Die Linke has long drawn its foreign policy red lines around rejecting militarism, NATO, and arms exports. But with wars raging in Ukraine and Gaza, these principles are being tested as the party seeks to redefine its role in international politics. How can solidarity with the oppressed be reconciled with a rejection of arms deliveries? What role should Germany play in a world of shifting power blocs and growing authoritarianism? Pauline Jäckels and Felix Jaitner sat down with Die Linke’s Co-Chair Jan van Aken to discuss these pressing questions — a conversation featured in the first episode of Weltunordnung, the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation’s new German-language podcast on international politics.
Die Linke is a long way from being in a position to help determine German foreign policy. What role does foreign policy play for the party?
Die Linke has made sure that foreign military deployments and arms exports are actually being critically questioned, thereby reducing the number of German soldiers stationed abroad. We’ve managed to achieve something there without even being part of government.
Jan van Aken is co-chair of Die Linke. He was previously a policy advisor for international conflict analysis at the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation and represented Die Linke in the German parliament from 2009 to 2017, during which time he served on the foreign affairs committee.
For many years, Die Linke’s positions on foreign policy were defined by three proverbial red lines: no arms provisions, no foreign deployments, and no NATO. Since the founding of the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance, the discourse has changed. What are the cornerstones of Die Linke today?
The party’s core idea is that we’re internationalists. When injustice occurs anywhere, we have to ask ourselves: how can we get involved? This is what sets us apart from the other parties in the Bundestag, which, when in doubt, would rather send weapons and soldiers. But between taking military action and doing absolutely nothing, there’s a wide range of civilian options available to a country like Germany, and we want to discuss those first.
Which more or less brings us straight to the war in Ukraine. There’s the question of arms deliveries, where there are certainly differing positions within the party. You still stand by your opposition to arms deliveries. Could you explain your reasoning?
As internationalists, we stand with the people of Ukraine. That is our basic point of departure: our solidarity goes out to anyone who is being oppressed, exploited, attacked, or tortured. And from this starting point, the next question we must ask ourselves is: what methods can I use to best support these people against an imperialist aggressor like Russia? Opinions differ here.
I’ve travelled to Ukraine, I’ve taken part in Zoom meetings with Ukrainian Leftists, and explained my position — which is not Wagenknecht’s position of “lay down your arms, hand over the whole country to Russia”, or in other words: let the aggressor win — but always from a position of standing alongside the people of Ukraine and in the interests of achieving a just peace. As far as I’m concerned, that doesn’t include giving the green light for arms deliveries, and this isn’t always easy for our Ukrainian friends to accept.
So would you say that you are critical of the prevailing Western policy towards Ukraine for not really being aimed at bringing about an end to the war or taking all conceivable measures to achieve it, but instead ultimately prolonging the war?
Yes. I would concede that the German government has always had the objective of ending or at least shortening the war. But it wasn’t prepared to pay the price for doing so. For example, it wasn’t willing to impose an oil embargo overnight, because that could have harmed the German economy in competition with China and the US.
The question remains: how do you get warring parties to come to the negotiating table? External actors have relatively limited options in this regard, but there are some.
In your opinion, how might Russia be persuaded to engage in serious negotiations?
It seems obvious to me that Russia has so far had no interest in engaging in serious negotiations. Ukraine didn’t either until a year ago. The question remains: how do you get warring parties to come to the negotiating table? External actors have relatively limited options in this regard, but there are some.
What will happen after the war in Ukraine?
The goal will have to be a cooperative security agreement in conjunction with both Russia and China. Cooperative security presupposes that all parties accept the status quo. That’s how it worked during the Cold War, with Willy Brandt’s policy of détente. As a first step, both NATO and the Soviet Union had to accept the borders as they were defined at the time. On that basis, it became possible to actually take into account mutual security interests, take steps towards disarmament, and so on.
At present, Russia does not accept the status quo. They have invaded a neighbouring country, they want to redraw national borders and replace a foreign government by force. As a result, there’s now zero trust there. Even if the war in Ukraine were to end tomorrow, it would take years to rebuild trust.
Let’s turn now to Palestine, where it’s becoming abundantly clear that Israel’s policy is now aimed at ethnically cleansing the Gaza Strip and completely annexing the West Bank. And the reason Israel can do this is because it has the full support of the United States. How can this be countered?
It’s not just the full support of the US, but to a very large extent also of Europe. For a long time, the Israeli government acted with restraint, because it was clear that as soon as it spoke openly about annexation, Europe or the US would indicate that this was where they drew the line. But now it’s clear that no such signal is going to come from the US, and Europe is also holding back.
