Global politics is undergoing a period of fundamental shifts that are changing the way states and other international actors interact with each other, both bilaterally and multilaterally. As the process of restructuring the post-1945 order is still ongoing, it is currently impossible to provide a definitive overview. Still, several strategic trends have become increasingly clear — trends that European policymakers should take into account when redefining their foreign policy priorities and Europe’s role on the global stage.
Alexandra Sitenko is an independent political analyst and researcher based in Berlin.
Three developments are particularly salient:
The fluid and often ambiguous relationships between the three principal poles of power — the West, the East, and the increasingly assertive Global South, which has gained new geopolitical visibility since 2020.
The rise of influential middle powers — such as Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Brazil or Central Asia — that pursue autonomous foreign policies and play a moderating role.
The re-emergence of Eurasia as a strategic space in terms of not only economics and infrastructure, but also geopolitical competition and cooperation.
Rather than viewing these shifts through the lens of rivalry alone, the emphasis should be on identifying opportunities for strategic engagement, issue-based coalitions, and collaborative conflict resolution. This will require a more flexible, inclusive, and interest-driven European foreign policy capable of responding to the realities of a multipolar world.
The Emergence of a Tripartite World
At the turn of the century, some scholars of international relations were still convinced that although new players, especially in East Asia, were emerging, US military, political, and economic power remained largely unchallenged and was decisive in shaping the global order. In his famous 2005 book, The Opportunity: America’s Moment to Alter History’s Course, US diplomat Richard Haass argued that the United States should not exercise its power unilaterally, but instead establish alliances with China, India, Russia, Japan and the European Union in order to create global rules and address risks such as terrorism, nuclear weapons, and climate change. However, a few years later, geopolitical and geoeconomic events would render this optimistic scenario impossible, steering the world in a different direction.
The year 2008 marked an important turning point for at least two reasons. First, the global financial crisis severely undermined the credibility and strength of Western economies. In contrast, China and several other Asian nations recovered relatively quickly, showcasing their economic resilience and growing global influence. It was around this time that the term “Asian century” gained traction among scholars and policymakers. Notably, many Latin American countries also rebounded faster than several advanced economies, further highlighting the shifting global economic landscape.
While the broad contours of an emerging global order are visible, its structural foundations are still taking shape.
Second, 2008 signalled the beginning of a renewed period of geopolitical tensions between Russia and the West — primarily the US and Europe. In February, Kosovo declared independence from Serbia, a move supported by the US and most EU member states. Russia, however, viewed this as a precedent that violated principles of territorial integrity and international norms. Then, at the NATO Summit in Bucharest, Georgia and Ukraine were offered the prospect of future NATO membership — a step Moscow had long considered a red line. The situation escalated further when, in August, war broke out between Russia and Georgia over the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Although the conflict lasted only few days, it had significant long-term consequences, deepening the rift between Russia and the West.
The East-West tensions reached a temporary peak in February 2014 following political turmoil in Kiev and Russia’s subsequent annexation of Crimea. When the US-China trade war erupted in 2018, the prospect of a new Cold War between the United States and its allies, and China and Russia and their allies, such as Iran and North Korea, gained new momentum. The world seemed to be divided into two: the West and the East.
However, a couple of years later, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the growing role of the Global South as a separate pole became evident. While Europe and the US led the way in vaccine production, they were initially reluctant to share their supplies. Nevertheless, countries in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia demonstrated resilience in managing the health crisis despite limited resources.
Many Global South leaders became global voices for vaccine justice as wealthy nations hoarded doses. The former Rwandan health minister, Agnes Binagwaho, had a clear message for the EU: “Be frank and say, ‘My people first.’ Don't lie to me and say we’ll be equal.” India and South Africa jointly proposed a temporary waiver of certain provisions of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) at the World Trade Organization (WTO). It was a landmark initiative that received broad support from developing countries and highlighted the growing leadership role of the Global South in global governance — particularly with regard to health equity and intellectual property reform.
This determination on the part of Global South countries made it clear that they were no longer willing to accept unjust treatment by the West, yet they also did not wish to become dependent on the challengers such as Russia and China — both of which had drawn attention through their vaccine diplomacy. The growing influence of the Global South became even more apparent after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Since the onset of the war, countries such as Indonesia, Brazil (in cooperation with China), and several African states have, for the first time in history, launched peace initiatives aimed at resolving a conflict in Europe.
