One Group, Two Parties?

The global right to the right has given rise to a new political dynamic. Its effects can also be felt on the political Left, where left-wing parties are reacting to the shift in a variety of ways. One symptom of the new dynamic is the splitting and reorganization of the Left at the level of European politics.

The late summer of 2024 saw the foundation of a new party, the European Left Alliance for the People and the Planet, or ELA for short. This will massively weaken the existing Party of the European Left (EL). For Germany’s Die Linke, too, the situation is anything but straightforward — and the party will have to decide what to do next.

The Crisis of the European Left

Since the 1990s, it has been possible to form a party from within a particular parliamentary group in the European Parliament. The EL was constituted on this basis in 2004. Besides the German Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), Enhedslisten from Denmark, and the Communist Party of Austria (KPÖ), the key founding members were the Italian, Spanish, and French Communist parties, which were strong at the time. But the EL also counted members from a range of minor left-wing parties, including from Hungary, Estonia, and Bulgaria.

Since the EL was established 20 years ago, the relative strength of the left-wing parties in the various countries has changed. Many of the old parties have fallen into crisis, while others have enjoyed increased influence. But membership numbers for the Left in the European Parliament, with some fluctuations, remained fairly constant during this period at around 40–50 deputies — showing that there is not simply a generalized crisis of the Left across Europe.

Although the traditional Communist parties have become weaker at the national level, they continue to wield considerable influence in the EL. Meanwhile, the EL also admitted a number of smaller organizations as member or observer parties (able to participate in party debates, but without voting rights) that have never managed to make significant gains in terms of electoral support or political relevance. Yet because there are no regularly reviewed minimum criteria for membership, these parties continue to be members of the EL regardless of their actual situation. The 150-member Communist Party of Finland, for example, is just as much an EL member as the Finnish Left Alliance, which won 17 percent of the vote in the European elections this summer. Various micro-parties are also members, some of which do not even stand in elections.

The fundamental problem here is that thanks to the principle of consensus anchored in the party statutes, any member party can block any decision within the EL. Thus, one of the triggers for the recent split was the veto exercised by the French Communist Party against naming Martin Schirdewan (Die Linke) and Manon Aubry (La France Insoumise) as the leading candidates in the European elections in June of this year. These two candidates were replaced, with the EL selecting party president Walter Baier as leading candidate in their stead. But this was a doubly unfortunate choice — firstly because the chances of Baier’s own party, the KPÖ, gaining a seat in the European Parliament were slim, and secondly because the KPÖ put forward a different person at the head of its list, which was anything but ideal for the EL’s public image.

More important than this concrete event, however, is the precarious state of the EL itself. Many of its working structures are scarcely in use any more. The party maintained long-running working groups on areas such as housing, the economy, feminism, and labour/trade unions, but many of these have grown inactive. A number of member parties have reduced their financial contributions mandated by the European Parliament — today, Die Linke contributes the lion’s share of the EL’s financial resources (which the European Parliament then matches tenfold to form the EL budget). All the same, due to the low contributions by the other left-wing parties, the EL does not even manage to use all of the European budget to which it is entitled. All the other party groups, including the Right, already profit from this.

Few of the resources offered by the EL were being actively used by its members, with the European Summer University a notable exception in this regard. Collaborative endeavours occurred far too infrequently, and many activities were restricted to the national level. Internal deadlock and dwindling benefits made the EL less and less appealing. As a result, many parties rolled back their participation. Even the round table of party leaders increasingly became a round table of proxies standing in for stand-ins.

Founding the European Left Alliance

Of course, the new European Left Alliance did not come out of nowhere. Most of the parties that are now in the ELA already ran on a collective platform in the 2019 European elections. The same spectacle was repeated this year. (Die Linke pragmatically participated in both.)

Behind these rather curious theatrics, however, lay years of mutual alienation between the Left in the European Parliament and the parties of the EL. To this day, common working methods remain elusive.

Yet the assumption that foreign policy lay at the heart of the split is not entirely correct. Many parties in the new ELA have been critical of the European project for years. Like many left parties, after Brexit they switched out their radical rejection of the EU for a critique of its undemocratic, anti-socialist, and neoliberal practices. On the matter of the Ukraine war, however, many left-wing parties are internally divided. Podemos, a member party of the new alliance, leans pacifist. And while the Spanish Communist Party has expressed its opposition to the supply of weapons to Ukraine, Spain’s government, in which the Communist Party participates via Sumar, approved them. Thus, compromises are constantly being formulated here. At its last congress, the EL passed a resolution opposing Russia’s war of aggression and calling for a diplomatic solution to the conflict.

The ELA only allows parties with seats in a national parliament or with elected European deputies to be members. But that means the exclusion of parties like the KPÖ and makes it impossible for smaller parties to become members.

According to the view from Germany, the new left-wing alliance is primarily under the influence of the Nordic Left, which stands in solidarity with Ukraine and conditionally approves of military support. In contrast, La France Insoumise and Portugal’s Bloco have more critical positions on the supply of arms. When it came to the European Parliament vote on supporting Ukraine “until victory”, the left-wing group was proportionately disunited: a third of all delegates backed the motion, another third abstained, and a further third voted against the supply of arms. In sum, the discussion around solidarity with Ukraine is not only splitting the peace movement, but also many of the left-wing parties.