A few countries are now beginning to discuss the prospect of suspending the EU Association Agreement with Israel. That’s new. But Germany and other European nations are still preventing that from happening. And that’s why we have to hold Germany to account and demand that it change its policy towards Israel.
Many people say that the two-state solution is dead. I think they’re wrong, because there are some very good ideas coming from Israeli and Palestinian peace activists.
I absolutely agree with the German government’s unwavering stance that Israel’s right to exist is non-negotiable. Germany has a special responsibility in this regard. I share this view, I feel the same way, and we must act accordingly. But this cannot mean allowing a right-wing extremist government to do as it pleases completely unchecked.
This is the situation we currently find ourselves in — how do we get out of it?
We need a two-state solution. But having two hostile states that erect and live divided by a high fence will never work. We can’t allow the Israeli settlements in Palestinian territory to remain, because then there won’t be much left of Palestine. But we also can’t expel them all either; there are some 600,000 or 700,000 settlers, some of whom have been living there for 40 years. It wouldn’t even be feasible to enforce this within Israel.
That’s why so many people say that the two-state solution is dead. I think they’re wrong, because there are some very good ideas coming from Israeli and Palestinian peace activists who say that we do not need two states with a high fence between them, but rather two states that are mutually permeable. In the same way that it’s completely normal in Europe for national borders to be permeable. There are several models for that, but the core of it all is that the land is used consensually by both nation states.
Every peace activist I speak to in Israel tells me that this can only come from Europe.
In Germany, we’re now also seeing a move to more aggressively define German interests once again and to combine this with a claim to leadership. Isn’t that also evidence of a change of course?
Yes, perhaps. Nowadays, in view of Russia’s current aggression, it’s suddenly acceptable to talk about military strength again. That was taboo in Germany for decades — which was certainly a good thing and also contributed to our success as an antimilitaristic Left. But the majority of people in Germany are now open to it, because there is a major aggressor right next door. That means we also need a military for the purposes of both EU and national defence. That’s my starting point. And from there the question follows: what do you actually need for EU and national defence?
And then you have to admit: it’s actually far less than most people would think, if the spending were firmly and solely focused on the task of defence. With the huge sums that are being talked about at the moment, it’s not just about EU and national defence, it’s about projecting the idea of Europe as a world power. If we do away with that kind of thinking, I believe the current military budget will be more than enough for ensuring both EU and national defence.
Now suppose you were foreign minister or even chancellor. What would your vision be for an independent German foreign policy?
My vision is for Germany to be a force for peace — and I use the word "force" in more than one sense. That term may scare many Leftists, but no matter what you may think, Germany is a force to be reckoned with — if only by virtue of its being one of the world’s largest economic powers. Somehow, it has an influence all over the world. And I would mobilize that power in pursuit of peace.
The first step is to transition from violent to peaceful international relations.
And if, to return to the beginning, we were in government in three years’ time, then a left-wing foreign minister would also seek to advance the relevant formats for pursuing these goals — like, for example, convening an international, top-level peace conference.
Does renouncing profits — for example, saying “we will trade only with states we consider morally acceptable” — work within a capitalist system?
If you traded only with the states you considered morally acceptable, could you even trade with yourself? That’s not exactly what it’s about. The point is to address particular instances of extreme injustice. The Supply Chain Act, for example, was a good start here. I would say we need to initiate a global debate about paying a minimum wage everywhere in the world. A minimum wage like it’s calculated in the EU — always 60 percent of the median wage. And Germany would then impose special tariffs on countries that fail to pay the minimum wage. You would have to push that kind of legislation through in the face of some fierce economic interests, but I believe it’s possible. Or take Lula, Brazil’s left-wing president, who is now introducing a global wealth tax. Of course, it’s far too low, but the fact that there’s even a debate about it at all is a good thing.
That would basically be capitalism restricted by ethics.
We’re still committed to the goal of abolishing capitalism. But even if we as the Left were to appoint the next chancellor, we wouldn’t manage to abolish capitalism tomorrow. However, there are many things we could do to initiate a trend reversal in favour of a different kind of economy that is no longer so dominated by capitalism: we could bolster international standards, curb how much power the wealthy have. But I think it’s unrealistic to expect to be able to achieve this on a global scale in just four years. The first step is to transition from violent to peaceful international relations.
Translated by Diego Otero and Louise Pain for Gegensatz Translation Collective.