The United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran are negotiating Iran’s nuclear programme. This ironically coincides with the second presidential period of Donald Trump, who described the previous nuclear agreement as a disaster and unilaterally withdrew from it as early as 2018. Whether a deal can be reached, and under which terms, is currently a matter of diplomatic struggle. At this stage, it is certain that the negotiations already have far-reaching effects on the regional stability of West Asia and the global order more broadly.
Hamid Mohseni was born in Iran and grew up in Germany. He follows developments in the country and is involved in left-wing solidarity initiatives.
The Status Quo
Current negotiations are unfolding against the backdrop of a highly tense and unstable situation. Iran’s weakened external relations with its “Axis of Resistance” play a central role here. This network of regional allies and non-state actors was crucial in expanding Iranian influence in West Asia, but it has suffered significant setbacks since 7 October 2023 and potentially stands to deteriorate completely. Assad has fallen, Hezbollah is massively weakened, and Hamas is fighting for its survival. On top of this, Israel’s unprecedented series of attacks on high-level players in the axis has demonstrated that it is willing to put everything on the line, including by deploying its secret service. The Mossad may well be capable of significantly weakening Iran and its allies.
At the same time, Iran’s economy is in deep crisis. Structural issues, mismanagement, and sanctions have substantially worsened living conditions for the Iranian population. Inflation has been at a high for years, while half of the population lives below the poverty line and earns less than 450 US dollars per month. The economic state of emergency is one of the main sources for growing poverty, with the divide between the majority of the population and the ruling establishment deepening since the revolutionary protest of 2017. This was most recently demonstrated by the devastating explosion at Bandar Abbas, the country’s most important port, which killed 70 and injured around 1,000. Even as the reasons for this tragedy remain unclear, many blame the regime.
These internal tensions are doing a great deal to destabilize Iran’s position at the negotiating table.
Divided Interests
The US aims to use the negotiations to comprehensively restructure its relations with Iran. The US government seeks a deal that will not only permanently and irrevocably curtail Iran’s nuclear programme, but also restrict the Iranian missile programme and push back against Tehran’s influence across West Asia. This approach is accompanied by a display of military muscle, as well as new (partial) sanctions and tariffs. Should the US be successful, the entirety of Iranian foreign relations and security policy will be shaken to the core – and with it, the foundation of its regional hegemony. Within the US political establishment, however, the question of how to achieve these goals – and indeed, how urgent they really are – is a matter of deep controversy.
Iran enters into the negotiations from a very unstable position. Its focus lies primarily in revoking the harsh economic sanctions that have burdened the country for years. Despite Iran’s efforts to orient itself towards China and Russia, it is still dependent on access to Western markets. At the same time, the Iranian leadership is eager to restrict changes to its nuclear programme and wants to bracket out other controversial topics, such as its missiles programme and regional policy. This reflects the country’s broader efforts to safeguard its sovereignty, including by refusing to make concessions that could be perceived as jeopardizing national security. If hampered at the level of foreign and security policy, the regime could be driven into an existential crisis by internal disquiet. The recent downfall of Tehran’s ally, Bashar al-Assad, has shown all-too-well how suddenly a regime can be overthrown.
Alongside the US and Iran, further regional and international stakeholders play an important role in the negotiations. China and Russia strongly endorse a diplomatic solution to the conflict through the restoration of the first nuclear deal as a starting-point for negotiations, which is known as the Joint Comprehension Deal of Action (JCPOA). Both countries reject the UN snapback mechanism, which would facilitate the automatic reintroduction of harsher sanctions against Iran.
As the most important US regional partner, Israel pursues a harder line against Iran, and is pushing for its nuclear programme to be completely and permanently dismantled. Conversely, the E3 – France, Germany, and Great Britain – seek a reactivation of the JCPOA, which they originally had co-negotiated. Today, however, their position is significantly weaker in comparison to in 2015.
An Unstable Situation Beset With Controversies
The negotiations of previous weeks have been shaped by a series of events and dynamics that have influenced the complex interplay of interests and strategies of all participating stakeholders.
This was sparked by a letter from Trump to Ali Khamenei from early March, in which the US president held the metaphoric gun to the Iranian revolutionary leader’s head: either Tehran negotiates with Washington, or the US will attack. With US troops, aircraft carriers, and fighter planes allocated across the region and an escalation of the situation in Yemen, a huge discussion was triggered in Iran. Hardliners feared a deal that would be even worse than the JCPOA, above all because they are not willing to relinquish the missile programme and regional ties.