Yet the Swedish and Finnish Left are far from switching to the pro-NATO camp, regardless of the rumours prevailing in Germany to that effect. In government, the Finnish Left predominantly voted for the country’s joining NATO, but maintains a critical stance towards the treaty organization. In the Swedish parliament, the Left even voted against joining. Both parties continue to speak out against NATO bases and the stationing of nuclear missiles in their countries, and are fundamentally opposed to military intervention against Russia.

It is therefore no wonder that a common ELA position on aid to Ukraine is lacking — a not insignificant element supported the resolution in favour of military aid, while others abstained.

The electoral programme of the new party points to the lack of unity on these questions. In terms of content, it is hardly distinct from the EL programme, offering no more than a series of very succinct statements and declarations of belief in peace. The new party statute, on the other hand, is kept so brief and so general that hardly anything can be derived from it in terms of content.

Unfortunately, the ELA’s statutes throw the baby out with the bathwater. In order to avoid situations like those that have arisen within the EL, the ELA only allows parties with seats in a national parliament or with elected European deputies to be members. But that means the exclusion of parties like the KPÖ and makes it impossible for smaller parties — particularly those from Eastern Europe — to become members of the ELA. In this way, it becomes substantially more difficult for emerging parties to benefit from the experience of their more established counterparts.

The Left in the European Parliament

Both parties are now represented in the Left group in the European Parliament. While the Left Alliance has 18 members, 16 members of the group have signed up for the European Left. So far, the ELA includes Finland’s Left Alliance, the Danish Enhedslisten, the Swedish Vänsterpartiet, Podemos from Spain, La France Insoumise, Bloco from Portugal, and (with no deputies) Poland’s Razem party. The EL, on the other hand, only has the six deputies from the last major parties that are still members (Die Linke and Syriza), plus ten voluntary signatures.

It should be noted that the deputies from member parties of either of the European parties are automatically included. The members of the Group from the unaffiliated parties can opt for either. The number of signatures then determines the budget of the respective European party, and of its associated party-political foundation. Apart from the EL and the ELA, there are a further 12 European parliamentarians who have signed up for neither of the two formations. This bloc is dominated by the Italian Five Star Movement. Sinistra Italiana and the Workers’ Party of Belgium (PVDA/PTB) are also among the unaffiliated parties.

Ultimately, the EL and the transform! europe foundation linked to it now have to make do with only half as much money. Whether a joint foundation between the two parties is possible is currently being reviewed.

What Next?

The splitting of the European Left into two competing parties (plus numerous configurations in between) massively weakens it. In particular, the very existence of the European Left is under serious threat. What were previously its strongest parties are now faced with a difficult situation. Meanwhile, the German Left is heading towards a fresh round of elections with no certain outcome, and Syriza is mired in controversy following the dismissal of its leader.

Die Linke’s Executive Committee therefore decided in June to champion a united European Left. The aim here is to pragmatically struggle for reform within the EL, while also keeping an eye on the ELA’s development (but without participating in its foundation). Die Linke has accordingly submitted a reform proposal paper to the board of the EL and, together with other member parties, initiated a debate on potential reforms. The paper argues for an EL that would serve as a strategic platform to enable parties, trade unions, and social movements to be involved in the EU’s real political processes. In order to restore the party to a state where it is capable of working, the paper includes proposals for dissolving structural blockages with qualified majority decision-making, for increasing the party’s practical relevance, for more broadly internationally-oriented party events, and introducing minimum criteria for member parties.

The EL member parties — such as the Slovenian party in government, Levica — have until December to submit their own proposals. At the beginning of next year, the Executive Board of the EL will deliberate on potential reforms; the outcome remains open.

In view of prolonged neoliberal supremacy and the upsurge of the extreme Right across Europe, a withdrawal into the national sphere is out of the question.

One argument for the new ELA party is that it brings together all of the left-wing parties that are presently the strongest and most politically relevant, and it would therefore be unfortunate if Die Linke were to be left out. The ELA’s vague and exclusive party statute speaks against it, however. It is also still unclear what positions the ELA will develop and what it will achieve in practical terms.

The decisions of parties like the PVDA/PTB and Sinistra Italiana are also yet to be determined. The only certainty is that Germany’s Left remains an important point of reference internationally. What happens in Germany always has consequences for the entire EU.

The newly founded Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) has not played a role in this situation thus far. The party was not able to form a faction in the European Parliament and is a member of neither of the two European parties. Due to its positions on migration and climate protection, the new party has received scant support from the Left across Europe.

But even beyond the current wrangling, the goal remains to form a common European left-wing party that is appealing, able to make political proposals about current issues, and have greater political impact. This will require substantive working groups whose discussions add value both for local representatives and for MEPs. International event formats (such as the summer university) and exchanges, particularly between youth organizations, also need to be fostered. Experience has shown that members learn more from each other at face-to-face meetings than through arid educational materials.

Moreover, international exchange on matters of political strategy is essential in view of the overall shift to the right. Some countries have years of experience with the rightward surge, and this experience must be put to good use. Added to this is the fact that economic and social trends across Europe exhibit significant similarities. How the different left-wing parties react to this, and which organizational and political innovations they put to the test, are only perceived and assessed transnationally to a very limited extent.

Faced with these developments, Die Linke will soon have to decide on its stance. One thing is certain: in view of prolonged neoliberal supremacy and the upsurge of the extreme Right across Europe, a withdrawal into the national sphere is out of the question — certainly in the interests of the future of the party, but most importantly in the interests of the people who live here.

Translated by Samuel Langer and Louise Pain for Gegensatz Translation Collective.