Next week, global leaders and state representatives will converge in Belém, Brazil for the yearly UN Climate Conference to advance solutions to the climate crisis through global negotiations. This year, the Thirtieth Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework on Climate Change (COP30) marks the tenth anniversary of the Paris Agreement, widely regarded as the landmark achievement of international climate diplomacy. But the geopolitical landscape that shaped the agreement back in 2015 looks very different from the one confronting negotiators in Belém.
David Williams directs the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation’s Climate Justice Programme in New York.
Tetet Lauron lives in the Philippines and works as a consultant to the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation’s New York Office.
Katja Voigt is the Senior Advisor for Climate Policy at the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation.
Ten years ago, the grand boulevards of the world’s metropolises were filled with climate justice demonstrators, and political parties with robust climate policy positions were being elected into regional and state parliaments. Fast forward to today, and the US has left the Paris Agreement (again) while also embracing fossil fuels, and even forcing others to do so. Argentina’s delegation was withdrawn from last year’s meeting, COP29 in Azerbaijan, its leader describing climate change as a “socialist lie”. El Salvador is incarcerating environmental activists whom the UN and numerous human rights experts say are being illegally persecuted.
The backsliding on climate policy not only extends to the more overtly authoritarian governments. While publicly supporting the language of renewables, Australia is extending the use of coal, the EU is in a process of environmental deregulation, the UK’s net-zero plan is under severe pressure, and a few weeks ago the Brazilian government approved a license for oil exploration in the Amazon. These are merely a small selection of far-reaching examples in which the rise of the populist far right is recognizable, with climate-ignorant viewpoints dealing a significant blow to climate diplomacy.
International commentators and analysts increasingly argue that global diplomacy is moving from cooperation to competition.
It is important to note that climate diplomacy is not the only area plagued by crisis. More generally, faith and trust in multilateralism has declined significantly in recent years. Multilateral institutions failed to prevent a horrific genocide in Palestine or avert the Russian invasion in Ukraine. The UN, long viewed as the leading multilateral institution, is under sustained attack from right-wing populist leaders, facing both severe funding cuts and a wave of bilateral deals that sidestep its authority.
International commentators and analysts increasingly argue that global diplomacy is moving from cooperation to competition. Some, however, note that collaboration on truly equal footing may have never existed in the first place. The rift between the Global North and the Global South, stemming from years of colonial exploitation, still looms large, particularly when it comes to international climate diplomacy.
The Global North has never shown willingness to centre justice, historical responsibility, and adopt fair shares principles when it comes to atmospheric appropriation. Similarly, they have also consistently failed to provide sufficient climate finance to Global South countries in line with the “common but differentiated responsibilities” principle. The claim of many Global North governments that public funds are scarce appears increasingly dubious given the recent, rapid rise in military spending. Moreover, while genuine cooperation on equal footing has long been elusive, the urgency of that goal is growing as global competition intensifies.
More Than Symbolism
These are the conditions under which state representatives will be arriving in Brazil next week to negotiate. Brazil hosting COP30, bringing global leaders to the Amazon, the world’s largest rainforest and critical stabilizer of the climate system, is not only symbolically significant. It is also key in terms of how COP30 will unfold, as the Lula government will want to place itself at the forefront of the sustainable energy transition as a counter-weight to Brazil’s previous authoritarian and climate-denialist government.
The timing of this strategy is notable, with Brazil heading into elections next year with an uncertain outcome. The hosts (known as the “Presidency”) wield considerable influence at COPs. They use their diplomatic networks to shape the agenda, hold preparatory meetings with key parties, and step in to steer consultations when talks stall. Crucially, when negotiations succeed, much of the credit is typically attributed to the Presidency.
Geopolitical tensions are reflected in this year’s formal messaging of COP30, which has been focused around the shift from “negotiation” to “implementation”. The presidency has consistently emphasized the importance of collective action, encompassing not only the formal negotiations, but also outside the negotiation halls where business leaders, technology innovators, and sustainability scientists are meant to congregate and craft responses to the climate crisis.
The presidency has proposed the Mutirão — a form of collective action inspired by indigenous traditions, described as a “continuous method of mobilization” — as the mechanism through which a new form of climate governance would be achieved. It is the first time a presidency’s communication strategy has actually extended to spaces beyond the formal negotiations. Well-intentioned as it may be, this approach risks undermining the process, as negotiations between state actors are meant to establish the global standards that others are expected to follow.
