To start page
After more than two years of a caretaker government, Lebanese prime minister Nawaf Salam presented a new cabinet with 24 ministers, carefully balanced between different sects, on 7 February 2025. The new ministers, among them five women, come from prestigious academic institutions and have a business, diplomatic, political, or research background. The setup of the new cabinet is also remarkable because the new ministers are relatively independent.
Christina Foerch Saab is a Beirut-based filmmaker, journalist, and consultant, as well as co-founder of the NGO Fighters for Peace.
The new prime minister presented his proposed ministers to the parties and secured their approval, ensuring that each minister had the trust of the sects and political groups they were meant to represent. More than half of the cabinet is said to be loyal to the prime minister and president. Rather than being tokens of power play between sects and parties, the new ministers can be considered technocrats, who are highly qualified in their fields.
In this sense, the cabinet is very different from previous ministries: In the sectarian-based power-sharing system that prevails in Lebanon, politicians would usually shuffle posts according to political or religious loyalties, thus making sure to secure important posts that would give them access to public funds. With the new independent ministers in place, this habitus might be significantly disrupted. For the first time since the Ta’if Agreement in 1990, which ended the Lebanese civil war (1975–1990), there is a genuine opportunity for a technocratic government to steer the country towards a better future.
The new president, prime minister, and cabinet came to power in a significant shift of regional and national balances: Israel’s massive attacks on Hezbollah during the last war weakened the Shiite militia by destroying the majority of its weapons arsenal and eliminating the top and medium level leadership. The abrupt collapse of the Syrian regime further weakened Hezbollah, severing key smuggling routes for weapons and financial support to the non-state armed group. In the political arena, however, Hezbollah is still present with deputies in parliament. During the funeral ceremony of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, who was killed by Israel five months ago, estimation between 700,000 and 900,000 supporters gathered on 23 February 2025 in the streets of Beirut, sending a clear message to the public — and Lebanese politicians: the leadership of Hezbollah might have been eliminated, but the basis of Hezbollah is still there. It cannot be ignored on the political level.
Change with Challenges
The newly elected and appointed Lebanese leadership is well aware of this. In several rounds of negotiations with the prime minister, the Shiite “duo” — meaning both Shiite parties, Amal Movement and Hezbollah — managed to secure five Shiite ministers out of 24. However, they lost the power of the blocking third. In the past, they used to hinder much-needed reforms that were not in their interest.
Some analysts argue that, in this context, the Shiite parties — especially Hezbollah — were marginalized. However, the critical post of the finance minister went to Yassine Jaber, a former MP and Minister of Economy and Public Works, representing the Shiite sect while not being a member of Hezbollah. The finance minister has the say over government spending. However, the reconstruction of South Lebanon and the southern districts of Beirut — predominantly Shiite areas that suffered extensive destruction during the 2024 war between Israel and Hezbollah — will be managed by a special ministerial committee. This committee will oversee the allocation of international aid, which has yet to be secured for the rebuilding efforts.
Other than the cabinet, the prime minister must appoint the head of the General Security Directorate, the head of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), and the governor of the Lebanese Central Bank. The General Security, among other tasks, oversees the Lebanese airport, which in the past had been an important entry point for large sums of cash money coming from Iran to support Hezbollah, and was also used for smuggling weapons. The former central banker, Riad Salameh, was arrested in September 2024 over money laundering, fraud, and embezzlement charges. All these posts are important further to limit Hezbollah’s capabilities of financing and rearmament, and to engage in much-needed reforms in the finance sector, tackling widespread corruption and fraud.
Nawaf Salam’s decision to nominate ministers without strong ties to political parties is strategic.
The new government had already mastered its first political challenge: The first ministerial statement had to be voted for by a majority of deputies in a confidence vote for the new prime minister and his cabinet. It establishes the key guidelines and policies for the transitional government over the next year and three months — the period during which this government will operate until the next parliamentary elections at the end of May 2026. Past ministerial statements included “the people, the army, and the resistance”. This phrase legitimized Hezbollah’s significant military role as a heavily armed non-state actor in Lebanon, defending Lebanon’s Southern border.
The new ministerial statement removed the word “resistance”, emphasizing that the Lebanese state must hold the monopoly on weapons and regain full military control over all of Lebanon. Hence, the wording of the ministerial statement forms the basis for a disarmament process of Hezbollah as well as all other armed non-state actors, among them militant Palestinian groups. The open call for a disarmament process is a clear policy shift: in a passionate speech, Christian Kataeb Party leader Sami Gemayel called for a balance of power, supporting the disarmament of Hezbollah, but also asking for a reconciliation process among the Lebanese and a new beginning for a unified country. While this is a clear message to Hezbollah to disarm, it also accepts them as a political force. The majority of deputies approved the ministerial statement in a confidence vote on 25 February 2025.
A Rocky Road
The new government has a very short period of action, and substantial challenges lie ahead: It needs to make sure to fully implement the ceasefire agreement reached between Lebanon and Israel in November 2024, disarming Hezbollah South of the Litani River and making sure that the Israeli army entirely withdraws from Lebanese territory. On 18 February 2025, the Israeli military forces withdrew from Lebanon. Still, they kept five strategic positions along the Lebanese-Israeli border, which can weaken the new government and the Lebanese army’s legitimacy to be the sole defenders of the country. If the Israeli military continues to be present on Lebanese territory and continues to attack, Hezbollah supporters will likely use it as a justification to rearm and take matters into their own hands.
The implementation of the ceasefire and defence policies is just one task among many challenges ahead. The new government has to tackle the economic and financial disaster of the last five years by implementing urgent reforms in the economic and finance sector in order to secure much needed international funding and support from the International Monetary Fund.
Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, the former head of the International Court of Justice, is pressing for a functioning judiciary in Lebanon, saying that without a well-functioning justice system, all other reform and rebuilding efforts will be in vain. In the past years, Lebanon’s judiciary was dysfunctional, such as the investigations in the massive explosion of the Lebanese port in August 2020, which caused the death of over 200 people, had been obstructed and stalled. Other significant cases, such as investigations into politically motivated assassinations of important opposition figures, were never fully pursued.
The new government will not have it easy either reforming the finance sector, exposing corruption, increasing transparency of public spending, and recovering depositors’ lost money. Many of the deputies, who are affiliated with the old elites have no interest in tackling these issues because of their own involvement in corruption and the disappearance of billions of dollars.
Therefore, Nawaf Salam’s decision to nominate ministers without strong ties to political parties is strategic. The new cabinet somewhat disrupts the old linkages between ministers and deputies, making it more difficult for lawmakers to abuse their positions of power for their interests. Although the time for action is very short, and the challenges manifold and immense, the new leadership can lay the groundwork for a more profound transformation process for Lebanon’s future.