The reform-oriented camp, including the likes of former president Hassan Rouhani, saw in the negotiations a chance to relax sanctions and improve the country’s economic situation. Foreign minister Abbas Araghchi ultimately officially announced his willingness to enter into indirect negotiations. Subsequent to a discrete mediation through Oman, on 12 April, Araghchi and the US representative Steve Witkoff came together for the first round of negotiations in Muscat.
Three further negotiation rounds were to follow that month: one in Muscat, and two in Rome. The fifth round was initially delayed, before taking place in Muscat on 11 May. While Witkoff afterwards spoke of constructive negotiations, Araghchi stated that the negotiations were difficult, but useful.
Alongside political representatives, technical experts also met from both sides. While Witkoff repeatedly pushed the line of direct negotiations, Tehran holds on to the narrative that negotiations are taking place indirectly. However, Araghchi eventually was forced to concede that he also spoke directly with Witkoff.
Despite this apparently positive kick-off, it still remains to be seen whether an agreement can be met. This uncertainty has less to do with Iran, which appears to be willing to push through a deal. Khamenei strengthened the negotiation process with a religious analogy pointing towards the need to reach agreements with one’s enemy – the same argument that he used to justify the JCPOA. Araghchi and other politicians are presenting themselves as rational diplomatic players and, for the most part, present the conversations in a positive light.
The ongoing course of these complex – and complicated – negotiations between Iran and the US is likely above all to depend on which line prevails in Washington.
Doubts around the viability of an agreement arise more in light of the different positions held by US stakeholders. The US government itself does not represent a coherent position. To date, Trump appears to prioritize a deal around uranium enrichment for civilian purposes, and in so doing, to concede to Iran’s demand to restrict negotiations to the nuclear question only. Witkoff holds true to this position to the outside, but from time to time, he steps out of line and demands a complete dismantling of the nuclear programme, as happened during the most recent round.
Trump, too, is prone to rhetoric escalation. Moreover, he has arranged for further sanctions, for example most recently against the Iranian petrochemical industry. This points towards the influence of more hawkish positions within the US government: foreign minister Marco Rubio, for example, demands that Iran’s nuclear programme be completely abolished. Beyond this, the hardliners not only push for negotiations on the nuclear question, but also for more far-reaching demands relating to the missile programme and the “axis of resistance”.
Israel, too, has a finger in the pie. Netanyahu continues to affirm his demand for a complete dismantling of the Iranian nuclear programme (as in 2003 for Libya). Other Israeli politicians strengthen him in his resolve, exerting further pressure on Trump.
Regional and Global Repercussions
In the midst of this diplomatic state of exception, Iran is attempting to gain new traction in the region. Currently, it is competing with Israel for the favour of Azerbaijan, with both countries trying to extend their influence on Baku. The Israelis hope for an expansion of intelligence cooperation in order to increase pressure on Iran, and are therefore working for a strategic alliance. Iran, on the other hand, sees in Azerbaijan an important political and economic transit zone. Tehran hopes to capitalize on a lucrative energy trade route, and additionally aspires to use Baku to create ties with the “new” rival in the region: Turkey.
Moscow and Beijing each have their own interests in securing a diplomatic solution and with it, stability in the region. Their willingness to set aside their own interests in support of Tehran is called into question, particularly in the US. The Kremlin may well emphasize its alliance with Iran, but what this actually entails for negotiations remains unclear. Meanwhile, for China, economic considerations appear to play the upper role. China’s plastics industry, for example, has been affected by the introduction of the most recent secondary tariffs against Iran, since 40 percent of its methane oil is imported from Iran and is now subject to heavy tariffs. In light of the current escalation of this tariff war with the US, which has identified China as its main enemy, Beijing is likely to look to avoiding further such burdens.
The ongoing course of these complex – and complicated – negotiations between Iran and the US is likely above all to depend on which line prevails in Washington. A successful deal will depend on the willingness of all parties to be able to build trust, enter into compromises, and take into account the regional and global impact a treaty will have. Given the deeply divided interests at play, the success of this endeavour remains highly unclear.
Translated by Sonja Hornung and Rowan Coupland for Gegensatz Translation Collective.