Gaza’s Tenuous Future

The future of the Gaza Strip is more uncertain than ever before — and not only due to the recent slew of obtuse statements made by US President Donald Trump, which were met with global condemnation. Following his meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in early February, Trump announced his “plan” to relocate (in other words: expel) the Palestinian population of the Gaza Strip and transfer the area to US control. In true property-developer style, he announced that he intended to transform Gaza into the “Riviera of the Middle East”.

After all, Trump isn’t the only one who earns his money through high-end property development — his special envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, is also in the business. Particularly in light of the desperate plight of the Palestinian people, these comments are truly unrivalled in their cynicism. Even CNN responded by describing the plan as “twenty-first-century colonialism”, as there is no provision in Trump’s proposal that would allow for Palestinian codetermination.

But for the more than 2 million people who will now be forced to endure amidst a desert of rubble after almost a year and a half of Israeli attacks, the issue is precisely this: how can they obtain much-needed humanitarian aid, how can rebuilding begin, and what might a post-war order look like? At the core of such considerations is the question of Palestinian self-government and whether the Palestinian Authority (PA), which is so often mentioned in this context, could play a role.

Origins of the Authority

The PA was established more than 30 years ago as part of the 1993 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (Oslo I Accord). On the Palestinian side, the accords were signed by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which was and remains to this day the internationally recognized official representative of the Palestinian people. As a newly established institution, the PA was intended to form the nucleus of Palestinian self-government, and following a five-year interim period, eventually culminate in the founding of an independent and democratic Palestinian state.

In 1994, Jericho and the Gaza Strip became the first self-governing Palestinian territories from which Israel withdrew in line with the “land for peace” principle. The Palestinian president, who is directly elected every four years, is supposed to preside over the PA: this was initially Yasser Arafat in 1996, while Mahmoud Abbas was elected in 2005 following his predecessor’s death. No further presidential elections have been held since — instead, they have been repeatedly postponed.

One of the core roles in the Palestinian political system was earmarked for the Palestinian Legislative Council, which, in its capacity as a parliament, is tasked with managing the PA and confirming the government proposed by the president. But ever since Hamas won the 2006 Legislative Council election, not a single election has been held.

The PA was in a pitiful state even before 7 October 2023.

Moreover, when the Oslo process began to falter in 1996 with the election of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, one of the fiercest Israeli opponents of the accords, the “interim self-government” ended up evolving into a deeply unsatisfactory permanent solution. Ever since the PA launched its campaign for full Palestinian membership of the United Nations in 2011, the political body has officially referred to itself as the representative of the “State of Palestine”. In 2012, Palestine’s status in the UN was upgraded, and a number of international organizations have since recognized Palestine as a member state. But even today, the PA continues to govern a mere 40 percent of all territory in the West Bank on the ground. Even in those areas, the Israeli occupation and settler movement undermine its authority and control.

Meanwhile, the Gaza Strip has been under the rule of Hamas since 2007. All attempts at reconciliation have foundered due to the deep rivalry between the two main political parties, Fatah and Hamas. Soon after Hamas’s attack on Israeli kibbutzim on 7 October 2023, then US Secretary of State Antony Blinken proposed the idea that the Palestinian Authority might assume governance of the Gaza Strip in a post-war order, and that the organization would need to be strengthened in order to do so. However, no definitive plan was ever proposed as to how this might come to pass.

Even in the wake of Israel’s devastating military campaign, which has reduced virtually the entire Gaza Strip to rubble and displaced the majority of its civilian population, Hamas still maintains de facto control over the territory. Israel reached a ceasefire agreement with Hamas in January 2025, after which a permanent post-war settlement is expected to be negotiated.

The PA since 7 October

The PA was in a pitiful state even before 7 October 2023. Palestinian activists had for some time criticized its increasingly authoritarian conduct, examples of which include violently repressing protests, persecuting critics on social media platforms, curtailing freedom of expression, and widespread repression of opposition members. Activist and government critic Nizar Banat died while in custody in 2021, most likely as a result of the PA security forces using extreme force. His death has still not been properly investigated, and those responsible were never brought to justice.

Palestinian critics accuse the PA of employing repressive measures against its own citizens and — especially within the scope of its ongoing security cooperation with Israel — of acting in the interests of the occupying power. Under the terms of this cooperation, which had been agreed upon in the Oslo Accords, the PA commits to preventing all armed groups and terrorist activities, as well as to arresting any individuals who are wanted by Israel, who should then be handed over to the Israeli state. These measures are frequently employed against the PA’s own political opponents, such as members of Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad. According to Palestinian observers, this directive also criminalizes legitimate Palestinian resistance to the occupation.

Despite continuing with security cooperation efforts, the Israeli regime has undertaken a number of measures aimed at deliberately undermining Palestinian self-government, including withholding its tax revenues and restricting the freedom of movement of the Palestinian population.

The war in Gaza has further contributed to the PA’s credibility crisis. While Hamas has managed to present itself as a capable, active force — however destructive and fatal the consequences — the PA has been rendered an idle bystander. It was unable to formulate a clear position around support for a ceasefire, let alone present a viable political framework for a post-war scenario. Likewise, in the West Bank, the PA has been forced to stand idly by and watch as violence committed by Israeli settlers has escalated with the active encouragement and support of the far-right Israeli government.

Loss of confidence in the PA is also reflected in public polls conducted by the Policy and Survey Report since 7 October 2023: in September 2024, approval ratings for President Abbas fell to an all-time low of 18 percent, with 84 percent of Palestinians in favour of his resignation. Despite the disastrous situation in Gaza, 36 percent said they favoured Hamas, with Fatah garnering only 21 percent of the vote (whereby support for Hamas remains consistently lower in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank). One year earlier, however, support for Fatah (26 percent) was even greater than for Hamas (21 percent).

