject of political activities.

Yet one has to admit that the openly repressive elements and, maybe even more so, the subtle mechanisms of self control resulting from the all-encompassing experience one has of being under suspicion and under surveillance are an absolute threat to the political activist, who is altered as a person in this web of measures, experiences, expectations, fears, and hopes. Personal strength and especially political solidarity are required to avoid letting this notion of prevention by control and self-control win. This is necessary to keep your identity despite all efforts to turn yourself into someone else, someone who is adapted to society in ›their‹ way.

Michael Shane Boyle

## **The Criminalization of Dissent: Protest Violence, Activist Performance, and the Curious Case of the VolxTheaterKarawane in Genoa**

*»...the last time I was in Italy was in June, more than a month before the protests. At that time, it was already clear that the police were running out of control, getting their excuses ready for a major civil liberties crackdown and setting the stage for extreme violence. Before a single activist had taken to the streets, a preemptive state of emergency had been essentially declared: airports were closed and much of the city cordoned off.*

*Yet when I was last in Italy all the public discussions focused not on these violations of civil liberties but on the alleged threat posed by activists.«*

Naomi Klein, »Getting Used to Violence«

*»The double violence of organized representation, which consists in the distortion and shutdown of images by the mass media communication and in the subjugation and striation of the war machine by the state apparatus and its traditional organs of the police and justice, this combination of rigid spectacularization and criminalization overtook the VolxTheaterKarawane in Genoa with full force...«*

Gerald Raunig, »Art and Revolution«

### **The arrest: Genoa's discourse of criminality**

On the afternoon of July 22, 2001, a small but conspicuous convoy belonging to the Viennese activist-performance collective the VolxTheaterKarawane departed the Italian city of Genoa, leaving behind the 2001 G8 summit and the tumultuous events of the previous days.<sup>1</sup> But while parked at a rest stop some twenty kilometers outside Genoa's city limits, the summit—or more specifically, a large group of heavily-armed Carabinieri—caught back up to them.

By that sweltering mid-summer Sunday in 2001, members of the VolxTheater-Karawane were certainly no strangers to police harassment. The tight-knit group had been touring central Europe for four weeks as part of a migrant rights activist tour performing actions, organizing demonstrations, and throwing parties on the

<sup>1</sup> While not standard German spelling, VolxTheaterKarawane is often translated into English as PublixTheater Caravan.

streets of cities throughout Austria, Slovenia, and Italy. Their slow-moving caravan and colorful public spectacles routinely attracted the attention of local authorities, often resulting in searches, seizures, and in the case of the G8 summit in Genoa, indefinite detainment and torture. Despite being accustomed to the repressive tactics of the police, the surprise meeting with Carabinieri just outside of Genoa presented the group with an altogether novel although unwanted experience: this was the first time authorities wielded machine guns at them.

All of the twenty-five individuals traveling with the caravan that afternoon were arrested and held in custody for the next three weeks.<sup>2</sup> There they were subjected to aggressive interrogations and physical abuse.<sup>3</sup> Italian police accused the activist-performance collective of forming a criminal organization and charged them under a law most often reserved for the mafia. While the VolxTheaterKarawane was eventually released following a massive public outcry that featured solidarity actions throughout Europe, diplomatic pressure by foreign governments, and open letters of support from such disparate sources as Amnesty International, Nobel laureates Elfriede Jelinek and Dario Fo, and the rock group U2,<sup>4</sup> as of the time of this writing over eight years later the dubious charges brought against the Vienna-based group are still pending. None of the twenty-five arrested have received their day in court, let alone seen the charges against them dropped.

As I argue in the following paper, the lingering case of the VolxTheaterKarawane concretely reveals and can help us to analyze the consequences of the multiple, overlapping, and violent taming practices that state authorities exercised at the 2001 G8 Summit in Genoa, Italy. My argument makes a careful, albeit admittedly artificial distinction between the descriptive discourse of criminality that emerged from the Genoa demonstrations in the media and the discourse of criminalization that provided crucial conditions of possibility for the violent events that ensued in Genoa. I privilege the discourse of criminalization in my analysis of the VolxTheaterKarawane's arrest and detainment in order to examine how the police's handling of the Genoa demonstrations as a criminal problem that demanded a repressive response corresponds to the general refusal of political elites to recognize the movements against corporate globalization as legitimate political interlocutors. As I explain below, my methodological decision to analyze how the discourse of criminalization operated on a specific activist group is an effort to study the demonstrations against the Genoa G8 Summit outside the abstract

2 While most of those traveling with the VolxTheaterKarawane that day were part of the group, four of those arrested had simply joined the caravan for a ride out of Genoa. The information presented in this essay on the VolxTheaterKarawane's arrest and detainment in Genoa comes from interviews with group members, documents on the VolxTheaterKarawane's website (<http://no-racism.net/nobordertour> [2009-10-20]), press releases from the VolxTheaterKarawane, and secondary sources such as Raunig (2007) and Müller (2007).

3 For a general overview of group's detainment written by the VolxTheaterKarawane in English, see [http://no-racism.net/nobordertour/noprison/pk\\_20801\\_state\\_01.html](http://no-racism.net/nobordertour/noprison/pk_20801_state_01.html) [2009-10-20].

4 These letters of support and others can be found on the Caravan's NoBorder Tour website: <http://no-racism.net/nobordertour/> [2009-10-20].

frames that have been typically employed by the mainstream media to discuss the Genoa protests.

As a number of scholars, journalists, and activists have noted, the public memory of the Genoa G8 Summit is largely one of chaos and violence, what anthropologist Jeffrey Juris has described as, »an iconic sign of wanton destruction« (Juris 2008, 162). In his study of the Genoa demonstrations and their representation in the media, Juris writes, »Genoa has become synonymous with protest violence, a metonym evoking images of tear gas, burning cars, and black-clad protestors hurling stones and Molotov cocktails at heavily militarized riot police« (161). His analysis corresponds to other studies that highlight how evocative images of violent confrontations between militant demonstrators and heavily armed police have adversely affected public perceptions of not only the Genoa demonstrations, but the anti-corporate globalization movement as a whole (see also Graeber 2007; Perlmutter and Wagner 2004; Atton 2002). As is well-known, the violence in Genoa led to intense public and legal scrutiny of the militant tactics of demonstrators and the brutal behaviors of police (Caroll 2002; Klein 2002b; Allen Jr. 2001). The drive to attribute blame and prosecute those responsible for the violence in Genoa yielded a powerful discourse of criminality (Hall et al. 1978) that quickly enveloped the public memory of the Genoa demonstrations (Hooper 2008; Perlmutter and Wagner 2004; Hislop 2001). Like the »active forgetting of the events« which characterizes what Kristin Ross has described as the »after-lives« of the May 1968 protests in Paris, the demonstrations against the 2001 G8 Summit have also become »disembodied, increasingly vague in [their] contours ... more and more a purely discursive phenomenon« (Ross 2002a, 182; see also Ross 2002b). This forgetting is not due to any »shroud of silence« around the Genoa demonstrations (Ross 2002a, 184), but results from Genoa's discursive prominence in the media which focuses on the violence of the demonstrations. Yet responsibility for this framing certainly does not rest solely with the media. After all, the repressive behaviors of police and the »protest aesthetics« of militant activists (Day 2007) combined to create an atmosphere of siege and conflict that lends itself to particular and predictable »framings« in the media (Juris 2005; Graeber 2002). Yet as Stuart Hall et al. have compellingly argued, the unsurprising narrative strategies used by the media to represent protest violence invariably presents such turbulence as a crime against society itself (Hall et al., 1978, 68). The many legal proceedings against demonstrators and police following the 2001 G8 summit only intensified the sense of Genoa as being the scene of multiple crimes.

The descriptive and highly performative discourse of criminality that emerged out of the violent images and stories from the protests has undoubtedly shaped symbolic registers and public perceptions of the Genoa demonstrations to a dramatic extent. Such perceptions fixate, of course, on the militant and destructive actions of demonstrators. This focus relies on a depoliticization of the demonstrations into something amorphaously criminal, which inevitably leads to a forgetting

and/or discursive perversion of the political aims, goals, and subjectivities of the demonstrators themselves. Perhaps more importantly, this discourse of criminality has transformed Genoa into an abstraction, or as Juris suggests, a »metonym« for the alternative globalization movement as a whole. Abstract yet seemingly obligatory references to the Genoa demonstrations in the public discourse around the anti-corporate globalization movements carry strong performative effects. In addition to dramatically structuring readings of related protest events, this discourse also influences public perception of the anti-corporate globalization movements as a whole, for which Genoa has become a central referent (FAIR 2003).<sup>5</sup>

While critiquing this discourse of criminality is a necessary project, my study focuses primarily on the role that a discourse of criminalization played in Genoa, specifically with regards to shaping the repressive tactics used by police against demonstrators. I argue that in addition to the discourse of criminality that emerged in representations of the Genoa demonstrations, there also existed a powerful discourse of criminalization that provided crucial conditions of possibility for the tumult itself. As the case of the VolxTheaterKarawane illustrates, the repressive tactics of police in Genoa were not anomalous, nor were their targets of application indiscriminate. Police behavior was guided by a potent discourse of criminalization that informed police training before the protests and which presented demonstrators as potentially violent criminals whose assembly in Genoa required repression.

The following study of the VolxTheaterKarawane draws primarily on interviews with and materials produced by members of the group. The lengthy account of the group's activities in the years and weeks before their arrest that I begin with is not an attempt at offering a complete history of the VolxTheaterKarawane. By focusing on the conditions surrounding the VolxTheaterKarawane's arrest and detainment following their participation in the protests against 2001 Genoa G-8 summit, I look to contribute to understandings of how the routine criminalization of dissent in liberal democracies operates on and influences activist practices themselves. Moreover, my essay also explores what the particular case of the VolxTheaterKarawane can reveal about the embodied and discursive challenges facing movements against neoliberalism and corporate globalization. What does the case of the VolxTheaterKarawane reveal about the impact of this discourse of criminalization on activist practices as well as activist bodies? And finally, what possibilities does the case of the VolxTheaterKarawane offer for negotiating discourses of criminalization and their repressive manifestations?

5 At the same time, it should be remembered that as a number of activists, journalists, and scholars often remind us, it is mainly activists from and demonstrations in Western Europe and North America who are even included in this public discourse around the movements against corporate globalization. This has a number of discursive and material effects for activists outside of Europe and North America, not the least of which is the general lack of attention to those activists who are murdered or injured elsewhere in the world while demonstrating for similar issues as activists in Genoa did. See, for example, Naomi Klein: *Fences and Windows. The Front Lines of the Globalization Debate*, New York, 2002.

## The VolxTheater Konzept: Vienna 1994 – 2001

»volxTheater. People, who want to make theater. Volxtheater as a collective, non-hierarchical concept, whether on stage or in the street. Theater from below, from the head, the stomach, the ass, the fist, from each tiny toe and from the chest!«<sup>6</sup>

The VolxTheater was founded in 1994 by members of the Ernst Kirchweyer Haus (EKH), a squatted autonomous social center in Vienna's 10<sup>th</sup> district whose residents included a mix of anarchists, students, artists, migrants, and refugees from Africa and Eastern Europe. Initially, the VolxTheater Favoriten (as participants originally called it) was an attempt by the EKH to expand its mission as a cultural center that regularly hosted events like concerts to one that actually produced and presented its own performances. The group drew on the vastly different theatrical talents and training of its members to create performance pieces defined not so much by their production quality as the group's production process. As member Gini Müller noted in 2002, »From the beginning, the working process was defined as a collective process and was accordingly long, lasting several months and rich in conflicts« (2002). Their experiments on the stage featured musical adaptations of works by prominent playwrights like Bertolt Brecht, Dario Fo, Heiner Müller, and Heinrich von Kleist. Productions invariably included loose dramaturgical interpretations of the chosen text's themes and staging practices which often yielded energetic, raucous, and highly tendentious performances.<sup>7</sup> While the group's membership would constantly change throughout its eleven-year existence, the VolxTheater's founding principles of non-hierarchical organization, collective collaboration, consensus decision-making, and openness to all persons remained intact.

In addition to their stage work (almost all of which premiered in the EKH), the VolxTheater also regularly produced public direct actions that blurred the lines between site-specific performance and activism. The group's concerns with European migration policies and detention practices largely defined their political agenda. One of their earliest actions, »Flight from Transdanubia« took place in May 1995 and featured the VolxTheater working together with other squats and activist groups in Vienna to raise awareness of Austria's deportation policies. In the middle of Vienna's 2<sup>nd</sup> district, for example, the VolxTheater publicly dramatized the plight of refugees in Austria by staging a highly theatrical exodus in which refugees from fictional Transdanubia struggled to swim across Vienna's Donaukanal to the other side. In early 1996, the group began holding what they called »racist purity checks« throughout Vienna. In one iteration of this intervention, the VolxTheater set up a portable toilet in front of Vienna's Hofburg Imperial

6 »VolxTheater Konzept.« [http://no-racism.net/volxtheater/\\_html/vkfstset.htm](http://no-racism.net/volxtheater/_html/vkfstset.htm) [2009-10-20].

7 Descriptions, pictures, videos, and sound files of each of the VolxTheater's stage productions can be found online at: [http://no-racism.net/volxtheater/\\_html/vkfstset.htm](http://no-racism.net/volxtheater/_html/vkfstset.htm) [2009-10-20].

Palace. There they sought voluntary stool samples from passersby which they then ostensibly used to confirm the racial purity of citizens.<sup>8</sup> The group's interest in combining performance with direct action ultimately took precedence over their desire to produce work for the theater. By 1999, after being banned from the Vienna Schauspielhaus where they had been invited to stage a cabaret production »Austria, a Country goes Haywire ... and the Foreigner is to Blame,« an incendiary response to Austria's newly formed right-wing coalition government, the VolxTheater began devoting its energy solely to activist projects. In these explicitly activist interventions, however, performance would remain a central part of the group's action strategy.

The end of the VolxTheater's theatrical work set the stage for their first caravan project: the so-called »EKH Tour« of May 2000 in which the group visited nine different cities throughout Austria in just nine days. The caravan was part of a larger Austrian movement called the »Platform for a World without Racism« which had been founded in 1999 to protest Austria's deportation practices.<sup>9</sup> On each stop of the tour, the group set up camp in the middle of the city's main square where they played music, held pie fights, distributed political literature, hosted a public kitchen to make food for passersby, and performed variety acts, magic tricks, and excerpts from the VolxTheater's stage repertoire. The success of this first tour soon led to others, including a caravan the following October called, »The Culture Caravan Against the Right Wing,« which became a central part of the protests that swept through Austria in 2000 in response to the nation's new conservative government. In both of these early caravans, the VolxTheater experimented with street theater and improvisational tactics all while learning how to function as a traveling activist-performance collective. The lessons learned during these early caravans laid the foundation for four more caravans over the next five years, including the one that led to their arrest just outside of Genoa the following summer.

## **Performance and policing: The 2001 NoBorder Tour**

The VolxTheaterKarawane's arrest in Genoa brought their 2001 tour to a sudden and surprise ending. Since June 26, the group had been traveling central and eastern Europe on an international activist tour sponsored by the NoBorder activist network which took aim at Europe's heightened immigration controls, biometric surveillance tactics, and detention practices.<sup>10</sup> Under the slogan, »For

8 Information on the VolxTheater's early performative direct actions can be found in texts by Raunig (2007) and Müller (2007), as well as online at [http://no-racism.net/volxtheater/\\_html/vktfset.htm](http://no-racism.net/volxtheater/_html/vktfset.htm) [2009-10-20].

9 The »Platform for a World without Racism« was founded in response to the death of Nigerian refugee Marcus Omofuma. Omofuma was killed during a deportation flight from Vienna to Sofia on May 1, 1999 when three Austrian officers strapped him to a seat of the plane and sealed his mouth with tape, causing him to suffocate.

10 The NoBorder network was founded by antiracist and immigrant rights activists in 1998 to challenge the emerging power structures and policies of what some call »Fortress Europe.« See <http://www.noborder.org> [2009-10-20].

freedom of movement and freedom of communication,« the VolxTheaterKarawane (as it was renamed at the beginning of this tour) toured Austria, Slovenia, and Italy where they conducted street performances, set up NoBordercamps, protested deportation centers, and participated in demonstrations against the World Economic Forum in Salzburg and the G-8 Summit in Genoa.<sup>11</sup> Before their arrest on July 22, the group had planned to conclude the tour in early August with a massive NoBorder Camp at the Frankfurt am Main Airport in Germany. Throughout their entire tour, the VolxTheaterKarawane emphasized transparency and publicness. In addition to their colorful and highly conspicuous caravan and camps, the group maintained an online tour diary, frequently broadcasted reports of their actions over the Viennese independent Radio Orange, and sent out regular mobile phone updates to supporters. The group also readily made room in the caravan for anyone they met along the way who wanted to come along.

The NoBorder tour kicked off in Vienna on June 26, 2001 with a press conference and outdoor party. The next morning, twenty activists in cars, vans, and small buses decorated with NoBorder banners and homemade signs set out for Salzburg where they joined the demonstrations against the World Economic Forum (WEF). There the VolxTheaterKarawane organized street parties, conducted info-sessions, and added their own colorful twist to the main demonstration. Dressed as UN soldiers in blue helmets and green fatigues or in bright orange jump suits emblazoned with the NoBorder logo, the VolxTheaterKarawane infiltrated the heavily guarded red-zone around the WEF's central meeting place and constructed a massive and absurd-looking ›WEF-monster‹ made of black innertubes. In what would become the first of many questionable accusations leveled against the group that summer, Austria's largest newspaper the Kronen Zeitung reported on a secret weapons depot the VolxTheaterKarawane was carrying in one of their vehicles. When the VolxTheaterKarawane responded to these allegations by holding a party and public viewing of their »illegal weapons depot,« the Austrian police arrived to investigate. The officers promptly left when all they discovered was a collection of cooking utensils, juggling sticks, and as the VolxTheaterKarawane's tour diary explains, local children having »great fun with our innertubes and waterpistols« (VTK, July 3).

Following the demonstrations in Salzburg, the caravan traveled to the Slovenian town of Lendava, on the border of Croatia, Hungary, and Austria to join other activists in setting up a NoBordercamp. Here the VolxTheaterKarawane gave performances, held workshops on protest tactics using Boalian invisible theater techniques, and distributed information about contemporary migration issues. In addi-

11 A detailed log of the VolxTheaterKarawane's entire 2001 caravan can be found online. The log was updated daily during the tour until the group's arrest on July 22. The contents of the »Caravan Diary« are in English, German, Spanish, and Italian. See <http://www.no-racism.net/nobordertour/media/2606/2606.html> [2009-10-20]. From here on, direct quotations from the online diary will be referenced by the initials VTK followed by the entry date.

tion to the NoBordercamp, the VolxTheaterKarawane also produced a number of performative direct actions in Lendava. For the NoBorder Action Day on 7 July, members of the group dressed again as UN soldiers and set up temporary border stations on the highway along the Slovenian-Croatian border where they stopped cars to distribute NoBorder passports and information on Europe's migration policies to drivers. After organizing a demonstration in front of a deportation center in Ljubljana with Slovenian activist groups »to protest the inhumane conditions faced by those denied the freedom of migration« (VTK, July 10), the group's next stop in Eisenkappel, Austria once more attracted the attention of police. Following a lengthy and thorough search of their vehicles, the police demanded the names of everyone who would be heading to the Genoa protests. As their online diary entry for the day indicates, these aggressive police tactics made a strong impact on the group, prompting them to have »long discussions about the tour, responsibility and police repression and how these topics were influencing our groups dynamics« (VTK, July 13).

From here the group began their journey to Genoa to join the protests against the G8 summit. Before even crossing into Italy, however, the VolxTheaterKarawane experienced what has become a familiar ritual in the regulation of dissent by European governments. Beginning on July 11, 2001, the Italian government mounted a massive border control operation, which included suspending the Schengen agreement on the free movement of people within the European Union. This exceptional measure allowed the government to conduct border checks on over 140,000 individuals between July 11 and July 21, the final day of the summit. These checks resulted in 2,930 entry refusals (IPIC 2001b, 139). Upon learning of these strict plans, the VolxTheaterKarawane decided to split up and cross into Italy at different border points. While most of the group entered Italy successfully, three members were refused entry because their names were on a dubious government watch list prepared specially for the summit. When the VolxTheaterKarawane reunited in the small town of La Spezia, about one hundred kilometers from Genoa, they were again detained by local police. This time officials not only recorded their passport numbers but also conducted a full search of their vehicles resulting in the destruction of a number of the VolxTheaterKarawane's theater props. Despite these encounters with Italian police, the VolxTheaterKarawane's tour diary reveals that heading into Genoa the group's spirits were high, albeit wary of what loomed ahead:

»Confronting the armageddon. Monday is the day to enter what has almost been built up to be something equivalent to entering the twilight zone, or alcatraz or a wicked combination of both.... After another hour or so we began the trek toward Genoa. There was an air of excitement, concern and anticipation as we drove upward through the beautiful mountains and Italian countryside. We stopped at one point to get out of the cars and take in a gorgeous view of the beach and mediterranean, before piling back in and continuing. I asked then »so how far is Genoa now?«, with the reply of »we're here« (VTK, July 16).

