Social Anti-Fascism against Neoliberal Fascization

Capitalism is changing before our eyes. In late neoliberalism, a period marked by instability and permanent crisis, political developments threaten to shatter the mould of liberal democracy.[1] The rise of right-wing nationalism across the West has put an end to what Nancy Fraser called “progressive neoliberalism”. The liberal project of “green capitalism” has run its course, with ecological modernization failing to stimulate growth. What we have instead is a “blocked transformation”.

In the United States, Italy, and Argentina, new syntheses of authoritarian neoliberalism and fascism are emerging. These examples do not simply represent the return of historical fascism. Instead, what we are seeing is a transnational laboratory of authoritarian, anti-democratic state-building projects. In the face of multiple crises, parts of the neoliberal power bloc are seeking to build a restaurative und reactionary social order and state. This is a process of “experimentation”, the outcome of which in terms of which old/new forms of domination will emerge (in different states and regions) remains undetermined. Neo-fascist forces are a minor part of this constellation (for the moment), but they represent a growing threat. We must grasp this new reality. The crux of “fascization” is that we are not (yet) dealing with open fascism. The terms “incipient fascism” and (late-stage neoliberal) “fascization” describe the grey area between “no longer liberal-democratic” and “not yet fascist”.

At the same time, Die Linke’s stunning comeback in the last German election, unexpected as it was, has revived hope in the country. Social polarization is still possible. The Left must prepare and reorient. The next ten to 15 years will be crucial — an alliance of authoritarian-neoliberal and neo-fascist forces currently poses the biggest threat. Our choice is stark: either we succeed in building an alternative power base and forming alliances for a popular-democratic and socio-ecological project in order to win a break with authoritarian neoliberalism and a left-wing, anti-fascist government, or we face — sooner or later — the threat of a new fascism.

The Last Grand Coalition?

Disruption driven by parts of the power bloc is a central aspect of the crises of late-stage neoliberalism. A strategic convergence of right-wing nationalist and authoritarian neoliberal forces is underway in the US, the EU, and Latin America. Bridging ideological differences, they are bent on assaulting the vestiges of the welfare state, sections of government, and the public sector, attacking trade unions and environmental organizations, and suppressing Social Democracy, civil society, and the Left. This “creative destruction” of parts of state and society is supposed to generate “innovation” and a fundamental rejuvenation of capitalism. In practice (and most importantly), it provides new opportunities for elites to enrich themselves. Examples of this paradigm are Milei’s “chainsaw” cuts in Argentina and DOGE’s “shock and awe” assault on US government agencies. In Germany, this current is represented by the forces surrounding the “Merz Project”, as well as the Free Democratic Party (FDP), the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), and pundits like Ulf Poschardt. Significant segments of conservative society are watching keenly to see how far they can go without (completely) abandoning the liberal form of government.

The forces of neoliberal disruption are looking for conservative bourgeois “moderate majorities” without the Social Democratic Party (SPD) or the Greens — essentially a “black-and-blue” coalition consisting of the conservative Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the AfD (or black-blue-yellow, including the FDP). In the last years the right wing of the CDU/CSU more and more adapted to this idea. Before the federal election, Germany had already reached a tipping point in terms of the convergence of neoliberals and the Right.

Just a few weeks into the grand coalition between the CDU and SPD, it looks like that alliance may be no more than an intermezzo on the road to a deeper political crisis. Friedrich Merz will not able to keep his central promise (“This country should function again”) with his proposed policies, and SPD voters are going to be especially disappointed. Instead, we will see a continuation of the familiar dynamic of increasingly radical authoritarian pseudo-solutions to the migration issue. This will take us further down the previous coalition’s path of “imperial crisis liberalism” — but with even more militarization, more public spending cuts, more isolationism and “homeland security”, and less climate action. This is no way to build a new consensus. The government is already massively bleeding support. Not resolving the social crisis at the same time, this will probably be the last classic CDU-SPD grand coalition. Instead, it looks set to catalyse authoritarian developments.

