Brazil: Development Policy or Climate Action?

To understand Brazil’s social, political, economic, and environmental situation in Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s third term in office, one must take into account the legacy left by Jair Bolsonaro’s previous neoliberal-authoritarian administration. The combination of economic deregulation, racialized anti-environmentalism, and attacks on Indigenous and Quilombola peoples — many of whom are descendants of Black slaves — perpetrated between 2019 and 2022 saw the dismantling of socio-environmental policies and the militarization of the Amazon through Operation Green Brazil.

Under Bolsonaro, deforestation grew by almost 150 percent, while mining advanced over Indigenous lands, 2,182 pesticides — nearly half of which are banned in Europe — were authorized for use, and the country recorded the highest number of land conflicts since its democratic transition in the late 1980s. With the federal government’s logic of pushing deregulation to “let the herd pass through”, using lies and violence as its method of government, Brazil became an example of authoritarian, neoliberal, and racist environmental policies.[1]

Since then, the Lula administration has sought to steer economic, social, and environmental policy in a different direction by resuming public investment, raising the minimum wage, rebuilding social programmes such as the conditional cash transfer programme Bolsa Família, and strengthening policies to combat hunger and inequality. With a new industrial policy launched in 2024, New Industry Brazil (NIB), and investments in energy transition, it aims to reconcile inclusive growth and fiscal responsibility, while reintegrating weakened environmental policies, expanding dialogue with social movements and federated units, and putting a stop to the isolation and denialism of the previous administration.

This institutional recomposition includes strengthening the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), which funds forest protection, renewable energy projects, and strategic mining operations, and mobilizing funds via so-called Environmental, Social, and Governance bonds, repositioning the state as a broker of green assets. These projects, however, are saddled with territorial conflicts and display a colonial character, as they are oriented towards foreign energy demands, and NIB replicates aspects of the old developmentalist model that promotes concentration and environmental contradictions.

Meanwhile, the financialization of the economy and public policies remains central, with tax reforms and high interest rates restricting the expansion of productive investment, employment, and social welfare. On the social front, while anti-poverty programmes allowed Brazil to be removed from the UN Hunger Map in 2025, structural vulnerabilities and gender inequalities persist, intensified by debt burdening families, especially women.

The country thus remains at an impasse: on the one hand, there are efforts to reactivate the role of the state and resume sustainable and socially just growth. On the other, the constraints of financial hegemony and economic orthodoxy restrict the universalization of rights and the effective reduction of inequalities, maintaining a model where the interests of finance are placed above collective well-being.

Brazil at COP30

COP30 was conceived by the Lula administration as a strategic platform to reinforce Brazil’s international image, projecting it as a major player in the energy transition and climate governance after the isolation and climate denialism the country had endured under the previous administration. In this context, strategic minerals, including rare-earth elements (REEs), have become bargaining tools in international negotiations, as evidenced by the United States’ attempt to impose unilateral tariffs on Brazilian products, and the pressure for privileged access to resources. The Brazilian government’s firm reaction sought to reaffirm the country’s national sovereignty, historically compromised by state support for foreign exploitation, including via the Brazilian Development Bank.

Domestically, COP30 functions as an instrument to improve political and electoral legitimacy. The government associates the event with green prosperity, job creation, and regional development, especially for the North and Northeast of the country, reinforcing the narrative of reconciliation between economic growth, social justice, and sustainability. Yet contradictions persist: the expansion of agribusiness, extractive infrastructure, and strategic mining stokes socio-environmental tensions, while sectors such as agribusiness consolidate domestic political power and receive tax incentives that compromise essential resources, such as the budget of the Ministry of the Environment. Despite the climate leadership rhetoric, significant contradictions persist in practice. The intensive exploitation of strategic minerals keeps the country subordinate to global value chains, and Brazil’s energy transition replicates the extractivist model, fostering territorial conflicts and rights violations. 

Neo-extractivism, a development paradigm that persists regardless of who is currently in office, keeps Brazil subjected to exporting natural resources, reshaping yet replicating centre-periphery relations.

Despite seeking a leading role at COP30, Brazil still strives to play a relevant leadership role in the G77 — traditionally representing the “developing countries” within the UN system — by coordinating the interests of the Global South around a fairer and more multipolar agenda, with the aim of reforming the international financial system and reducing the asymmetries between developed and developing countries. With a long history of cooperative diplomacy and institutional capacity, the country proposes bridges between historical demands, such as financing and technology transfer, and new global agendas, including the energy transition and tackling inequalities. Participation in the G77 + China Summit in Havana and the promotion of these agendas in larger forums, such as the G20, the group of the 20 biggest economies, and BRICS, reflect the resumption of Brazil’s international presence after years of diplomatic retrenchment and international isolation under the previous administration.

Within the BRICS, Brazil is pursuing strategic autonomy, balancing alignment with emerging powers and penetration in traditional institutions. It acts as a moderating voice, advocating multilateral governance and South-South cooperation, while avoiding excessive polarization vis-à-vis the West. Participation in the group reinforces its complementarity with the G77, allowing the country to consolidate its leadership based on dialogue, consensus-building, and the defence of a more inclusive and balanced international system.

What about Civil Society?

In the weeks few weeks leading up to COP30, the Brazilian political scene witnessed a rise in support for the Lula administration and the erosion of far-right leaders associated with Bolsonaro. Polls show that 48 percent of Brazilian voters say the government had a better response to the so-called US “tariffs”. The image of the Right became even more deteriorated after Bolsonaro was found guilty in a historic Supreme Court trial and sentenced to 27 years and three months in prison for plotting the 8 January 2023 coup attempt, a sign of a new level in the fight against impunity.

