This year’s UN climate conference was ill-fated even before it started. The political shift toward the right in both the European and US elections spelled difficult times ahead for those fighting for progressive outcomes at this year’s climate summit in Baku, Azerbaijan, the twenty-ninth conference of parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). US President Joe Biden, China’s Xi Jinping, France’s Emmanuel Macron, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, Germany’s Olaf Scholz, Brazil’s Lula da Silva, and India’s Narendra Modi were just some of those who were conspicuously absent.
David Williams directs the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation’s Climate Justice Programme in New York.
Tetet Lauron lives in the Philippines and works as a consultant to the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation’s New York Office.
Katja Voigt is the Senior Advisor for Climate Policy at the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation.
But the drama that followed more than made up for this lacklustre kick-off of the climate talks.
Shortly after the negotiations began, the Argentinian government withdrew its delegation, and a diplomatic spat between Azerbaijan and France led to a French boycott. Innovative and forward-thinking host country leadership could have compensated for this difficult start. However, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev proceeded to describe oil and gas as a “gift from god” in his opening speech, and lambasted Western media and climate activists for criticizing the continued proliferation of fossil fuels in Azerbaijan, accusing them of hypocrisy.
The COP’s host country had received extensive criticism for their dependence on oil and gas exports, as well as their assault on civil society in the run-up to the negotiations. Climate activists who had travelled to Azerbaijan were placed under severe limitations, with no public demonstrations permitted in Baku, and forced to operate under heavy restrictions at COP29. These restrictions extended to advocacy efforts around the involvement of the Azerbaijani government in the unfolding genocide in Palestine. While it is the US and Germany who are the key suppliers of weapons, the Azerbaijani government is the key supplier of fuel to Israel.
While governments of the Global North seem able to find trillions in public money to fuel wars of aggression, the same cannot be said for responding to the climate crisis. The UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement clearly state that climate finance should be provided from developed to developing countries. Developed countries have a far greater responsibility when it comes to the causes and drivers of the climate crisis in the form of historical and current rates of emissions when compared to countries of the Global South. Climate finance is therefore by no means to be thought of as a form of charity (as reported in numerous Western media outlets), but as an equity and human rights-based obligation for the damages caused by the Global North to the Global South.
Therefore, the Paris Agreement specifically cites the obligation for climate finance to be provided to developing countries both for reducing emissions to stay within the 1.5C limit to global warming (for instance through funds for the construction of wind farms, solar panels, electric transport, etc.) and to respond to the impacts of climate change (for instance through early warning systems, coastal protection, rebuilding infrastructure, etc.). After the failures of the last climate finance goal that was agreed on at COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009 but only reached in 2022 — at least according to developed countries — these mistakes were not to be repeated in the setting of a new climate finance goal, the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (NCQG) at COP29 in Baku.
Fighting over Finance
In the run-up to COP29, civil society had clearly stated their demand of 5 trillion US dollars per year, an amount that according to the UN is in-line with what is needed on the ground in affected countries. Early during the negotiations, developing countries took the position of 1.3 trillion US dollars per year, which was already an attempt at compromise. However, developed country negotiators refused to put forward a concrete proposal without deliberating on a number of details first. Unfortunately, progress on these details was exceedingly slow during the first phase of negotiations.
One disagreement was around who would pay in, the expectation of the developed countries being that emerging economies (such as China, Singapore, Saudi Arabia, etc., which are not classified as developed countries under the UN) should also contribute, although this was not agreed upon in the Paris Agreement. Another sticking point was over eligibility, in terms of whether Small Island States and the Least Developed Countries should have prioritized access to the available climate finance due to their special circumstances. Whether finance for Loss & Damage — climate-induced and non-reparable losses and damages — should be included as a sub-goal was another cause of disagreement. Outcomes of these discussions would ultimately determine the overall amount within a multi-layered structure, at the centre of which would be a core of public non-debt-creating grants and highly concessional loans, supplemented by a wider investment goal comprised of a wide array of market-based financial instruments.
It is difficult to describe what happened at COP29 other than a complete abdication of obligation and responsibility.
Asked during a press conference as to whether a public core of 200 billion US dollars per year would be acceptable, Bolivian negotiator Diego Pacheco responded, “Is it a joke?” The tone was set therefore when developed country negotiators released their first proposal of 250 billion US dollars per year. Adding insult to injury, this amount was proposed in a way that would not guaranteed for it to be provided in the form of non-debt-creating grants and highly-concessional loans, but rather from a “variety of sources, public and private”. While the 1.3 trillion US dollars had been acknowledged as a demand from developing countries in the draft decision text, it was to be achieved by “all actors”, as opposed to the responsibility being with developed countries, essentially widening the contributor base and shifting the financial burden onto developing countries. Meanwhile, although the importance of public and grant-based finance for Loss & Damage was acknowledged, there was no inclusion as a sub-goal.
What ensued over the final hours of the already over-running negotiations was a frenzied back-and-forth within the negotiation halls of COP29, which included shouting, walkouts, protests, and global open letters in an attempt by civil society to call on developing countries to “hold the line” and to call out developed countries to “pay up” for climate finance. Nevertheless, the only change in the final agreement text was an increase to the initial proposal of 250 billion in core funding to 300 billion US dollars by 2035. To the dismay of many, passages indicating that this could be drawn from both public and private sources remained in the text.
Opening the Door to Unjust Carbon Markets
Looking for solace to other areas of the agreement remains futile. Language from the agreement reached at COP28 in Dubai to “transition away from fossil fuels” was severely watered down, after painful negotiations that left much to be desired in terms of leadership. There is also no decision on the Just Transition Work Programme at this year’s COP, shifting it automatically to COP30’s agenda — another setback for workers and local communities by choosing extractive economies over people and planet.
Article 6 — carbon markets — provided a further stage for this year’s unjust negotiations. It already started on day one of COP29, when the presidency tried to bulldoze the gavelling of decisions on Art. 6.4 about standards and methodologies for a global carbon market during the opening plenary. This very uncommon procedure is not only highly undemocratic, but also breaks with the usual negotiating procedures within the UN. The final outcome of Art. 6.2 and 6.4., meaning carbon-trading and offsetting, lacks comprehensive social and environmental protections and is unlikely to lead to a decrease in emissions. It furthermore opens the door to a transition of old habits of the former mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol — the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) — which lead to severe human rights violations and environmental destruction. It is now in the hands of the Supervisory Body for Art. 6 to prepare a more just guidance for the next negotiations in Brazil.
It is difficult to describe what happened at COP29 other than a complete abdication of obligation and responsibility. With the political sea changes on the horizon, it was an opportunity sorely missed for the Global North to abide by international law and repair the harms caused to the Global South as a result of colonialism and extractivism. The voices of developing countries, communities, and activists inside and outside COP were silenced and betrayed in Baku. The rage will be carried forth to Belem in Brazil, where the fight for climate justice continues.