A late-stage neoliberal offensive that some factions of export capital had been hoping for, on the other hand, has so far been pushed onto the government’s agenda only in weakened form. This has drawn massive criticism from employers and parts of the CDU. Merz’s decision to abandon Wolfgang Schäuble’s taboo on state borrowing has drawn particular ire from those quarters, as he lifts the “debt brake” to permit massive military spending, as well as infrastructure investment and corporate subsidies. Contrary to the demands of the CDU and the Confederation of German Employers’ Associations (BDA), there will be no cap on social spending either. This puts Merz partly at odds with the disruption faction.

While segments of the ruling bloc are hoping for political stability and prioritizing support for European industry and rearmament — despite being unhappy with parts of the coalition agreement — other parts are still eyeing options for a Milei-style shock-and-awe strategy.

At the same time, the disruptors are still working to exert pressure on the SPD in government, with new forays almost daily from the business lobby and the Christian Democrats. Under Lars Klingbeil, the SPD is positioning itself as a “constructive” participant in a new neoliberal political agenda. It is not very likely that the SPD group in the Bundestag will put up resistance against attacks on the working week, pensions, and healthcare, as well as cuts to social infrastructure. More likely they will slow down the neoliberal offensive a bit or block, for example, a later retirement age in return for accepting cuts in health care. It is possible that the SPD will again “succeed” in actively involving itself in a new phase of neoliberal social restructuring and will thus still be considered necessary by parts of the export capital faction (at least for now).

While segments of the ruling bloc are hoping for political stability and prioritizing support for European industry and rearmament — despite being unhappy with parts of the coalition agreement — other parts are still eyeing options for a Milei-style shock-and-awe strategy. What we are seeing is a convergence between authoritarian neoliberal business forces, the right-wing neoliberal currents in the Christian Democrats, and the AfD, although there are (still) political obstacles on their path to national power. The political crisis continues to simmer. The CDU could be losing its role as the obvious governing party for the neoliberal bloc. The AfD can try to fill that gap, although they may be met with resistance by some export capital factions.

In the meantime, the “firewall” (a common trope in German public discourse and popular consciousness) against AfD participation in government has become increasingly flimsy. Yet after Germany’s domestic intelligence agency classified the AfD as “confirmed right-wing extremist”, the idea of CDU-AfD coalitions in the eastern states seems even less likely. The more or less explicit criticism from the ranks of the CDU/CSU also evinces a deeper contradiction within the power bloc in relation to the AfD. The offensive that the right wing of the CDU/CSU has in mind cannot be fully realized in a coalition with the SPD (or the Greens). On the other hand, an appreciable minority within the CDU/CSU rejects the direction Merz is taking and wants a Christian Democratic political direction that clearly opposes cooperation with the AfD.

A lot will depend on whether and how quickly the export model’s structural crisis develops into a broader economic crisis. This would inevitably heighten contradictions within the grand coalition, and could create a window of opportunity for the “disruption faction”. There is a danger of the AfD leveraging crisis-related grievances and channelling them into racism and transphobia. The grand coalition may prove to be a transitional stage, with its broken promises preparing the way for a governing coalition that includes the AfD. Germany is heading into political crisis by 2029 at the latest, perhaps even earlier. In the next federal election a black-blue(-yellow) coalition (CDU-AfD with or without the FDP) is one likely outcome. Also possible is that the liberal forces will succeed in mounting one last stand of the “democratic centre” with the participation of the Greens. With the ongoing crisis of hegemony and political crisis of imperial crisis liberalism, the turn to a right-wing CDU-AfD government seems only a question of time, also depending on the developments in the US, France, and other EU members like Austria, Poland, and Italy. History is an open process, and we have to try to build on the emerging contradictions to build a real alternative to the transnational right-wing laboratory.

