Interview | Lebanon / Syria / Iraq - Middle East Shaping a New Syria

The end of the Assad regime sparks new hopes, while also raising new challenges

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Syrians celebrate the fall of the Assad regime in Idlib, Syria, 31 January 2025.
Syrians celebrate the fall of the Assad regime in Idlib, Syria, 31 January 2025. Photo: IMAGO / Middle East Images

On 8 December 2024, Syria experienced a political turning point of historic significance: after 54 years of rule and 13 years of revolution and civil war, the Assad dictatorship fell apart in a matter of days. The toppling of the once-feared regime has not only reshaped the power dynamics within the country, but also fundamentally altered the geopolitical landscape of the region. The new administration under Haiʾat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which played a key role in defeating Bashar al-Assad’s forces on the battlefield, now faces the challenge of transforming the war-torn nation.

Ansar Jasim worked with the Syrian-German solidarity organization Adopt a Revolution as a project manager in the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation’s Beirut Office.

But can such a transformation succeed? Is it possible to build a Syria that represents all its citizens and lays the foundation for a more just future? Moreover, how can reconstruction occur in the face of such profound humanitarian and structural challenges?

Ansar Jasim, a project manager at the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation who until recently worked with the Syrian–German solidarity organization Adopt a Revolution, these pressing questions with Corinna Bender, director of the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation’s Beirut Office, during a recent visit to Syria in the weeks after Assad’s fall.

You are currently in Syria, taking in the mood following the fall of the Assad regime. What emotions are being expressed, and what changes have you noticed?

One of the feelings described to me was relief and disbelief. Several friends active in Syria’s oppositional civil society described how, for the first time since the revolution began in 2011, they could sleep without fearing arrest. Then there is disbelief. There was a huge cult of personality based around the Assad family. At border crossings, signs even proclaimed the country to be “Assad’s Syria”. This ideology penetrated all parts of society. This is why it was so hard for some — although they were pleased about the fall — to believe it really happened.

In the weeks after the fall, Damascus saw an influx of activists from across the country, eager to witness first-hand the destroyed posters, toppled statues, and other signs that Assad’s rule had truly ended. However, this victory belongs to the Syrian people, who endured years of unimaginable oppression and sacrificed hundreds of thousands of lives for their freedom. As leftists from the region, we stand in solidarity with their struggle, and their victory gives us much hope for change.

Right now, the feeling of ownership is extremely strong. Activists from Rif-Aleppo, Homs, Hamah, Qamishlo, Raqqa, Deir Azzor, Salamiya, and Lattakia are traveling throughout to get to know the realities of other activists and organize both small gatherings and larger discussions. One of the first events I attended was organized by Kurdish journalists on the Kurdish question in Syria. Another event discussed the realities and struggles of women journalists and how they helped to expand the discourse in the areas controlled by the Hai’at Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) government and Syrian National Army (SNA). Generally, there is hunger to hear the stories of people from other parts of the country and their revolutionary experiences.

These discussions are inspiring for left-wing visions for the region and are happening in front of our eyes.

Another very impressive effort is the work in Aleppo and Damascus with people who have not been politically or socially active. To foster an informed and active society, activists from areas like Azaz in Rif-Aleppo — considered a hub of civil society activism in Syria since 2018 — seek out organizers, intellectuals, and open-minded individuals to share their experience and knowledge of civil society work.

Since 2018, after most armed opposition and civilian groups signed reconciliation agreements and were forcibly displaced to the north, Aleppo and Damascus came fully under regime control. This means their experiences, such as protesting against decisions by Turkish-imposed local councils in Rif-Aleppo or the dress codes enforced by HTS’s so-called “Salvation Government”, are absent. However, these experiences are exactly what is needed now to organize from below and monitor what the interim government headed by Al-Sharaa is doing.

In Germany, there is a growing demand for Syrian refugees to return home. Yet, the humanitarian situation in the country remains catastrophic, with scarce resources, lack of infrastructure, and ongoing bombardments from Israel and Turkey — issues on which the German government has largely remained silent. How would you describe conditions in Syria?

The political economy of every region in Syria differed according to its respective de-facto authority. Hence, there were at least four different political and economic systems. The regime-held areas, such as the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, used the Syrian pound as a primary currency. While simply possessing US dollars was punishable by imprisonment in regime-controlled areas, regions in Rif-Aleppo under Turkish occupation and HTS-controlled areas used the Turkish lira and US dollar as their main currencies.