## »Confronting the Armageddon«

The process of search, seize, and destroy the VolxTheaterKarawane experienced in La Spezia would only repeat itself upon the group's arrival in Genoa. On their second morning in Genoa, the VolxTheaterKarawane was rudely awakened by a police search of their vehicles and camp-site: »[W]e woke up at 8.30am when between 20-30 civil policemen (quite hard to tell) invaded the camp and searched the cars and busses and also sent the pass-port-data to the authorities in Austria. According to one of the policemen, the Austrian police had told them, that we would be terrorists, trying to smuggle weapons for the G8 summit. Of course, no weapons were found and obviously no caravanists had terrorism-e[n]tries in the Austrian database...Still, nobody here can understand the danger of jumping balls, tires... and orange cloths« (VTK July 18).

That afternoon the VolxTheaterKarawane began preparations for a migrant rights march they were organizing the following day in Genoa with activists from Italy and the rest of Europe. As part of the so-called »Alien-Nation Block« on July 19, one day before the official start of the G8 summit, the VolxTheaterKarawane led a highly theatrical demonstration in Genoa against Europe's migration policies. The demonstration featured variety acts, street theater, skits, music, and a crowd of over 20,000 people. During the next two days of extremely violent clashes between protestors and police, the VolxTheaterKarawane chose not to appear in Genoa as a group. While some joined other demonstration blocks, the rest worked for the summit's independent media center gathering photos, videos, and news of what would become the most violent anti-corporate globalization demonstration to date.

The Genoa G8 demonstrations resulted in over 1,000 injuries, more than 200 arrests, and one protestor, 23 year-old Carlos Giuliani, being shot dead by police (Juris 2008). On the first day of the protests, nearly 80,000 demonstrators took part in marches and an attempted siege of the summit venue. An unusually dry and terse diary entry from the VolxTheaterKarawane reveals the shock and gravity of that first day's events: »Day of action against the G8-summit. One protestor shot dead, many injured with some of them seriously. For more information on the events, please go to [it.imc](#), [uk.imc](#), [at.imc](#), [ch.imc](#) and [de.imc](#)«<sup>12</sup> (VTK, July 20).

In response to Giuliani's death and the heavy-handed tactics employed by police, nearly 300,000 people showed up for a solidarity march the following day, July 21 (Juris 2005). Although the demonstrations would end that evening, police attacks and brutal raids on activist centers continued into the night and the following days (Juris 2008, 186-188). The most notorious of these attacks was undoubtedly the midnight raid on sleeping activists in the Armando Diaz High School. At the time of the raid, the school was serving as the official meeting place of the

12 The internet links referred to in the diary entry are websites of different Indymedia outlets.

Genoa Social Forum, the umbrella organization who coordinated most of the demonstrations in Genoa and was committed to a non-violent activist strategy. During the attacks, police beat and arrested almost every activist inside the school building. An incredible sixty-two out of the ninety-three people had to be hospitalized following the raid, with three left in comas. Of the ninety-three arrested, only one person was officially charged.<sup>13</sup> Understandably unnerved by these events, the VolxTheaterKarawane was thankful just to get out of Genoa (relatively) unscathed the following morning on July 22.

Yet as the group waited just outside of the small town of Mocconesi (about twenty kilometers east of Genoa) for a few members who had returned to Genoa to collect some of the group's theater equipment that had been left behind, the VolxTheaterKarawane was suddenly joined by a large troop of police. Officers detained the group for hours outside in the hot sun while they thoroughly searched the vehicles and hastily interrogated a few members before escorting the VolxTheaterKarawane back to Genoa where the group was eventually charged with forming a criminal organization. The evidence against them consisted solely of those items confiscated by police, including black clothing such as a bra and a few t-shirts, harmless theater props like a 50 year-old gas mask and fire juggling equipment, and a set of cooking knives that the VolxTheaterKarawane used for their public kitchen. Although members repeatedly tried explaining that they belonged to a theater group and not any criminal organization, they were detained for over three weeks during which time they suffered through interrogations, sleep deprivation, and beatings. One member's description of their first night in custody reveals the physical and psychological ordeals the VolxTheaterKarawane was forced to endure in custody: »The things which happened at the station carried on in an atmosphere of systematic terror, some being beaten badly and some left with a feeling of guilt for being treated less bad. There were also a few policemen distancing themselves from what was happening to us that night. Before leaving the Carabinieri station the groups of men and women, now separated, were kept in a small cold cell with no blankets and windows open. Early in the morning they had to stand with their hands up in a painful position causing cramps, before they were handcuffed and taken away in chains, which were used to strain the handcuffs even more. Someone complained the handcuffs were too tight, whereby the police put them even tighter« (VTK Press Conference).<sup>14</sup>

In the media frenzy that ensued during their confinement, the head of Italy's anti-terrorist task force accused the group of »spiritual complicity« with the Black Bloc, the militant activists blamed by police for the violence of the G-8 summit. Austria's foreign minister Benita Ferrero-Waldner and member of the right-wing

13 Another investigation determined that the two Molotov cocktails presented as the most serious evidence of the dangerousness of the people inside the school had been planted in the school by the police themselves (Juris 2008).

14 For the full statement, see [http://no-racism.net/nobordertour/noprison/pk\\_20801\\_state\\_01.html](http://no-racism.net/nobordertour/noprison/pk_20801_state_01.html) [2009-10-20].

Austrian People's Party responded to the indefinite detainment of the VolxTheaterKarawane by expressing »her complete trust in the Italian justice system.«<sup>15</sup> The group's arrest generated substantial news coverage in both Italy and Austria as well as around the world. Solidarity actions calling for the VolxTheaterKarawane's release took place throughout Europe and the United States and continued until the group's deportation from Italy on August 16. When and if their trials ever come, each member could face a fifteen-year prison sentence. Although convictions are highly unlikely considering the dearth of evidence and absence of wrongdoing, the question remains: how is it that an activist-performance group whose sole collective action in Genoa consisted of organizing a colorful migrant rights march could be charged with forming a criminal organization and subjected to such police brutality?

### **The criminalization of dissent**

The arrest and detainment of the VolxTheaterKarawane is only one of a number of seemingly inscrutable actions taken by police against demonstrators in Genoa. Despite the group's identity as an activist-performance collective, the VolxTheaterKarawane was cast into a role they did not fit: that of a criminal organization. Members were subjected to unjust punishments none of the group's activities in Genoa warranted. When they were not fixating on the violence of protestors, Italian politicians and police officials explained to the press and the courts that much of the police brutality in Genoa was carried out against orders or by rogue officers (Carrol 2002; Klein 2002b). According to this rhetoric, the violent actions of police in Genoa should be understood as exceptions, or at least mistakes—certainly not representative of any policy decisions or police leadership. In what follows, I dispute these insidious claims that suggest the brutal and extra-legal measures taken by police in Genoa were aberrations or responses to activist behavior. Far from being anomalous, I claim that actions such as the arrest and detainment of the VolxTheaterKarawane were a direct consequence of the discourse of criminalization that guided the taming practices exercised by police in Genoa. Moreover, the criminalization of dissent practiced at the 2001 G8 summit is not particular to Genoa. Rather, it corresponds to the general strategy taken by political elites toward the demands and subjectivities of anti-corporate globalization movements around the world. Instead of treating them as political interlocutors, anti-corporate globalization activists are deemed criminal problems that need to be met with repression.

15 Ferrero-Waldner's refusal to defend the VolxTheaterKarawane during their detainment ignited a controversy in Austria and prompted the VolxTheaterKarawane to target Ferrero-Waldner in a number of their later actions, most notably during her 2004 presidential campaign, which she lost. See the VolxTheaterKarawane's documentation of their feud with Ferrero-Waldner at <http://no-racism.net/benita/> [2009-10-20].

To understand how this discourse of criminalization emerged in Genoa, one must remember that the Genoa demonstrations were the climax to nearly a year of harsh state repression against mass gatherings of anti-corporate globalization activists in Europe. Beginning with the first large-scale anti-corporate globalization protest in Europe that took place in September 2000 against the meetings of the World Bank and the IMF in Prague where 600 protestors were injured by police, anti-corporate globalization activists had routinely been targets of police violence. The violence in Genoa followed a series of increasingly violent protests which included the extremely brutal demonstrations just one month earlier in Gothenburg, Sweden. There twenty-five thousand people protesting the meeting of the European Union were met by a highly militarized police force who fired live ammunition at protestors for the first time at a European globalization demonstration, leaving one activist in a coma (Juris 2008, 54). The much publicized turbulence at these protests engendered a powerful public discourse around the Genoa G8 summit before it even began. This discourse legitimated a number of exceptional security measures taken by the Italian government and heightened tensions throughout Italy—tensions that were only intensified by a spate of bomb threats in Genoa that shook Italy just days before the opening of the summit.<sup>16</sup>

As Donnatella della Porta et al. have compellingly argued in their rigorous study of policing at the Genoa G8 protests, the public discourse that preceded the Genoa demonstrations profoundly influenced the attitudes of the various Italian police forces mobilized for the summit (2006). Suspicious, distrust, and fear of anti-corporate globalization activists among police was only exacerbated by a training program that instructed summit police to view protestors as potentially violent criminals seeking to disrupt public order. Through analysis of the training literature distributed to police before the demonstration used to »teach« officers about the anti-corporate globalization movement, della Porta et al. conclude: »The information strategies used for the Genoa G8 [...] led the police to an undifferentiated image of the ›no globals‹ as bad demonstrators« (172). Protestors were depicted as young, misinformed, and destructive with little direct interest in the issues being protested (172). Such views were worsened by rumors that circulated among police forces from dubious Italian intelligence findings suggesting demonstrators were prepared to take such drastic measures as holding police officers hostage or using them as human shields (173). High pressure situations demanding officers make quick decisions on how to react to demonstrators further pushed

16 Peter Hajnal provides an overview of some of the security measures taken in Genoa in preparation of the summit: »Security concerns had prompted the local hosts to designate a red maximum security zone between 18 and 22 July that was accessible only to local residents and those authorized to be in the immediate area of summit events. Tall wire fences surrounded the red zone, and massive police guards at each gate controlled access. Public demonstrations were not allowed in the larger yellow zone surrounding the central red zone. The port of Genoa was closed to navigation, and the city's airport and main railway stations were also closed« (2001).

police to develop a stereotype of protestors »as possible sources of difficulty and danger« (172). As della Porta et al. argue, »These stereotypes, filtered through police knowledge, [became] a sort of guideline for the actions of individual policemen and the force as a whole« (171).

What della Porta et al. describe as a guideline for action constituted a discourse of criminalization that relied on a discursive depoliticization of the protestors. This informed and legitimated the various brutal and repressive tactics used by police in Genoa. In the absence of any political demonstrations of similar scale in the years directly preceding the summit, superiors instructed Italian police to treat the demonstrations as a public-order disturbance, analogizing the protests to familiar criminal disruptions they had encountered with soccer hooligans, the mafia, or terrorists (della Porta 2006, 173).<sup>17</sup> Della Porta et al. argue that ingrained structural tendencies within Italian police such as »a broad conception of public order as being a higher order than civil and political rights« further contributed to the discursive depoliticization of demonstrators (179). The discourse of criminalization combined with poor coordination between the differing police forces present in Genoa led to a police strategy of escalated force that all but ruled out any priority of protecting rights of dissent as police sought to ensure public order and the smooth functioning of the summit (154). Instead protestors were approached not as political interlocutors but as criminals worthy only of repression. The discourse of criminalization that structured the police strategy at the demonstrations led to brutal and even fatal situations, which every independent and international study has concluded were worsened or even provoked by police behavior (See IPIC 2001a). During the two days of demonstrations on July 20 and July 21, police launched over 6,200 tear gas grenades, and at least thirteen officers fired pistol rounds at protestors, with one fatal outcome (IPIC 2001a). With this said, the case of the VolxTheaterKarawane offers a concrete example of how this discourse of criminalization manifested itself in the repressive tactics used by police. The arrest of the VolxTheaterKarawane followed directly from the discourse of criminalization that guided police behavior in Genoa. The VolxTheaterKarawane's case was far from an anomaly especially since the measures taken against them were repeated against several other groups, perhaps most shockingly in the aforementioned Armando Diaz High School incident on the night of July 21.

Although the VolxTheaterKarawane's colorful dress and actions clearly did not fit the profile of militant activists who typically prefer the protection of anonymity to avoid arrest, they were not an indiscriminate target. In fact, the conditions of

17 Della Porta et al. go on to note that while the image of protestors by police fostered before the demonstrations before the protests did not favor deescalation strategies, a number of organizational features of the police further enhanced the violent response of police including the degree of militarization of the Italian state police and carabinieri, their low accountability, as well as their politicization. Della Porta et al. write, »A high degree of police militarization may, through the type of weaponry and training, predetermine certain types of action and preclude others, as well as creating a climate of separateness and mistrust in relations between the police and citizens« (174).

their arrest followed logically from the discourse of criminalization at work in Genoa. Yet many scholars, activists, and even police officers have argued that police in Genoa created what Jeffrey Juris has called, drawing on Giorgio Agamben, »a zone of indistinction,« in which activists were attacked and arrested without regard for their tactical choices (Juris 2008, 162; Agamben 1998). According to this argument, the Genoese authorities' inability (or in Juris' words »refusal«) to differentiate between »good« and »bad« protestors« led them to »quash dissent altogether within a »zone of indistinction« (162). Juris' study draws a stark contrast between what he deems to be the indiscriminateness of police targets and the efforts made by activists to distinguish themselves according to their tactics. (Juris 2008, 172-173).<sup>18</sup> Yet as Juris notes, these activist attempts to demarcate themselves according to tactical choices proved futile as police proceeded to treat the protestors as a single undifferentiated mob, attacking and arresting them in what seemed to be a haphazard manner.<sup>19</sup> While Juris' argument emphasizes the extent to which police suppressed all forms of dissent in Genoa, it does little to explain the discourses that informed the repressive tactics used by of police. Instead, it leaves unexamined the larger structures of power within which police behavior in Genoa was enmeshed.

The case of the VolxTheaterKarawane demonstrates that the repressive tactics of police in Genoa were not arbitrary and their targets far from indiscriminate. In fact, it was the VolxTheaterKarawane's very distinctiveness from other protestors that led police to notice them in the first place. Departing Genoa as a caravan and stopping just outside the city limits together attracted police attention, the same as it had throughout their entire tour. The VolxTheaterKarawane was arrested because of, not despite, their distinctiveness from other protestors. As Gerald Rauhig writes, »[I]nstead of having an exonerating effect, the Caravan's self-chosen conspicuousness actually backfired at the moment of attack by the state apparatus: nothing was easier for the police than to isolate a group setting out from Genoa so visibly and so slowly« (2007, 234). The dependence of their arrest on their conspicuousness followed from the discourse of criminalization that instructed police to approach the demonstrations as a public-order disturbance. For a police force unnerved by the turbulent events of the previous two days and trained to assess

18 As Juris explains, before the protests, the Genoa Social Forum, a coalition of more than 800 organizations from around Italy who coordinated many of the demonstrations in Genoa, put forth a pair of action guidelines mandating that activists not damage the city's infrastructure or physically attack the police (Juris 2008, 169). After extensive debate, and in the spirit of a »diversity of tactics ethic,« there emerged a tacit agreement among diverse groups to dedicate predetermined spaces in Genoa to specific action tactics ranging from carnivalesque forms of protest to confrontations with police and attempted sieges of the summit venue. Within these spatial zones, some activists sought to further differentiate themselves by demarcating their tactical choices according to the colors worn.

19 Juris' conclusion corresponds to the comments made by Giuseppe Bocuzzi, an officer of the seventh Bologna mobile division in Genoa, who laments: »They [his superiors] taught us only to repress, not to prevent; the no-global movement was presented to us as the enemy; there was no training about the various components of the movement, no distinction between violent and peaceful groups. We were prepared for much throwing of Molotovs, for walking through flames, for hitting the deck running« (quoted in della Porta et al., 177).

demonstrators as »possible sources of difficulty and danger,« a large group of activists waiting on the side of the road would of course raise suspicions (della Porta et al. 2006, 172). This should not be taken as a criticism of the VolxTheaterKarawane's decision to depart Genoa in such a manner. I only mean to call attention to how the VolxTheaterKarawane's arrest was not arbitrary, but corresponds to the discourse of criminalization that guided police behavior in Genoa.

The VolxTheaterKarawane's criminalization must also be understood as part of the state's own performative response to the protests. The huge crowds and provocative tactics of demonstrators undoubtedly challenged established structures of authority. As should be clear, the VolxTheaterKarawane's arrest and detainment was not about exacting any form of justice. If it were, the group would likely have received some sort of trial by now. Instead, the VolxTheaterKarawane's arrest was, to paraphrase Michel Foucault, not meant to reestablish justice but to reactivate power (1995, 49). Thus, the twenty-five members of the VolxTheaterKarawane were sitting ducks for a police force eager to reassert their authority and establish order. In his study of police behavior toward mass anti-corporate globalization demonstrations in the United States and Europe, David Graeber details a number of recent cases where police have gone out of their way to defame and criminalize anti-corporate globalization activists, often using extra-legal means to do so (2007; see also Graeber 2004). The cases Graeber cites resonate strongly with that of the VolxTheaterKarawane and others from Genoa, including the controversy caused by Italian police who confessed to planting the Molotov cocktails in the Armando Diaz High School that prompted the July 21 raid (Carroll 2002). Graeber argues that such exceptional efforts on behalf of police to »change the script« of protests constitute a »calculated campaign of symbolic warfare« that aims at damaging public perception of activists as well as legitimating the harsh tactics taken against them (2007, 396). According to Graeber, heavy-handed measures by police against even »non-violent« activists is only further evidence of police disregard for the right of dissent that is supposedly guaranteed by liberal democracies. Instead of protecting this political right, police are chiefly concerned with preserving their own »right« to be in control. Graeber asserts, »If you want to cause a policeman to be violent, the surest way is to challenge their right to define the situation« (2007, 404). Anti-corporate globalization activists and their provocative actions challenge not only the operations of global capital and neo-liberal governance, but structures of authority as well, which as a number of scholars have argued, rest on the state's monopoly of violence. »Police represent the state,« Graeber writes, »the state has a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within its borders; therefore, within that territory, police are by definition incommensurable with anyone else« (2007, 401; See Weber 1964). The challenge that anti-corporate globalization activists pose to this incommensurability, according to Graeber, often leads police to take extreme measures to regain »their right to define the situation.«

Yet as Graeber makes clear, the situation he describes is not limited to the Genoa G8 protests. In fact, the discourse of criminalization at work in Genoa corresponds to the general strategy taken by political elites toward the movements against corporate globalization, characterized chiefly by the refusal to recognize anti-corporate globalization activists as legitimate political interlocutors.<sup>20</sup> The criminalization of the VolxTheaterKarawane involved both a discursive and literal shifting of the group from a political to a criminal frame. Even before they took any action in Genoa, the VolxTheaterKarawane was positioned by police as a problem that needed to be dealt with criminally. As the case of the VolxTheaterKarawane clearly demonstrates, this translation of political actors into criminal problems has profound embodied and discursive consequences for activists—consequences that continue to present dire challenges to anti-corporate globalization movements. Moreover, the discourse of criminalization mobilized against the VolxTheaterKarawane and other activists in Genoa was not the work of errant police officers. The brutal behavior of police in Genoa cannot be understood as only a question of activist provocation or the poor training and coordination of police. As della Porta et al. have argued, the repressive measures taken in Genoa are not »technical questions.« Rather, they »reflect the quality of democratic systems« (195). It is the discursive processes of criminalization and the corresponding repressive tactics that the state routinely uses to regulate dissent which most clearly reveal both the limits and the rationality behind neoliberal governance.

### **»But the caravan goes on!!!«**

»Apart from the political aspects of the arrest and charges, being held in prison for three weeks not knowing for how long or what will happen, has psychological implications and this is just another way of trying to prevent people to take action and stand up for their beliefs. But the Caravan goes on!« (VTK Press Conference).

When I first met Gini Müller in Berlin in late May of 2007, it was just a week before the G-8 summit being held that year in the sleepy resort town of Heiligendamm, Germany. As a veteran of the VolxTheaterKarawane from its origins in the mid-1990s to its disbandment in 2005, Gini was happy to answer my questions about her experiences with the activist-performance group. With the 2007 G8 summit looming, Gini and I could not help but chat at length about the demonstrations planned for Heiligendamm and the German government's massive security crackdown. Since I knew of Gini's precarious legal position stemming from her arrest six years earlier, I was not at all surprised when she expressed serious reservations about joining the protests that year.

When asked about the impact of the arrests in Genoa on the VolxTheaterKarawane, Gini described it as »a near disaster for the group.« Although the arrests

20 Of course, such refusals to engage are not limited to anti-corporate globalization activists.

brought the VolxTheaterKarawane wide international support and solidarity, the group was for a time shattered both emotionally and physically. Their detainment produced multiple schisms within the group. While in custody, disagreements arose over whether members should cooperate with authorities. When it came time for their arraignment, members were split over whether they should even respond to the charges brought against them. For some, the mere acknowledgment of the charges was out of the question; to do so would be to recognize the legitimacy not only of the charges, but the corrupt legal structures positioned against them. Their legal counsel, however, warned them that to say nothing before the judge would be tantamount to offering a confession.