Towards a Social Anti-Fascism

The massive protests against Merz’s flirtation with the AfD generated momentum within society. Without this, Die Linke would probably not have returned to the Bundestag, and certainly not with an increase in its share of the vote. Without a doubt, many different pieces came together — that said, the primary factor in the party’s great success was not its focus on inflation and housing costs, but rather that it benefitted from an emerging current of social anti-fascism. The party succeeded in responding to the hopes and expectations of many people who fear the growth of the authoritarian right and oppose Merz’s harsh neoliberal policies and race-baiting against refugees. This was attributable to quick action and a clear, credible position. Heidi Reichinnek, the young and popular leader of Die Linke in parliament, delivered a “we are the firewall” speech in the Bundestag that went viral and signified open opposition to Merz’ manoeuvre to further restrict migration policies with the votes of the AfD’s parliamentary group. Additionally, active participation in the following mass protests against fascism and an excellent social media campaign paved the way for Die Linke’s successful election result.

The obvious alliance between the neo-fascist MAGA movement and Elon Musk and other tech oligarchs in the US, as well as Musk’s public support for the AfD, played a part in helping more and more people to recognize that neoliberalism and society’s rightward shift are “somehow” connected and to feel a need to “do something”. This shift on a heterogeneous base has yet to be constituted into an active and politically effective force. That will be the task of Die Linke and the broader Left over the coming years. It will be anything but easy — any hope anchored primarily in the opinion polls is by definition fragile.

The short-termism of party politics, which extends to a single legislative period at most, must be overcome. The conjunctions of authoritarian neoliberalism, imperial confrontation, and worsening climate crisis with tendencies toward fascization will shape the coming decade in ways we cannot predict. Where can we find hope that will endure beyond the next election? Could social anti-fascism offer opportunities for an offensive defensive strategy? The first step is to be clear about what it would mean to challenge authoritarian dynamics. Neoliberal fascization can only be stopped through a democratic break with financial market capitalism.

The need to combat authoritarian neoliberalism and fascization must not lead the Left to reduce its political vision to a mere (de facto) defence of existing realities.

As long as the crisis of organized class politics has not been resolved, all left-wing politics will face a dilemma. Late-stage neoliberalism narrows the scope for reforms, even milquetoast social-democratic initiatives. Preventing further deterioration will require massive social movements and strikes. Experience with various left-wing governments has taught us that breaking with neoliberal financial market capitalism cannot succeed without a popular counterforce and a new, radical democratic organized form of unifying left-wing party. Hope for change from a government that will do something “for us” can quickly turn into disappointment.

This practical deficit of social-democratic reformism is one that the Left repeatedly stumbles over. Conversely, the last few decades have demonstrated the potential and limits of left-wing populist momentum. Whether we look at Sanders, Corbyn, La France insoumise, or Syriza, the promise of a government prepared to defend the interests of the majority of wage earners against the neoliberal elite generated widespread hope and even excitement. At the same time, the limited vision of left-populist politics falls short. The promise of representing and realizing the interests of wage earners by way of electing left-wing parties is not working and not enough for a sustainable break with the structures of authoritarian neoliberalism and its economic, political, and ideological dynamics of fascization. In other words, as a medium-term strategy, it is a dead end, in part because this vision of building power and democracy is limited to elections — the question of how to bring about a “radical transformation” of the neoliberal state (nationally and transnationally) and create a new international bloc is not even posed.

Yet the crisis dialectic goes even further. We have to prevent the ideological vacuum created by neoliberalism’s late-stage crisis being filled by the neo-fascist right. In the long run, the ruling class’s leadership crisis could offer fertile ground for socialist alternatives. If social struggles, class power, or even left-wing projects on a national scale were seriously placed on the agenda, however, the danger of a “preventive” neo-fascist counter-revolution would also increase. In the short and medium terms, there is urgent need for (offensive) defence strategies against authoritarian shifts. Conversely, an “alliance of all democrats” to defend the status quo against the Right can only be a dead end. It offers no escape from authoritarian neoliberal dynamics, and the forces of the liberal and neoliberal centre will erode and shift right.

The need to combat authoritarian neoliberalism and fascization must not lead the Left to reduce its political vision to a mere (de facto) defence of existing realities. At the same time, alliances are necessary in order to defend and expand democracy. A left-populism that is limited to electoral politics will fall short in the struggle against neoliberal fascization.

