Export-oriented Slovakia is in the midst of a deep crisis. In particular, its most important economic sector, the automotive industry, is causing problems. The Volkswagen, Peugeot, Jaguar, and Kia corporations all have vehicle production sites in this country of 5.5 million people, but the upheaval caused by Chinese competition, declining sales in the US, and the Trump administration’s tariff policies have placed significant pressure on car production. The consequences of this crisis are so serious that they are jeopardizing the future of what is known as the Slovakian model.
Joanna Gwiazdecka runs the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation’s Prague Office.
In the shadow of the crisis in this key industry, Slovakia has transformed into one of the leading arms producers in the EU. In the past year alone, the Slovakian arms industry has sold 1.15 billion euro worth of weapons.
Arms manufacturing sites were already being established while the country was still part of Czechoslovakia, producing munitions, military technology, and military vehicles. In recent years, these have been thoroughly modernized, making them increasingly independent of external supplies from countries like China or Türkiye.
For that reason, Slovakian arms producers have been following the “ReArm Europe” project with great interest. In March of this year, the “ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030” plan proposed by the European Commission envisioned a massive expansion of the European arms industry, which will be used to further increase the trade in weapons. Moreover, Bratislava is hoping to see growth in its arms sales in the wake of the most recent NATO decision to increase defence spending to 5 percent of GDP.
Nonetheless, the country may find it difficult to offset the losses it has suffered in the automotive industry by increasing arms production. Moreover, the government has yet to present a plan for fundamental economic reforms. Instead, it seems to have committed itself to just muddling through. In the past year, the budget deficit has reached 5.3 percent of Slovakia’s GDP — the Eurozone only permits a maximum of 3 percent. The government’s response has been contradictory: on the one hand, it has passed financial consolidation measures, while increasing some taxes and social insurance contributions and cutting holidays; on the other, it also passed an energy subsidies bill and a thirteenth monthly pension payment for retirees.
Horseshoe Government
This inconsistency is also the outcome of an idiosyncratic ruling coalition, which forms a kind of “horseshoe”. It consists of Direction – Social Democracy (SMER), the party led by Prime Minister Robert Fico, which has 41 representatives in parliament, Voice – Social Democracy (HLAS), which split off from SMER in 2020 and has 26 representatives including Peter Pellegrini, who was elected president last year, and the small right-wing nationalist Slovak National Party (SNS), which has eight representatives. This heterogeneous coalition is held together by the Prime Minister, whose party is a member of the Socialist International, but which behaves like a national-populist party and advocates socially conservative policies.
This is already Fico’s fourth term in office, having previously led various coalitions from 2006 to 2010 and from 2012 to 2018. His return as head of state surprised many observers given that he had been driven out of office in disgrace in 2018. His forced resignation was the result of mass protests over the murder of journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée Martina Kusnirova. Kuciak had been investigating the close connections between the worlds of politics and organized crime.
While Fico is verbally advocating for a turn towards Moscow, his country remains well integrated into the structures of the EU and NATO for the time being.
Fico has been “obsessed with revenge” since then, says Peter Bárdy, editor-in-chief of the online news outlet Aktuality (which also happens to be the name of his current bestseller about the Slovakian prime minister). Aktuality recently exposed a scandal about a luxury villa on Croatia’s Adriatic coast that allegedly belongs to Fico via a convoluted chain of ownership that would also suggest another case of large-scale corruption.
Fico sees himself as a victim surrounded by enemies on all sides. In the time since he narrowly survived an assassination attempt in May 2024, his actions have in fact bordered on obsessive: his political opponents, the independent news media, liberalism, “LGBTQ ideologues”, and the EU have all ostensibly been conspiring against him.
Looking Eastward
This litany of adversaries corresponds to Fico’s overtures to Moscow. Similar to Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Fico advocates a pro-Russian line. Even during his election campaign, he said that under his leadership, Slovakia would send “not one round of ammunition” to Ukraine and promised to foster better relations with Moscow. SMER party leader Andrej Danko’s pro-Russian statements go even further — which may be due to the fact that the smallest partner in the ruling coalition, the SNS, is driving the coalition due to its poor polling numbers.