The massive publicity the VolxTheaterKarawane received following their return to Austria only worsened the multiple rifts growing within the group. As Gini noted to me, the media's interest in the group made life »hell.« She recalled being personally hounded by reporters for interviews, even being confronted at her home on multiple occasions. This publicity had a dramatic effect on the group's internal dynamics. When it came to speaking with the press, struggles arose over who would talk and what would be said. Still others expressed skepticism over the need to speak to the mainstream media at all and questioned the motives of those who willingly stood in the limelight. As a result of these divisions, not to mention the physical, emotional, and psychological torture many endured during their indefinite detainment, many members left the VolxTheaterKarawane.

Yet the group never allowed the »Genoa-Repression« (as Gini described it in an article commemorating the VolxTheaterKarawane's ten year anniversary in 2004) to stop or define them (Müller 2004). Lest one be left with the false impression that the VolxTheaterKarawane acquiesced to the passive and powerless position they were subjected to in Genoa, it is important to note how ardently the group refused to be a »»tortured« subject« (Feldman 1991, 109). Instead of succumbing to the terror of their detainment, the group made use of the surprising opportunities their arrest afforded them. They utilized the attention their case received in the press by going on the offensive and making public the full details of their arrest and detainment in press conferences and documents released online. In addition, their newly acquired notoriety helped them to easily recruit new members and resources. They took full advantage of the financial support they received from sympathetic donors as a result of their arrests. These donations would not only support their legal struggles but also fund future projects. The VolxTheaterKarawane even used some of these funds to purchase an old British double decker bus that would become the centerpiece of the group's future caravans with the NoBorder network. Before disbanding in 2005,<sup>21</sup> the VolxTheaterKarawane continued to create actions that sought novel and provocative ways to combine performance with activism. They continued to tour Europe and, of course, continued to attract the attention of police.

21 It is important to note that the disbandment of the VolxTheaterKarawane in 2005 was not due to their arrest or pending legal case from Genoa. For more information on their disbandment, see Müller 2007.

## References

- Agamben, Giorgio (1998): *Homo-Sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, Stanford.
- Allen Jr., John (2001): *Fascism's Face in Genoa*. *The Nation*, August 20.
- Carroll, Rory (2002): *Italian police framed G8 protesters*. *The Guardian*, London, June 22.
- Day, Richard (2007). *Setting up Shop in Nullity. Protest Aesthetics and the New »Situationism.«* *Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies*, 29 (2), pp. 239-260.
- Della Porta, Donatella et al. (2006): *Globalization from Below. Transnational Activists and Protest Networks*, Minneapolis.
- Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR) (2003): *Media Advisory. Media Missing New Evidence About Genoa Violence*, <http://www.fair.org/activism/genoa-update.html> [20-10-2009].
- Feldman, Allen (1991): *Formations of Violence. The Narrative of the Body and Political Terror in Northern Ireland*, Chicago.
- Foucault, Michel (1995): *Discipline and Punish. The Birth of the Prison*, New York.
- Graeber, David (2007): *On the Phenomenology of Giant Puppets. Broken Windows, Imaginary Jars of Urine, and the Cosmological Role of the Police in American Culture*, in: *Possibilities. Essays on Hierarchy, Rebellion, and Desire*, Oakland, pp. 375-418.
- Graeber, David (2004): *Lying in Wait*. *The Nation*, April 13.
- Graeber, David (2002): *The New Anarchists*. *New Left Review*, London, 13 (Jan-Feb).
- Hall, Stuart; Critcher, Charles; Jefferson, Tony; Clarke, John and Roberts, Brian (1978): *Policing the Crisis. Mugging, the State, and Law and Order*, London.
- Hajnal, Peter (2001): *Civil Society at the 2001 Genoa G8 Summit*. *International Journal*, Toronto, 58.1, pp. 13-15.
- Hislop, Donald (2001): *Contextualizing Genoa: Protest, Violence and Democracy*. *Ephemera*, 1 (3), pp. 282-290.
- Hooper, John (2008): *Uproar as Top Police Cleared of Attack on Genoa G8 Protesters*. *The Guardian*, London, November 14.
- Italian Parliamentary Investigative Commission (IPIC) (2001a): *The Events which Occurred in Genoa in Genoa on the Days 19th, 20th, 21st, and 22nd July 2001 in Occasion of the G8 Summit. Report III. Alternative Proposal to the Final Document, Presented by Deputy Graziella Mascia*, <http://www.camera.it> [2009-10-20].
- Italian Parliamentary Investigative Commission (IPIC) (2001b): *Minutes of the Hearing. August 28*, <http://www.camera.it> [2009-10-20].
- Juris, Jeffrey S. (2008): *Networking Futures. The Movements Against Corporate Globalization*, Durham.
- Juris, Jeffrey S. (2005): *Violence Performed and Imagined. Militant Action, the Black Bloc and the Mass Media in Genoa*. *Critique of Anthropology*, 25 (4), pp. 413-432.
- Klein, Naomi (2002a): *Getting Used to Violence. How years of police brutality culminated in the death of the Italian protester Carlo Giuliani*, in: Levy, Debra Ann (ed.): *Fences and Windows. The Front Lines of the Globalization Debate*, New York, pp. 149-151.
- Klein, Naomi (2002b): *Manufacturing Threats. The Italian government cracks down on civil liberties after Genoa*, in: Levy, Debra Ann (ed.): *Fences and Windows. The Front Lines of the Globalization Debate*, New York, pp. 152-155.
- Müller, Gini (2007): *Possen des Performativen*, Vienna.
- Müller, Gini (2004): *10 Jahre VolxTheater*, <http://no-racism.net/article/948> [2009-10-20].
- Müller, Gini (2002): *Transveral or Terror: Moving Images of the PublixTheatreCaravan*, <http://eipcp.net/transversal/0902/mueller/en> [2009-10-20].
- Perlmutter, David and Gretchen Wagner (2004): *The Anatomy of a Photojournalistic Icon. Marginalization of Dissent in the Selection and Framing of a Death in Genoa*. *Visual Communication*, 3 (1), pp. 91-108.
- Raunig, Gerald (2007): *Art and Revolution: Transversal Activism in the Long Twentieth Century*, Los Angeles.
- Ross, Kristin (2002a): *May '68 and its Afterlives*, Chicago.
- Ross, Kristin (2002b): *Establishing Consensus. May '68 in France as Seen from the 1980s*. *Critical Inquiry*, 28 (Spring), pp. 650-676.
- Weber, Max (1964): *Politics as a Vocation*, in: Gerth, H.H. and Mills, C.W. (eds.), Oxford, pp. 77-128.

## **»Wichtig ist der Widerstand«: Rituals of Taming and Tolerance in Movement Responses to the Violence Question**

### **Introduction**

Whether violence should be considered a legitimate protest tactic has been a topic of heated debate among activists for decades. Whatever one's position on this question, it is clear that the rift between militant and nonviolent factions can severely diminish a movement's capacity for solidaristic action and lead to deep and lasting animosities among activists. While scholars are beginning to theorize the ways in which violence has become ritualized in the dance between protesters and police in most western democracies, activists know that the movements' ways of responding to violent protest have also become ritualized. Whenever protesters participate in »violent« actions recriminations fly about who »started it«, whether or not it was justified, and whether and how disapproving parties should present their views in the press. In an effort to discourage, de-escalate, and/or punish the use of violence as they define it, moderate and nonviolent civil disobedience groups engage in a variety of »taming« rituals, i. e. actions intended to subdue and generally delegitimize other activists' use of violence. These attempts at taming, however, have generally not been successful at preventing the use of violent tactics, and increasingly some movements have begun to approach this internal dilemma in a new way: rather than the one side trying to »tame« the other, they have constructed rituals and frames of tolerance and solidarity that allow them to work together more effectively, despite their differences.

The importance of this issue for many social movements raises a critical question that has so far received almost no scholarly attention: Under what conditions are militant and nonviolent factions able to construct common frames and rituals that encourage tolerance and even celebrate different tactical approaches, and when do they interact with mutual animosity, noncooperation, and obstructionism?

To address this question, we examine the relationship between the autonomous and nonviolence movements in Germany – two wings of the radical left whose identities are critically shaped by their orientations to violence. Specifically, we analyze two instances of interaction between them: one in which they worked together fairly successfully (in the actions against a nuclear waste transport in the »Free Republic of Wendland« in March of 2001) and one where they were less able to resolve their differences and engaged in taming behaviors, including public denunciations and fierce in-fighting (during the actions against the G8 meetings in Heiligendamm in June 2007).

## Violence in social movements

Relative to the amount of attention it gets in the mainstream media and in activist discussions, the question of how movements resolve »the violence question« has been virtually ignored by movement scholars. The majority of the work on movement violence has focused on ascertaining why people choose violent tactics (Johnson 1997, Wood 2007, Meyer 2004, Grant & Wallace 1991, Piven & Cloward 1977), under what conditions violent protest occurs (Mahanta 2002, Apter 1979, Piven & Cloward 1977, Tilly 2003, Gillham & Marx 2000), and how effective such tactics are compared to more conventional and/or nonviolent means (Hubbard 1994, Kowalewski 1987, Schumaker 1978, Klarman 1994, Piven & Cloward 1977, Gamson 1990). Another line of research has investigated police violence (Sheptycki 2005, della Porta & Reiter 1998, McPhail & McCarthy 2005, Morris 1993, Klarman 1994). In general scholarship in this area has focused on the relationship between an undifferentiated group of protesters (»the movement«) and the police or countermovement groups.

A smaller number of studies have looked at inter-factional relationships within particular movements. Of these, some have investigated the often volatile relationship between militant extraparliamentary groups and more moderate reformists (Ron 2001, Owens 2002, Hannigan 1985). Others have looked at tactical debates within parliamentary movements, such as the split between the *fundis* and *realos* in the German Green party (Ely 1997, Markovits & Gorski 1993, Scharf 1994, Frankland & Schoonmaker 1992, Hulsberg 1988) or between American Black Power and anti-war activists in 1967 (Hall 2003). Others have examined ideological conflicts within individual extraparliamentary groups, although these groups were all dedicated to nonviolence (Downey 1986, Epstein 1991, Polletta 2002, 2005). Few of these conflicts addressed the question of violence directly, however, and more importantly, the result in every case was factional splitting rather than effective coordination.

We have found only two studies specifically investigating the relationship between militant and nonviolence factions within an extra-parliamentary movement. Brooks (2004) argues that the »anti-globalization« movement's preference for participatory democracy and non-hierarchical structure (which he calls a »lack of leadership«) makes it difficult for them to exclude or police violent protesters, limiting the movement's effectiveness. However, because this study was based solely on news reports, treated the meanings of »violence« and »effectiveness« as unproblematic, and left the activists' reasons for their commitment to egalitarianism and non-hierarchical organization unexamined, it sheds little light on their negotiation of the violence question. On the other hand, while Kassimeris' descriptive study (2005) of the conflict between nonviolent Marxist-Leninist groups and militant leftists in Greece in the summer of 1974 shows that the two factions were not able to coordinate effectively, it is difficult to draw any conclusions as to why without a comparative case.

In addition to the scarcity of research in this area, certain assumptions have limited the way scholars have asked and answered questions about violence in social movements. First, the vast majority of authors start from a normative view of violent tactics as necessarily illegitimate, either on moral grounds or because they are presumed to be ineffective. Second, the term »violence« is often left undefined, as if there were some widely shared, nonideological understanding of the term, when in fact contestation over its meaning is often at the core of the debate among activists. Lastly, it is often assumed that there is no rational foundation for the use of violent tactics – that when it occurs, it is because people are being irrational, undisciplined, unstrategic, overly emotional, etc. These assumptions have led scholars (and many activists) to approach the violence question as a problem of social control faced by organizers as they try to keep fanatical, irrational extremists from ruining their actions.

This study takes a different approach, starting from the assumption that those who engage in violent tactics, however defined, are not acting without reason, but see such tactics, at least under certain conditions, as legitimate and strategically useful. If this choice of tactics is intentional and rational, it follows that efforts to control or suppress it that do not address the rationale for its use are likely to fail and/or split the movement. For this reason, we argue that the question of when and how violence is used by social movements is better understood as a problem of coordination and negotiation, rather than one of discipline. From this perspective there are three basic ways in which nonviolent factions can respond to the violence issue: 1) they can allow everyone to participate but try to »tame« those whose tactics they define as violent, be it through persuasion, political isolation, or physical suppression; 2) they can try to exclude the more militant factions from their actions; or 3) they can decide to tolerate tactical diversity and work to coordinate their efforts. The sociological question then becomes: under what conditions do movements pursue each of these strategies? As many of the »newest« social movements seem to be moving towards coordination rather than taming or exclusion (Day 2005, Starr 2005), the goal of this study is to see what factors contribute to the success or failure of this strategy.

## **Methodology**

In examining our cases, we analyzed published statements made by participating activists, archival data collected by the authors, field notes from Darcy Leach's participant observation during the March 2001 nuclear waste blockade (Leach 2006), and Sebastian Haunss' direct observations of the 2007 G8 protests.

Archival data included calls to action, self-evaluations, and debates from movement magazines or websites, as well as a sampling of news coverage of the events in mainstream newspapers. For the Gorleben actions in March 2001 we

gathered a total of 132 documents, including articles and official statements put out by key groups, individual postings and commentaries in movement publications, and newspaper articles. For the G8 protests in Heiligendamm, we analyzed 122 documents taken from the websites of the larger mobilization networks, and several brochures published before and after the protests. We also relied on empirical analyses of the press coverage of the G8 protests carried out by Dieter Rucht and his collaborators (Rucht and Teune 2008).

For both events, we coded all references to protest forms and/or militancy and analyzed them for variation along five general dimensions:

1. Whether and how coordination took place during the *planning process*;
2. How the various parts of the movement and their action forms were framed in the *mainstream press* before, during and after the event;
3. How various action forms and the question of violence were framed within the movement prior to the action;
4. How the militant and nonviolence factions interacted on the ground during the action; and
5. How the various parts of the movement evaluated the events that took place (forms of action, effectiveness, level of coordination, etc.) after the actions were over.

After reviewing the two cases, we will discuss four factors we found to be important in determining whether the movement tended toward taming or tolerance in each case: 1) the degree to which acceptable forms of action and tactical coordination were specifically discussed in the planning phase; 2) whether or not there was a concrete, tactical goal in each particular action; 3) whether or not the groups had worked together before and/or expected to work together again; and 4) the range of ideological, political, and tactical orientations among the participating groups.

## **Background**

There are several important structural similarities between the two cases. Both were multi-day events incorporating a wide variety of demonstrations, actions, and cultural/educational activities. Both involved thousands of demonstrators from a range of institutional affiliations, action traditions, and political orientations. In both cases, many of the activists traveled long distances to participate, the vast majority of whom were not involved in planning the event. As both events took place in Germany, the mobilization process in both cases also reflected many of the particular characteristics of German new social movements, especially those of the far left. And lastly, both were met with intensive police repression prior to and during the event, including house searches, the seizure of mobilization materials, electronic and visual surveillance, restrictions on the right

to demonstrate, and the deployment of tens of thousands of armed police. Aside from these similarities, the two events emerged out of very different movement contexts.

### **Heiligendamm and the alterglobalization movement**

The protest against the G8 meetings in Heiligendamm was one event in a long line of protests against neo-liberal corporate globalization, including those against annual meetings of the World Economic Forum in Davos since 1998, and meetings of the WTO in Seattle (1999), the IMF and World Bank in Washington (2000), Prague (2001) and Ottawa (2001), and of the G8 in Genoa (2001), Evian (2003), and Gleneagles (2005). The Genoa and Gleneagles G8 meetings were especially important points of reference – Genoa for the intense violence that engulfed the protests,<sup>1</sup> and Gleneagles for the dominance of the NGO campaign for debt cancellation and the marginalization of more confrontational forms of protest.

All of the preceding protests had been characterized by the often tense co-existence of various forms of protest, including counter-summits, demonstrations, blockades, property damage, and attempts to storm the cordoned-off »red zones« where the meetings took place.

### **The anti-Castor campaign in Wendland**

The German anti-nuclear movement began in the mid-1970s with massive demonstrations and the occupations of power plant construction sites in places like Wyhl, Brokdorf, and Wackersdorf. In the late '70s the movement's epicenter moved to Gorleben, a town in the rural area of Wendland, in Lower Saxony, where the industry proposed to build a new power plant, reprocessing plant, and waste disposal facility.

Over the next two decades, the resistance, led by a local citizens' initiative, the Bürgerinitiative Umweltschutz Lüchow-Dannenberg (the »BI«), defeated all but the disposal site, which in 1995 was approved as a »temporary« storage facility. At that point the movement launched its »anti-Castor« campaign to blockade all transports of nuclear waste (shipped in containers called Castors) to Gorleben. The objective of the blockades was to turn public opinion against nuclear power and drive up the cost of each shipment, in order to reduce their number.

1 Genoa 2001 marked the high-point of violence at these summit meetings. Battles between protesters and police and a police raid on peaceful demonstrators sleeping in a school resulted in hundreds of injuries, many serious, and the death of one demonstrator, Carlo Giuliani, who was shot in the head by an Italian police officer.

## Setting the stage: Planning, repression, and framing

### The run-up to Heiligendamm

Mobilization for the June 2007 G8 summit took place under highly charged and repressive conditions. Officials undertook a number of measures to reduce the number of protesters and keep them away from the summit location. The police strategy combined a media campaign to undermine the movement's credibility with various tactics to repress mobilization. Months before the summit, federal intelligence agencies and the German federal police (BKA) began voicing concerns in the press about violent protests and potential terrorist attacks (Frankfurter Rundschau 2006). Then on May 9, police conducted simultaneous raids of 40 leftist projects, apartments, and offices across the country. They were ostensibly looking for evidence against 18 people being investigated for »membership in a terrorist group«<sup>2</sup>, but activists saw it as an intimidation tactic meant to both assess and undermine their mobilization efforts. That evening 5000 people in Berlin and up to 10,000 nationally demonstrated against the raids. Another demonstration in Hamburg on the 28<sup>th</sup> was brutally put down. But if the police had hoped to dampen mobilization for the G8, their efforts backfired, serving instead to unite and anger the radical left, drawing even more activists' attention to Heiligendamm.

Other legal and physical barriers were raised to keep protesters away from the summit. Following the lead of other countries since the 2001 meetings in Genoa, the German summit would be held in a remote location, at a resort hotel on the Baltic Sea. A massive fence – 12.5 km long, 2.5 meters high, and topped with razor wire – was built around the summit hotel to prevent demonstrators from reaching the venue by land, reinforcing the message that the German government expected violent protests. In the final days before the summit, the government also suspended the Schengen Agreement, allowing border police to prevent thousands from crossing into Germany for the event. Finally, a general dispensation was issued suspending the right to demonstrate anywhere within 10 km of the meeting site – encompassing an area twice as large as that within the fence – and declaring any gathering of three or more people within that radius an illegal demonstration.

Planning meetings for the protests against the 2007 G8 summit started roughly two years beforehand. Most important were three »action conferences« held in Rostock in March 2006, November 2006, and April 2007 and several open meetings of the »G8 coordinating circle« in Hannover. Participants included NGOs (e.g. Christian development organizations, environmental groups like BUND<sup>3</sup> and Greenpeace, and groups for alternative trade regulations like Attac<sup>4</sup>), local ci-

2 A federal court ruling in October 2007 found these accusations baseless and declared the May raids and wire-taps illegal (Beck 2008).

3 Bund Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland (Association for Environmental Protection Germany).

4 Association pour une taxation des transactions financières pour l'aide aux citoyens (Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens).

tizens' initiatives, trade unions, leftist political parties (e.g. »die Linke«), and a range of radical leftist groups, from the more formally organized Interventionist Left (IL), to the loose network of Autonomes in Dissent! Representing a broad range of political perspectives and tactical preferences, Yang (2008) categorizes the participants into three general orientations toward the G8: »partners, critics, and antagonists«. The NGOs (partners) hoped to influence the G8 and the general public through dialogue. The Autonomes and other radical leftists (antagonists) saw the G8 meetings as illegitimate, denounced any form of negotiation, and approached the protests primarily as an opportunity to express their rage and opposition. Standing between the other two, the »critics«, the largest and most diverse group, advanced a radical critique of the G8 while still allowing for the possibility of compromise.

Debates about tactics, when they occurred at all, took place mainly within each of the separate networks (Rätz 2007a). The first Rostock conference<sup>5</sup> produced a general schedule, consisting of a kick-off demonstration on Saturday, June 2, followed by »Days of Action« and, finally, blockades at each of the five resort entrances. There would also be cultural events throughout the week, and a counter summit mirroring the official summit meetings (Indymedia 2006). Working groups formed to organize the various activities and would report on their progress at the next two meetings in Rostock. Especially given the repressive political context, one would expect the issue of violence to be an important topic for the groups organizing the demonstration and the blockades. As it turned out, however, only the blockade group took up the question in any detail.