Social anti-fascism as offensive defence must address these contradictions, deeply reconnecting the issues of democracy to those of class, and must do so in more than an exclusively left-populist manner. Die Linke and the broader Left need to prepare collectively — as they have not yet done — to face a worsening crisis, and to develop a popular-democratic project.

Democracy and Class: Towards a Popular-Democratic Left

What does “popular-democratic” mean? For the Black British Marxist Stuart Hall, popular-democratic struggle meant a “deep process of democratisation”, whose goal was a new “egalitarian, more open, more diverse, more libertarian”, and radically democratic socialism. Hall argued for a left realignment against the racist, authoritarian populism of Margaret Thatcher, which was part and parcel of the imposition of the neoliberal state project the United Kingdom.

At the end of the 1980s, Hall also understood popular-democratic to include “the ‘socialisation’ of feminism” as well as “the ‘feminisation’ of the Left” — in other words, the development of a socialist and anti-racist feminism applicable to all social, economic, and democratic issues, aiming to rejuvenate the lifestyle of the working class and form a “popular bloc, a practical material force” against conservative, patriarchal, and racist “elements in popular morality”. Hall was building here on Gramsci’s understanding of hegemony: socialist hegemony requires emancipatory, anti-racist, and feminist class perspectives to be connected with struggles for radical democratization. Reviving and adapting this kind of leftist realignment is all the more urgent today. In contemporary terms: beyond simply defending democracy, social anti-fascism, intersectional (!) class politics, and a yet-to-be-developed ecological socialist perspective form the triangle for a politics of hegemony today.

A popular-democratic strategy of social anti-fascism centres the issue of democracy from the perspective of class and emancipatory struggle. Only with a vision of “true democracy” and associated everyday transformational processes can the neoliberal crisis of democracy be overcome. Combatting the Right’s reactionary “anti-elitism” requires intensified class conflict, work to embed and build power in everyday life (in workplaces, neighbourhoods, schools, universities, clubs, and societies, and in the cultural sector), and a vision for democratizing all areas of society. Here one decisive weakness of the current Left and Die Linke can be found. The task before us is to revive the promise of democracy from the vantage point of labour, on the basis of the experiences and needs of waged workers. Reviving it as real power to make collective decisions about the role of work in society and the uses of wealth in a period of lower intensity of class struggle is a challenge, addressing it requires more than the important (and, since 2024, mass-scale) door-knocking.

Popular-democratic politics also aims to transform our everyday lives, the ways in which we live, think, and feel.

Understanding social anti-fascism from a popular-democratic perspective also means thinking differently about which alliances we need. Queer feminist movements across the world are standing up against neoliberal policies, authoritarian shifts to the right, militarization, occupation, and war. Alongside unions and the climate movement, they are central to advancing international social anti-fascism and contemporary anti-imperialism.

In the coming years, the Left will need to adopt a clear, proactive stance in the “class/culture- wars” (rather than remaining reactive or avoidant). It will need to advance its own version of polarization: for solidarity with migrants, for democratization of state infrastructures to strengthen solidarity against racism, sexism, homophobia, and transphobia, for better social infrastructure, better recognition of care work, and against domestic violence, for bodily autonomy and self-determination with regards to sex and gender, for inclusion as a way to overcome ableist social structures, for radical democratization, and so on. Developing this kind of counter-polarization with intersectional class perspectives will be a learning process for the Left, as well as for anti-racist, queer, and feminist movements and initiatives.

Only through opposition to neoliberal authoritarian policies can a social base begin to take shape in the first place. To take up Étienne Balibar’s observations on a “new popular front”, we are talking about a political and cultural practice of counter-polarization: Merz’s government (especially the CDU/CSU) and the AfD vs. a left alternative that addresses, understands, and connects democracy, social crises, and the role of work in society. As Balibar writes, we are talking about completely different conceptions of work, the people, the nation and Europe, community, and democracy: “People against people, nation against nation, community against community. And, in the present situation: ‘front’ against ‘front’. The ‘people’ in the popular front are not a given; one might even say that, in a way, the ‘people’ as such does not exist, is still taking shape.”

