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Dubbed the “Twelve-Day War” by US President Donald Trump, a term subsequently adopted by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian in his victory statement, the recent Iranian-Israeli air war marked a pivotal geopolitical moment. However, that moment was measured not in terms of the blows exchanged, but in the transformations it triggered, which continue to reshape the security doctrines of both parties. After decades of adherence to cautious and indirect rules of engagement characterized by a kind of “shadow war”, the veritable Iron Curtain of traditional deterrence collapsed, pushing Tehran and Tel Aviv onto a collision course set to redefine fundamental concepts of national security and survival.
Ramez Salah is an independent researcher based in Egypt.
The collision course reached its climax in the early hours of 22 June 2025, nine days after the Israeli bombings marking the outset of the war, when the United States officially joined the Israeli campaign against Iran with direct air strikes targeting three major nuclear facilities: Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. This dual campaign was not of a mere military nature — it has fostered a state of unstable deterrence in the Middle East and begun to reshape the rules that governed the relationship between the two regional powers for decades.
To understand the transformation currently under way, we must return to the theory of deterrence in international relations, or more specifically, the question of how one geopolitical actor can prevent another from taking aggressive actions by convincing them that the costs will outweigh any potential gains. Traditional deterrence models rely on a set of assumptions, most notably actors’ fundamental rationality, their uniformity within the nation-state structure, the clarity of diplomatic signals and red lines, as well as actors’ ability to verify the source of a threat and link a response directly to it. The Israeli-US campaign against Iran revealed the limits of these assumptions, and now pushes us to develop more complex deterrence equations that transcend classical models.
Israel’s Evolving Security Doctrine
Since its founding in 1948, Israel’s security doctrine has been based on the concept of “Absolute Deterrence”. This doctrine was rooted in a firm belief in military superiority, allowing Israel to maintain “strategic immunity” by transferring the theatre of conflict to enemy territory. Although this doctrine had been under strain for some time, its collapse began in practice on 7 October 2023, when Hamas succeeded in breaching Israeli defences and suddenly posed an unprecedented direct threat. It marked the “most prominent crack” in Israel’s immunity, later deepened by Iranian attacks that turned a confrontation with an irregular armed faction into a conflict with a regional power. Therefore, Prime Minister Netanyahu’s warning of “difficult days” was not just mobilization rhetoric but an acknowledgment, albeit implicit, that Israel was now prepared to bear unprecedented losses. This acceptance of harm stems not from weakness, but is the result of a calculated desire to absorb such costs in pursuit of strategic gains, all within a broader vision of a new Middle East in which Israel is the dominant power.
This is no mere a tactical adjustment — it represents a sharp, almost revolutionary shift at the core of Israeli strategic thinking and the state’s security orientation. For many decades, Israeli national security was shaped by the “Begin Doctrine”, a framework built on two pillars: eliminating existential threats in their early stages through decisive pre-emption, and ensuring near-absolute immunity from attacks on the home front. What we are witnessing now is the emergence of a doctrine that deliberately embraces domestic costs as a strategic tool. Bearing a disturbing resemblance to some aspects of coercive deterrence theory, which views the intentional use of risk or accepted damage as a means to compel an opponent or radically change their behaviour, Israel’s emerging doctrine views open warfare not just as an avoidable consequence but as a viable path to achieve goals far beyond preventing direct threats. The principle of Israeli immunity, once inviolable, is no longer sacred — instead, it has become a strategically vulnerable component that can be sacrificed to push the adversary to the brink. This unfolds within a broader strategic context in which the rules of deterrence are being redrawn by direct challenges and the shared burden of confrontation costs.
Direct US participation grants Israel strategic depth that it did not possess and allows it to adopt a doctrine of coercive absorption and calculated risk, aware that a superpower not only stands as the ultimate guarantor of Israel’s safety but actively participates in the fighting and bears part of the confrontation’s cost should things spiral out of control.