Early movement documents from various groups did address the question of militancy, but only in a vague and indirect way. In July 2005, the IL was formed, a coalition that joined elements of the nondogmatic and (post-)autonomous left with a faction from Attac that was more movement oriented. In their founding statement, the IL called for »the mutual recognition of different forms of action and resistance« in the spirit of »constructive cooperation« and foresaw the use of »confrontational action forms like civil disobedience« (Interventionistische Linke 2005). In the Spring of 2006, the IL and a group called »X-tausendmal quer« (XQ), known for their anti-Castor actions, became the driving force behind a new coalition called »Block G8«, which was founded as a working group to organize the mass blockades of the summit. Block G8 met 20 times between March 2006 and May 2007, and in December 2006 they reached an »action consensus«, which became the focus of the first debate about the violence question.

### **Civil disobedience and militant forms of action**

Block G8 brought together people from various backgrounds to plan a common action, including groups like XQ from a tradition of nonviolent civil disobedience

5 The number of reported participants ranged from 70 (Block G8 2008) to 300 (Indymedia 2006).

and some in the IL drawn from the autonomous movement (although many Autonomi groups remained unaffiliated). After much discussion, and despite their usually incompatible positions on acceptable action forms, Block G8 published an »action consensus« in December 2006, stating that their objective was »to practically and effectively stop the Summit and cut it off from its infrastructure« through various forms of blockades. To accomplish this, they promised »to overcome the police barriers; pushing them out of the way, going around them, or canily flowing through them. We will not allow ourselves to be stopped, distracted, or to get embroiled in the police’s possible strategy of escalation ... By means of civil disobedience, we will resist by showing solidarity. We do not want to injure anyone« (Block G8 2007).

Significantly, this concept did not commit to a purely nonviolent stance and included the idea that other groups could carry out blockade actions using other means as long as they kept their distance. These other groups would include some from the autonomous movement who previously, in statements advocating »imaginative and/or militant actions« (autopool 2006) or declaring that they would »throw a definitive ›NO‹ and some other things at the G8« (PAULA 2006), had hinted at more confrontational forms of action. Aside from one mention of flaming barricades (NoLager Bremen 2007), documents from these more militant groups remained rather abstract, almost never referring to specific tactics.<sup>6</sup> Nonetheless, the Block G8 consensus was a policy of mutual acceptance and non-interference between the respective forms of action—specifically, that more militant forms should not take place near the blockades, and nonviolent protesters should not try to hinder autonomous groups in their activities. Block G8 activists later argued that »avoiding an explicit statement regarding the ›violence question‹ combined with a clear non-escalating action concept« had been the key to their success (Block G8 2008, 6).

It soon became evident, however, that not everyone endorsed this policy. At a press conference after the second Rostock conference, Peter Wahl from Attac’s coordinating committee unilaterally announced that »all actors, organizations, groups that are part of this process have in no uncertain terms stated that violence will not emanate from them« (Wahl 2006). Other spokespeople immediately corrected him, insisting on the co-existence of different action forms and denying any inherent opposition between nonviolent and violent resistance. Groups linked to the Autonomi argued that asking everyone to renounce all forms of violence would only aid the police in criminalizing parts of the movement and thereby weaken it (NoLager Bremen 2007; Dissent Netzwerk 2007).

Aside from Block G8 and Attac, discussing the question of confrontational forms of action was not high on most groups’ agendas. The primary call for action

6 Among autonomous groups, published descriptions of actions tend to use vague language, because police categorize explicit calls for illegal acts as »calls for violence« and use them as a pretext for arrest and/or as evidence in legal proceedings.

from the NGOs makes no mention of action forms (G8 Bündnis 2007). Attac itself was split on the issue: representatives of the movement wing supported the mutual acceptance of different action forms, while representatives of the NGO wing called for strictly nonviolent protest.<sup>7</sup> Ultimately, Attac did not support the blockades, even though some of its members participated.

In sum, several important facts characterized the situation on the eve of the anti-G8 protests. First, among the more action-oriented groups a general agreement had been reached with respect to the *blockades*: diverse forms of action would be tolerated, and people would not interfere with each others' actions. For their own part, Block G8 announced they would be engaging in civil disobedience and would not attack the police or try to break through the fence into the inner security zone. Second, despite the fact that earlier alterglobalization protests had seen their share of street fighting, no ground rules had been set for any of the week's *other* activities aside from the blockades. It was clear that the NGOs and the more action-oriented groups had different tactical orientations, but these had not been addressed. NGOs and especially Attac had publicly stated their preference for peaceful protests, predicting that »apart from a few paint bombs or stones thrown by the misdirected, no major violence would take place« during the protests (Attac 2007b). In response, radical leftist groups reiterated their call for a diversity of action forms, but what this would mean in practice remained unclear. Organizers may have thought that since no one was explicitly mobilizing for a violent confrontation, it would not be a problem, but it seems more likely that, knowing they would not get consensus on a purely nonviolent position, the organizers simply bracketed the issue in order to keep the coalition together.

### **After the Castor is before the Castor**

Much to the movement's delight, after the 1997 nuclear waste transport to Gorleben, the Castor containers were found to be leaking radiation, and a moratorium was called on all transports until they could be confirmed safe. Thus, while it was not clear when or where it would happen, planning for the March 2001 transport began immediately after the 1997 Castors had reached their destination.

While the protesters had not been able to prevent the 1997 transport the movement nevertheless had much to celebrate: the shipment had cost an unprecedented 111 million DM to push through, and public opinion was moving sharply against nuclear power (Ehmke 2001b, *Süddeutsche Zeitung* 2001).

But the protests had also resulted in a bitter split within the movement. In contrast to the occupations in Brokdorf and Wackersdorf, which had involved brutal battles between protesters and the police, the anti-nuclear movement in Wendland

<sup>7</sup> Several of the founding members of Attac Germany had been involved with XQ during the 1997 debate over violent/militant tactics. Thus, it is not surprising that, despite their own preference for nonviolence, this movement faction would support the same pro-tolerance position XQ supported in the 2001 Gorleben transport.

formed around a general consensus against interpersonal violence. Within those bounds, however, there were strong differences over the relative merits of sabotage, property damage, and civil disobedience. Nor was the absolute prohibition against interpersonal violence ever universally accepted. These differences came to a head during the 1997 blockades in a way that strongly influenced the movement's approach to the transport in March 2001.

In 1997 XQ had called for a nonviolent sit-down blockade at the switch-station, where the Castors would be moved from the train onto trucks for the last 18 km of the transport. By the time the train arrived for the transfer, 9 000 people were sitting in the road, refusing to move. At the same time, perhaps 1 000 other protesters – mostly Autonomen – carried out dozens of small group actions all along the route, chaining themselves to the rails, building blockades out of boulders, logs, and flaming hay bales, and removing whole sections of track. Local farmers had created a blockade of 75 tractors parked tightly together on one of the two roads from the switch station to the storage site, while hundreds of Autonomen had dug huge cavities into the other road, leaving it impassable. When police arrived to reclaim the road, the Autonomen moved back to the switch station where XQ's blockade was still being cleared.

Tensions immediately arose between militants and nonviolence activists over what kinds of actions were appropriate at the switch station.

To defend the sitting blockaders and divert the police, the Autonomen threw paint balloons at the windshields of the water canon trucks, threw rocks, and set hay-bales on fire. This drew the ire not only of the police, but also many in XQ, who feared the Autonomen would tarnish their image as »normal« citizens engaged in nonviolent protest. Some Autonomen who tried to participate in the sit-down blockade were asked to leave because they »looked like Chaoten« (pejorative: chaotic ones), while others were searched for weapons or had their kerchiefs/masks pulled from their faces. Others near the blockade reported being yelled at, pointed out to the police, or even held for the police as they were being chased. A bitter debate ensued, including personal attacks on all sides and public statements by both XQ and the BI, distancing themselves from the Autonomen. Meanwhile, the media happily differentiated between brave, peaceful demonstrators and »evil Chaoten.«

As these tensions were playing out and in response to the transport moratorium, XQ launched a new campaign, called »X-tausendmal quer – überall« asking people to sign a commitment to blockade the next transport, whenever and wherever it might take place.<sup>8</sup> In the summer of 2000 it was announced that the Castors

8 By February 2001, XQ had gathered 4100 such signatures. The qualifier »wherever it may take place« meant that even a transport from a German plant to one of the reprocessing plants would be blockaded. The movement's focus on Gorleben had been criticized for making it seem that the activists in Wendland only cared about keeping the waste out of their own backyard.

had been fixed and the next transport would go from a plant in Philippsburg to a reprocessing plant in La Hague, France in mid-October, and the movement immediately began mobilizing for another blockade. A nation-wide demonstration was held in Gorleben in September 2000, and the BI began hosting its regular monthly delegate meetings in Wendland, to which any group could send a delegate. At these meetings delegates debated the issues, exchanged information, analyzed the political and legal situation, and considered various action concepts. Whatever tentative agreements were reached would be carried back to the various groups for consideration. While decisions made in Wendland were not considered binding, if the BI supported them, they were usually accepted by the others. At the same time, because the movement operated on a non-hierarchical, participatory-democratic principle, and many of the Autonomien groups wouldn't allow themselves to be dictated to in any case, decisions generally take the form of »action concepts« that merely lay out a framework within which individual groups plan and coordinate their actions.

This planning process took place within a political context that had changed dramatically since the 1997 transport. Most importantly, this transport was backed by a »Red-Green« government that had supposedly just reached an agreement with the nuclear industry to phase out the use of nuclear power. Most of the movement saw this »exit consensus« (*Ausstiegskonsens*) as nothing but a weakly veiled attempt by the Greens to save face after completely failing in their negotiations. Still, the agreement made it much harder to mobilize for the blockade, because the common perception was that the issue had been resolved.

A second important aspect of the political situation was that the Philippsburg transport was cancelled at the last minute, when France announced they would accept no more waste in La Hague until Germany transported at least one shipment back to Gorleben. Jürgen Trittin, a former activist who was now the Green environmental minister and champion of the exit agreement, argued that Germany was obligated, under international law, to take back the waste it had produced and shipped to France in the first place, that it was Germany's »national responsibility« to let this Gorleben transport through. Trittin's argument convinced many to stay home, and as sponsors of the exit agreement, the Green Party told its members not to join in the protests. The movement worried that every transport to Gorleben made it more likely to be approved as a permanent disposal site. It was imperative that they expose the exit »consensus« as a fraud and show the Greens they would not be so easily appeased. Thus the transport in March 2001 was a decisive battle for both the movement and the Greens. As Jochen Stay, spokesperson for XQ put it, »they want to test us, so let's make sure they get a clear result!« (Vorant 2001).

The police strategy for this transport had also changed slightly. As usual 30,000 police and border patrol officers would be deployed to secure the transport, several thousand of whom were stationed in Wendland 6-8 weeks ahead of time to

patrol the route and to stop and search anyone who seemed »suspicious looking.« Locals and the press called this »occupation« a »totally normal state of emergency« (Gaserow & Maron 2001). But this time the police also had their own public relations team and deployed 130 officers to serve as »conflict managers«, reportedly to negotiate with protesters and manage potentially violent situations. They received a very chilly reception, however. One local woman had this to say about their campaign: »That the people in this region and along the transport route have been subjected to unbearable psychological violence is ignored in these visits. Night after night the racket of low-flying helicopters forces its way into our sleep. Gas stations, businesses and snack bars are populated by armed border patrol and police officers. On the way to kindergarten or to school the children are met by convoys of deployment vehicles. Telephone tapping, criminalization, searches, infiltration, police lies – all of this is our daily experience« (Huneke 2001).

While the »conflict managers« preached nonviolence, legal and illegal repression was intensified. A general dispensation issued by the regional court suspended the right to demonstrate within 50 meters of the transport route, and at the last minute, approvals that had been granted by local city councils for setting up camps within 5 km of the route were revoked by a higher court (Boecker 2001). XQ and the BI complained that the police and the courts were trying to criminalize the movement by portraying the activists as violent, in order to justify both the civil rights restrictions and the police's own use of violence during the actions. For their part, the press made it clear that they expected at least as much violence as in 1997, but they overwhelmingly expected it to come from the *police*. Only two articles in our sample referred to *protesters* as violent. One, which spoke of »1000 violence-ready Autonomen«, was referring to the 1997 protests (Süddeutsche Zeitung 2001). The other was an interview with Markus Mohr, speaker for the »Autonome Unruhestifter« (autonomous trouble-makers), which was conducted during the transport and included a photograph of a hooded, black-clad Autonomer standing on the tracks with a raised fist, with the caption »destroy what destroys you«. Mohr had spoken at the kick-off demonstration for the week of protest. While characterizing Mohr's group as one »whose actions often lead to police interventions from which peaceful protesters also suffer«, even this article is somewhat sympathetic, noting that while Mohr has no problem with breaking the law, his one rule is that »people can't be hurt« (Krupp 2001).

In sum, the political context prior to the March '97 transport was contradictory. On the one hand, much of the public was sympathetic to Trittin's national responsibility argument and believed that the »exit consensus« would soon resolve the issue anyway. At the same time, due to police violence during past transports and the unprecedented level of repression this time, protesters were framed sympathetically by the press.

## Old consensus, new action concept

The long-standing and widely understood consensus in Wendland was that there should be »no violence against people«, but sabotage and civil disobedience were tolerated (Leach 2006). The only public reference to this rule around the March 2001 transport, however, came after the transport in a statement by the BI published in the movement magazine *anti-atom-aktuell*. They were very disturbed by comments in two other articles, in which Autonomen applauded instances where protesters had offensively attacked police. The BI chided the Autonomen, noting that »in the anti-nuclear movement there has for years been a common consensus not to endanger people« (BI Umweltschutz Lüchow-Dannenberg 2001).

Prior to the action, however, the consensus about not endangering people was assumed, and a specific action concept was developed and communicated in the various calls to action. The action concept explicitly valorized the notion of a diversity of action forms. For example, the BI's call to action stated that »imagination is called for. Out of diversity, complementarity should emerge rather than mutual impediment. The best place [to be] is wherever there are not a lot of police« (BI Fall 2000). In movement publications, both before and after the transport, a diversity of action forms was mentioned in 14 documents, making it the most common descriptor of the movement's tactical approach. As with the G8, the range of acceptable tactics was not further specified. Since the injunction against interpersonal violence was generally understood, however, we believe the lack of specificity in this case indicated not a failure to address the issue, but rather the desire to avoid being charged with inciting violence (since the police count sabotage as violence).

The action concept not only called for a diversity of tactics, but laid out a concrete three-part plan for their compatible simultaneous use. The first element, the »track concept« (»Schienenkonzept«), stated that instead of focusing only on the last 18km of road between the switch-station and Gorleben, this time the whole route from Lüneburg to Gorleben would be fair game for actions – including the 56km of railroad tracks – making it much harder for the police to secure the route.

The second aspect of the plan was the »section concept« (»Streckenkonzept«) – that this 74 km would be divided into sections that would be assigned to specific groups (leaving some open for unorganized groups), who could then organize whatever kind of action they wanted in their own section. As Jochen Stay explained in a call for action directed at a broad progressive audience: »With the division of the route into various sections, all kinds of tactical approaches can be carried out without bothering each other. This way an optimal complementarity is conceivable, for example if well-prepared people chain themselves to the tracks in one place, and in that way make it possible for a larger group to get onto the tracks in another place« (Stay 2001a).

Delegates signed up for their preferred sections in a closed-door session at a delegate meeting in Wendland, with the understanding that no one would disclose

anyone else's assigned location. In the movement documents we analyzed, the »track concept« was the second most frequently cited positive characteristic (after a diversity of tactics) – mentioned in 11 documents – followed by references to spatial separation between action forms (in 9 documents).

The third provision of the agreed-upon plan was that one area would be open for all action forms, and the various groups would coordinate with each other on site. It was announced at a meeting of the XQ coordinating group in February 2001 that the road between the crane and the disposal site in Gorleben would be an »open space for all groups,« with the provision that all actions should be »politically conveyable.«<sup>9</sup> After some discussion, XQ concluded that it was unclear what »politically conveyable« would mean in practice and acknowledged the possibility that more confrontational tactics could take place right next to their non-violent action. Still, XQ and the BI tentatively decided to carry out a joint sit-down blockade in that space.

The open space agreement was communicated in slightly different terms in a flyer targeting the broader radical-leftist scene: »The area between the reloading crane and Splietau will be available as a public space for all action forms – the cops, as pre-programmed, will be causing trouble here. At the same time, it is expected that everyone will be very careful that their own behavior must remain compatible with the operation of other protesters. The same goes for the last kilometer before the waste storage facility in Gorleben: here, too, thousands will be trying to come together« (Castor-Info-Dienst 2001).

Although this flyer did not use the term »politically conveyable«, it clearly communicated the requirement that more militant actions not interfere with non-violent actions, which suggests that organized autonomous groups supported the action plan.

## **On the ground:**

### **Taming, tolerance, and the challenge of coordination**

#### **Familiar (taming) rituals in Heiligendamm**

The protests against the G8 began in Rostock on Saturday, June 2<sup>nd</sup>, with an 80,000 person kick-off demonstration. As the two routes of the demonstration converged at the Rostock Harbor, it quickly became clear that avoiding discussion of what forms of action would be acceptable during the demonstration had been a serious mistake. The exact course of events has been disputed,<sup>10</sup> but what is certain is that after most of the demonstration had already reached the end of the route, a battle broke out between the police and roughly 500 demonstrators from

9 Leach field notes, February 17, 2001.

10 See Steven and Narr (2007) for a detailed description of the demonstration.

the »black bloc«. Demonstrators attacked the police with poles, stones, and bottles, police charged into the demonstration wielding billy clubs, several rubbish containers and one car were set on fire, water cannons were turned on the demonstrators, and things did not calm down until early evening.

Fueled by misinformation from the police,<sup>11</sup> the press coverage for the next several days focused almost exclusively on the riots, writing about a »new quality of violence« (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2007), and the television news was flooded with images of black-hooded rock throwers (Herrmann 2008).

Responses to the riots within the movement ran the gamut. On one side, representatives of some moderate and left-leaning organizations resorted to the classic taming rituals, distancing themselves from the violence and denouncing it. Peter Wahl from Attac went so far as to announce that Attac would forcibly exclude violent protesters from future actions (Wahl 2007), though his colleague, Werner Rätz, argued that 95 % of the Autonomen were not involved in the riots (Rätz 2007b). On the other side, the more radical groups defended the rioting. The leftist party, WASG/Die Linke, blamed the German government for escalating the situation (Die Linke 2007). The IL saw the riots as a legitimate form of action that was part of the movement's broad tactical repertoire (Interventionistische Linke 2007), and an autonomous antifascist group from Frankfurt/M. noted that »The promised diversity of action forms – that is precisely what took place in Rostock« (Antifa[F] 2007). The most positive appraisal claimed that in Rostock »[t]housands [had] taken the initiative and ... attacked at those places where capitalist exploitation and the material impact of the global civil war are escalated daily« (Internationale Brigaden 2007). Interestingly, aside from Attac, the DFG-VK<sup>12</sup>, (a peace movement organization), and »erlassjahr.de« (»Jubilee«, a Christian NGO), none of the NGOs mentioned the violent protests in their press releases. Nor did the press seem interested in their position on this issue.

After such a violent beginning, protest activities for the remainder of the week were remarkably peaceful. This was especially true of the blockades organized by Block G8, where a variety of actions took place side by side without incident.

### **(Fairly) smooth collaboration in Wendland**

Back in Wendland, the Committee for Civil Rights and Democracy, a national watchdog organization, sent observers to monitor the March 2001 transport from a neutral perspective. Their report evaluated the protests as follows: »The actual level of violence was low. No violence targeting people emanated from the demonstrators; nor did any property damage take place that endangered people.

11 After the riot, the police announced that 433 police officers had been injured. After a leftist newspaper investigated, that number was reduced to 43 left »unfit for duty,« only two of whom required ambulant treatment. Similarly, damages initially claimed to be »in the millions« later turned out to be closer to 50,000.

12 Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft – Vereinigte KriegsdienstgegnerInnen (German Peace Society – United War Resisters).

The police—virtually omnipresent, even when they outnumbered the demonstrators—employed more personal violence: from water canons to truncheon attacks to using painful holds when carrying people away, right through to making arrests« (Komitee für Grundrechte und Demokratie 2001, 16).

While much of the violence was clearly perpetrated by the police, a few activists' reports indicate that on at least one occasion, they engaged in interpersonal violence as well. One account states that »[t]hese militant actions, sometimes also attacking police, mostly happened at relatively stupid points ... [nevertheless, they] showed that there are still people who are ready to do that, and that they have a little more in mind than blocking this transport« (*anti-atom-aktuell* 2001). The BI considered these attacks a violation of the consensus and called for the matter to be discussed (BI 2001). If such a discussion took place, however, it was not made public.