One decisive point here is that social anti-fascism cannot succeed through an appeal to “pure” class antagonism (workers vs. capital). As a social, political, and cultural practice, it transcends the occupational logic of class and the representational logic of the Social Democrats, moving beyond the representation of interests through party politics. It is about collective empowerment, about a political and cultural transformation of everyday life and of the worldview of the lower and middle classes, about bridging contradictions and (cultural) differences. As the Left, we will therefore inevitably be bringing our perspectives into spaces not yet shaped by leftist politics. That entails learning to “translate” and adapt them, creating points of contact and forging connections with social-democratic, liberal, and conservative/Christian circles. This is the only way to widen the base of social anti-fascism and build a social bloc.

Popular-democratic politics also aims to transform our everyday lives, the ways in which we live, think, and feel. Its goal is to shape the “dormant” or perhaps already resistant desire for liberation into what Antonio Gramsci would have called a politically effective “spirit of division”. For many people, the growing strength of the radical Right — and government inaction on the climate crisis — are experienced as feelings of powerlessness. Popular-democratic anti-fascism must therefore strive to engender a comprehensive cultural practice of “militant hope” and solidarity, of care for one another.

A majority of the German population no longer trusts the mainstream parties to tackle current social problems or address future threats.

Hope requires this kind of grounded perspective on change. Gramsci used the concept of “myth” to this effect, myth having the power to generate collective belief in the face of humiliation, crisis, fatalism, and feelings of powerlessness. Hope becomes “militant hope” when experiences of collective struggle, solidarity, and empowerment meld into a “concrete utopia”, the notion of an emancipatory, socialist shift. This does not happen automatically. It requires political organization and a culture that bolsters the “current of warmth” (Ernst Bloch), coalescing with people’s desires for belonging, solidarity, empathy, and love.

This is not about the specious hope that “things won’t get that bad” (an offshoot of the classic liberal logic of “progress”), nor is it about wishful thinking. Hopes always coexist with grief, with the acceptance of defeats, with bafflement and exhaustion. This makes it all the more important to counter neoliberal individualization — and the associated experiences of being left alone with precarity, violence, and fear — with a practice of collective care. This queer feminist understanding of care means much more than a redistribution of (unpaid) care work, aiming instead for a politics that places (differing) needs at the forefront. The ability to experience needs in differing ways is central to engendering “militant hope”. Collective survival will require social spaces that nurture practical solidarity, pleasure, and the desire for liberation from the oppressive and restrictive experiences of everyday life.

Rebuilding an Eco-Socialist, Feminist Left

A majority of the German population no longer trusts the mainstream parties to tackle current social problems or address future threats. At the same time, there is no widely accepted explanation of the crises and their causes, no recognizable vision or emancipatory answers. The “us vs. them” narrative of elites on top and working people below, which revolves around questions of distribution (living costs, fiscal policy, and social policy), shaped Die Linke’s successful election campaign. This only worked, however, because the campaign addressed a multiplicity of experiences in its messaging.

Nevertheless, a populism limited to the welfare state falls short of addressing our current crises and the rise of authoritarianism, and will not get the rejuvenated party very far. As the party rebuilds by virtue of recruiting so many new members, it should finally rid itself of the narrow slogan “For Peace and the Welfare State” and conceive itself as a force for the fundamental renewal and appropriation of democracy from below. The central issues of our time must be re-embedded in a clear ecological, feminist-socialist, and internationalist perspective, with the goal of preserving the prerequisites of human survival and securing a better life for all.

In these times of late-stage neoliberal destruction of the future, “preparing” means, more than ever, working on a concrete alternative system that addresses ongoing discussions around common-good and care economies that promote solidarity, circular economies, and socio-ecological conversion in industry, public ownership and reducing working hours, economic democracy, and elements of democratic planning. Many questions remain unresolved and are not rooted deeply enough within the party to be effectively offered to wider society as credible alternatives: How do we want to democratize democracy and overcome the competition-based neoliberal state? What does socialist democracy mean to us? How can the party address these complexities, strengthen its intellectual milieu, and promote a productive discussion process?

