Poland Shifts to the Right

With the national-conservative Law and Justice (PiS) party candidate Karol Nawrocki being elected president, Polish politics are moving further to the right. In a runoff election with a record 72 percent voter turnout, Nawrocki received 50.8 percent of the votes, narrowly defeating his opponent Rafał Trzaskowski of the liberal-conservative Civic Coalition (KO), who received 49.1 percent.

This result marks the onset of a new phase of political uncertainty in Poland. The day after the election, Prime Minister Donald Tusk (KO) called a confidence vote in parliament as a means of restoring his government’s authority. Nawrocki’s victory will weaken the government’s position and increase the likelihood that PiS will win in the next parliamentary elections in 2027, possibly forming a governing coalition with the far-right Konfederacja (Confederation).

Far-Right Kingmaker

After the first round of the presidential election, the Konfederacja candidate Sławomir Mentzen was able to play the role of kingmaker. Together with the even more radical candidate Grzegorz Braun, the extreme right received about 20 percent of the votes in the first round. Prior to the runoff, Mentzen met with both candidates, with Nawrocki unconditionally agreeing to all of Mentzen’s demands, indicating that there is hardly any policy or ideological difference between them. By contrast, Trzaskowski only agreed to a few of Mentzen’s demands, although he did allow for photos of the meeting to be released, in which the two men could be seen drinking beer together in a pub alongside Minister of Foreign Affairs Radosław Sikorski (KO).

Trzaskowski’s attempt to win over Mentzen’s voters was unsuccessful. Moreover, he was unable to preserve the coalition that had brought the KO — together with the conservative Trzecia Droga (Third Way) and the centre-left alliance Lewica (The Left) — into power in 2023. It should also be kept in mind that in this parliamentary election PiS received more votes than the KO, with Nawrocki’s victory providing further evidence that PiS support in Poland exceeds that of its competitor.

When the coalition government led by the KO won, it was carried by a wave of optimism from its supporters. That segment of Polish society had been hoping for a fundamental break with eight years of PiS rule. However, in less than two years, the government has become extremely unpopular: 44 percent of the population has a negative view of it, and only 32 percent has a positive opinion. Although economic growth is relatively strong in Poland, large swathes of society are not benefitting from that success. Moreover, the government has made no progress of note — partly due to veto threats from President Andrzej Duda (PiS) — with respect to issues like reforming the extremely restrictive abortion law, introducing registration for same-sex partnerships, and re-establishing the rule of law. The ruling coalition’s record in government both hampered Trzaskowski’s election campaign and allowed the already loose, very heterogeneous governing alliance to disintegrate further.

The Social Divide

Trzaskowski’s election campaign primarily focused on the shortcomings of his rival, Nawrocki. These included accusations and revelations: in the past, Nawrocki had participated in organized brawls between football hooligans, scammed an older gentleman out of his apartment, fostered connections with criminal and far-right gangs, and while working as a hotel doorman procured prostitutes for guests. It was hoped that this would be enough to deter voters from supporting Nawrocki and that they would be won over by the serious, if bland, Trzaskowski instead.

However, this election was no mere personality contest. As in many other countries, the contempt mainstream liberalism showed for its opponents primarily served to mobilize the supporters of these opposition parties. Nawrocki was able to exploit the anger of people who felt they had been increasingly excluded from the country’s economic growth. His voters did not care about aspersions cast by members of a government they did not trust.

Despite political divisions in Poland, the two major political blocs are united on many issues.

An analysis of the election results illustrates the social differences that determined the outcome. Trzaskowski received 73 percent of the vote from college graduates, while Nawrocki took 63 percent of the votes cast by people with only a basic education. On top of that, 79 percent of farmers, 68 percent of manual labourers, and 65 percent of unemployed people supported Nawrocki, while 65 percent of executives and managers, and 57 percent of self-employed people voted for Trzaskowski. Nawrocki received 64 percent of the rural vote, and Trzaskowski took 66 percent of the vote in large cities. Among women, Trzaskowski received 54 percent of the vote, while 54.3 percent of men voted for Nawrocki.

It is interesting to note that there were only minimal differences in voting habits based on age. This is partly due to the fact that Nawrocki was able to win the support of most of the younger voters who had supported Mentzen in the first round.

