Donald Trump’s surprise announcement of a summit with the leaders of Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania, and Senegal on 9–11 July points to both the erratic nature of Africa policy under the new administration as well as its blatant focus on transactional relationships, this time in pursuit of critical minerals. Prior to the summit, Africa had not been a foreign policy priority of President Donald Trump’s second administration, just as Africa was a low priority during his first term and, indeed, as the continent is often neglected by US foreign policy regardless of who is in office. But priority or not, various decisions by Trump’s team have already had major impacts on Africa, not least in the form of collateral damage from cuts to foreign aid or bans on travel and immigration.
Alex Thurston is Associate Professor in the School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Cincinnati. His most recent book is Jihadists of North Africa and the Sahel (Cambridge, 2020), and he publishes regularly in his newsletter, Sawahil.
The five-country summit held this week suggests that the administration is looking for opportunities to cut deals with some African leaders. Nevertheless, there are already serious ruptures between the US and Africa, especially in the humanitarian and trade spheres, and the US is likely to lose some economic and political influence on the continent.
Trump’s selective engagement, overt racism, and lack of a stable Africa team will all likely widen an already growing gulf between the United States and Africa. Moreover, the wild swings in US policy and posture between Democrats and Republicans also have an impact in and of themselves, reinforcing the image of Washington as an unpredictable and unreliable force in the world — all trends that will likely make African countries and citizens think even more about alternative partners and paths towards greater self-sufficiency and sovereignty.
A One-Sided Relationship
Trump is hardly unique in dedicating relatively little attention or time to Africa. US presidents have tended to focus their foreign policies on building and maintaining (or, in Trump’s case, shaking up) alliances in Europe, dominating the Middle East, countering various perceived rivals, and intervening in South American affairs. As such, they often look at Africa through the lens of wider geopolitical conflicts, such as the Cold War or the so-called “War on Terror”, to cite two recent examples.
Among Trump’s recent predecessors, George W. Bush displayed an unusually high level of interest in the continent, as evidenced by his creation of the United States President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) in 2003, his team’s close involvement in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan, and the creation of US Africa Command (AFRICOM) late in his second term. In contrast, Presidents Barack Obama and Joe Biden offered little of substance on Africa policy, contenting themselves with high-profile but relatively superficial “US-Africa Leaders Summits” in 2014 and 2022.
Trump neglected to visit Africa in his first term, but made consequential changes in a few areas. For example, in exchange for Morocco’s participation in the US-sponsored Abraham Accords, the United States recognized Morocco’s claims to sovereignty over the disputed Western Sahara territory and backed Morocco’s “autonomy plan” for the region. The move disquieted Algeria, Morocco’s long-time rival and a firm supporter of Sahrawi independence, but today the country appears unruffled by Trump’s return and even open to limited deal making with the new administration.
Trump’s provocative moves elicited pushback from African leaders, but their responses are generally tempered by a desire to leave the door open to transactions with the Trump administration.
Trump’s second administration features no senior officials with extensive Africa experience; neither Secretary of State Marco Rubio nor Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth have a record of showing interest in the continent. As of July 2025, only a few senior appointees with Africa-focused portfolios are in place. Although Trump has some Congressional allies with a pronounced interest in Africa, notably Congressman Chris Smith of New Jersey and Senator James Risch of Idaho, he may ultimately cut or downgrade infrastructure relating to Africa policy, including some embassies and even AFRICOM itself.
Trump’s racist messaging, a core part of his domestic rhetoric, has carried over into his Africa policy during both terms. In the first term, Trump made waves for his infamous characterization of many African nations as “shithole countries”. This time around, a provocative February missive titled “Addressing Egregious Actions of The Republic of South Africa” stoked diplomatic tensions. As in the first term, various Trump “travel bans” and “Muslim bans” have affected many African countries. Trump’s deportations have also affected African refugees in the ÚS.
Trump’s provocative moves elicited pushback from African leaders, such as Chad’s decision to suspend visas for Americans, but their responses are generally tempered by a desire to leave the door open to transactions with the Trump administration. Trump himself, meanwhile, is strikingly popular in some African countries, for example in parts of Nigeria, which acts as an additional brake on African leaders’ willingness to challenge him.
Targeting the Most Vulnerable
Trump’s most consequential decision affecting Africa so far were his cuts to foreign assistance. One of his immediate actions on 20 January 2025 was to issue an executive order on “Reevaluating and Realigning United States Foreign Aid”, freezing most aid for 90 days while undertaking reviews of various programmes. His “Department of Government Efficiency” (DOGE) targeted the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in particular, terminating over 1,500 workers. As of June 2025, the administration and its Congressional allies were moving ahead with slashing all overseas positions and cutting approximately 9.4 billion dollars in funding for foreign assistance and public broadcasting.