Preparing means developing a concrete eco-socialist, feminist project of social transformation. This kind of left state project must be more than a government programme. It must involve building power for a radical transformation of both the economy and the de-democratized neoliberal state — from within and from without. Rather than debating our programme, our energy should be put into this concrete utopia and the transformational strategy that comes with it.

The direction in which this project develops will be decided by how we resolve the structural crisis of the export model. One enormous challenge for Die Linke — on top of campaigning, communications, education, and the day-to-day grind — will be waging a successful struggle for hegemony: around the economic model, the division of labour, and the evolution of society as a whole. In other words, it will come down to answering the grand coalition with an alternative proposal for democratic, socio-environmental, and feminist economic and social policies

The neoliberal export model that the grand coalition, the AfD, and even the Greens seek to protect in their respective way is based on low wages, excessive working hours, and the devaluation of care work and social infrastructure. This goes along with unequal gender relations and structural racism, with the destructive hunger for cheap resources, and increasing resource and energy use.

Building a Progressive Bloc

It is right that Die Linke clearly emphasizes concrete social issues and works systematically to win majorities for demands like a federal rent cap. Other examples of issues where power relations could be shifted include poverty-proof pensions, healthcare funding, public transport, and a socio-ecological investment programme. Die Linke needs to offer a clear alternative to the crisis-ridden neoliberal export model. This could happen through (critically) building on and critically further developing existing concepts like the Left’s Green New Deal. This alternative must be more firmly anchored than hitherto in the party’s activities and social milieu and connected with visions for a radical democratization of the state. Having gained many new members and supporters, Die Linke is now in a better position to fulfil these requirements.

Die Linke now has a unique selling point with its convincing concepts for strengthening social infrastructure — from housing, education, and social work to health and caregiving. The party should place greater emphasis on the workplace, as the crisis fuels uncertainty and right-populist ideas resonate. Die Linke could respond with an investment programme aimed at creating a functioning and climate-neutral social economy and infrastructure — infrastructure for a better life — and thus offer an alternative to the policies of the grand coalition and the AfD. At the same time, this would represent an alternative to the spiralling militarization of economy and society that, like the grand coalition’s climate policy, leads to climate catastrophe. 

Without a realignment of the Left, we risk succumbing to resistance on the part of capital and the Right, or being thwarted by our own mistakes (as Syriza was).

The Greens’ momentum is over — it has subsided with the failure of “green capitalism” and the end of “progressive neoliberalism”. This does not mean that the Greens as a Party are over — far from it — but the attempt to build hegemony with a new liberal centrist party failed. The Greens are divided both socially and politically; their base is the university-educated middle class and certain groups of workers, while their party structure and apparatus (and parts of their social base) are firmly entrenched in the neoliberal bloc. Die Linke should work on speaking to parts of the Greens’ social base and their milieu, seeking to gain hegemony within the “progressive camp”, which exists as social tendency but not as a party bloc due to the neoliberal integration of Greens and SPD.

The Bundestag election results show that is it possible to speak to a progressive base of workers — including young migrants, union members, advocates of socially just climate action, and many who are not cis men — and parts of the middle class who used to vote Green. Cultivating a progressive bloc around Die Linke, however, can only succeed if this core base can be politically consolidated and broadened by convincing relevant parts to participate and organize.

In local government, Die Linke can pursue environmental class politics such as concepts for climate-neutral communities with cooperative, affordable housing, or mobilize the community with campaigns for expanding affordable public transport. Such efforts could have regional or even national influence. Simultaneously, the party can work on gaining a firmer foothold among workers, speaking with industrial workers, for example, about alternative industrial policies and shorter working hours, in addition to issues like the rent cap, pensions, health care, and social care, as well as reducing the tax burden. In this way, Die Linke can bridge political differences and appeal to both the employed middle classes and those who have turned away from party politics out of disappointment.