Change of Strategy on the Right

Despite political divisions in Poland, the two major political blocs, PiS and KO, are united on many issues. Both Trzaskowski and Nawrocki have expressed hostility toward immigrants and refugees, supported lowering taxes, and advocate for maintaining or even increasing Poland’s military spending, which currently amounts to almost five percent of GDP. Meanwhile, the KO’s tactic of imitating the far right on matters such as migration policy has not helped, but has instead led to people voting for the original rather than the copy. Steps like abolishing the right to asylum have ultimately further inflamed the anti-immigrant mood in Poland and thereby prepared the ground for the extreme right.

Nawrocki’s election campaign was testament to how the strategy of the PiS had changed. During its two terms in office (2005−2007 and 2015−2023), the party had combined Catholic conservatism with elements of redistributive social policy: the PiS governments introduced a new, universal childcare allowance, significantly increased the minimum wage, lowered the retirement age, and largely prohibited businesses from opening on Sundays. It was the first time in over two decades that a government had taken steps to curb the neoliberal dismantling of social services.

Yet during the presidential campaign, Nawrocki neither emphasized the social record of the PiS, nor did he oppose the neoliberal economic policies of the KO. Instead, he advocated for lowering taxes and even for introducing a constitutional guarantee that inheritances would not be taxable. Moreover, his “social” promises were openly racist and directed against immigrants. For instance, Nawrocki promised that “Polish citizens must be given priority in doctor’s visits and in clinics. Polish children must be given priority in schools and kindergartens. We have to ban supplementary payments to Ukrainians and to state pensions, and social benefits will be given to Poles first and foremost.”

During the next parliamentary elections, PiS will likely build on Nawrocki’s strategy. It could try to win the support of younger — primarily male — voters who feel that Konfederacja and other far-right entities speak to them. There will be less emphasis on social cohesion and conservative values, and more on social hierarchies, including hostility toward outsiders and people who are not considered “real Poles”.

A Win for Trumpism

The presidential election took place amid changing international relations following the re-election of Donald Trump as president of the US. Both candidates had similar views of the war in Ukraine, are decidedly pro-American, and advocate massive investment in the Polish military. However, the KO-led government and Trzaskowski also argued in support of stronger ties between Poland and other European countries like Germany and France. They also supported plans for building up the EU’s armaments. By contrast, PiS and Nawrocki allied themselves more closely with the Trump administration, and the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) held its first meeting in Poland just five days before the second round of the presidential election. It was there that US Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem declared her support for Nawrocki, saying that, “If you have elected a leader that will work with President Donald J. Trump, the Polish people will have an ally [who is] strong, that will ensure that you will be able to fight off enemies that do not share your values.”

In light of the dominance of the two competing right-wing blocs, the Polish left remains stuck.

For that reason, Nawrocki’s victory also represents a win for Trumpism in the region. Nawrocki agreed to Mentzen’s demands to not send any Polish troops into Ukraine and to veto any Ukrainian attempt to join NATO (Trzaskowski only supported the first demand). This is a reflection of the changed foreign policy of the new US administration as well as the growing fear in Polish society of being drawn into a larger conflict over Ukraine. Nawrocki also advocates further increases in military spending for Poland, in full compliance with Trump’s strategy of forcing European NATO countries to expand their military capacities.

Prospects for the Left?

In light of the dominance of the two competing right-wing blocs, the Polish left remains stuck. The social-democratic Lewica alliance is still the junior partner in a three-party coalition. After the election of Nawrocki, little hope remains that this government will meet Lewica’s policy demands, such as reforming the abortion law. Under these conditions, it seems likely that support for Lewica will decline and overall backing for Tusk’s government will continue to dwindle.

However, the left-wing Partia Razem (Together Party), which is not part of the governing coalition, was able to stake out a stronger independent position in the recent election and boosted its share of the vote. The question is whether it can fill the gap left by declining support for the government and for Lewica. Does it want to be able to win over voters looking for a social alternative, as the economic and social policies of the PiS move further to the right? Can it find the strength to challenge the prevailing political consensus, which prioritizes military spending over investment in the energy transition, housing construction, and healthcare? The answers to these questions could determine the fate of the Polish left.

Translated by Joseph Keady and Eve Richens for Gegensatz Translation Collective.