Mozambique’s Tortuous Path to Democracy

On 9 October, Mozambique held its seventh general elections and the fourth provincial vote in the country’s history. However, as seen from the manner in which they were organized, elections do not yet seem to constitute a credible pillar of democratic consolidation, but rather fuel mistrust, social upheaval, political instability, and armed conflicts. It is no coincidence that turnout reached only 44 percent — a historic low.

As anticipated by most independent analysts, the incumbent Frente de Libertação de Moçambique(Mozambique Liberation Front, or FRELIMO) and its presidential candidate, Daniel Francisco Chapo, obtained a large majority of votes nationally and provincially. According to the official results, FRELIMO obtained 78 percent of the vote, while Daniel Chapo got 70.67 percent. The party won in all 11 provinces. The main opposition party, Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambican National Resistance, RENAMO), suffered the greatest defeat in its history, losing its status as the leader of the opposition.

For the Movimento Democrático de Moçambique (Democratic Movement of Mozambique, MDM), the disaster that everyone anticipated was confirmed: with only 2 percent, it is now the fourth-most important political party in Mozambique and narrowly missed re-entering parliament. The newcomer, Povo Optimista para o Desenvolvimento de Moçambique (Optimistic People for the Development of Mozambique, or PODEMOS) led by the charismatic Venâncio Mondlane, entered the national parliament for the first time as the second-strongest party with 12 percent. Meanwhile, 56.52 percent of potential voters decided not to show up at all. This is the highest number ever recorded in the electoral history of Mozambique.

Also as anticipated, these results are hotly contested by all parties involved, as well as by independent media and the Mozambican population — a recurring feature of Mozambican elections. What do these results, and their rejection by the opposition and most of the voters, say about Mozambique’s tortuous path to democracy?

Post-Colonial Pathways

On 25 June 2025, Mozambique will celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of its independence. FRELIMO, which started as a liberation movement, led the armed struggle for independence against colonial and later fascist Portugal, a struggle that lasted for ten years. Portugal was one of the poorest countries in non-Communist Europe, but still clung to its colonial empire until the regime was overthrown by the military in 1974.

In the five decades since independence, the country has experienced important political and economic transformations. It went from a single-party state ruled by FRELIMO (1975–1992) to a multi-party electoral system, coinciding with its transition from a devastating civil war (1976– 1992) to peace. Since 2017, however, it has been experiencing a new form of violence, Islamist terrorism, in the gas-rich northern province of Cabo Delgado.

The new government inherited a complex socio-economic situation, exacerbated by a hostile political neighbourhood bordering Rhodesia and Apartheid South Africa. The colonial education system was characterized by poor infrastructure, shortages of qualified staff, and explicit regional and gender inequities. As a result, by 1975, nearly 95 percent of the country’s 11 million residents were illiterate and less than 4 percent could speak Portuguese, the official language. No more than 5 percent of the black population lived in or around the major white towns.

Post-independence Mozambique has been characterized by recurring episodes of political conflict and post-electoral violence.

The majority of the population also had extremely poor access to healthcare. Few if any health services were provided by the colonial state outside the country’s major towns. Instead, church groups or traditional medical practitioners provided most healthcare services. Shortly after independence, only 80 doctors remained in Mozambique (before independence, that figure was 500). In 1975, Mozambique ranked 172 out of 177 countries on the Human Development Index (HDI). Life expectancy at birth was 43.21 years.

During the colonial years, black Mozambicans were totally excluded from any kind of political activity. Economically, the population was almost entirely dependent on remittances from some 100,000 migrant workers in South Africa and Rhodesia and on a plantation- and settler-dominated, export-oriented agricultural sector. Cash crops accounted for more than 80 percent of foreign exchange. These structural economic challenges were further exacerbated by the exodus of 200,000 Portuguese who feared FRELIMO’s Marxist-Leninist policies, resulting in a dearth of capable administrators and skilled labour in almost all sectors.

In terms of regional politics, the newly independent Mozambique was surrounded by two white minority governments, Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and South Africa, neither of which was willing to co-exist with a socialist-oriented neighbour open to supporting independence struggles in both countries. In global political terms, Mozambique gained independence during a period of relatively weak US intervention — fortunate timing for the budding nation. Five years later, however, the US elected Ronald Reagan, a vehement anti-communist, leading to a shift in global discourse and policy.

Even without external hostility, the young country faced significant political challenges: colonialism had resulted in a weak state, underdeveloped infrastructure and an inefficient bureaucracy, a culture of authoritarian paternalism, and a limited human-resource base. These difficulties were aggravated by the adoption of FRELIMO’s version of a Marxist-Leninist one-party state in 1977, by the country’s strategic position in Southern Africa, and by having such a powerful, aggressive, and ruthless neighbour.