The fallout hit Africa hard, particularly in the public health sector and in conflict zones such as Sudan. USAID cuts were particularly devastating in Nigeria, which has suffered for over 15 years from the Boko Haram insurgency and various other violent conflicts including endemic banditry and organized crime. As the New Humanitarian and other outlets reported, the yanking of USAID funding not only removed direct humanitarian support to the vulnerable in northeast Nigeria but also shocked a whole economic system wherein many workers were employed by local NGOs funded largely or partly by foreign aid. Republican Congressman Scott Perry’s evidence-free allegations that USAID funded terror groups, including Boko Haram, ricocheted through the Nigerian media; the ultimate effect was to exacerbate an already widespread mistrust of foreign NGOs in Nigeria and beyond.
USAID’s activities in Africa and worldwide certainly merit scrutiny. Trump’s cuts have elicited thoughtful reflections about how USAID’s “democracy and governance” work sometimes involved far-reaching efforts to reshape other countries’ domestic politics, protest currents, and social values, adding up to a kind of imperialism. Much of USAID’s budget, meanwhile, fed back into the US economy and into American NGOs, and vaunted “monitoring and evaluation” efforts were often undertaken by consultants with close ties to USAID itself. Still, well over 40 percent of funds went to humanitarian and health programmes, and the cuts have dealt a serious blow to some of the world’s most vulnerable people.
Hypocrisy and Human Rights
All US presidents have been, at best, inconsistent when it comes to upholding their stated commitment to democratic values and human rights. Indeed, even Jimmy Carter aligned himself with figures such as Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran. The Biden administration continued the longstanding American tradition of partnering with long-time authoritarian leaders such as Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni, even as Biden’s Africa strategy ostensibly sought to “foster openness and open societies”.
Trump, for his part, has been particularly indifferent to even the rhetoric of democracy and human rights, voicing admiration for leaders like Russia’s Vladimir Putin and Egypt’s Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. It thus appears quite unlikely that Trump and his team will pressure African governments to maintain or advance democracy.
That posture — and the lack of pressure — could have subtle effects on the trajectories of various countries. The Biden administration was unable or unwilling to halt Tunisia’s descent into authoritarianism, but that trend is even less likely to reverse under Trump. Although it is unlikely that the Biden administration or a hypothetical Kamala Harris administration could have deterred Cote d'Ivoire’s President Alassane Ouattara from pursuing a fourth term in October 2025 or banning his key challengers, Ouattara now has an even freer hand with Trump in the White House.
Should Trump eventually pivot from broad-ranging tariffs to more targeted, bilateral deals, some northwest African countries could emerge as minor partners.
The military regimes in Guinea and the central Sahel (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger) as well as the dynastic regime in Chad also face reduced pressure now, with many of those governments planning to stay in power through at least 2030. If the Trump administration is successful in concluding pacts with Libyan political factions to settle Palestinians and/or deportees there — pacts that could bolster such factions’ power as well as the favour they enjoy in Washington — then Libya’s democratic prospects could dim further. Indeed, there are few bright spots for democracy in northwest Africa now, save for Senegal and a handful of other countries.
If the Trump administration remains disengaged on these issues, then several looming succession crises are likely to play out without much involvement from Washington. Succession scenarios are approaching in several countries with aging, long-time presidents, such as Cameroon and Uganda. Further coups are also possible in various countries, including Cote d’Ivoire (as well as further coups in the Sahel), takeovers the Trump administration would likely tolerate — as the Biden administration ultimately felt compelled to do as well.
Fewer Boots on the Ground
With Trump back at the helm, much of Africa faces deep-seated, seemingly intractable conflicts, ranging from the Sahel’s long-running insurgencies to the uptick in violence in northeast Nigeria, the brutal civil war in Sudan, the simmering conflict in Ethiopia, or the resurgence of al-Shabab in Somalia. To those in Trump’s orbit with long memories, most of these conflicts will be familiar, although neither Trump’s first term nor Biden’s presidency brought major progress in peacebuilding on the continent. Of Africa’s conflicts, Trump’s team has shown the most interest in Somalia, both during the first term and again during the second, launching airstrikes at a regular clip alongside talk of closing the US Embassy in Mogadishu.
Trump appears likely to continue his predecessors’ relatively hands-off approach to armed conflict in the Sahel and Nigeria. The Sahel governments are widely suspicious of Washington, with Niger having expelled US troops after the 2023 coup there. Nigeria has long been interested in securing more hardware from the US, and the first Trump administration authorized a major sale of attack aircraft, but Nigeria appears uninterested in welcoming in American troops or advisors, nor is there much appetite in Washington for such deployments. Oversimplified narratives framing Nigeria’s conflicts as primarily anti-Christian violence are gaining traction in Washington, but on their own are unlikely to draw the US into direct military involvement in Nigeria.
Assuming it survives the next rounds of cuts, Trump’s relative lack of interest in Africa may give AFRICOM the freedom to continue pursuing closer relations with some coastal West African countries adjacent to the Sahel, such as by placing drones in Côte d'Ivoire. AFRICOM will also likely continue to partner with countries like Morocco and Tunisia on major training exercises. On the whole, however, northwest Africa’s conflict zones are likely to continue evolving based primarily on their own internal dynamics, rather than US intervention. A stark degradation of one or more conflicts, or the very unlikely scenario of a strike on US territory by an African militant group, could change the Trump administration’s calculus, but current momentum points towards a hands-off strategy.