Such a radical doctrinal shift cannot be separated from Israel’s complex domestic political context. The transition to a more adventurous doctrine that accepts exposing the home front to threats comes at a time of existential challenges for the government. The decision to enter into a confrontation of this magnitude and to endure “difficult days” can also be interpreted as a bid to reunify the divided home front, postpone political crises, and solidify the current leadership’s image as an impenetrable fortress. Netanyahu’s gambit relies on the logic that wartime does not permit trials, protests, or even calls for elections. Since 7 October, this situation has perpetuated a continuous state of emergency, through which he has secured exceptional powers to delay political accountability and curb oversight, thereby strengthening his position and making it difficult to remove him from power.
Moreover, none of this would be possible without direct US participation. The explicit threats made by Donald Trump, going so far as to demand Iran’s “unconditional surrender” and hint that he “might order strikes” against it, not only indicate political support but fundamentally alters Israel’s risk calculations. It grants Israel strategic depth that it did not possess and allows it to adopt a doctrine of coercive absorption and calculated risk, aware that a superpower not only stands as the ultimate guarantor of Israel’s safety but actively participates in the fighting and bears part of the confrontation’s cost should things spiral out of control.
Iran’s Doctrine under Stress
If we can see how Israel’s security doctrine has shifted in response to external shocks, how did “the other side” respond? More specifically, how did Tehran reformulate its doctrine? The answer to these two questions points to parallel transformations in Iranian deterrence strategy.
Iran’s so-called “resistance” doctrine is undergoing a violent stress test. For decades, it was based on the idea of “strategic patience” — avoiding direct wars and relying on a network of regional actors to fight proxy wars, while responding to Israeli strikes in a measured and limited manner. This cautious approach was clearly demonstrated in the “limited effectiveness” responses to the targeting of the Iranian consulate in Syria in April 2024, or in response to the assassination of Hezbollah leaders in October of that same year. Tehran wagered that time was on its side, and that avoiding direct confrontation would allow it to work on its nuclear program until it achieved deterrence.
But the sheer scale of the Israeli attack and the unprecedented escalation of the situation with the US joining the attack days later made this patience look like weakness. Iran’s limited response no longer achieved deterrence, but instead encouraged further aggression that could have led to the collapse of the system itself. As a result, the doctrine of strategic patience has become synonymous with political and strategic suicide.
A qualitative shift in Iran’s military doctrine is now emerging, necessitated by new deterrence equations. Iran is implementing what is known as “mutual targeting”, meaning its cities, critical infrastructure, and decision-making centres are now vulnerable to direct strikes in exchange for its ability to target the Israeli interior. It also moved from a policy of almost exclusive reliance on regional proxies to direct engagement, activating its own military capabilities. This was clearly evident in the missile attack on the Al-Udeid US air base in Qatar on 23 June. While Iran issued a prior warning to Qatar — a move interpreted as a tactical effort to manage escalation and minimize casualties — the strike itself marked a major strategic shift: from using the “Axis of Resistance” as an indirect pressure tool to a doctrine in which “comprehensive confrontation” is viewed as an option should the regime face an existential threat. It signals Iran’s readiness to assume greater risks and engage in conflict more directly. Indeed, Ali El Din Hilal, a leading international relations expert, argues that the failure of the upcoming Oslo talks, or a breach of the current ceasefire, could directly lead to “a scenario of full military escalation, and possibly a regional war”.
In light of this situation, Iran may resort to targeting military installations or bases within certain Gulf states in parallel with shutting down the Strait of Hormuz, in an attempt to pressure them into urging Washington to halt the war — despite the great political, military, and economic costs. Hence, Iran’s readiness to bear unprecedented human and material costs reflects a desire to prove that its ability to inflict pain on Israel is no longer hypothetical, but real — pushing the region towards uncontrollable chaos. This introduces a new deterrence equation based on “mutual attrition”, where deterrence does not aim to prevent war outright, but rather to create an implicit acceptance of shared costs, rendering the continuation of conflict exhausting, expensive, and potentially unsustainable for both sides.