Acting SMER chairman Luboš Blaha, who is among Fico’s closest advisors, is particularly pointed when he talks about this turn toward the East. His statements paint a clear picture of the West as the source of all problems: it is evil and is forever pushing for war and nationalism. By contrast, he has a positive view of the East, which he believes is governed by principles like peace and freedom.
The prime minister is backing up this ideological change of course in Slovakia’s foreign policy with concrete action. In May of this year, he was the only EU head of state to travel to Moscow to commemorate the end of World War II. Fico himself described his trip as a great success. He wrote that it earned “diplomatic recognition for Slovakia at the highest international level” and confirmed that “Slovakia can stand on its own two feet, represent its own views, and respect its own traditions and historical truth”. Unsurprisingly, this optimistic assessment met with opposition from Slovakia’s EU partners.
The conflict in the discussions over the EU’s eighteenth sanctions package against the Russian Federation came to a head in June. One motivating factor here was the fact that Slovakia’s energy supply remains highly dependent on gas deliveries from the Russian corporation Gazprom. Fico only agreed to the package after the EU assured Slovakia that a portion of the bloc’s financial support could be put toward energy subsidies and that it would help the country in the event of possible legal issues with Gazprom.
The prime minister went a step further in June. In light of NATO’s stated goal of spending five percent of GDP on defence, he openly speculated about the possibility that Slovakia might leave the alliance, saying that “neutrality would suit Slovakia very well”. President Pellegrini, the leader of the third coalition partner, HLAS, immediately contradicted Fico’s statement, which was primarily directed at SMER and SNS voters, saying that “our neutrality would cost us much more than our membership in NATO”.
“A Dam Holding Back Progressivism”
But while Fico, who is looking to close ranks with Orbán, is verbally advocating for a turn towards Moscow, his country remains well integrated into the structures of the EU and NATO for the time being. On the other hand, the prime minister has significantly more leeway in his attempt to reorganize the state along authoritarian lines.
After visiting Uzbekistan in June, he lauded the country’s model of government and criticized “European democracy” as inefficient. He intends to reconfigure the Slovakian political system and, for instance, limit the number of parties in parliament by putting up obstacles to keep some out. The reasoning behind this is simple: the fewer parties are in parliament, the higher the likelihood that his SMER will be in charge of the government again after the next election. The fact that this would require a constitutional amendment will certainly make this plan more difficult to carry out, but the opposition is nonetheless alarmed.
One thing that is certain is that Fico’s rhetoric — and, more importantly, his political praxis — has intensified significantly since his previous terms in office.
Along with constitutional amendments, Fico is also seeking to build a “dam against progressivism” this year — which emphatically confirms that the common “left-wing populist” label is at odds with the facts when it comes to Orbán’s friend. For instance, he plans to ban all genders other than male and female and to change adoption laws. Given that the opposition parties have likewise proposed constitutional changes, it remains to be seen what the National Council will decide.
What’s more, Fico has been a longstanding critic of non-governmental organizations, whose work he would ideally like to restrict in keeping with the model of the Russian law on “foreign agents”. His public rejection of independent journalists, who he has quite openly described as “idiots”, also fits this mould. Two years ago, a law was passed that would enable the government to exercise stricter control over public media. Fico’s latest idea is to introduce a special journalists’ association that would monitor journalistic training.
However, the constitutional change that has the potential to be the most consequential concerns his goal of prioritizing Slovakian law over European law. If that amendment passes, then Slovakian citizens will no longer be able to turn, for instance, to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg or other European authorities — which would be a massive advantage for a potential anti-democratic reorganization of the state. Nonetheless, it is uncertain whether the government will actually take this step, which could end up costing Slovakia its membership in the EU.
Finally, Fico also plans to change the penal code and abolish the special prosecutor’s office, which deals with high-level corruption crimes — including in Fico’s personal entourage. He has given the job of enacting the penal reform to, of all people, former police superintendent Tibor Gaspar, who was also forced to resign in 2018. Opposition leader Michael Šimečka of Progressive Slovakia (PS) has called this a “frontal assault on the rule of law”.
One thing that is certain is that Fico’s rhetoric — and, more importantly, his political praxis — has intensified significantly since his previous terms in office. Slovakia is in for an extremely unpleasant autumn.
This article first appeared in nd in collaboration with the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation. Translated by Joseph Keady and Louise Pain for Gegensatz Translation Collective.