In this context, COP30 poses a political dilemma for civil society. Social movements, environmental organizations, and traditional peoples are trying to put pressure on the Brazilian government to ensure coherence between climate discourse and practices including expedited licence processes, environmental exploitation, and repression in Quilombola and Indigenous territories. While a recently passed bill known as the Devastation Bill sets forth the loosening of environmental licence processes, Ibama, Brazil’s environmental protection agency, authorized the country’s oil giant Petrobras to drill block 59 at the Amazon River mouth, a highly environmentally sensitive area, paving the way for licensing oil drilling operations at other 27 blocks, including partnerships with foreign companies. Meanwhile, there are concern that strong criticism will weaken the progressive sector and favour the return of authoritarian policies in the 2026 elections.

Neo-extractivism, a development paradigm that persists regardless of who is currently in office, keeps Brazil subjected to exporting natural resources, reshaping yet replicating centre-periphery relations. By putting effort in the expansion of chains including mining, agribusiness, and “renewable” energy projects, the government is reviving this model, legitimized by the ecological transition and social inclusion rhetoric.

From this tension emerges a civil society divided between cooperation and confrontation: some seek to influence the official COP30 agenda, while others denounce the risks of “greenwashing” and the capture of decisions by corporations and elites. This reflects a broader challenge, namely that of contesting the political meaning of the ecological transition without legitimizing its appropriation by capital and the state.

This is the context in which the People’s Summit takes place. Held concurrently with COP30 and bringing together more than 1,000 organizations from different countries, including social movements, Indigenous and Quilombola organizations, environmental collectives, trade unions, and academic networks, it forms a plural front of resistance, proposing alternatives to the neo-extractivist development model.

The space takes on special relevance as it takes place in the Brazilian Amazon, a region marked by profound ethnic and population diversity: more than 180 Indigenous peoples live there, with more than 300 recognized ethnic groups, as well as more than 1,000 Quilombola communities and other traditional peoples, such as rubber tappers, fisherfolks, and river dwellers. Its central objective is to demand coherence between the climate commitments announced by the government and effective socio-environmental protection practices, prioritizing human rights, climate justice, and the defence of traditional territories. The summit is thus structured as a strategic counterpoint in the battle over political narratives, in which civil society aims to mobilize enough pressure and exposure to prevent the ecological transition from becoming an instrument for legitimizing capital and governments.

Indigenous Movements between Institutional Dialogue and Territorial Resistance

Indigenous movements are central actors in Brazil’s environmental policy and agenda, combining grassroots mobilization, institutional action, and international advocacy. Indigenous leaders have led the debate on climate and territorial rights, both in Brasilia and in multilateral forums such as the COPs, while facing growing violence in their territories aggravated by agribusiness operations and large logistics and mining projects.

The establishment of the Ministry of Indigenous Peoples headed by Indigenous woman Sônia Guajajara, the appointment of Joênia Wapichana, the first Indigenous woman elected to the National Congress, as president of the National Foundation for Indigenous Peoples, and the resumption of land demarcation processes represent institutional and symbolic advances, but controversial infrastructure and licensing policies such as the Araguaia-Tocantins Waterway, the BR-319 highway, and energy and mining projects reveal contradictions between climate discourse and developmentalist practice, while Congress remains under strong anti-Indigenous influence.

Brazil at COP30 faces tensions between attempts at institutional and social reconstruction promoted by the Lula administration and the restrictions imposed by historical economic and political structures.

At this year’s COP, Indigenous and Afro-descendant organizations are demanding their own funding mechanisms and direct access to climate funds, such as the Tropical Forests Forever Facility (TFFF), strengthening their participation in governance and forest conservation processes. The TFFF, however, operates according to a speculative logic, subordinating the interests of the Global South to financial capital and global markets, while Law 15,042/2024 consolidates Brazil’s position in the carbon market but exhibits weaknesses that affect Indigenous and traditional rights. In this context, Indigenous peoples act in institutional dialogue and territorial resistance at once, denouncing new forms of green colonization and carbon credit contracts, consolidating a critical force in the battle for environmental and democratic justice, in a COP marked by the greatest ever participation of Indigenous peoples, Quilombolas, and traditional communities.

Reconstruction under Restrictions

Brazil at COP30 faces tensions between attempts at institutional and social reconstruction promoted by the Lula administration and the restrictions imposed by historical economic and political structures, including financialization, neo-extractivism, and the persistence of economic powers that give priority to private profit, exploitation of natural resources, and racist attitudes. While COP30 serves as a showcase for international protagonism, it highlights contradictions between discourse and practice, especially when it comes to environmental licensing, mining, and agribusiness, exposing the challenges of aligning environmental protection policies with the development model adopted.

The work of Indigenous peoples and traditional communities demonstrates the centrality of organized civil society in the fight for environmental and territorial justice, combining institutional dialogue and resistance against new forms of green colonization and pressure on natural resources. On the international stage, Brazil is trying to balance its leading role in the G77 and BRICS with domestic challenges — and COP30 illustrates both the potential for leadership and the risks of legitimizing an exclusionary and extractivist model. The challenge for civil society is to offer a firm and strategic criticism of the government, denouncing setbacks and inequalities without compromising political action, while also strengthening democracy and socio-environmental justice.