From available chronologies, we found reports of five incidences of interpersonal violence during the transport. Three of these cases were reportedly unprovoked attacks by the police, using billy clubs to clear protesters from a particular area. One of these took place without warning against a peaceful XQ blockade of 750 people; another was against 300 people who were on their way to a registered demonstration. The other two incidents involved protesters actively engaging in some sort of interpersonal violence against the police. The most serious was at the switching station in Dannenberg, during a spontaneous demonstration of about 12,000 people on the night the Castors were transferred onto the truck. It is not clear whether the police or the demonstrators initiated this confrontation, but it is clear that protesters were active participants. Two similarities are worth noting between this situation and the anti-G8 riot in Rostock: both were mass demonstrations in which there was no immediate practical objective, and in both cases the demonstrations had been surrounded by the police when violence broke out.

While the amount and intensity of activist violence in Wendland was clearly lower than it was during the Rostock demonstration, we know that there were at least two violations of the »no violence against people« rule. As we will see, however, in contrast to the G8, these infractions did not trigger an intensive internal debate. Nor did they result in public distancing or cause a schism within the movement.

## **The aftermath: Taming, tolerance and the question of dirty laundry**

### **Fallout from the G8 protests**

The third wave of debates about violence/militancy around the G8 protests started about two weeks after they were over. By this point the hypercharged atmosphere after the Rostock demonstration had largely dissipated. 10,000 people had breached the no-protest zone and successfully blocked all land entrances to the summit

hotel for 48 hours. During the blockade, despite repeated provocation (including a water canon attack in which one protester lost an eye), the protesters had remained nonviolent, and the public image of the G8 protests was now one of peaceful protest rather than rioting.

Werner Rätz and Monty Schädel of Attac were now the only ones from the NGO contingent still participating in the debate. Both still condemned the violence of the demonstrators but not without blaming the police for escalating it (Rätz 2007c, Schädel 2007). The 33 other documents bearing on this wave of the debate came from various radical leftists and Attac's movement wing. Not surprisingly, in these documents the nonviolence groups praised the successful blockades, and groups from the autonomous movement continued to defend the riots but also complained that the movement had missed opportunities for more militant action after June 2<sup>nd</sup>. Some groups also criticized the Block G8 blockades. The autonomous network PAULA wrote that the moderate character of the blockades implied their »implicit adoption of a criminalizing perspective on militant forms of resistance« (PAULA 2007). Others found the blockades »as entertaining as conformist« (ums Ganze! 2007). At the same time, this sector evaluated the violence at the demonstration more positively. One autonomous activist saw the rioting as the action that most clearly showed the nonconciliatory character of the protests; they were »an expression of our antagonism« (Anton 2007). Another autonomous group interpreted the violence as unmistakably expressing a »radical criticism of the ruling order«, but also complained that the violence question had not been addressed before the demonstration (United Colors of Resistance 2007).

While some kept to the party line, however, there were also indications that many who had participated in the blockades had come to truly embrace the principle of »mutual acceptance of different action forms« and had become more tolerant of the other side. One Block G8 activist (and former spokesperson for XQ) stressed how they had decided not to call the blockades nonviolent, so that those using other protest forms would feel more welcome (Frauke 2008). Some autonomous groups from Block G8 even called the blockades a radicalizing experience in which many activists came to reject the state monopoly on violence (Avanti 2008), or said they had come to appreciate the potential of civil disobedience (Antifaschistische Linke Berlin 2008). The groups in Block G8 were also more critical of the riot. Christoph Kleine of the IL called for an overdue debate on the functions and forms of violence (Kleine 2007) and autonomous activists from the Netherlands reported that many in their evaluation meeting had questioned the appropriateness of the black bloc's actions (AktivistInnen aus NL 2007).

### **Business as usual in Wendland: After the Castor is before the Castor**

Jochen Stay's comment on the actions in Philippsburg in October 2000 aptly summarizes the lesson the movement had learned from the Gorleben transport in

1997: »It's just important that the various approaches have their own free space. Then it definitely works« (Stay 2000). This lesson was applied during the March 2001 transport, and while some activists did engage in interpersonal violence, there was no public distancing in the mainstream press afterwards, and very little comment on it within the movement. In fact, the general consensus once the transport had gone through was that the two factions had worked surprisingly well together. Some Autonomen attributed this to what they interpreted as XQ's having embraced a more practical and less ideologically rigid stance on nonviolence, as in this interview with »Grete« and »Charlie« in the *anti-atom-aktuell* documentation of the March transport: »Grete: You can tell that this time the various resistance concepts integrated with each other very well ... It's in general a very important political point that these small [Autonomen] groups are no longer letting themselves be limited and are choosing their action forms themselves ... On the other hand is the fact that the certified nonviolent activists from XQ have themselves expanded the concept of nonviolence. Pushing police out of the way to get onto the tracks is becoming more commonly understood as within the realm of nonviolent action.

Charlie: ... The split between the nonviolent and the not so nonviolent activists didn't really happen in the praxis this time. During actions it still happened once or twice, where self-proclaimed nonviolent activists pulled others' masks off their heads. Still, the schisms and the fights between the fractions have decreased and working together has gotten better« (*anti-atom-aktuell* 2001).

The »Stiftung Unruhe« also had good things to say about the level of cooperation on site, which they attributed to the »track concept«:

»From the strategic perspective of blockading, we consider the track concept a success. Lively and determined XQ people, engaged activists from environmental groups and concerns, unorganized anti-Castor activists, direct action groups, and a few hundred masked Autonomen cavorted happily on the tracks. Partly in an uncoordinated ›next to each other‹ kind of way, partly it was skillfully synchronized or in agreement« (Stiftung Unruhe 2001).

## **Conclusions: »Ob friedlich oder militant, wichtig ist der Widerstand«?**

### **Conclusions from the G8 protests**

The dominant frame regarding violence before the G8 summit was clearly the acceptance of multiple forms of protest. Numerous statements emphasized that the protests would not be divided by the »violence question«; they stressed the »strength and diversity« of the protests, »diversity of the forms of action«, and the »mutual acceptance of action forms«. Aside from Attac, which was split on the issue, movement actors generally supported this line of reasoning. Most of the NGOs, however, treated violence as a non-issue. In fact, they were noticeably

silent on the question, both before and during the protests, preferring instead to keep their focus on issues of poverty, debt, and climate change.

This frame is reflected in the general consensus that emerged from the three action conferences in Rostock and the meetings in Hannover, that a multiplicity of action forms would be embraced as long as they did not interfere with each other. The practical implications of this, however, were only discussed in the Block G8 network, who reached an agreement that violent and/or more confrontational forms of protests should not take place at the central points of the blockade. The Block G8 consensus held even after the violence on June 2<sup>nd</sup>, and no group from this network publicly condemned the rioting.

On the other hand, the larger coalition that mobilized for the June 2<sup>nd</sup> demonstration did not discuss specific action forms or how they would react to protesters' violence, should it happen, a fact made clear when representatives from Attac and the IL made openly contradictory statements in a press conference about the organizers' position on violence. Not surprisingly, these differences became even more apparent after the demonstration escalated. Attac's unilaterally declaring a non-existent non-violent consensus can be seen as an attempt to tame the militants that backfired. In fact, the larger coalition's implicit strategy of bracketing the violence question in the hopes of uniting around a minimal »anti-G8« consensus undercut the possibility of responding in a unified and effective way when violence did break out.

### **Conclusions from Gorleben**

Whereas at the G8 there was no clear consensus about tactics outside of the blockades, the Wendland consensus against interpersonal violence was widely known and accepted. Some Autonomen, however, felt that using violence to defend against police attacks fell within the consensus, and, as the following statement suggests, at least some felt that under certain circumstances, *offensively* attacking police is strategically warranted and legitimate. In any case, they reserved the right to make that determination themselves, regardless of what the delegates may have decided beforehand: »There were also attacks on cops. But of course this is also a part of the resistance and has a role within it. It's not about saying ›the cops say that's violence but it really wasn't!‹ Rather it's that we find that in certain situations it is also correct to behave that way« (Tolle Kür 2001).

Even though there were incidents of both defensive and offensive violence against police during the March 2001 transport, there was very little internal discussion about it or policing of that boundary. This is undoubtedly partly because neither side wanted to re-open old wounds from 1997. In fact, with both sides so sensitive to criticism from the other, there may well have been a general calculation that harping on the few infractions would do more internal damage than leaving it alone would cost them in public credibility or political effectiveness. The movement's own conclusions are perhaps best articulated in this reflection on

the March 2001 transport, published in the nonviolence movement's most widely read newspaper, *graswurzelerrevolution*: »Without a broad mass movement, however—which we were able to mobilize this time, despite all the red-green nay saying—an effective resistance is unthinkable. Only through the coordinated efforts of all available forces, be they Autonomen sabotage actions, massive sit-down blockades, people nonviolently chaining themselves to the tracks, or even the Robin Wood people cementing themselves under the tracks, is it possible to achieve the kind of impact that sends a signal beyond Wendland that this is about more than an anti-castor movement. The immediate abandonment of nuclear power can only be accomplished with the whole breadth of the movement« (Markus 2001).

This sentiment was echoed in slightly different form by autonomous groups. All in all, the emphasis on tolerance—captured in the old Wendland slogan that »whether peaceful or militant, what's important is resistance« (*ob friedlich oder militant, wichtig ist der Widerstand*)—was perhaps the most prevalent value voiced by anti-nuclear groups across the spectrum, both before and after the March 2001 transport.

### **Factors affecting tendency toward tolerance or taming**

Comparing the two cases, four factors significantly influenced whether the interactions between nonviolent and militant factions in these movements were characterized by taming or tolerance. The degree to which the issue of violence was directly addressed in the planning phase, whether or not there was a concrete, tactical objective for each particular action, and whether or not there was an expectation of continued collaboration were the most important factors. The range of the participating groups' ideological, political, and tactical orientations was also important, but to a lesser degree.

*Face-to-Face Efforts to Reach Consensus on Tactics*—We initially felt that one critical factor would be whether all relevant actors were included in face-to-face planning sessions. Our analysis suggests, however, that the more important issue is whether or not the topic is explicitly addressed in these meetings and an effort is made to come to a clear consensus about what forms of action will be allowed during specific protest events. Clearly some of the groups most heavily involved in the rioting in Rostock were not involved in the planning meetings, either because they came from abroad or because they did not want to cooperate with the more moderate groups. But many of the black bloc activists *had* been involved in the planning. At the same time, the protests in Wendland followed a strategy of tolerance, even though not everyone took part in the planning meetings. The problem at the G8 was not that those who broke the consensus had not been at the table, but rather that there was no consensus to break, because no effort had been made to generate one for the June 2<sup>nd</sup> demonstration. In contrast, the Block G8 coalition had explicitly addressed the issue and forged a consensus for the blockades.

This suggests that if the goal is successful movement-wide collaboration, it is better to explicitly discuss tactical preferences, coordination, and compatibility (and to talk about how to respond if violence *does* occur) than to sidestep the question in the hopes of avoiding a split. Factional splits over tactics may be more likely to result from unsuccessful taming rituals than from directly addressing the issue beforehand. Both in the Block G8 coalition and in Wendland, the question was respectfully discussed, with the goal of finding a consensus that left room for various tactics to coexist without hindering each other, and in both cases the result was successful collaboration, even when violence did occur.

*Having a concrete objective*—In both instances of successful collaboration, the action had a concrete objective, whether it was to blockade the entrances to the G8 meeting or to delay the Gorleben transport for as long as possible. And in both instances where violence caused some level of internal friction, it took place during a mass demonstration where there was no clear, tangible objective, i. e. in the kick-off march in Rostock and the spontaneous demonstration in Dannenberg. This is most likely because it is harder to tolerate militant action forms when there is no immediate instrumental benefit to be gained.

*Experience of Working Together and Expectation of Future Collaboration*—Our analysis suggests that the most important factor in determining whether taming or tolerance takes place is whether the central actors have worked together before and/or expect to work together in the future. This helps to explain not only the difference between the G8 and Wendland actions, but also between the June 2 demonstration and the blockades during the G8.

The fact that the Block G8 coalition was able to reach an action consensus had much to do with the fact that many members of the coalition had worked together before, in Wendland and elsewhere, and could reasonably expect to work together again. Their intent was not only to prepare for the protests in Heiligendamm, but to lay the groundwork for a longer-term collaboration. This intention is strongly reflected in Block G8's self-evaluation published after the protests, although the non-violence groups emphasize this commitment more than the autonomous groups.

The pattern is even more pronounced in Wendland. The primary reason for their commitment to tolerating a diverse range of action forms was that the same actors had had such a negative experience with the taming approach in 1997. The whole coalition of actors there has been working together to resist the various planned projects in Gorleben for more than 30 years, and over that time, they have learned how to work together more effectively—coming to understand what offends and alienates the others and what it takes to keep them coming back. Because of the high frequency of Castor transports, they can also expect to be working together in an on-going way into the future, which motivates them to act in a way that will not endanger future collaboration.

In contrast, the broader coalition of groups who organized the June 2<sup>nd</sup> demonstration had not worked together before and was less action-oriented than

either the Block G8 coalition or the groups in Wendland. And while most of them consider themselves part of the larger alter-globalization movement, the G8 protests were largely seen as a one-time event, and it was not likely that the same constellation of actors would have occasion to organize future events together.

*Range of Actors*—One factor which we thought would be important is the range of political perspectives represented by the various groups in each event. The range of actors appeared to be broader for the G8 events than in Wendland. On closer inspection, however, the difference seemed both less clear and less significant than we expected.

There was, in fact, an exceptionally wide range of actors involved in the G8 protests. Preferences for certain forms of action differed accordingly, ranging from some NGOs who doubted that even peaceful demonstrations would have any meaningful effect, to the other extreme of some Autonomen and anarchist groups who saw violent confrontation with the police as the only meaningful form of action. It also seems to be true that the difficulty in reconciling these extremes led to a *de facto* strategy of spatial separation—the so-called »choreography of resistance«—which aimed at keeping protesters with different action preferences physically apart. This strategy clearly failed when all actors necessarily had to come together in the same space for the June 2<sup>nd</sup> demonstration in Rostock. It is also true that the Block G8 coalition included a much narrower spectrum, which made it easier to integrate the different actors into a plan that physically separated civil disobedience from more confrontational forms of action, but still embraced both in a common strategy to disrupt the summit infrastructure. This consensus of tolerance held even after the violence at the opening demonstration, and members of Block G8 did not participate in the taming rituals of some of the NGOs.

However, it is not clear whether the difference in the range of actors is the determining factor in these events. For one thing, it is difficult to tell whether the range in Wendland was really any narrower than in the G8 coalition. The overall number of groups is certainly smaller, but their ideological range—which includes a large contingent of farmers who on some issues are fairly conservative—may be even broader. While our data do not allow us to make any definitive claims in this regard, the action-orientation of the actors may be more important than the range of political ideologies. For example, the NGOs involved in the Wendland campaign (e.g. Greenpeace and Robin Wood) were more action oriented than many of the NGOs in the anti-G8 coalition, and thus fit more easily into the Streckenkonzept.

Based on the cases examined here, another factor which may be even more relevant than either the range of political ideologies or the action orientations of the various actors may be the degree to which key actors are *internally* united in their approach. The one organization in the G8 coalition that was especially upset and vocal about the violence on June 2<sup>nd</sup> was Attac, largely because they were internally split over the question themselves, and the two factions within the orga-

nization—one more movement oriented and the other more lobbying oriented—had publicly taken contradictory positions.

In sum, we found that the most important factor determining whether the movement tended toward tolerance or taming was the degree of on-going collaboration. Both the experience of working together in the past and the expectation of future collaboration generate a strong urge to choose a strategy of tolerating different action forms. More generally, our two cases suggest that a strategy of tolerance and cooperation *works*, and that taming rituals *do not*. Not only do attempts to control or tame violent protesters seem to aggravate relationships within the movement, resulting in factionalization and weakened mobilization capacity; it also does not tend to effectively stop militant activists from using confrontational tactics. When we say cooperation »works« we do not mean that it stops violence, since activists who use these tactics generally do it intentionally and there is often a wing of the movement that sees it as both politically legitimate and strategically useful. Rather, we mean that movements are able to coordinate more successfully, foster solidarity, and avoid schisms when they can find ways to make multiple tactics complement each other. That said, it is interesting that of our two cases, the one that was the least violent was also the one that was the most overtly tolerant of confrontational action forms. Ironically, it may well be that tolerance is the most effective taming strategy.

## References

- AktivistInnen aus NL (2007): »Symbolik und Wirklichkeit der G8 Proteste«  
<http://dissentnetzwerk.org/node/3712/print>.
- Anne-Liese (2000): „Wenn Ahaus, dann Gronau.« posted on website from Anti-Atom Plenum Berlin.  
<http://squat.net/aap-berlin>.
- Anti-atom-aktuell (2001): »Tolle Kür, müdes Schaulaufen«, May, no. 119/120.
- Antifaschistische Linke Berlin (2008): »Massenhafter Ausdruck der Ablehnung und tatsächliche Störung« in Block G8 (ed.), Chef—es sind zu viele. Die Block G8 Broschüre, Lübeck: Eigendruck im Selbstverlag, pp. 30-31.
- Antifa[F] (2007): Presseerklärung der Antifa[F] zu der Demo in Rostock,  
<http://umsganze.blogspot.de/2007/06/03/2500-menschen-im-ums-ganze-block/> [2009-01-20].
- Anton (2007): „Es hilft nur Gewalt, wo Gewalt herrscht, oder: In Rostock waren Steine notwendig«  
<http://dissentnetzwerk.org/node/3740>.
- Apter, David. E (1979): »Notes on the Underground: Left Violence and the National State.« Daedalus 108(4):155-172.
- Attac. 2007a: »Globalisierung geht ganz anders! Kritik und Alternativen zur Politik der G8«  
[http://www.Attac.de/heiligendamm07/media/text\\_dl/material/G8-Reader-Online-eBook.pdf](http://www.Attac.de/heiligendamm07/media/text_dl/material/G8-Reader-Online-eBook.pdf).
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2007b): »Attac: »Nichts Großes an Gewalt« gegen G-8-Gipfel« Hamburger Abendblatt, 2007b-02-5,  
<http://www.abendblatt.de/daten/2007/02/05/683064.html?prx=1> [2009-02-19].
- autopool (2006): »Was wir machen, muss sich ausdrücken in dem, was wir tun«  
<http://dissentnetzwerk.org/node/84/print>.
- Avanti (2008): »Block G8 war radikalisiert im besten Sinn« in Chef—es sind zu viele. Die Block G8 Broschüre. Lübeck: Eigendruck im Selbstverlag, p. 33.
- Beck (2008): »Aktion Wasserschlag, Razzien und Durchsuchungen im Vorfeld des Gipfels...«
- BI Umweltschutz Lüchow Dannenberg (2001): „Uns befremdet Euer Befremden« anti-atom-aktuell #121 (July):47-48.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2000): »In die Puschen kommen« Call to action flyer, Fall 2000.
- Block G8 (2007): »Das Massenblockadekonzept Block G8.«
- Block G8 (Ed.) (2008): Chef—es sind zu viele. Die Block G8 Broschüre. Lübeck: Eigendruck im Selbstverlag.