An Endless Cycle of Political Conflict

Post-independence Mozambique has been characterized by recurring episodes of political conflict and post-electoral violence. After the armed struggle that led to its independence, effective peace was very short-lived. Significant levels of popular dissatisfaction with FRELIMO’s early repressive policies led to a civil war. Although supported by neighbours Rhodesia and the apartheid regime in South Africa, the civil war found its origins and sustainability internally.

Mozambique’s civil war was one of the most brutal on the African continent. It ended in 1992 with the signing of the General Peace Agreement (GPA) between FRELIMO and the then-rebel movement RENAMO. The peace agreement included the introduction of a multi-party democratic system and a market economy. Liberal democracy was introduced to bring peace and prosperity to Mozambique.

However, 32 years later, neither peace nor prosperity has been achieved. The country remains one of the poorest nations in the world. Most of the dominant political conflicts in Mozambique are associated with elections and the general understanding that FRELIMO has used its control over the country’s institutions to prevent free, fair, and transparent elections.

FRELIMO’s control over the state provides it with the human and material resources to run the party and its electoral machinery effectively.

Since the first multi-party elections in 1994, the opposition and independent analysts have not accepted a single electoral result as credible. This lack of credibility is associated with recurring election fraud and the ruling party’s control of elections and the judiciary. The result has been post-electoral instability, including armed conflicts.

Although there has been no formal connection between state and party since the 1990 constitution came into effect, FRELIMO continues to dominate de facto in all spheres of political life. The relationship between party membership and access to the state and thereby wealth is undeniably deep and multifaceted. Active membership or possession of a FRELIM membership card can ease access to a job, career advancement, promotion, business, and services.

On the other hand, FRELIMO’s control over the state provides it with the human and material resources to run the party and its electoral machinery effectively. The opposition parties, in contrast, struggle to provide even minimally adequate oversight of the government’s work, in addition to lacking the capacity to offer an effective alternative agenda. The difference in resources is very noticeable during election campaigns, with the ruling party producing far more campaign materials than all the opposition parties, who struggle to generate visibility.

RENAMO’s claims of electoral unfairness came to a head in 2012 when, after 20 years of apparent peace and stability, the group returned to armed struggle. One of their demands was a revision of the country’s election laws, which it claimed favoured the ruling party — a claim that is generally accepted. The law was amended and a cease-fire agreement between RENAMO and the Mozambican government was signed on 25 August 2014. While the agreement initially seemed to reduce instability, it continued to prevail and was further exacerbated by the results of the 2014 general elections, which RENAMO and a local civil society consortium classified as fraudulent and not free.

The most recent local elections were held on 11 October 2023. In what was again considered to be a fraudulent election, the ruling party won most of the municipalities contested. This led to an unprecedented level of popular anger over electoral results in the country, with at least three people killed by security forces and a number of others injured.

Gen Z Stands Up

In the absence of independent progressive forces and the failure of electoral processes to bring about free, fair, and transparent elections, there is a high possibility that popular protests will lead to widespread violence in the country. Indeed, following accusations of irregularities during vote counting and the killing of two opposition politicians, violent protests and incidents broke out on 21 October, leading to several deaths and wounded.

Social media has proven to be an extraordinary source of information for today’s youth.

There are two important aspects of the current developments worth noting. The first is the emergence of Generation Z. Two thirds of the country’s population are young people who have no link to the country’s two most important historical processes: the experience of colonialism and FRELIMO’s struggle for independence, which ended 49 years ago. The second is the access that these youths have to social and independent media, sources of information that are not controlled by the ruling party.

FRELIMO’s legitimacy has always been linked to its past as a liberation movement as well as its struggle against RENAMO. However, today’s younger generation has no link to the party’s historical roles — they make their decisions based on current facts, associating the party with poverty, corruption, and bad governance. As a result, Mozambique’s youth are more and more visibly contesting not only way the country is being governed, but also the way elections are conducted. In the past ten years, poverty and unemployment, especially youth unemployment, have increased significantly. Today, 62 percent of the population lives in extreme poverty. This is probably why young Mozambicans contested the results of the 2023 local elections more visibly than ever before.

Social media has proven to be an extraordinary source of access to information for today’s youth. Information that does not fall under the control of the ruling party (unlike the official public media) has been fundamental to establishing counter-narratives. More importantly, during the 2023 public demonstrations, social media was used as a platform for mobilizing people to contest the election results and to expose election fraud. The big question now is whether Gen Z’s mobilizing will be enough to democratize the country in a lasting fashion.