On 20 October 2024, businessman and former general Prabowo Subianto became the President of Indonesia, the world’s fourth-most-populous country. He took over from Joko Widodo after a landslide victory in the February election, in which he was supported by nine parties and won around 96.2 million votes, or 58.6 percent.
Liliane Danso-Dahmen directs the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation’s Southeast Asia Office in Manila.
Prabowo rose to power using the economic and political resources derived from his status as one of the richest people in the country and the prestige of his elite family. His win underlined the blend of informal political and economic power that characterizes Indonesia’s oligarchic political system. His formula was thus a combination of nationalism and authoritarian features, which he acquired as a leading army figure under Suharto’s military dictatorship (1966–1998). General Suharto, who was responsible for killing millions of leftist activists in the 1960s, was Prabowo’s father-in-law.
Prabowo still has skeletons in his closet from that time. Academics and human rights activists have accused him of massive human rights violations against the left-leaning opposition and civilians in Indonesian-occupied East Timor. As commander of a special army unit during the last years of the dictatorship, Prabowo was responsible for the abduction of student activists who opposed Suharto’s regime. Dozens were later released, but 13 students disappeared forever, and Prabowo was dismissed from the military without honours. In August 2024, he indirectly admitted guilt when his party, Gerindra, offered 1 billion Indonesian Rupiah (around 60,000 euro) in compensation to each of the families of the disappeared students.
By electing Prabowo, a majority of Indonesian voters chose a man who played an active part in the dictatorship. However, if we look at the results in terms of electoral tactics, it becomes clear that this was an election that forgot history.
Prabowo won over the relatively young electorate via social media, including with a viral video presenting him as a kind of Indonesian Teletubby. This image of a lovable cartoon avatar dominated social media and left no room to address his past as the dictator's son-in-law or his role as Suharto’s general.
Why were left-wing and progressive forces in Indonesian civil society unable to make a different narrative heard before or after the election of the ex-general?
Reactionary, undemocratic elites in the incoming Prabowo government, some with military or police backgrounds, are a danger to Indonesia’s democracy. While the election was peaceful, vote buying and other forms of electoral fraud were widespread. Many observers described this election as the most manipulated since the end of the dictatorship, although repressing criticism is a long-standing tradition in Indonesia. For instance, one report says that there have been 1,019 attacks and/or threats against 5,475 civil society activists during the Widodo era. Most were connected to advocacy for the so-called Job Creation Law in October 2022 or the Constitutional Court’s questionable October 2023 decision allowing President Widodo’s son Gibran to run for vice president (on Prabowo’s ticket), although he is under the minimum age of 40. The ruling was orchestrated by the president’s brother-in-law, Constitutional Court Chief Justice Anwar Usman.
There are also other signs of declining democracy. Prabowo's strategy of embracing elites in his government means totally eliminating political opposition in important state institutions. Eight of the nine parties in the parliament have already joined his coalition, while the ninth is considering joining as well.
Ahead of Prabowo’s inauguration, several demonstrations and critical discussions were disbanded and the offices of several civil society organizations were attacked. These attacks were carried out not only by state officials, but also by paid thugs. Another tool for silencing critical voices is the criminalization of activists by applying the Electronic Information and Transactions law. In particular, union and other civil society actors calling for economic development alternatives to the current neoliberal path risk their lives and well-being.
As president, Prabowo will not change the unfair economic order. He already made clear that he will continue his predecessor’s business-friendly economic policies.
Indonesia has a capitalist economist system. There are state-owned enterprises, but they are run by oligarchs and political elites — not in the interest of ordinary people. Prabowo is part of this oligarchic elite, which is why most Indonesian unions and the Labour Party (Partai Buruh) did not support his campaign.
Nonetheless, the Labour Party changed its position a few weeks before his inauguration and began supporting him. Party leader Said Iqbal demanded that the new president implement wage rises and abolish private and state-owned companies’ outsourcing system. He also said the “Job Creation Law” established by Widodo, which undermines the human rights of the working class, must be revoked. The new government is extremely unlikely to meet these demands. On the contrary, Prabowo will probably make no major changes to the unfair socio-economic conditions. Most observers predict that, as a former general and Minister of Defense, he will increase the military budget, but not funding for poverty relief or the welfare state.
Why were left-wing and progressive forces in Indonesian civil society unable to make a different narrative heard before or after the election of the ex-general? Why did the working class vote for a candidate whose class works against them? These questions can only be meaningfully answered by looking at Indonesia’s historical, social, societal, and political developments as well as the geopolitical context. Despite all the complexity, however, there are developments in other countries that are similar in terms of rising authoritarianism.
There are recognizable parallels with the May 2022 Filipino presidential elections, when a vast majority of voters elected Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. Moreover, progressive civil society in various countries globally has seen that many voters are choosing authoritarian leaders over progressive forces or, at least, over defenders of democracy.
Progressive forces should be very alarmed at how effectively far-right and authoritarian actors can use democratic processes to establish a repressive, authoritarian order based on neoliberal policies — and not only in Indonesia.
Some parallels can even be seen across continents, such as the June 2024 European elections or the September 2024 state elections in eastern Germany. There as well, the far right uses social media much more effectively than democratic actors.
Although historical contexts are well known, they may not impact voters’ decisions much. People are willing to forget the past. The importance of candidates’ integrity also appears to be changing among voters. For example, before the EU elections, bribery cases involving far-right candidates had little adverse effect on their election prospects. On the contrary, a candidate of the Alternative für Deutschland, an extreme right-wing party, who has been accused of being deeply involved in this EU bribery scandal, was more than successful campaigning for his party’s candidates ahead of the state election in Brandenburg.
While acknowledging the complexities of different countries, another observable parallel is that this is all taking place under the primacy of a neoliberal economic model in society and politics. Moreover, neoliberalism’s dominance is connected to right-wing and conservative forces’ systematic degradation of social actors striving for alternative development, as when parliamentarians accused the Green Party and climate activists of being the “real culprits” behind miseries such as rising energy prices, inflation, and war.
In Indonesia, civil society actors fighting for changes in the existing system have also been blamed for poverty and stagnation. Progressive actors are marginalized and lack the capacity to establish a counter-narrative. However, progressive forces should be very alarmed at how effectively far-right and authoritarian actors can use democratic processes to establish a repressive, authoritarian order based on neoliberal policies — and not only in Indonesia. More analysis and cooperation on the left are needed to fight these developments in Germany and Indonesia. We need to promote global solidarity!