Feminist and Intersectional

Since the elections, Die Linke has been strengthened by many new and returning comrades, becoming a party of more than 120,000 members This development became possible once the party was rid of Wagenknecht’s “socially conservative” variant of authoritarian populism.

One decisive factor in its revitalization has been the media transmission of parliamentary speaker Heidi Reichinnek’s clear feminist angle, which represents an antithesis to right-wing culture wars, misogyny, anti-queerness, and racism.

Approaches built on feminist class politics — towards caring cities, the revaluation and socialization of care work, and shorter working hours, for example — have been developed in recent years within the party, in the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, and in their broader milieu. These approaches must be expanded with intersectional perspectives built on the knowledge of critical anti-racist, queer, trans, and disability movements. Intersectional feminist politics must be carried over from the margins into the core of the party. When connected to each other, these discrete, concrete intersectional class issues give rise to a perspective of radical transformation and democratization of the state and the social division of labour.

While there is no inherent contradiction between intersectional feminist policies and popular, down-to-earth policies, there is nevertheless a tension that is not easy for socialists to resolve. Emphasizing the contrast between elites and the rest of us is the right way to go. The challenge now is to advocate for inclusive solidarity — concretely and more assertively than we have so far — on issues such as demonization of the unemployed, racism and antisemitism, repression of the Gaza protests and of resistance against a genocidal war, everyday sexism in workplaces, the criminalization of sex workers, and transphobic moral panics. A feminist campaign initiated by the party base (and maybe also the movements) to demand that the organization of everyday life be shaped by feminist principles would be a great leap forward and an important contribution to the alliances required for a social anti-fascism.

For a Social Anti-Fascist Government

While a “class against class” strategy would emphasize (quite rightly) that the neoliberal wing of the ruling class is no genuine partner against authoritarianism, we cannot afford (at least for the present) to rule out pragmatic alliances that help us to defend democratic rights and the institutions of liberal democracy against attacks from the Right. Once in power, there is a real danger that the anti-democratic and fascist Right could instigate a new, qualitatively different level of authoritarian dismantling of state and society combined with full-scale repression, which would pose an existential threat to the forces of the Left, to the trade unions, and to social movements, and which would potentially endure for years. This is something we must prevent with the utmost determination.

We must therefore reconsider the relationship between left government, anti-fascism, and transformational perspectives. It makes sense to distinguish between situations of extremely defensive — including preventing the direct threat of an AfD-led government — and the perspective of a left-wing government, a social anti-fascist government. But even in the — possible case of a limited and conditional support of a minority non-AfD government by Die Linke (such as in some eastern states, where the AfD has topped 35 percent in recent polls), the party must insist on certain clear minimum conditions. Die Linke must never participate in attacks on working and living conditions, or in militarization or dismantling of democracy.

Given the state of the SPD and the Greens, a left-wing government in 2029 or earlier seems unlikely. Of course, we will fight for every social, environmental, feminist, and anti-racist reform. This may entail participating in government coalitions at the state level, from a position of strength and with clear, firm boundaries rather than abandoning principles before negotiations have even started in order to appear “acceptable” as a coalition partner. What we urgently need is a plan: a strategy and a clear message about how we can together stop the rise of the authoritarian right.

The decisive question is how to set a dynamic of mass-scale organizing in motion. A strengthened Die Linke with a popular-democratic strategy and broadened social alliances transcending single-issue campaigns will both be necessary to make this happen.

The medium-term goal must be to make Die Linke the leading force to the left of the CDU/CSU, to achieve hegemony on key social, economic, and political issues and conflicts, and to win a majority for certain key reform projects. Only at that point can the prospect of a social anti-fascist government emerge, borne by a broad civil society alliance. This would not yet constitute a full-scale break with neoliberalism, but there would be room for certain important social-ecological reforms and policies strengthening progressive civil society structures and solidarity in everyday life. This could buy time with which to build up counter-power and hegemony for a left project of rupture and radical democratization

Without a realignment of the Left, however, we risk succumbing to resistance on the part of capital and the Right, or being thwarted by our own mistakes (as Syriza was). We must therefore ensure that we communicate unequivocal red lines and clarity about our projects, while building broad alliances and organized power. The dialectic of crisis dictates, however, that we will not be able to stop the Right without preparation.