Both areas witnessed economic growth in recent years, with many imported Turkish products dominating the market. Food and energy prices were relatively low. Meanwhile, the purchasing power of families in the regime-held areas shrunk more and more. Back in 2020, a friend of mine described how she would only buy single tomatoes and apples because she could not afford to buy a kilo.

Since then, the situation deteriorated. A taxi driver told me how after hours of waiting at the bakery, each family only got four pieces of pita bread. The regime-held areas hardly had electricity, diesel, or petrol in the years before the regime fell. When it did, diesel and gasoline suddenly flooded the market, which many saw as proof that the regime had created an artificial shortage. This reflects a policy of impoverishment used to control the population — keeping people focused on survival rather than organizing and demanding their rights.

The situation was quite different in Rif-Aleppo and Idlib: the most common heating material here is a heater that burns pistachio shells, a common crop in Idlib and Aleppo. HTS developed a pretty reliable electricity system with their own energy company called Green Energy. Solar panel-based systems are now common all over Idlib and Northern Aleppo. Solar panels existed in regime-held areas, but were heavily taxed, making them unaffordable for most people. Additionally, people in regime-controlled areas often had to pay steep bribes to survive, with stories circulating about specific checkpoints extorting money to let people pass — or detaining and possibly disappearing them.

The new interim administration’s approach is already taking shape. Despite not being part of their mandate, they cut bread subsidies, causing prices to quadruple. Soon after, imports were allowed, flooding former regime-held areas with Turkish products. While people welcome higher-quality goods, unregulated imports could devastate Syria’s fragile agricultural sector, already weakened by war and displacement. Farmers in Idlib are returning to their fields, even if their homes remain unliveable. Agriculture is strategic for Syria, previously exploited by the regime through extractive policies. The east produced wheat, which was then transported to the coast for processing. Now, people demand a system that respects farmers’ integrity and preserves national resources. These factors are crucial in maintaining social cohesion during the transition, preventing deeper divisions.

Syrian civil society has been preparing for the regime’s fall for a long time. What is your impression of its role in the current transition?

Under Assad, all parts of civil society were under the regime’s control in one way or another. Since the beginning of the revolution in 2011, a counter-civil society has developed in the areas outside of regime control and, to a minimal extent, even in the regime-held areas over the last year. In Rif-Aleppo and Idlib, public sector workers like teachers and female agricultural workers were organized in unions independent from the de-facto rulers of their areas. Now, they are trying out new forms of organization.

The foundational narrative of the New Syria, according to which Syrians overthrew the Ba'athist Assad dictatorship to decide their own future, cannot endure if Turkish aggression causes further bloodshed and leads to the occupation of more Kurdish territory.

Students of the so-called “free universities” outside the regime-held areas went on strike after the regime’s fall, demanding that their universities — which are not internationally recognized but often offer a better education — merge with state universities and provide free education. While the universities under HTS’s Salvation Government are private, this demand opposes that model.

It is very unclear what the “National Dialogue Conference” will look like, but Syrians are not waiting for the caretaker government to invite them. When I was in the southern province of Suwaida last week, on one panel, three different opinions reflecting different political currents in Syrian society were proposed. While some propose that regional representatives from all Syrian provinces join the conference, others support a conference of technocrats, and others suggest that the conference should be the culmination of discussions held by local committees in every neighbourhood over several months or even years. Most agree that the idea of a national dialogue cannot be limited to a one-off event. These discussions are inspiring for left-wing visions for the region and are happening in front of our eyes.

Recently, an EU delegation, including German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock and her French counterpart, visited Damascus, signalling a potential path toward normalizing relations between Syria and Europe. However, the EU outlined specific conditions, such as fostering an inclusive civil society, ensuring women’s rights, and addressing the past to achieve justice — demands also voiced by Syrian civil society. Do you think these demands will be implemented, and how does al-Sharaa, the head of HTS and de-facto leader of Syria, respond to these demands?

So far, the de-facto leader of Syria primarily concentrates on gaining international legitimacy. While he met various diaspora delegations, local civil society representatives criticized that they had not yet been invited to talk with him. This shows that people want to be part of this new reality and accept that Ahmad al-Sharaa is leading this new phase.

I see two parallel approaches emerging within civil society. On the one hand, activists view Ahmad al-Sharaa’s desire for international recognition and economic support as a tactical opportunity to influence his agenda. At the same time, people are demanding inclusion, while recognizing that shaping politics is not limited to formal political channels. On the other hand, various groups are coming together to form new political platforms, such as the Gathering of Democratic Syria, which seeks to unite all democratic forces and build a grassroots movement in every city.