Deals, Tariffs, and More Deals
Trade has always been Trump’s prime focus, and his second term in particular has featured a dramatic cycle involving announcements of tariffs, “negotiations” with China and other countries, adjustments and withdrawals of certain tariffs, followed by further rounds of the same cycle. Africa has not been the administration’s primary target, but some African countries have been heavily affected, by the tariffs themselves and the uncertainty surrounding them.
The tariffs call into question the future of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a law passed in 2000 up for its second renewal in September 2025. AGOA lifted tariffs on some African exports and seeks to promote industrialization, trade, and regional integration on the continent — but has also been heavily criticized for what some see as unilateral and coercive conditionality requirements that impose US political preferences on African trade partners, lopsided impacts favouring larger economies over smaller ones, and underwhelming impacts that fall far short of initial promises. If AGOA goes unrenewed or simply becomes irrelevant as Trump tariffs supersede the law, some African industries will be hit hard, while some countries may even welcome the arrival of a more transactional era.
Trump’s targeting of China may also redound to Africa’s gain. In June 2025, China announced it would remove tariffs on exports not just from Africa’s low-income countries, as it already made provisions for in 2024, but on all African countries with whom China has diplomatic relations, including some 20 middle-income countries. Beijing’s move clearly came in response to the Trump tariffs. China is already Africa’s largest trading partner, and Trump may inadvertently accelerate the continent’s economic turn towards China and Asia.
Tracking Trump’s Africa policy will likely remain difficult due to the president’s mercurial personality and amorphous preferences, as well as the presence of multiple and sometimes conflicting ideological currents among his advisors.
Trump’s tariffs have arrived in a context in which the European Union is seeking to boost its trade with Africa. Although France in particular faces considerable mistrust on the continent due to the colonial past and what many see as neo-colonial present, European countries — bilaterally and collectively — may find new business opportunities as Washington comes to appear unreliable and capricious.
Trump, meanwhile, cultivates a pronounced interest in critical minerals. Administration rhetoric and policy have focused on boosting domestic production, but Trump is also prioritizing critical minerals in his negotiations with China, South Africa, and others. Northwest Africa is clearly not the main zone of concern for Trump, but countries such as Ghana and Mali have lithium, which may put them on Washington’s radar. Should Trump eventually pivot from broad-ranging tariffs to more targeted, bilateral deals, some northwest African countries could emerge as minor partners.
Sovereignty or Submission?
Tracking Trump’s Africa policy will likely remain difficult due to the president’s mercurial personality and amorphous preferences, as well as the presence of multiple and sometimes conflicting ideological currents among his advisors. One scenario could be greater isolationism, which would involve cutting funds and staff, ignoring conflicts and crises, and extending travel bans and other punitive and restrictive measures. Another scenario could involve a neoconservative bent, with a dual focus on pursuing the remnants of the War on Terror in Somalia and perhaps a few other theatres, while simultaneously confronting China on the continent.
A third scenario, however, would feature a highly transactional approach, as Washington pursues deals with Morocco, Libya, Djibouti, and others, focused on securing African support for Israel, resettlement of Palestinians and deportees, and trade – especially in critical minerals. Given the flux in personnel and policies that has characterized both Trump terms, it is most likely that the ultimate “policy” will include a mixture of all the above elements and unfold through ad hoc decisions.
African leaders, organizations, and citizens have various options as they mull their responses to this unpredictable policy environment. On the one hand, Trump’s transactional approach, his scepticism towards Ukraine, and his relative indifference to Africa all give African governments somewhat more room to manoeuvre than they had under Biden — the Biden administration put substantial pressure on African countries to align themselves against Russia, for example. On the other hand, it will be harder to attract Washington’s attention and funding for any priorities beyond commercial deals and, in the case of a few countries such as Somalia, counterterrorism.
One obvious path for African governments is to move even closer to various other powers ranging from China to India to Turkey to the Gulf countries to the EU, keen to shore up its waning influence on the continent. BRICS may attract even more African members. Another, partly complementary path for African governments is to pursue the “sovereigntist” discourse embraced by the military regimes in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger — a hyper-patriotism combined with economic self-sufficiency and a rejection of Western (particularly French) influence, which appears to have a wide audience among the citizenry of other countries.
Another option is to adopt a “wait-and-see” attitude. It would seem many African leaders anticipate remaining in power well beyond 2029, giving them the time horizon to see whether Trump’s cuts to aid and development are idiosyncratic quirks of his administration or more long-lasting changes in US policy. Finally, some African leaders may feel that they must simply remain adroit, ready to accept an invitation to Washington at a moment’s notice, or to spend four years attending to their own affairs without American involvement — benevolent or malevolent.