Prepare. Gather Strength. Prevent Black-and-Blue.

We must start preparing now for the foreseeable escalation against a black-blue-yellow coalition (CDU/CSU-AfD-FDP). Amidst all the challenges and work of orienting an expanding party and a new set of deputies, there is a danger of losing sight of that. Yes, building and entrenching Die Linke as a unifying and organizing party is the core of a social anti-fascist perspective. Die Linke must put all its efforts into organizing more people and acquiring the strength to block undesirable developments. The important thing is to root the party in society through organizational processes that take up and politically translate the dreams, cares, and energy of multitudes within and outside the party itself.

The challenge and contradictions we face, however, are even bigger. Confronted with neoliberal fascization at the end of a long period of decline of popular class power in Germany and other Western countries, the most promising strategy to countering the threat of a far-right government is the building of a popular front. To build a popular front is the quest for an offensive defence in the face of accelerating authoritarian transformation — by developing the necessary popular-democratic social forces in the process and trying to reach a different scale from civil society mobilization and discourse to building power. The elements of the equation of a twenty-first-century type of popular front are not all known yet, none of the elements seem to be guaranteed now, and none of the existing organizations and forces of the Left can remain the same in the process of building. The experiences of the left-wing electoral alliance New Popular Front (NFP) in France have not been promising, however. The alliance has struggled to keep the Socialist Party, which now appears to drift back to the neoliberal centre, in line with the NFP’s programme, and has had even less success in becoming a real social force and building counter-power. In any case, in Germany the NFP’s strategy cannot simply be copied. 

One of the weak points of the German Left is that a social alliance (one originating primarily from outside the political parties, in the realm of organized progressive civil society like unions, welfare organizations, and NGO) looks unrealistic at the moment. Without a shared programme and project, such an alliance would be doomed from the outset, given the role of the SPD and the Greens in implementing neoliberal and authoritarian policies. Clarity on this starting position, however, does not necessarily mitigate against a strategy that draws on and updates concrete elements of the historical united and popular fronts (connecting workplace and social mobilizations, comprehensive class politics, broad alliances, and the question of government). It is important to see the potential of a popular front arising in the dialectics of fascization in the medium term. We see a molecularly emerging third pole in society — as of yet without clear political organizational forms, but oriented towards representation by a renewed Die Linke. We, party and movement initiatives, should orient with medium-term perspective towards this.

The decisive question is how to set a dynamic of mass-scale organizing in motion. A strengthened Die Linke with a popular-democratic strategy and broadened social alliances transcending single-issue campaigns will both be necessary to make this happen. The third element that will be necessary to realign the forces in the social-democratic and left camp is a new upsurge in anti-fascist protest and strikes. We cannot wait for this to happen. We must actively prepare now and take the initiative.

In the coming years we will have to focus on preventing an CDU-AfD alliance taking government after the 2029 elections. What might be possible now? With the existing processes of grumbling and searching, tendencies of emerging antifascist polarization in parts of civil society, a broad alliance that extends well beyond the Left is possible, reaching into churches, sport clubs, schools, universities, and the sphere of culture. Initiatives like the anti-fascist alliance Widersetzen offer starting points, but the process must go further, structured less as a classical coalition of organizations and more as a (self-)organizing process and campaign, a sort of Unteilbar 2.0 (an alliance of NGOs, initiatives, and trade unions that demonstrated for solidarity and the welfare state between 2018 and 2020). Die Linke must neither dominate this process nor hold itself back. The party must provide infrastructure, create space for discussion, and contribute to organizing and mobilizing. The challenge is huge: such an alliance would have to aim towards civil disobedience and building structures of solidarity, including a perspective of general strikes. This would not yet be a new popular front, but it is urgent and necessary anyway to prevent a black-and-blue alliance taking government in 2029 (or earlier). 

This article originally appeared in LuXemburg. Translated by Anna Dinwoodie and Meredith Dale for Gegensatz Translation Collective.