For COPs to be deemed a success, presidencies are commonly measured by whether the negotiations have yielded significant tangible achievements. As its signature policy, the Brazilian presidency appears to want to pre-empt negotiations however, having already revealed the Tropical Forest Forever Facility (TFFF), to be launched during the World Leaders Summit just before the beginning of negotiations next week. The facility is being promoted as an innovative financing model, aiming to generate approximately 125 billion US dollars in investments from governments, businesses, philanthropies, and wealthy individuals. These funds would then be invested, with the returns first distributed to investors, and the remaining proceeds used to compensate forest owners and protectors based on the number of hectares of standing forest.
Climate finance remains a critical driver of emission reductions.
However, the fund would invest heavily in loans and bond instruments that are susceptible to crises such as debt default, currency depreciation, or political instability. Should the fund fail, private creditors would be bailed out first, prompting urgent questions about what would become of the world’s remaining forests and their protection. Despite these concerns, the World Bank nevertheless gave its seal of approval last week, agreeing to host and manage the fund, with numerous governments lending their endorsements.
Even as the Brazilian presidency seeks to steer focus beyond the formal talks, a number of pivotal agenda items are set to dominate discussions in Belém. One key issue is each country’s commitment to curb greenhouse gas emissions in line with the 1.5°C warming target, as outlined in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). Every five years, countries are required to submit their NDCs, which are then compiled into a synthesis report. Current submissions, taken together, would achieve only about 10 percent of the reductions needed to meet the 1.5°C target. Significant gaps remain, as Global North countries fail to take into account historical emissions and climate debt, which would require them to contribute their fair share to emission reductions.
Climate finance, understood as the funding that underpins both mitigation and adaptation efforts, remains a critical driver of emission reductions. Under the Paris Agreement, developed countries are supposed to provide these funds to developing nations in line with historical emissions, yet this commitment has never been fully realized.
At last year’s climate talks in Baku, two major decisions were made. First, 300 billion US dollars were pledged for developing countries to mitigate and adapt to climate change — an amount widely criticized by Global South representatives and civil society as far short of what was adequate. Second, a broader annual investment goal of 1.3 trillion US dollars was announced, even if few details were specified.
In both cases, it remains unclear who will actually provide the funds, a question that developing country negotiators are expected to press at COP30. Beyond the question of scale and sources, advocates stress that climate finance must not come in the form of loans, which would deepen the already unsustainable debt burden in the Global South. They demand that funding for adaptation needs to match that for mitigation, finance for Loss & Damage — impacts of the climate crisis that cannot be avoided through adaptation — should be explicitly included, and access must be guaranteed for the communities most vulnerable to climate impacts.
After three years of COPs hosted by authoritarian regimes, civil society will finally have the chance to convene.
After the much-celebrated creation of the Fund for Responding to Loss & Damage at the UN conference COP27 in Sharm-el-Sheikh in 2022, the initiative now risks stalling. Few funds have been pledged or committed, even as scientists warn that trillions will be needed to help communities recover from devastating climate impacts.
While the Brazilian presidency has perhaps sought to downplay the centrality of formal negotiations, particularly attempting to divert attention from thorny finance issues, it may unintentionally shift focus to an area where its influence is more limited. After three years of COPs hosted by authoritarian regimes, civil society will finally have the chance to convene their own summit outside the official meeting.
The People’s Summit, Cupola dos Povos, is the culmination of years of effort by Brazilian and Latin American civil society, offering a people-led alternative to what many see as stagnation within the negotiation halls. Indigenous movements, social justice activists, women, youth, and Black-led organizations along with numerous other civil society groups will present their visions for a sustainable energy transition, while also tackling urgent challenges such as climate denialism and the rise of the populist far right. With governments consistently falling short, the question is how people can reclaim power.
On the surface, geopolitical dynamics may appear less favourable than in past years, but COP30 still offers a crucial opportunity. With climate denialists sidelined, negotiators can demonstrate what is possible when justice, historical responsibility, and fair shares drive the agenda, potentially mending fractured North–South relations and breathing new life into multilateral institutions. Rarely has the world ever needed them more.