I firmly believe these forces represent the majority and have the potential to push for a democratic transition. However, we should also not be naïve — there are still many other domestic and foreign interests that not only pose a threat to Ahmad al-Sharaa, but also to the so-called “New Syria”. This is the dilemma Syria inherited from Assad. In the south, for example, rebel leader Ahmad al-Awda, whose forces were integrated into the Syrian army’s Fifth Brigade under a Syrian-Russian deal in 2018, might gain support from those who oppose both an Islamist-led and a democratic Syria to avoid encouraging their own internal opposition. This scenario is not new. After the uprising, Syria became more militarized. The US, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and sometimes individual businessmen tried to influence developments through conditional financing of armed groups.

Another very serious issue is how to solve the Kurdish question. There cannot be a transition in Syria without dealing with it. The foundational narrative of the New Syria, according to which Syrians overthrew the Ba'athist Assad dictatorship to decide their own future, cannot endure if Turkish aggression causes further bloodshed and leads to the occupation of more Kurdish territory.

I wish for Syria that this transition is shaped by the streets, labour unions, feminist groups, journalists, and the political parties in parliament. The situation is still very fragile.

Research shows that political processes tend to be more sustainable when women are included. What is your impression of HTS in this regard? Do you believe women will have the opportunity to assume leadership positions and help shape Syria’s future?

Past institutions of the Syrian opposition, such as the Syrian National Council or the interim government of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, lacked women’s representation to some extent. At the same time, the list of female-led and feminist civil society organizations in Syria is very long.

A few weeks ago, a Women’s Affairs Office was created in response to public criticism over the absence of women in the new interim government. This reminded my friend Souad Al-Aswad, who runs a women’s centre in the small Idlibi city of Salqeen supported by Adopt a Revolution, of her experience during the revolution. Back then, when she sought election to the local council in her hometown, Kafr Nabul, they sidestepped her candidacy by creating a Women’s Affairs Office, effectively separating women’s issues from politics.

Syrians do not want to be beggars.

On 8 January 2025, only one month after the regime’s fall, the Syrian Women’s Political Movement held its first conference in Damascus. The movement was founded in 2017, and today, more than 170 women from all over Syria are organized in it, with 50 more joining since the conference. At the beginning of the conference, the women were dancing and singing “Kurdish women, Arab women, long live the Syrian woman!” All of the members of the movement have extensive political experience, such as in the realm of grassroots civil society or political parties such as the Communist Labour Party. I am confident that as they move forward, the question of women in politics will become secondary, and the question of what kind of politics these women push for will become the relevant factor.

What role could Germany play in the reconstruction of Syria?

Some days ago in Suwaida, I joined a meeting of activists from Homs, Idlib, Damascus, and Suwaida. A 20-year-old representative of the Youth Political Movement told us that in their meetings with German representatives, they demanded an apology for not having done enough to support and protect Syrians. Since 2018, the German government has deliberated which areas in Syria are safe enough to deport Syrians to, despite the fact that establishing safe zones seemed impossible at the time. The UN and the German Foreign Office assessed that Syria was not safe, while German politicians have continued to discuss deporting Syrians back to Syria since 2018, after Assad managed to brutally regain control over all the areas of Rif-Homs, Daraa, and Damascus. While Germany was investigating members of the Assad regime for crimes against humanity, it was willing to work with the Syrian state to facilitate deportations.

Syrians do not want to be beggars. There is widespread awareness of the negative consequences of uncoordinated, donor-focused aid to NGOs over the past 13 years. There is a wish to coordinate the reconstruction democratically instead of following donors’ agendas.

How Germany could really help is to allow Syrians with asylum and protection status to visit Syria and return to Germany without losing their residency. Remittances to Syria are essential for many Syrian families to survive inside the country. The diaspora should have the chance to be involved in the process of rebuilding Syria, while recognizing that they are also a part of Germany.

Syrians often say that before rebuilding their homes, they must first rebuild themselves — through meaningful social and psychological support, as well as fostering social peace. Therefore, Germany should continue to support the prosecution of members of the Syrian regime who managed to escape.

Germany can also help by stopping double standards. No occupation of Syrian soil is justified, neither by Turkey nor Israel. Both states have previously caused mass displacement of Syrians. The Golan Heights is a region rich in agriculture and home to a diverse population. After Israel’s occupation in 1967 and annexation in 1981, many residents ended up in Damascus’s Al-Hajar Al-Aswad district, which was later almost completely destroyed by regime bombing. All Syrians should have the right to return to their homes in New Syria, yet Israel continues to seize more land and villages, turning them into militarized zones.