The violent conduct of the Palestinian security forces in Jenin that broke out in 2024 has placed additional strain on the PA’s credibility. In the city’s largest refugee camp, the Israeli military is not the only one known to employ brute force against inhabitants — according to critics, the PA is also waging an outright war against Palestinian armed groups. The PA security forces are also accused of abuses and carrying out targeted killings. “One could easily mistake PASF for the Israeli army, if it weren’t for their different uniforms”, writes analyst Yara Hawari. The PA’s reputation has plummeted to an unprecedented low — at a time when the international community’s expectations regarding the organization’s future role are higher than ever before.

Israel’s right-wing government under Netanyahu has been hostile towards the PA from the very beginning. Despite continuing with security cooperation efforts, the Israeli regime has undertaken a number of measures aimed at deliberately undermining Palestinian self-government, including withholding its tax revenues and restricting the freedom of movement of the Palestinian population. At the same time, it is also actively encouraging the settler movement, including its radical and violent fringe, and has raised the possibility of annexing parts of the West Bank.

Prime Minister Netanyahu has made several scathing attacks on the PA and has expressed his opposition to its presence in the Gaza Strip, claiming that the PA “supports and finances terror”. This policy is very much in keeping with his most fundamental political objective: hindering the establishment of a future Palestinian state.

Scenarios for Power

In light of the current Israeli government’s hostile position, the dwindling confidence in the PA among the Palestinian population, and President Trump’s recent proposal to “take over” the Gaza Strip, the question arises as to just how realistic it would actually be to expand the power and authority of the PA.

In January 2025, President Abbas reiterated the PA’s willingness to assume “full responsibility” in Gaza. Yet this would only be possible if he were to address the role played by his most significant political rival: Hamas. After all, Hamas remains the key player in Gaza. Israel, the US, and Arab states such as Qatar, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan negotiated their ceasefire deal with Hamas, not with the PA. And Hamas will also be key to further stages of negotiations, which are expected to transition the ceasefire deal into a long-term post-war order.

Realistically, this means that an accord between the two largest Palestinian political parties would be a crucial prerequisite — and a move that a vast majority of the Palestinian population still supports. In order to achieve this, compromises would need to be made on both sides. As far as Hamas is concerned, this would above all mean relinquishing its absolute rule in Gaza and putting an end to its military campaign against Israel. But Fatah, for its part, has proven time and again that it is unwilling to concede any ground to its sworn enemy. An attempt to reshuffle the cabinet and form a technocratic government supported by both major parties under the new Prime Minister Mohamed Mustafa failed in March 2023.

Although the PA could potentially be utilized as a means of undermining Hamas’s influence or even replacing it in the long term, the current Israeli government has no desire to foster a dynamic that could lead to the issue of Palestinian statehood and the implementation of a two-state solution being put back on the agenda.

When it comes to Gaza, Egypt is attempting to persuade the two parties to work together in a proposed “Community Support Committee”, which would be responsible for coordinating reconstruction efforts and would constitute a non-partisan interim administration for the Gaza Strip. However, President Abbas has yet to give his formal approval for the plan, and recent announcements by the PA that it intends to set up its own “task force” to oversee Gaza’s reconstruction and the coordination of humanitarian aid also indicate how difficult it will be to come to an agreement and coordinate efforts.

The Rafah Border Crossing to Egypt was reopened at the beginning of the ceasefire, which led to a remarkable development: the EU reactivated the presence of EUBAM, an organization which, following the terms of the 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access, had been responsible for controlling the border until Hamas assumed power in 2007. On the Palestinian side, the forces currently involved are reported not to belong to Hamas but to be “affiliated with” the PA. This constitutes a first small step towards the organization taking charge in Gaza.

Trump and the International Community

Nonetheless, Israel is particularly opposed to the presence of the PA in Gaza. Although the PA could potentially be utilized as a means of undermining Hamas’s influence or even replacing it in the long term, the current Israeli government has no desire to foster a dynamic that could lead to the issue of Palestinian statehood and the implementation of a two-state solution being put back on the agenda. Instead, it is banking on a “deal” brokered with US President Donald Trump that would favour Israel, a deal that has likely been bolstered by Trump’s latest incendiary remarks.

Aside from what he has expressed in his wildly unrealistic comments, Trump also harbours another more concrete objective: he aims to achieve the normalization of Israeli–Saudi relations — a goal he began working towards during his first term in office and that he hopes will reap great economic benefits. The attack perpetrated by Hamas was one of the factors that prevented this reconciliation from being achieved. However, if the Saudi Crown Prince intends to negotiate an accord with Israel on behalf of his own citizens (and the wider region), he must be able to achieve tangible success. He cites the creation of a Palestinian state as a fundamental condition for an agreement.

The EU should do everything in its power to facilitate this. It must make it clear that this is not a question of a “backroom deal”, but rather a viable, worthwhile settlement that conforms to international law, that would prevent renewed bloodshed in the wake of Israel’s disastrous war on Gaza, and guarantee security for the people of both Israel and Palestine. The opening of the border crossing with Egypt and the reinstatement of the EUBAM support mission constitutes an important first step in this direction. The EU can also play a role in bolstering the PA, having been one of its principal supporters in recent years — however, this only stands a chance of succeeding if the organization is also given sufficient democratic legitimization and champions the interests of all Palestinians.

The EU should resolutely oppose Trump’s proposals and instead reaffirm the right of Palestinians to determine their own fate. The EU must formally recognize a Palestinian state and make clear to Israel that it now has a historic opportunity to implement the terms of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative: full normalization between Israel and the Arab world and, in return, the creation of an autonomous and viable Palestinian state.

Translated by Louise Pain and Rowan Coupland for Gegensatz Translation Collective.