- Boecker, Arne (2001): »Von der Sitzblockade in die Kirche« Süddeutsche Zeitung. March 26.
- Brooks, D. Christopher (2004): »Faction in Movement: The Impact of Inclusivity on the Anti-Globalization Movement.« *Social Science Quarterly* 85(3):559-577.
- Broschürengruppe (2007): protest.widerstand.perspektive. Texte zur Mobilisierung gegen den G8-Gipfel 2007. Berlin: Eigendruck im Selbstverlag, <http://home.arcor.de/g8-broschuere/brosch.pdf>.
- Castor-Info-Dienst (2001): Flyer: »Überlegungen und Pläne« February 20.
- Day, Richard J. F (2005): Gramsci is Dead: Anarchist Currents in the Newest Social Movements. Ann Arbor: Pluto Press.
- della Porta, Donatella, and Herbert Reiter (1998): *Policing Protest*. Minneapolis, MN: Univ. of Minnesota Press.
- Die Linke (2007): »Linkspartei gibt Polizei Mitschuld an Krawallen« MVRegio, <https://gipfelsoli.org/service/print?id=2518> [2009-03-2].
- Dissent Netzwerk (2007): »Erklärung zur Diskussion der »Gewaltfrage.« <http://dissentnetzwerk.org/node/1078/print>.
- Dissent! (2006): »Einblicke in das Innenleben einer Mobilisierung.«
- Downey, Gary L (1986): »Ideology and the Clamshell Identity: Organizational Dilemmas in the Anti-Nuclear Power Movement« *Social Problems* 33(5):357-373.
- Ehmke, Wolfgang (2001a): »Zum Eisen X« *Gorleben Rundschau*. Feb./Mar.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2001b): »Das Verschwinden der Politik« *anti-atom-aktuell* 119-120.
- Ely, John (1997): »Green Politics and the Transformation of the Left in Germany« *New German Critique* 72: 177-192.
- Epstein, Barbara (1991): *Political Protest and Cultural Revolution*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Förderverein Libertad e.V (2007): G8: Die Deutung der Welt, Frankfurt a. M.
- Frankland, E. Gene and Donald Schoonmaker (1992): *Between protest and power : the Green Party in Germany*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2007): »Fassungslosigkeit über »neue Qualität der Gewalt«, 4 June.
- Frankfurter Rundschau (2006): »BKA befürchtet Randal«, 23 November.
- Frauke (2008): »Alte Brüche und neue Gemeinsamkeiten« in *Block G8* (ed.), *Chef – es sind zu viele. Die Block G8 Broschüre*, Lübeck: Eigendruck im Selbstverlag, pp. 36-38.
- G8 Bündnis (2007): »Eine andere Welt ist möglich!« <http://www.heiligendamm2007.de/> [2009-02-17].
- Gamson, William. 1990 [1975]. *Strategy of Social Protest*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co.
- Gaserow, Vera and Thomas Maron (2001): »Es kocht noch mal im Abklingbecken der Bewegung« *Frankfurter Rundschau*. March 28. Nr. 74, p.3.
- Gillham, Patrick F. and Gary T. Marx (2000): »Complexity and Irony in Policing and Protesting: The World Trade Organization in Seattle.« *Social Justice* 217:212-236.
- Grant II, Don Sherman and Michael Wallace (1991): »Why Do Strikes Turn Violent?« *American Journal of Sociology* 96(5):1117-50.
- Hall, Simon (2003): *On the Tail of the Panther: Black Power and the 1967 Convention of the National Conference for New Politics*.« *Journal of American Studies* 37(1):59-78.
- Hannigan, John A (1985): »The Armalite and the Ballot Box: Dilemmas of Strategy and Ideology in the Provisional IRA« *Social Problems* 33(1):31-40.
- Herrmann, Sabrina (2008): »Schlüsselszenen des Protests. Der Wettbewerb um die Aufmerksamkeit der TV-Nachrichten« in Dieter Rucht and Simon Teune (eds.), *Nur Clowns und Chaoten? Die G8-Proteste in Heiligendamm im Spiegel der Massenmedien*, Frankfurt - New York: Campus, pp. 97-118.
- Hubbard, Amy S (1994): »Using Media Frames to Examine the Impact of Violent and Nonviolent Strategies« *Presentation at American Sociological Association*.
- Hulsberg, Werner (1988): *The German Greens: A Social and Political Profile*. New York: Verso Books.
- Huneke, Birgit (2001): »Hurra die Konfliktmanager« *Gorleben Rundschau*, March 2001.
- Indymedia (2006): [de.indymedia.org | G8 Aktionskonferenz in Rostock](http://de.indymedia.org/l/G8_Aktionskonferenz_in_Rostock), <http://de.indymedia.org/2006/03/142339.shtml> [2009-06-10].
- Internationale Brigaden (2007): »Der Battle von Rostock« <http://dissentnetzwerk.org/node/3040.html> [2009-02-19].
- Interventionistische Linke (2005): »Protestieren, Umzingeln, Blockieren...« [http://www.g8-2007.de/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=2&Itemid=21](http://www.g8-2007.de/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2&Itemid=21) [2009-01-20].
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2007): »Kurz vor Beginn des G8-Gipfels zieht die Interventionistische Linke Zwischenbilanz« [http://www.gipfelsoli.org/Home/Heiligendamm\\_2007/Heiligendamm\\_2007\\_deutsch/Texte\\_davor/2690.html](http://www.gipfelsoli.org/Home/Heiligendamm_2007/Heiligendamm_2007_deutsch/Texte_davor/2690.html) [2009-01-20].
- Johnson, Victoria (1997): »Operation Rescue, Vocabularies of Motive, and Tactical Action: A Study of Movement Framing in the Practice of Quasi-Nonviolence« *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change*, Vol. 20, pp.103-150.
- Kassimeris, George (2005): »Junta by Another Name? The 1974 Metapolitefsi and the Greek Extra-parliamentary Left« *Journal of Contemporary History* 40(4):745-762.
- Klarman, Michael J (1994): »Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement« *Virginia Law Review* 80(1):

- Kleine, Christoph (2007): »Wir nehmen uns unser eigenes Recht« SoZ - Sozialistische Zeitung, July, p. 5.
- Komitee für Grundrechte und Demokratie (2001): »Castor März 2001 – Die Kontinuität undemokratischer Politik und systematischen Missbrauchs der Polizei.« Berlin/Köln. April 6. Retrieved April 24, 2001.  
<http://www.oneworldweb.de/castor/nix5/2001/komitee0406.html>.
- Kowalewski, David (1987): »Protest Militancy in the USSR: When Does It Work?« *The Social Science Journal* 24(2):169-179.
- Krupp, Kerstin (2001): »Kampf dem Frieden« *Berliner Zeitung*, March 27.
- Landeszeitung für die Lüneburger Heide (2001): »Was sagt der Pastor zum Castor?«, 23 March, p. 9.
- Leach, Darcy K (2006): »The Way is the Goal: Ideology and the Practice of Collectivist Democracy in German New Social Movements« Doctoral Dissertation. University of Michigan.
- Mahanta, Nani Gopal (2002): »State, Identity and the Politics of Violence: The Case of UFLA« Presentation at International Sociological Association, Brisbane, Australia.
- Markovits, Andrei S. and Philip S. Gorski (1993): *The German Left: Red, Green and Beyond*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Markus (2001): »Schwerpunkt Schiene« *graswurzelrevolution* 259. May.
- McPhail, Clark and John D. McCarthy (2005): »Protest Mobilization, Protest Repression, and Their Interaction« in McPhail & McCarthy (eds) *Repression and Mobilization*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. pp.3-32.
- Meyer, Megan (2004): »Organizational Identity, Political Contexts, and SMO Action: Explaining the Tactical Choices Made by Peace Organizations in Israel, Northern Ireland, and South Africa.« *Social Movement Studies* 3(2):167-197.
- Morris, Aldon D (1993): »Birmingham Confrontation Reconsidered: An Analysis of the Dynamics and Tactics of Mobilization« *American Sociological Review* 58(5):621-636.
- NoLager Bremen (2007): »Wider die sogenannte Gewaltfrage« <http://dissentnetzwerk.org/node/1322.html> [2009-01-20].
- Owens, Lynn (2002): »The rise of social movement culture and the culture of social movement decline: The case of the Amsterdam squatters' movement.« Presented at Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Chicago, IL.
- PAULA (2006): »Irgendwie kam dem Wächter der Wald immer dichter vor, und näher kam er auch...« <http://dissentnetzwerk.org/node/75.html> [2009-01-20].
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2007): »PAULA erklärt sich« *indymedia*, <http://dissentnetzwerk.org/node/3863/print>.
- Piven, Frances Fox and Richard Cloward (1977): *Poor People's Movement: Why They Succeed and How They Fail*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Polletta, Francesca (2002): *Freedom is an Endless Meeting: Democracy in American Social Movements*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2005): »How Participatory Democracy Became White: Culture and Organizational Choice.« *Mobilization* 10:271-288.
- R.O.S.A. (Ed.) (2007): »resistance inside. einblicke in das innenleben einer mobilisierung 2.0« <http://media.de.indymedia.org/media/2007/11/199944.pdf>.
- Rätz, Werner (2007a): »Die Spektren stimmen sich ab. Proteste und Akteure der Gipfelproteste in Heiligendamm« *ila*, 305 (Mai 2007):53-54.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2007b): »Mit Ausgrenzung verhindert man nichts« *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 2007b-06-4, <http://bb.focus.de/focus/p=demonstrationsrecht-1121698-> [2009-03-2].
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2007c): »Gemeinsamer Erfolg trotz Differenzen« *ak – analyse & kritik*, 2007c-06-22, <http://www.dazwischengehen.org/de/story/2007/06/gemeinsamer-erfolg-trotz-differenzen> [2009-01-20].
- Rilling, Rainer (Ed.) (2008): *Eine Frage der Gewalt*. Berlin: Kar Dietz Verlag.
- Ron, James (2001): »Ideology in Context: Explaining Sendero Luminoso's Tactical Escalation.« *Journal of Peace Research* 38(5):569-592.
- Rucht, Dieter (2008): »Die Ereignisse in Heiligendamm im Spiegel der Kommentarspalten« in Dieter Rucht and Simon Teune (eds.), *Nur Clowns und Chaoten? Die G8-Proteste in Heiligendamm im Spiegel der Massenmedien*, Frankfurt – New York: Campus, pp. 78-95.
- Rucht, Dieter, and Simon Teune (Eds.) (2008): *Nur Clowns und Chaoten? Die G8-Proteste in Heiligendamm im Spiegel der Massenmedien*, Frankfurt – New York: Campus.
- Schädel, Monty (2007): »Natürlich ist es falsch von gleichen Bildern zu sprechen!« [http://www.montys.de/dateien/themen/heiligendamm07/erklarungsversuch\\_m\\_s.pdf](http://www.montys.de/dateien/themen/heiligendamm07/erklarungsversuch_m_s.pdf) [2009-01-20].
- Scharf, Thomas (1994): *The German Greens: Challenging the Consensus*. Oxford: Berg Press.
- Schumaker, Paul D (1978): »The Scope of Political Conflict and the Effectiveness of Constraints in Contemporary Urban Protest.« *The Sociological Quarterly* 19 (2):168-184.
- Sheptycki, James (2005): »Policing Political Protest when Politics Go Global: Comparing Public order Policing in Canada and Bolivia« *Policing & Society* 15 (3):327-352.

- Starr, Amory (2005): *Global Revolt: A Guide to the Movements Against Globalization*. New York: Zed Books.
- Stay, Jochen (2001a): »Querstell-Konzepte für den Tag in Gorleben« *analyse & kritik* 447. February 22.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2001b): Letter to editor. »Blockaden: die Polizei muss ihre Einsatzpläne ändern« *Elbe-Jeetzel-Zeitung*. March 7.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2000): »Die Ereignisse in Philippsburg« *graswurzelrevolution* 254. December.
- Steven, Elke, and Wolf-Dieter Narr (2007): *Gewaltbereite Politik und der G8-Gipfel*. Köln: Komitee für Grundrechte und Demokratie.
- Stiftung Unruhe (2001): »Ein kleiner politischer Blick über den autonomen Tellerrand« *Castor Kommt! Stiftung Unruhe-Info* No.2. July 15.
- Süddeutsche Zeitung (2001): »Aufwändige Polizeieinsätze«, 26 March.
- Tilly, Charles (2003): *The Politics of Collective Violence*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press.
- ums Ganze! (2007): »...ums Ganze! G8-Nachbereitung« <http://umsganze.blogspot.de/2007/10/02/sonderseite-zum-ums-ganze-kongress/> [2009-01-20].
- United Colors of Resistance (2007): »Demo 2.6. in Rostock aus autonomer Sicht« <http://dissentnetzwerk.org/node/3784>.
- Voran (2001): »Größe anzunehmende Verarschung«, April 2001, no. 223, p.11.
- Wahl, Peter (2006): Pressekonferenz Internationale Aktionskonferenz in Rostock zur Vorbereitung der Proteste gegen den G8-Gipfel 2007 in Heiligendamm, <http://video.indymedia.org/en/2006/12/637.shtml>.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2007): »Attac-Vorstand will Gewalttäter von Demos fernhalten« *Deutschlandfunk*, [http://www.dradio.de/dlf/sendungen/interview\\_dlf/631983/](http://www.dradio.de/dlf/sendungen/interview_dlf/631983/) [2009-03-2].
- Wood, Lesley J (2007): »Breaking the Wave: Repression, Identity, and Seattle Tactics« *Mobilization: An International Journal* 12 (4):377-388.
- Yang, Mundo (2008): »Partner, Kritiker oder Antagonist? Drei globalisierungskritische Protestdramaturgien« in: Dieter Rucht and Simon Teune (eds.), *Nur Clowns und Chaoten? Die G8-Proteste in Heiligendamm im Spiegel der Massenmedien*, Frankfurt – New York: Campus, pp. 219-239.

Nick Montgomery

## **Beyond Civil Disobedience and Counter-hegemony: Legitimacy, Strategy and Tactics in the 2010 Anti-Olympics Movement**

In 2008, massive protests disrupted the Olympic torch relay, particularly in London, Paris, and San Francisco. The protests received worldwide coverage, and were celebrated by many as a success, insofar as they embarrassed Chinese officials by politicizing China's human rights record and its occupation of Tibet (Economy 2008). The widespread media coverage of worldwide protests against the Beijing Olympics might make more recent anti-Olympics protests in Canada seem like a failure. Beginning on February 10<sup>th</sup>, 2010, anti-Olympics activists converged to protest and disrupt the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver, Canada (Olympics Resistance Network 2010). These demonstrations were the culmination of a series of actions that disrupted the Olympics ceremonies and organizing efforts. The 2010 protests received far less media attention than their counterparts during the Beijing Olympics, and it is much less obvious (to many people) why the 2010 Olympics are even being resisted. Why would anyone protest the Olympics in Canada? Who are these protesters, and what do they want? What are they advocating, and what are they against?

These questions tend to be asked about protests in general, providing answers about the politics of protests. However, the purpose of this paper is not to answer these questions, but to problematize them, in hopes of uncovering other forms of politics at work in anti-Olympics activism in Vancouver. This paper takes these questions as a central *problem*; not as a problem to be solved, but rather as one whose solution is often already given by the way we ask the question.

These questions—Who are they? What do they want? What are their objectives? What are they protesting?—are the common-sense questions asked about protest in the media and in academia. In order to understand protests, they need to be made intelligible; one needs to locate coherent aims, objectives, and claims. This knowledge enables judgment about whether the aims are realistic, legitimate, feasible, and so on. It also enables judgment about the success or failure of the protest or ›the movement‹ more generally. Did they achieve their objectives? Did they receive media attention? Did governments and other political institutions listen and respond to their demands? I will suggest that if these questions are approached uncritically, we will miss some of the most creative and significant currents of contemporary social movements and protest.

In the case of anti-Olympics protest in Victoria, protesters have been variously portrayed as vague, infantile, immoral, selfish, stupid, and violent (Dronsfield

2009). Rather than confront these claims, I want to ask what allows them to function. What makes it possible (and maybe even inevitable) for protesters to be condemned, dismissed, or infantilized? I will suggest that these tendencies are built into the structure of protest itself, and the types of questions that are asked about it. This paper seeks to destabilize these questions by tracing out some of their assumptions, and situating them within broader historical tendencies. I will argue that these questions reproduce assumptions about politics that have their roots in liberal notions of civil disobedience and Marxist imperatives of counter-hegemony, and that these assumptions create serious difficulty for thinking creatively about the politics of (and beyond) protest. These discourses help to produce a narrow form of politics that is centered on the state as the locus of politics.

However, I will also argue that anti-Olympics activists have avoided capitulating to this form of politics. Although they make use of these dominant discourses, contemporary anti-Olympic practices also point to alternative forms of politics that destabilize sovereignty and open up new political possibilities. If we continue to ask the same old questions of protests and protesters (Who are they? What do they want? How do they propose to get it?), we will miss these alternative politics at work. New questions are called for, questions that call into question traditional forms of politics, as well as enabling an understanding of the way new activist practices destabilize these traditional forms and point to new ones. This paper ends by seeking out different sites of anti-Olympics activism where politics works differently. I will focus on two events—the Victoria Anarchist Bookfair and the Networks of Dissent Teach-in—which open alternative possibilities for politics. It is argued that these spaces engage in what Deleuze and Guattari call »minoritarian politics« which is fundamentally different from the logics of hegemony and civil disobedience.

### **Contextualizing anti-Olympics activism**

The politics of anti-Olympics activism that I am interested in has little to do with the Olympic games as such, and more to do with the neoliberal economic restructuring, increasing surveillance, environmental destruction, and continuing colonialism that make the Olympic games possible. Much of the activism around anti-Olympics organizing can be understood as an attempt to expose these conditions of possibility, pointing to massive public and private expenditures on security, infrastructure, and advertising (Shaw 2008). In this sense anti-Olympics resistance can be situated within the history of politicizations and contestations of neoliberalism, and the forms of politics that have emerged as part of the anti-globalization movement. For many, this history began with the anti-WTO protests in 1999, where protesters impeded and eventually blocked World Trade Organiza-

tion meetings in Seattle (Newman 2007, 166-199).<sup>1</sup> Others have traced this legacy back to 1988, when thousands converged on Berlin to protest International Monetary Fund (IMF) meetings (Starr 2003). Others have traced these forms of politics to May '68 in France and the emergence of the ›new social movements‹ (Grindon 2004).

Claims about the meaning and significance of these forms of political action are equally varied. Some have hailed this as a world historical moment of transnational solidarity (Shiva 1999) while others have questioned the efficacy of the anti-WTO protest tactics (Day 2005, 3). Similar questions could be raised about the efficacy of anti-Olympics demonstrations: do activists *really* think they will be able to stop, impede, or even reform the Olympics? What's the point of resisting an event that seems to receive worldwide support? These questions gesture towards the (perceived) need to make anti-Olympics resistance intelligible or understandable so that it can be evaluated in terms of efficacy, legitimacy, or success.

### **Liberal discourses of civil disobedience**

I will suggest that attempt to make protests intelligible in this way has its roots in the discourses of liberalism and Marxism, and they rely on particular conceptions of politics. After briefly reviewing liberal theories of protest and civil disobedience, I will discuss the ways anti-Olympics organizers are making use of these discourses.

As a discipline, political science has been advanced as a theory of the state, and thus places the state at center of politics (Magnusson 1996, 49-73). The state tends to be understood as the locus of authority, and thus the most significant site of political change. In the context of protest, this means that political claims tend to be understood in relation to the state, with the state acting as the central agent of change. The state and capitalism exist in a reciprocal relationship with the abstract individual, »that self-contained, distinct, and autonomous person, who exists only in the imagination of liberal theorists« (Magnusson 1996, 56). I want to point to liberal discourses of civil disobedience as a particularly significant site for the reproduction of the liberal state and its autonomous citizen-subjects.

Conceptions of civil disobedience are always engaged, implicitly or explicitly, with the proper limits of civil disobedience, where disobedience becomes ›uncivil‹. A paradigmatic example of civil disobedience is John Rawls' (1991) attempt to justify civil disobedience as a legitimate ›last resort‹ when other political avenues have been foreclosed. As Rawls explains,

1 The Seattle demonstrations of 1999 are the paradigmatic point of reference for discussions about the anti-globalization movement, even when they are not taken as an explicit origin of the movement.

»The problem of civil disobedience ... arises only within a more or less just democratic state for those citizens who recognize and accept the legitimacy of the constitution. The difficulty is one of a conflict of duties. At what point does the duty to comply with the laws enacted by a legislative majority ... cease to be binding in view of the right to defend one's liberties and the duty to oppose injustice?« (103).

In this line of thought, the problem is how to determine whether protesters have the interests of the public at heart, and whether their actions reflect the conscientious politics of concerned citizens. In other words, the point of protest or civil disobedience is to enable the public to take note of injustices, so that they can urge the state to correct them: within this discourse, protest aims at state reform. Rawls explains that more militant actions of disobedience—where citizens aim at revolution or refuse to take responsibility for their actions—would be deemed illegitimate by this definition (107). However, the function of civil disobedience is not merely to sort out the difference between good citizens and bad militants: it reproduces the citizen. For Rawls, civil disobedience is a practice of the citizen who is willing to accept responsibility for his or her actions (107 f.). And who decides if a particular act of civil disobedience is legitimate? Not the liberal state or its representatives, but the polity of citizens. »The citizen is autonomous yet he is held responsible for what he does ... to act autonomously and responsibly a citizen must look to the political principles that underlie and guide the interpretation of the constitution« (120).

What does Rawlsian civil disobedience have to do with anti-Olympics protest? Rawls is useful here not because activists are reading his definitions of civil disobedience and obeying them, but because his theory of disobedience relies on much more fundamental notions of liberal common sense. The citizen-subject Rawls reproduces is deeply embedded in discourses of protest. This means that implicit assumptions of civil disobedience often condition judgments about protest: are they taking responsibility for their actions? Are they revealing an injustice to be addressed by the electorate? Are they providing well-reasoned arguments for their actions? Furthermore, debates about non-violent civil disobedience pervade activist debates and practices (Sharp 1973). As such, discourses of civil disobedience produce norms and imperatives governing the conduct of protesters themselves. The subjects of protest are produced by this discourse, and these subjects often rely on it for their actions to be intelligible. In this context, approaching civil disobedience critically means not simply tracing the way in which it delegitimizes militant action or legitimates State repression of militants. What also needs to be grasped is the way it is productive of the citizen-subject of civil disobedience. In this sense, the need for non-violence, rationality, state reform, and reasonableness enable forms of *self-discipline* rather than simply legitimizing State repression against more militant forms of action.

The subject of protest must orient herself to the state or other loci of political authority so that they can be responded to. One must avoid violence so that one's

actions are intelligible to the State, or to civil society, which may act as an intermediary in the achievement of State reform. These logics suggest that civil disobedience is a discourse of governmentality, where protesters govern their own conduct, and the conduct of others, in ways that make them and their demands more amenable to traditional political channels.<sup>2</sup> As Nikolas Rose (2006) explains, governmentality emerged not as a substantive doctrine of how subjects should be governed, but »as a search for a technology of government that can address the recurrent complaint that authorities are governing too much« (84).