Currently, we are in a transitional phase. While the broad contours of an emerging global order are visible, its structural foundations are still taking shape. What do these contours reveal?
The world today is neither unipolar nor bipolar, but increasingly multipolar. At least three main poles are emerging. First, there is the West, led by the US and the European Union. Despite internal disagreements and transatlantic rifts, this bloc remains an important geopolitical and economic actor. Second, the East, spearheaded by China and Russia, has asserted itself through a declared “No Limits” strategic partnership. More than 90 percent of bilateral trade between the two is conducted in Chinese yuan and Russian roubles, reflecting a deliberate effort to reduce reliance on the US dollar and challenge Western financial dominance. Third, the Global South is rising — not as a cohesive bloc, but as a diverse set of countries gaining economic and political weight. Regional powers such as India, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia are increasingly shaping global debates. Although the Global South is still underrepresented in global governance institutions such as the UN Security Council, its global influence is growing. Today, it accounts for over 80 percent of the world’s population and contributes nearly 60 percent of global GDP (measured by purchasing power parity). By 2050, its share of world GDP is projected to rise to 72 percent.
The three big poles are visible, but their relationships to each other and among themselves are not clearly defined. For instance, relations between the US and EU have fractured, while Washington and Moscow have initiated an attempt at rapprochement, which, however, has not really progressed so far. The relationship between the US and China fluctuates between escalating rhetoric and diplomatic engagement amid political tensions. Surprisingly, the two countries reached a temporary agreement on tariffs in June 2025.
When major powers find themselves in a geopolitical stalemate, middle powers are best positioned to start playing a prominent role.
At the multilateral level, more than 100 countries are participating in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), among them 53 from Africa, 22 from Latin America and the Caribbean, several Asian countries, but also 17 countries of the EU. Another example of interpolar engagement is the signing of the EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement in December 2024 after 25 years of negotiations between representatives of the West and the Global South. Meanwhile, the BRICS group brings together representatives from the Global South and the East.
Therefore, in the emerging multipolar global order, it seems that partnerships and alliances are increasingly shaped by strategic interests rather than shared values. This shift reflects a pragmatic recalibration of international relations, where states prioritize economic, security, and geopolitical considerations over ideological alignment. In the current climate of high unpredictability in global affairs, interest-driven diplomacy arguably offers more flexibility and space for compromise. Unlike value-driven foreign policy, which is often constrained by normative rigidity and mutual mistrust, interest-driven diplomacy allows for cooperation across political and ideological divides. In this sense, it may have greater potential for resolving conflicts pragmatically and for achieving functional multilateralism in a fragmented global landscape.
Strategic Mediators in a Fragmented Global Order
When major powers find themselves in a geopolitical stalemate, middle powers are best positioned to start playing a prominent role. A recent example of this is the bilateral peace talks held in Abu Dhabi between the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia. Notably, the meeting took place without the involvement of traditional mediators from the West or East like the US or Russia, reflecting a deliberate strategy to minimize external influence and reclaim regional ownership of the peace process.
The United Arab Emirates’ selection as host highlights a broader trend: rising middle powers are establishing themselves as neutral platforms for conflict resolution. The UAE has brokered prisoner exchanges between Russia and Ukraine, and Qatar has mediated to bring Ukrainian children home since 2023. Saudi Arabia and Turkey have also served as platforms for ceasefire negotiations in the war in Ukraine. Although the negotiations were unsuccessful, the global political and diplomatic influence of middle powers is growing. Due to their political ambitions and considerable flexibility, they have the potential to influence the balance of power between major powers, maintain equilibrium, and play a moderating role in the emerging global order.
In this context, Central Asia represents a unique case in global politics: it is not a single state, but an entire region evolving toward middle power status. This transformation is being driven by a growing commitment to regional cooperation and constructive diplomacy. Historically perceived as a zone of instability and rivalry, recent developments suggest that Central Asia is becoming a relatively independent and stabilizing actor in the broader international security architecture.
Relations among the five Central Asian republics have improved significantly in recent years. Notably, the border delimitation between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan was finalized, while Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan also reached a historic border agreement. Meanwhile, in 2022, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan — traditionally competing for regional leadership — entered into an alliance. This growing collaboration between the two largest economies in the region is pivotal to regional security and economic resilience. By setting aside post-Soviet disputes, the region is positioning itself as a more cohesive and influential actor. This could enhance its leverage in international affairs and contribute to a more balanced global security order.