Unable to match Israel’s technological superiority, Iran focused on developing “counter-deterrence technology” to neutralize and disrupt it instead. Its missile attacks adhere to a so-called saturation strategy, meaning massive numbers of missiles and drones launched from multiple axes to overwhelm and confuse Israeli defence systems. Some of these strikes reached critical targets despite the high interception rate, reflecting the tactic’s effectiveness. This coincided with the imposition of an almost complete internet shutdown to “close the digital domain” to Israeli cyberattacks, as well as deep fake videos to confuse public opinion within Israel.
Israel is moving from pre-emptive deterrence and absolute immunity to a doctrine of calculated risk and damage absorption, while Iran is forced to abandon strategic patience and deterrence by proxy in favour of direct confrontation and sovereign deterrence.
Iran’s offensive shift is symptomatic of a deeper transition on the part of the Mullahs, from practicing “deterrence through the region” to adopting “sovereign direct deterrence” as a fundamental pillar of its defence doctrine. Previously, Iran’s deterrent power was primarily based on its ability to threaten the interests of Israel or its regional adversaries through a network of proxies deployed in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Now, Iran is incorporating its direct sovereign power — represented by its precise missile arsenal, drones, and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz — into the core of the deterrence equation.
This change recharacterizes the Iranian regime’s behaviour: it no longer acts like a transnational revolutionary power with expansionist ambitions, but has begun to act as a functioning nation-state defending its regional sovereignty using traditional means. The danger of this transformation lies in its long-term strategic implications, as Tehran’s reliance on direct sovereign deterrence may reshape its patterns of interaction with neighbouring countries, changing deterrence and threat calculations in the region and, perhaps at the same time, influencing how international powers read Iran’s position in the region should a durable ceasefire be reached.
Rethinking Deterrence
The current geopolitical divergence is not limited to the transformations in Israeli and Iranian deterrence doctrines themselves, but extend to other countries’ approaches to dealing with Iran, as well.
Israel bases its strategy on the conviction that the logic of classical deterrence, intended to prevent states from crossing red lines for fear of retaliation, does not apply to the Iranian case. While some argue that the threat of force is sufficient to contain adversaries, Israel believes that Iran is driven by ideological and strategic motives that make it impervious to deterrence. Consequently, Israel prefers a preventive, or rather offensive approach to quash the threat in its infancy, believing that waiting until Iran reaches the nuclear threshold would be an existential gamble.
In contrast, several Arab countries adopt a more cautious perspective, stemming from their awareness of the risks of Iran’s uncontrolled collapse and the potential for cross-border fighting and chaos. According to them, Iran alone is not the source of the threat, but also its incoherent network of proxies, which may become uncontrollable should the regime collapse. Here emerges a different type of deterrence, which could be termed “pre-emptive deterrence of chaos”. These fears are exacerbated by the multi-ethnic nature of the Iranian state encompassing Persians, Azeri, Kurds, Arabs, and Baloch, and the potential for civil war and mass displacement. Such displacement, with its humanitarian, security, and economic repercussions, could arguably prove just as if not more impactful than the destruction of Iran’s uranium-enriched nuclear facilities.
Thus, the recent clash represents not just a round of military escalation, but an ongoing “ideological shock” forcing both parties to dismantle the pillars of their traditional deterrence. Israel is moving from pre-emptive deterrence and absolute immunity to a doctrine of calculated risk and damage absorption, while Iran is forced to abandon strategic patience and deterrence by proxy in favour of direct confrontation and sovereign deterrence. The dangerous irony is that, in their fervent pursuit to impose new deterrence equations, they are jointly establishing a regional system based on “unstable deterrence”, where open confrontation remains a viable option and the threat of imminent war becomes the new normal.
This scenario portends more fighting that could expand to include international actors, especially now that Washington has violated the taboo against direct participation. Moreover, it indicates that the region is entering a complex phase of strategic uncertainty, in which miscalculations may prove far more devastating than deliberate strikes, amidst a growing acknowledgment among all parties that prospects for a durable settlement in the region are slim. Against this backdrop, we must think more fundamentally about redefining deterrence itself — not as a restoration of states’ capacity to inflict harm and impose chaos, but as a tool to regulate stability between them.