Civil disobedience can be understood as part of this search, as an attempt to find the proper form of conduct for the liberal citizen who wishes to address the excesses of his or her state. Freedom is not opposed to government as such, but is rather the condition of possibility of the rational, responsible, autonomous subject who opposes himself to a law in a certain situation, with the aim of ameliorating technologies of government. Rather than asking how protest is repressed or policed ›from above‹ by the state or other authorities, we might ask how civil disobedience encourages protestors police themselves.

The need to be reasonable, rational, coherent, well-behaved, pacifist, and responsible operates as forms of control, exercised by protesters on themselves and others. At the same time, it would be wrong to think of self-disciplinary protest as an uncontested practice; it has been the site of a number of struggles and resistances. For example, Ward Churchill has attempted to revise histories of the civil rights movement and Indian independence to disrupt narratives that privilege non-violent, pacifist tendencies and marginalize violent resistance (Churchill 2007). ›Resisting‹ these discourses, as Churchill recognizes, is not simply about transgressing its norms and valorizing violence or irrationality, for this merely reproduces the dichotomies of violent/non-violent, rational/irrational. Anti-Olympics organizing points to some ways in which these discourses might be critically engaged while mitigating the forms of discipline they encourage.

Activists have made use of these liberal discourses of protest, framing their claims and struggles in terms of civil rights and free speech. For example, efforts by police to question anti-Olympics activists have been framed as harassment and an undue violation of civil liberties. In the words of one activist: »The police are not in a position to start a dialogue about free speech and the Olympics. They've already proven that their job is to restrict free speech. The place to start is by holding public meetings about Olympic security instead of visiting organizers' houses. We doubt that they will—talking to the VISU [Vancouver Integrated Security Unit] about Charter rights is like talking to a brick wall« (Olympics Resistance Victoria 2009).

Activists are thus attempting to position the police as a force opposed to free speech by inviting police to share their concerns at public gatherings. By posi-

2 ›Governmentality‹ is a term developed by Michel Foucault, formulated in his 1978 lectures (Foucault 2007). Nikolas Rose (2006) has produced a helpful survey of the literature on the concept of governmentality.

tioning their own concerns as ›public‹ and positioning the police as enemies of a public discussion and democratic dissent, anti-Olympics activists make use of liberal discourses that enable and protect free speech and freedom of assembly.

Olympics organizers have made use of this discourse as well, suggesting that ›there will always be critics of our project,‹ claiming that they ›only hope that any criticisms are constructive and truthful and demonstrations are safe and non-violent‹ (Bell 2009). Truthfulness, constructiveness, and non-violence are reiterated as the conditions of a legitimate and effective politics.

As I have suggested above, liberal discourses of civil disobedience are part of a discursive regime that functions to police protesters, not (only) through repressive force, but by creating norms that enable them to police themselves. Anti-Olympics activists have made use of these discourses tactically, but they have also resisted them as regimes of self-control. For example, at a roundtable discussion between anti-Olympics organizers in 2009, one audience member asked about non-violence, urging others to be peaceful during demonstrations. In turn, panelists responded by criticizing the call for non-violence, pointing to the ongoing violence of colonialism, racism, and the criminalization of homelessness and linked these phenomena to the Olympics and its effects on local communities. However, they did not simply invert the call for non-violence with a call for violence; instead, they gestured towards the need for a diversity of tactics, rather than an either/or choice between violence and non-violence. This exchange can be understood as a critical politicization of violence. Whereas liberal concepts of non-violence limit the question of violence to political subjects, the panelists politicized the structural and historical violence of the state and its role in maintaining colonial relations. Redefined in this way, violence ceases to be a simple choice made by a citizen about his or her tactics; it becomes a feature of everyday life, one that tends to be obscured in the call for non-violence.

Liberal discourses of non-violence, civil disobedience, and protest are a significant site of struggle in anti-Olympics organizing. My sketch of these discourses has been schematic and much more could be said about the history of struggles and transformations that have taken place in the constitution of discourses of civil disobedience. Although these discourses can end up regulating conduct and normalization, anti-Olympics organizers are navigating these discourses tactically, understanding them as sites of struggle rather than stable rules that should govern conduct. The same can be said of Marxist discourses of hegemony and strategy, which I discuss below. Although it is possible to understand anti-Olympics activism as a counter-hegemonic project, there are also elements of anti-Olympics organizing that exceed the limits of a counter-hegemonic strategy, and point beyond the logic of hegemony to more subtle and creative political practices.

## Hegemony and counter-hegemony in protest

Gramsci's political thought has been celebrated as an alternative to both liberal reformism and mechanistic Marxism through his focus on the way dominant groups are able to maintain consent and control (Carroll 1997). For Gramsci, the concept of ›hegemony‹ was an attempt to understand the ways in which the bourgeoisie was able to present itself (and its interests) as universal, »capable of absorbing the entire society, assimilating it to its own cultural and economic level« (Gramsci 1971, 236). Gramsci showed how the state was not simply a ›night watchman‹, whose functions are limited to safeguarding public order and respect for the laws; the State also has a hegemonic function, in its »production of the will to conform« (261).

There are significant differences in the ways in which hegemony has been taken up as a form of analysis; however, there are important shared tendencies as well (Carroll 1994). As Stuart Hall (1996, 417) suggests, hegemony tends to be intertwined with the question of »what strategies and forms of political action/organization could unite concretely different kinds of struggle?« In other words, hegemony tends to be attached to the question of counter-hegemony, and the prospects for challenging the hegemonic order. Counter-hegemony forms a tentative answer to the question of Marxist strategy, holding out the possibility of a basis of unity for the diversity of struggles for social justice. Counter-hegemony takes us from the question of responsible citizenship to the question of effective strategy. However, I will suggest that ›effective strategy‹ also produces norms of conduct and discipline. As with civil disobedience, this does not mean ›rejecting‹ this discourse but asking what forms of control it exercises and how it is engaged in anti-Olympics struggles.

With the concept of hegemony, it is possible to see that ›the Olympics‹ are not somehow essentially connected to global cooperation and sportsmanship, *or* to environmental destruction and colonialism, but rather that these connections are contingent and the way the Olympics is articulated.

The articulation of the Olympics—as a harmonious, unifying and inspiring event—is a hegemonic project that must be continually produced and maintained. Insofar as this articulation is successful, the Olympics signifies itself as a universal symbol of harmony, in line all interests: it's good for everyone.

The Olympics maintains its hegemony (and the consent of local residents, the Canadian public, and its global viewership) by articulating the Olympics as a symbol of sportsmanship, international cooperation, and athletic excellence. As a sporting event, the Olympics appears depoliticized, and therefore not a subject of contestation. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the Vancouver Organizing Committee (VANOC) have also used more national, regional, and local narratives to frame the Olympics in a positive light. VANOC and other Olympic organizers have teamed up with corporations to create sophisticated marketing

campaigns, clothing brands, and a media apparatus that links the Olympics to Canadian multiculturalism, economic development, and sustainability (VANOC 2009a; 2009b; 2009c).

Against these narratives of harmonious economic, racial, and environmental coexistence, anti-Olympics organizers undertook detailed research, engaged in media campaigns and direct actions to disrupt Olympics proceedings. Over the last two years, activists from across North America have carried out a series of direct actions to disrupt Olympic celebrations and ceremonies (no2010.com 2010). These actions have varied in their scope and purpose; however, all have served to disrupt the smooth functioning of the Olympics discourse, which depends on the depoliticization of the Olympics and its articulation as a two-week celebration of athleticism. Anti-Olympics efforts effect a disarticulation of the Olympics discourse, fracturing and problematizing its coherence.

In addition to these practices of disarticulation, activists have also engaged in their own project of (re)articulation, in the attempt to hegemonize a discourse that signifies the Olympics as a destructive force linked to corporate greed and fascism. This counter-hegemonic project is most evident in terms of the research and propaganda generated by anti-Olympics organizers, which includes a range of material from short pamphlets and posters to detailed documents on the history of the Olympics and the local impacts of the 2010 Olympics (2010 Watch 2009; zig zag 2009). These projects produce counter-narratives to the dominant narratives of harmony and sportsmanship. As zig zag (2009) writes, »while cutting social services, healthcare, education, etc., the BC Liberal government is at the same time providing billions of dollars to construction companies & other Olympic-related industries. The capitalists are making millions, while the poor are literally dying in the urban & reservation ghettos.«

Although they emphasize different issues and depend on different assumptions, the vast majority of these articles position the Olympics (and police, corporations, and Olympics organizers) as »enemies« and anti-Olympics resisters as defenders of the environment, indigenous peoples, public space, and local economies. In the language of Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) theory of hegemony, this is a process of articulation where the Olympics organizers are positioned on the »outside«, and diverse interests and identities (indigenous, homeless, ecological, municipal, etc) are articulated on the »inside«, with their opposition to the Olympics as a basis of unity and identification.

Although anti-Olympic efforts to produce the Olympics as a common enemy can be understood as a counter-hegemonic strategy, the lack of a set of coherent demands, alternatives, or claims is a serious weakness from the perspective of hegemony. It is often thought that the Left needs to articulate a common position so that it is not »condemned to marginality« (Laclau 1985, 189). This discourse is not limited to academic texts. Like the liberal discourse of civil disobedience I outlined above, the discourse of hegemony permeates both intellectual and ac-

tivist strategies and common-sense thinking about social change (Day 2005, 66-88). In order for a successful counter-hegemonic project to be carried out, »[o]ne needs to know for what one is fighting, what kind of society one wants to establish« (Laclau 1985, xix). From here, demands can be put forward which advance society in this direction, and protests and other political practices can be evaluated by how successful they are at articulating these demands and advancing this broader vision.

Demands and claims tend to form a central part in the analysis of hegemony, because they provide a means of locating longer-term objectives, aims and trajectories of protest movements. Ernesto Laclau (2005, 73) has gone so far as to insist that demands should form the central unit of analysis of social movements. We can recognize some familiar questions that are presupposed by the analytic of hegemony: What do they want? What are their long-term goals? What is their strategy? Here, coherence and unity become a priority in the attempt to win the struggle for hegemony against the Olympics and its corporate and government partners. However, this discourse and the imperatives it generates also produce their own norms and common sense, which governs conduct. For example, a successful struggle for hegemony means winning over a majority, creating widespread opposition to the Olympics. Good strategy, in this sense, means producing unified opposition to the Olympics and convincing the majority of Canadians that the Olympics is bad for Canada.

The need for a coherent opposition can be understood as a conduct-governing regime similar to the liberal discourse discussed above. In other words, the requirement for a coherent program produces a new set of norms that enables forms of discipline and control. Like ›violence‹ in the liberal discourse above, the specter of ›incoherence‹ or ›vagueness‹ functions within the hegemonic discourse as a danger that must be warded off, requiring the (self-)discipline of subjects and practices that do not cohere with the counter-hegemonic strategy. Like the discourse of civil disobedience, the discourse of hegemony and the need for coherent demands has been engaged and resisted in a number of ways (Day 2004; Robinson 2005).

One of the most powerful examples of this resistance is Richard Day's (2005) critique of hegemony in *Gramsci is Dead*. Day suggests that the discourse of hegemony has resulted in the privileging of what he calls »the politics of demand« which relies on and reproduces external structures (such as the state) for the satisfaction of these demands (80-84). Day points to a form of politics that is not confined to the state, but nonetheless reproduces relationships that mimic the citizen-state relationship. The politics of demand perpetuates a feeling of lack and the desire for emancipation through an appeal to an outside: to ›the people‹ or ›the state‹ or even ›the Olympics committee‹. In other words, by making ›demands‹ the central mode of politics, the politics of demand reproduces its dependence on corporations, governments, and other institutions. Whether advanced angrily,

through reasoned public debate, or through lobbying, demands reproduce the authorities they engage with, placing activists in an infantilized relationship to them.

The politics of demand is reproduced in the typical questions asked about protest: Who are they? What do they want? How do they propose to get it? However, anti-Olympics activism occupies an ambiguous relation to the logic of hegemony and the politics of demand. We have seen that anti-Olympics activism can be conceived as a counter-hegemonic struggle, and it is possible to locate demands issued by anti-Olympics activists that seem to play into the logic of hegemony. For example, some of the rhetoric at the recent protests centered on government spending, suggesting that money could be better spent on social services and low-income housing. Expressed in this way, opposition to the Olympics can be understood as a counter-hegemonic agenda focused on redistribution or institutional changes in the State.

Similarly, some activists have condensed the position of the anti-Olympics movement to opposition to the Olympics as such. In the words of Ivan Doumenc, »Vancouver is starting a new global movement, one that will continue in London and all other Olympic-plagued cities after that. A movement that says: we don't want the Olympics corporate franchise anymore, anywhere. We just want it abolished, period« (Doumenc 2010).

From this perspective, the anti-Olympics movement is tied to a program of abolishing the Olympics. Although this is certainly a radical demand from the perspective of those invested in the Olympics, it also confers a particular telos on the anti-Olympics movement itself, with a coherent objective that can be heard and responded to by authorities.

However, anti-Olympics organizing also disrupts and points beyond the politics of demand in a number of ways. For example, anti-Olympics propaganda often situates Canada, the Olympics committee and its corporate partners within global capitalism, rather than issuing demands that could be articulated to reforms: »If the 2010 Winter Olympics goes unchallenged, BC & Canada will indeed gain positive international exposure. This, in turn, will create greater international investment & corporate invasion, a process already underway & affecting many areas & communities. If opposition occurs, however, it can contribute to economic uncertainty, deter some investment, and limit the impact of 2010 on some communities & regions« (zig zag 2009).

This conception of disruption points towards a politics of resistance rather than a politics of demand and reform. Instead of relying on a counter-hegemonic strategy that would be evaluated in terms of its capacity to influence majorities and transform broader structures, the strategy of resistance above points to the capacities of local communities in resisting the impacts of the Olympics and mitigating their harmful effects. This analysis reveals that although anti-Olympics organizers are using modes of political organizing that could be understood as counter-hegemonic—the attempt to resignify the Olympics as a destructive insti-

tution, for example—the efficacy of this politics does not depend on the hegemony of their position. Tactics of resistance and disruption can succeed in limiting the effects of the Olympics whether or not ›the public‹ supports them. At the same time, one might question the significance of the politics of resistance in the longer-term, especially in the context of the Olympics. This form of politics pits grassroots activists against a massive security apparatus that is increasingly designed to constitute, locate, and eliminate guerilla tactics as acts of terrorism (Grindlay 2009).

A longstanding criticism of the politics of resistance has been its lack of constructive alternatives (Boggs 1986, 19; Gill 1995; Carroll 1994; Carroll 2009). As I have mentioned above, from a hegemonic perspective, the disarticulation and disruption of the Olympics and the discourses on which it relies misses the crucial task of re-articulation, in which counter-hegemonic movements find the capacity to advance their own objectives and aims for society.

In the final section of my analysis, I will suggest that anti-Olympics organizers are engaged in the project of advancing alternatives, but not according to the logic of hegemony. In order to understand the logic and significance of alternatives, we need to move from an analysis of propaganda and demands to concrete practices and events. In other words, it is where coherence and unity seem to be most ›lacking‹ that the most significant alternatives are emerging.

### **From hegemonic to minoritarian**

If we look for alternatives advanced hegemonically, we will be drawn to a search for programs, positions, or plans for what society should look like, how politics should be conducted, or how people should organize themselves. In contrast, I will suggest that the alternatives advanced by anti-Olympics organizers are fragmentary and experimental, rather than coherent and unified. The alternatives produced through anti-Olympics organizing are closer to what Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 469 ff.) have called a »minoritarian politics«, which can't be measured or understood by its capacity to enter and be heard by molar structures like the state, corporations or Olympics committees. This logic resonates with Day's (2005) alternative to the politics of demand, which he calls »the politics of the act«. Whereas the politics of demand reproduces dependent relationships by relying on institutions like the state, the politics of the act side-steps these structures and engages directly in political action. Direct action figures prominently here, as a form of political action that refuses mediation through bureaucracies, parties, or other forms of organization. However, this different political logic is not an opposition between ›demands‹ and ›acts‹ or between ›speaking‹ and ›action‹. Rather than a simple opposition to ›speaking‹, we should understand the politics of the act as a politicization of the disciplinary logics that take coherence, unity, and demands as

unproblematic political goals: »it means surprising both oneself—and the structure—by inventing responses that preclude the necessity of the demand and thereby break out of the loop« (Day 2005, 89).

I have tried to show how these disciplinary logics are built into the discourse of counter-hegemony, through which anti-Olympics activism is understood as insufficiently coherent, and lacking a long-term program for the reorganization of society. That which is being disciplined is the multiplicity of voices, tactics, and movements that make up ›the‹ anti-Olympics movement.

This multiplicity can always be ignored, overcoded or subsumed under the logic of hegemony or civil disobedience. This is what happens when commonsensical questions are asked about tactics that do not fit with the logic of protest. If actions are not intelligible as attempts to express dissent, they are illegitimate, pointless, or even unintelligible. This seems to be what happened in the recent debates surrounding black bloc tactics, where activists smashed windows of the Hudson's Bay Company during a demonstration on February 13<sup>th</sup> (CBC 2010). David Eby, executive director of the BC Civil Liberties association, condemned the black bloc tactics: »I don't see that there's any place for those kinds of actions if we're going to be encouraging free speech. If you want to speak your point of view in favor of or opposed to the Olympics, there should be space for that. You shouldn't expect someone to put a chair through your front window« (Carlito 2010).

In an interview from the same news article, Mark Leier insists that the actions of the black bloc were legitimate because they attracted media attention, framing the tactics as part of »a long tradition of people creating disruptions to draw attention to their causes.« What is significant about this debate is not the divergence of opinions about the legitimacy of these actions, but their *convergence* on the imperative of expressing dissent. In other words, the condition of possibility of judgement about (il)legitimacy turns on whether these actions can be understood as civil disobedience and the expression of dissent. If black bloc tactics succeed in drawing attention to issues and remedying injustices, their actions can be understood as (legitimate) civil disobedience.

Similar discussions have occurred on the terrain of hegemony. In this context, the black bloc tactics are judged in the context of whether they contribute to (or detract from) public opposition to the Olympics. For example, the logic of hegemony subtends Mark Sweetman's claim that »years of hard work that organizers had put into opposing the capitalist and colonial Olympic Games shatter in the eyes of the public with the first broken window« (Sweetman 2010). Similarly, prominent intellectual-activist Judy Rebick has condemned them because they reverse the gains made by hegemonic politics, which had »persuaded the majority in BC that the Games are not good for the province« (Rebick 2010). No longer couched in terms of legitimacy, the logic of hegemony appears even more forceful because it is about ›effectiveness‹ of tactics. This is about strategy, not legitimacy.

However, what needs to be critically engaged is the grounding of effectiveness in a totalizing logic of hegemony. What gives these statements their force is the common-sense logic of hegemony: the focus of anti-Olympics protest must be to send a clear message to be heard by ›the public‹ or ›the majority in BC‹. The logic of hegemony creates a form of discipline that is all the more subtle because it lays claim to the ground of strategic necessity instead of moral legitimacy. However, I have already suggested that there are alternative discourses and practices at work in anti-Olympics activism, which offer glimpses at an alternative politics.

In what follows, I want to point to new political sensibilities and modes of organizing that attend to this multiplicity, rather than subsuming it under the logic of counter-hegemony or civil disobedience. There have been a number of attempts to name and explain these emergent forms of political practice (Tormey 2006; Day 2004; Newman 2007; Graeber 319), but rather than compare these attempts, I will draw on those that seem to be the most relevant in the context of anti-Olympics organizing. Day calls this emerging form of politics the »logic of affinity«: »Living affinity-based relationships means not only hooking up with those with whom we share values, but actively warding off and working against those whose practices perpetuate division, domination and exploitation ... This is the crux of the task of building the coming communities: we must develop—and live according to—shared ethico-political commitments that allow us to achieve enough solidarity to effectively create sustainable alternatives to the neoliberal order« (2005, 186).

The logic of affinity operates in a way that is antithetical to traditional forms of protest, which rely on and reproduce the authorities they place demands upon. How can a multiplicity—an inherently incoherent assemblage of desires, movements, and flows—produce a coherent set of demands or a unified counter-hegemonic front? A multiplicity can always be represented or articulated as a coherent front; however, insofar as this articulation is successful, the multiplicity is covered over. The logic of affinity speaks to a different possibility, one that is always in tension with the logic of hegemony.

Anti-Olympics activism exists in an ambiguous relationship with these competing logics. The logic of affinity is reflected in a document written by anti-Olympics organizers: »Due to the diversity of social sectors & concerns, any anti-Olympic movement must include respect & tolerance for a diversity of tactics as a basic principle« (zig zag 2009).

The affirmation of a diversity of tactics is not simply a form of pluralism as a new strategy, but gestures towards a new political logic that side-steps the question of strategy, emphasizing instead a multiplicity of tactics that has *no universal measure of effectiveness*.