However, even a relatively large and resource-rich country like Kazakhstan cannot maintain middle-power flexibility independently due to competing external pressures resulting from its location at the intersection of Russian, Chinese, Turkish, Iranian, and Western interests. In recognition of this complexity, the five Central Asian republics have adopted a multilateral diplomatic approach — most prominently through the C5+1 format, which enables regular high-level engagement with key global powers including the United States, China, Russia, and the EU.
This diplomatic outreach, coupled with growing intra-regional cooperation, reflects a promising shift towards autonomous foreign policy and economic diversification. While Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan continue to compete as regional investment hubs, this competition has so far remained healthy and beneficial, reinforcing broader regional development.
Eurasia as the Strategic Epicentre of a Multipolar World
Looking ahead, the role of Eurasia in the emerging global security architecture is likely to grow significantly. The region’s geostrategic centrality — bridging East and West, North and South—makes it a potential epicentre of twenty-first-century geopolitics. As the influence of the transatlantic axis gradually diminishes, the strategic core of Eurasia — encompassing China, Russia, and Central Asia, and stretching further south to the Caucasus, Afghanistan, Iran and India — is gaining prominence as a pivotal centre of geopolitical and geoeconomic activity.
This resurgence is visible in major connectivity initiatives such as China’s BRI, the Middle Corridor (linking Central Asia and the South Caucasus to Europe via the Caspian Sea and Turkey), and the International North–South Transport Corridor (linking the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf with the Caspian Sea and then on to northern Europe), security alignments, and energy projects. One telling example is Kazakhstan’s decision to build not just one, but two nuclear power plants — one with Russian support and one with Chinese cooperation. The move exemplifies careful balancing act among competing Eurasian powers, while also underscoring the broader competition for influence in Central Asia’s energy and infrastructure sectors.
Although no single external actor currently possesses the capacity to unilaterally dominate or restructure the Eurasian space, the region continues to function primarily as an arena of strategic contestation rather than a platform for cooperative geopolitics.
The recent China–Central Asia Summit, culminating in the first-ever Treaty on Eternal Good Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation, signals a significant deepening of China’s strategic presence in Central Asia. The treaty outlines a long-term framework for political, economic, and security cooperation, reinforcing China’s ambition to institutionalize its influence in a region that is vital to its BRI and broader Eurasian connectivity strategy. Simultaneously, Russia is recalibrating its own regional strategy. The upcoming Russia–Central Asia Summit, planned for October, underlines Moscow’s emphasis on the region as a strategic anchor within its vision for a Greater Eurasian Partnership.
The EU has significantly stepped up its engagement in Central Asia, most notably through its support for the expansion of the Middle Corridor. As part of the Global Gateway initiative, the EU has pledged 10 billion euro in investment, aiming to enhance connectivity, energy diversification, and digital resilience across Eurasia. The US is also renewing its presence and planning to establish the largest US consular complex in Central Asia in Almaty, Kazakhstan. Far beyond traditional diplomatic functions, the new facility is expected to house a range of government agencies, including the Department of Commerce, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the US Commercial Service — indicating Washington’s recognition of the region’s growing strategic relevance and signalling a long-term commitment.
Although no single external actor currently possesses the capacity to unilaterally dominate or restructure the Eurasian space, the region continues to function primarily as an arena of strategic contestation rather than a platform for cooperative geopolitics. National interests — often driven by zero-sum logic — still prevail over inclusive engagement. Yet, Eurasia holds untapped potential as a geopolitical nexus where overlapping interests such as connectivity, energy security, climate adaptation, counterterrorism, and regional stability could serve as the basis for pragmatic cooperation.
Harnessing this potential, however, requires a fundamental rethinking of the relationships among the major Eurasian actors — Russia, China, the EU, and others. A constructive reshaping of these relationships means moving beyond entrenched binaries such as “us versus them”, and refraining from framing other actors as immutable adversaries. The global order is not fixed — it is fluid and continuously evolving. The emergence of a new global peace and security architecture presents both a challenge and an opportunity. To build a more peaceful and inclusive global order, international actors must adopt a mindset grounded in openness and mutual respect. In this context, reassessing the geopolitical identity and significance of Eurasia is not just desirable — it is essential.
Rather than being treated solely as a space of rivalry, Eurasia should be recognized as a region of strategic interdependence. Its future role in shaping global peace and stability depends on whether international actors are willing to engage with it not as a battleground, but as a potential bridge between East and West, North and South.