In order to see this alternative politics at work in a more sustained way, we need to move from spaces of protest to other spaces of anti-Olympics activism. I will consider two such events involving anti-Olympics organizing. The logic of affinity is particularly evident in No 2010 Victoria's ›Networks of Dissent‹ Teach-

in, which brought together non-governmental organizations, students, and activists working on issues of homelessness, poverty, sex-work, decolonization, healthcare and harm reduction (No 2010 Victoria 2009). Individuals and groups working and organizing in each of these areas held workshops where they discussed the impact of the Olympics, and suggested connections to other issues.

A similar political current can be detected in the more recent Victoria Anarchist Bookfair, in which anti-Olympics resistance was a major theme. Like the Teach-in, the Bookfair featured a number of workshops and discussions about the impacts of the Olympics and ongoing organizing efforts (VABF 2009). Both events were non-hegemonic in the sense that they did not tend toward the carving out of unified positions. Instead, they created spaces where political problems could be formulated, rather than proceeding with a search for a coherent program.

The important elements of these events may become clearer if we attempt to ask questions that are typically asked about protest: Who are they? What do they want? What are their objectives? What are they advocating, what are they against? In the context of the Teach-In and the Bookfair, none of these questions can be answered without considerable difficulty, because these events lack the typical contours of homogenous, delimitable groups with unified objectives. Indeed, these events will be found lacking in terms of a unified identity, goal, aim, platform or objective. From the perspective of hegemony, this lack signifies a weakness, for an effective counter-hegemonic strategy requires the articulation of clear objectives or alternatives. An alternative hegemonic reading might subordinate these events to the logic of hegemonic struggle by seeing them as forms of movement-building that are significant insofar as they can attract more people to the cause. Against these readings, I will suggest that these political spaces are significant in their own right, perhaps more significant than the counter-hegemonic struggle of anti-Olympics organizers, for they point to alternative forms of political engagement that point beyond the logics of civil disobedience and hegemony.

These events can be understood as minoritarian political spaces. As Deleuze and Guattari explain, »the power of the minorities is not measured by their capacity to enter and make themselves felt within the majority system... but to bring to bear the force of non-denumerable sets, however small they may be, against the denumerable sets« (471).

The language of »denumerable sets« is complex, but for our purposes, these ›sets‹ can be understood as forces that are *not* stable, coherent or unified. From a hegemonic perspective, these forces can only be understood as *lacking* coherence or unity: they seem ineffectual and fragmented because they fail to articulate demands or a coherent alternative capable of producing a counter-hegemonic force. In contrast, Deleuze and Guattari insist that they have their own political efficacy, which is precisely the fact that they formulate problems differently than major institutions. Minoritarian politics points to the places »when people demand to formulate their problems themselves, and to determine at least the particular con-

ditions under which they can receive a more general solution« (471). In this sense, we can understand anti-Olympics organizing as a form of minoritarian politics through its approach to the Olympics as a *problem* to be analyzed collectively. Its force consists in non-unitary, heterogeneous forms collective critique and the way in which this analysis connects and politicizes forms of everyday life.

The Teach-in and the Bookfair are excellent examples of this force, where collective problems can be formulated, which will have diverse and multiple responses. How are these modes of organizing different from the logic of hegemony? Counter-hegemonic action requires the articulation of a common enemy (which could be as specific as the Olympics committee or as broad as ›capitalism‹), placing the counter-hegemonic movement on the inside and the enemy on the outside. A minoritarian politics operates differently. Rather than tending towards the oppositional framework of positioning oneself ›against‹ problems like capitalism and colonialism, minoritarian politics deepens the ways in which these problems are understood, and multiplies sites of resistance and struggle. In many cases, this implicates everyday life in colonialism and capitalism. It is important to point out that there are no guarantees the minoritarian politics will be more effective from a strategic perspective. On the contrary, a deepening analysis of problems like capitalism—which permeates our everyday lives in countless ways—can lead to political paralysis and uncertainty about strategies and tactics.

However, I would suggest that minoritarian politics and its deepening of problems has the effect of paralyzing a *particular* form of politics, rather than politics as such. If forms of oppression and domination are understood as networked, local, and multiple, it becomes increasingly difficult to produce a coherent, unified alternative to something as decentralized and complex as colonialism. This does not preclude political responses altogether, but rather points back to the logic of affinity and the possibility of decentralized, heterogeneous political responses *with no basis of unity*.

My contention is not that hegemony *cannot* account for these spaces, but that the hegemonic analytic overcodes multiplicity and minoritarian political logics, subsuming them under a totalizing concept of strategy or effectiveness. In these spaces, ›the Olympics‹ was not simply maintained as an overarching problem that should organize or guide strategic thinking (counter-hegemony); instead, the Olympics functioned more as a heuristic device through which to understand the economic, social and political processes that are at work in local communities, and the connections between them. This is echoed in a statement from the No 2010 Victoria website: »More than a single rallying point of contention, we view the 2010 Olympics as the prism through which we can address ongoing systemic issues in Victoria, including poverty, ecocide, industrial capitalism, etc« (No 2010 Victoria 2009). Here, it is possible to understand the Olympics not (only) as a common front against which to unite (according the logic of counter-hegemonic practice) but as a phenomenon that is made possible by a diffuse network of dis-

courses and practices, and as an opportunity for collective analysis, critique and solidarity-building within and across organizations and communities. This is precisely what happened at the Networks of Dissent Teach-in. A workshop run by PEERS (Prostitutes Empowerment Education and Recovery Society) traced out the ways in which the Olympics had heightened processes of gentrification and police repression, exacerbating the situation faced by sex-workers and their allies in Victoria and Vancouver. Similar workshops were presented on homelessness, occupied indigenous territories, and environmental destruction. In this context, the Olympics could be understood as a process that intensified ongoing processes of colonialism, securitization, gentrification, patriarchy, and corporate restructuring. It became clear that these processes had multiple, overlapping sites of articulation and resistance, and were clearly irreducible to the Olympics as such.

Events like the Teach-in and the Bookfair lack the insides and outsides of traditional modes of political engagement. There are certainly varying levels of commitment and responsibility; however, there is no simple means by which to represent ›the group‹ that attended these gatherings. The significance of events like these is not simply that there are no clear insides and outsides, but that this difference has specific implications for political practice. It precludes practices like traditional liberal protest, which require a clear program, objective or demand that can be issued and heard by an ›outside‹ (be it a sovereign, a corporation or ›the public‹).

The political significance of these events is that they demonstrate the possibility of constituting political spaces that *do not* subordinate themselves to the search for a coherent strategy, platform, or goal. In doing so, they demonstrate the contingent nature of traditional political practices like protest, gesturing to other forms of politics.

The challenge then becomes to think about these political projects—and their effects and transformations—without subsuming them under the logic of hegemony. What effects do they have? One step in this direction can be made through the concept of ›prefiguration‹, which speaks to the possibility of creating alternatives relations and modes of organizing in the present. For example, the Teach-in and the Bookfair prefigure alternatives to capitalism, patriarchy, and hierarchy through their non-hierarchical organization, free food, and childcare. In this sense, these events bring the ›outside‹ of neoliberalism, capitalism and patriarchy ›in‹, recognizing that these practices and power relationships structure our everyday lives. They create alternative relations directly, rather than relying on ›centers‹ of power like the state. This is not to say that these spaces are free from domination or forms of (self-)discipline. Prefiguration only provides a means to think about political practices as experimental and tentative. I do not mean to suggest that these spaces or practices are free from power relations or forms of discipline. The claim here is not so much that anti-Olympics organizing is ›good‹ or that it is free from dominant power relations, but rather that elements of it are different from

traditional forms of political practice that remain confined within liberal or strategic discourses. This is not merely a difference in aims, objectives and programs, but a different approach to politics which problematizes coherent aims, objectives and programs. Appreciating these modes of politics requires asking different questions than those posed by liberalism and the logic of hegemony. If the same questions are posed, these forms of organization will only be found *lacking*: lacking legitimacy, structure, cohesion or direction. I have tried to suggest that this ›lack‹ must be reconceived as a positive difference that enables different capacities.

Anti-Olympics resistance is an interesting struggle because it engages in these discourses and disrupts dominant relations of power while *also* producing minoritarian political spaces where complexity and difference are deepened rather than erased. Anti-Olympics activists have constituted themselves as liberal subjects engaged in a struggle for free speech; however, this discourse has also been resisted and refused. Anti-Olympics struggle can be understood as a counter-hegemonic struggle in which organizers have attempted to position the Olympics as the enemy of ›the public‹. Some of their demands are intelligible, effective politics from liberal and hegemonic perspectives; however, others appear naïve, vague or contradictory.

These moments of apparent vagueness point beyond hegemony and liberalism to non-reformist, non-hegemonic currents that follow a different political logic, one that is erased or covered over by the hegemony of Marxism and liberalism. If these discourses are reproduced uncritically, the same questions will be asked of political protest: What are their objectives? What are they asking for? Who are they speaking to? Minoritarian politics is covered over by these questions, found lacking and incoherent, in part because the subjects of minoritarian politics are often not asking for anything at all; they are *producing, politicizing, and experimenting*.

The minoritarian spaces of anti-Olympics organizing—in particular the Teach-in and the Bookfair—point beyond protest to other forms of organizing that form a complex array of insides and outsides, rather than a clear subject of protest and an authority capable of hearing and responding. These spaces deepen problems rather than reducing them to sound bites. They also prefigure alternatives by creating spaces where relations of power operate differently, through non-hierarchical relationships, participatory workshops, and free food and childcare. Rather than spaces of lack, these are spaces of irreducible multiplicity, and their political force consists in the refusal to reduce this multiplicity to a single position or agenda.

The politics of these minoritarian spaces is obscured by liberal and Marxist discourses of protest. However, the point is not to dismiss liberal and Marxist discourses and point towards minoritarian politics as *the* way forward. I want to suggest that counter-hegemony and civil disobedience—as fields of political struggle in activism and academia—need to be *decentered* without being abandoned. This is because they continue to structure important relations of power, and dismissing them as ›bad‹ merely obfuscates their hegemonic effects. These struggles—and

the political stakes that inhere in them—are obscured by uncritical acceptance *as well* as complete dismissal of these discourses.

The politics of the act and the politics of demand (or the politics of minority/majority) exist in perpetual tension with one another. However, these logics should be understood as a simple opposition or an either/or choice. Following Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 474-500), I would suggest that these dualisms should be understood as constantly interpenetrating, capturing, and combating each other.<sup>3</sup> The notion of minoritarian politics provides a means of examining the ways in which subtle forms of domination and discipline are politicized, including those that inhere in the logic of hegemony. At the same time, minoritarian politics can always be subsumed within the logic of hegemony, both in activist organizing and in political analysis. The most significant challenge is to uncover the manifold relations between these logics rather than criticize one and celebrate the other. This paper can be understood as part of this project, in its attempt to sort out the ways in which movements operate within, across, and beyond civil disobedience and counter-hegemony, and the ways in which these dominant logics cover over minoritarian politics.

3 Deleuze and Guattari's dualisms are often misinterpreted as terms that are separate from each other, with the smooth, the rhizomatic, the molecular, and the war machine celebrated over and against the striated, the arborescent, the molar and the state. However, much of their analysis in *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus* is dedicated to showing the way in which these dualisms are constantly capturing, infiltrating, and giving rise to one another.

## References

- 2010 Watch (2009): 2010 olympic games watch, <http://www.2010watch.com/> [2009-05-10].
- Bell, S. (2009): The anti relay, National Post, October 17, A1.
- Boggs, C. (1986): Social movements and political power. Emerging forms of radicalism in the west, Philadelphia.
- Carroll, W. K. (1997): Social movements and counterhegemony. Canadian contexts and social theories, in: W. K. Carroll (ed.): *Organizing dissent. Contemporary social movements in theory and practice: Studies in the politics of counter-hegemony*, Toronto.
- Carroll, W. K. (2009): Hegemony, counter-hegemony, anti-hegemony. *Socialist Studies. The Journal of the Society for Socialist Studies*, 2 (2), pp. 9-43.
- Carroll, W. K.; Ratner, R. S. (1994): Between Leninism and radical pluralism. Gramscian reflections on counter-hegemony and the new social movements. *Critical Sociology*, 20 (3), pp. 3-26.
- CBC (2010): Anti-Olympics rioters smash Vancouver store windows, <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/british-columbia/story/2010/02/13/bc-vancouver-olympic-protest.html> [2010-08-03].
- Churchill, W. and Ryan, M. (2007): *Pacifism as pathology*, Edinburgh, Scotland; Oakland.
- Day, R. J. F. (2004): From hegemony to affinity. *Cultural Studies*, 18 (5), pp. 716-748.
- Day, R. J. F. (2005): *Gramsci is dead. Anarchist currents in the newest social movements*, Toronto.
- Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (1987): *A thousand plateaus. Capitalism and schizophrenia*, Minneapolis.
- Doumenc, I. (2010): *Grass!struggle: Olympic resistance - schedule of events*, <http://grassstruggle.blogspot.com/2010/02/olympic-resistance-schedule-of-events.html> [2010-06-03].
- Dronfield, D.; Lloyd, R. and Fraser, H. (2009): Pride and protest: Readers sound-off about olympic torch relay events. *The Gazette*, October 31., A7.
- Economy, E. and Segal, A. (2008): China's olympic nightmare. What the games mean for beijing's future. *Foreign Affairs*, 87 (4), 47-56.
- Foucault, M. (2007): *Security, territory, population. Lectures at the collège de france, 1977-78*, New York.
- Gill, S. (1995): Globalisation, market civilisation, and disciplinary neoliberalism. *Millennium – Journal of International Studies*, 24 (3), pp. 399-423.
- Graeber, D. (2002): The new anarchists. *New Left Review*, 13 (1), pp. 61-73.
- Gramsci, A. (1971), in: Hoare, Q. and Nowell-Smith, G. (eds.): *Selections from the prison notebooks*, London.
- Hall, S.; Morley, D. and Chen, K. (1996): *Stuart Hall. Critical dialogues in cultural studies*. London; New York.
- Laclau, E., and Mouffe, C. (1985); *Hegemony and socialist strategy. Towards a radical democratic politics*, London.
- Magnusson, W. (1996): *The search for political space. Globalization, social movements, and the urban political experience*, Toronto; Buffalo.
- Morton, A. D. (2007): *Unravelling Gramsci. Hegemony and passive revolution in the global political economy*, London.
- No 2010 Victoria (2009): Networks of dissent. Anti-olympics teach-in, <http://www.no2010victoria.net/index.php/component/content/article/3-march-2109-networks-of-dissent-anti-olympics-teach-in> [2009-10-13].
- No 2010 Victoria (2009): Who we are, <http://www.no2010victoria.net/who-we-are> [2009-03-15].
- No 2010.com (2010): Resistance and direct actions, <http://www.no2010.com/node/165?page=7> [2009-05-02].
- Olympics Resistance Network. Convergence summit schedule feb 10 – 11, <http://olympicresistance.net/content/convergence-summit-schedule-feb-10-11> [2010-06-03].
- Olympics Resistance Victoria (2009): Olympic police harass more victoria activists, [http://www.streetnewsservice.org/index.php?page=archive\\_detail&articleID=4461](http://www.streetnewsservice.org/index.php?page=archive_detail&articleID=4461) [2009-03-10].
- Pablo, C: Anti-olympics protest tactics scrutinized, <http://www.straight.com/article-290450/vancouver/protest-tactics-scrutinized> [2010-06-03].
- Rawls, J. (1991): Definition and justification of civil disobedience, in: Bedau, H. A. (ed.): *Civil disobedience in focus*. New York, pp. 103-121.
- Rebick, J. (2010): Breaking windows is not a revolutionary act, <http://www.rabble.ca/blogs/bloggers/judes/2010/02/breaking-windows-not-revolutionary-act> [2010-06-03].
- Robinson, A. and Tormey, S. (2005): Horizontals, verticals, and the conflicting logics of transformative politics, in: el-Ojeili, C. and Hayden, P. (eds.): *Confronting globalization: Humanity, justice and the renewal of politics*, Houndmills, pp. 208-226.
- Rose, N.; O'Malley, P. and Valverde, M. (2006): Governmentality. *Annual Review of Law and Social Science*, 2, pp. 83-104.
- Sharp, G. (1973): *The politics of nonviolent action*. Boston.
- Shaw, C. (2008): *Five ring circus. Myths and realities of the olympic games*. Gabriola Island.
- Shiva, V. (1999): The historic significance of Seattle, <http://flag.blackened.net/global/1299arshiva.htm> [2009-03-10].
- Starr, A. and Adams, J. (2003): Anti-globalization. The global fight for local autonomy. *New Political Science*, 25 (1), pp. 19-42.

- Sweetman, M. (2010): We need a mass movement not a black bloc,  
<http://linchpin.ca/English/We-need-mass-movement-not-black-bloc> [2010-06-03].
- Tormey, S. (2006): ›Not in my name‹. Deleuze, zapatismo and the critique of representation. *Parliamentary Affairs*, 59 (1), pp. 138-154.
- VANOC (2009a): Vancouver 2010 graphic identity, <http://www.vancouver2010.com/en/about-vanoc/the-vancouver-2010-brand/vancouver-2010-graphic-identity/-/54890/54900/znyhan/vancouver-2010-graphic-identit.html> [2009-04-10].
- VANOC (2009b): VANOC and architects recognized for leadership in building green venues, <http://www.vancouver2010.com/en/news/feature-stories/-/70096/32574/1qqf6fk/vanoc-and-architects-recognize.html> [2009-04-10].
- VANOC (2009c): Works of art by more than 90 aboriginal artists at 2010 winter games, <http://www.vancouver2010.com/en/news/news-releases/-/68394/32566/t7jpid/works-of-art-by-more-than-90-a.html> [2009-04-10].
- zig zag (2009): No Olympics on stolen land | no Vancouver 2010 winter Olympics on stolen Native land, <http://www.no2010.com/node/19> [2009-10-13].

## The Authors

### *Michael Shane Boyle*

Shane Boyle is an activist and theater director living in Oakland and Berlin. He is also a doctoral candidate in the Graduate Program in Performance Studies at UC Berkeley. Shane is writing his dissertation on the intimacy of activist performance, political provocation, and violence in the German New Left.

### *Stephen Gill*

is Distinguished Research Professor of Political Science, Communications and Culture at York University in Toronto, Canada. He is also a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada and a Senior Associate Member of St. Anthony's College, Oxford University. In 2009 – 10 he was the inaugural Jane and Aatos Erkko Visiting Professor of Studies on Contemporary Society in the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies at the University of Helsinki, Finland. His main fields are Global Political Economy, International Relations, and Social and Political Theory. His most recent book is *Power and Resistance in the New World Order* (Palgrave 2008).

<http://www.stephengill.com>

### *Sebastian Haunss*

Ph. D., is a lecturer in the Department of Politics and Management at the University of Konstanz. His research focusses on social movements, visual forms of protest, and conflicts about knowledge and intellectual property rights. He is coeditor of *Politics of Intellectual Property. Contestation Over the Ownership, Use, and Control of Knowledge and Information*.

<http://shaunss.wordpress.com>

### *Florian Heßdörfer*

is a doctoral student in the Department of Political Science at the University of Leipzig. His main areas of research are theories of subjectivation, political philosophy, youth culture, and cultures of visibility.

### *Andrej Holm*

Ph. D., is a lecturer in urban development at the University of Oldenburg. His main areas of research are urban development, housing policy, and gentrification. He is also involved in political activism in this field. In 2007 he was imprisoned as an alleged terrorist. An international solidarity campaign led to his release.

*Darcy K. Leach*

Ph.D., is Assistant Professor of Sociology at Bradley University. Her research focuses on the viability of non-hierarchical organizational forms, oppositional ideologies and countercultures, and social change in advanced capitalist democracies. Her dissertation compared the impact of ideology on the organizational practices of the German nonviolence and autonomous movements.

*Nick Montgomery*

is a graduate student in Political Science and Cultural, Social, and Political Thought at the University of Victoria. His research interests include: poststructuralism, postmarxism, postanarchism, anarchist theory and practice, radical social movements, and theories of social change.

*Andrea Pabst*

M. A., is a doctoral student in the Department of Social Sciences at the University of Wuppertal. She is working on a dissertation on meanings of corporeality in street protest. Her main fields of research are political sociology—with a focus on protest and violence, sociology of the body, and sociology of knowledge.

*Anne Roth*

is a political scientist, media activist, journalist and translator. Since the imprisonment of her partner as an alleged terrorist she has been writing a weblog about everyday life under total surveillance, terrorism, security, and the politics of fear.

*Marco Tullney*

is a political scientist and a research associate at the Freie Universität Berlin. He works and publishes on employee surveillance, surveillance and control in the city, electronic and open access publishing, and gender relations.

<http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/~tullney>

*Peter Ullrich*

Ph. D., is a cultural scientist and sociologist at the University of Leipzig and the Deutsches Jugendinstitut Halle. His research interests include political sociology (protest, social movements, surveillance, anti-Semitism, anti-Zionism, perceptions of the Middle East conflict) and medical social studies (prevention and governmentality, health services research). He has published several books and is co-editor of *Kontrollverluste. Interventionen gegen Überwachung* (Münster 2009).

<http://peterullrich.twoday.net>

