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Since 1986, Ugandan politics has been a story of one man: General Yoweri Kaguta Museveni. Coming to power in the wake of a five-year guerilla war and promising “fundamental change” to the country’s political trajectory, President Museveni and his National Resistance Movement (NRM) have ruled the country for 39 years. The NRM represents a stark case of a once-socialist liberation movement that fully reconciled itself with global capitalism, presiding over a system of profound inequality, systemic corruption, and political repression.
Mark Kaweesi is a political commentator based in Kampala, Uganda.
The Ugandan general election scheduled for 15 January 2026 is thus not a contest to determine a change of government in any meaningful, democratic sense. Rather, it represents a high-stakes ritual of power consolidation, a moment where the deep-seated social tensions of a predominantly young, impoverished, and agitated population threaten to push back against the might of a militarized state.
This electoral cycle is unfolding against the backdrop of domestic political friction and, significantly, in the shadow of the harshly contested and bloody elections in neighbouring Tanzania. The subsequent unrest saw widespread violence, internet shutdowns, and a total crackdown on the opposition, posing a clear warning to Uganda’s own electoral process. In addition, the elections are being held in the midst of growing youth dissent in the region, most recently in Kenya, amplifying local and global scrutiny of Uganda’s own commitment to a free and peaceful process.
An Atmosphere of Intimidation
The 2026 elections will see Uganda elect the president, parliamentary representatives, and local government councils. The Uganda Electoral Commission officially cleared eight candidates to contest the race for president, yet older, more established parties like the Democratic Party (DP) and the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) are not fielding candidates at the presidential level. This time, the election is largely framed as a contest between incumbent General Museveni, seeking to extend his 39-year tenure, and musician-turned-politician Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu, popularly known as Bobi Wine, from the National Unity Platform (NUP).
The election campaign, which kicked off in September 2025, is increasingly characterized by violence, especially in urban areas and opposition strongholds. Heavy-handed policing of opposition rallies by security forces, arrests of supporters of political rivals, and restrictions on media coverage by the Uganda Communications Commission (UCC) have become widespread. Similar to Tanzania, prominent opposition figures like Dr. Kiiza Besigye, one of Museveni’s fiercest critics, have been incarcerated. Several opposition members, including the outspoken deputy spokesperson of the NUP Waiswa Mufumbiro, were recently charged with robbery and murder.
The most potent issue of the campaign so far has been the question of democratic governance and political succession.
To further suppress political activity, the NRM-controlled parliament amended the Political Parties and Organizations Act prior to the commencement of the electoral cycle, changing the qualifications for state funding of political parties. Prior to this amendment, parties were funded according to their numerical strength in parliament. Following the amendment, numerical strength in parliament is not sufficient to qualify for public funding. It is now mandatory that for any political party to receive funding, it must be a member of the Inter Party Organization for Dialogue (IPOD) on top of having representation in parliament. The amendment denied the NUP funding in this critical year, as it is the only party with representation in parliament that is not also a member of IPOD.
On top of these institutional hurdles, political parties in Uganda face numerous additional challenges, such as restricted grassroots mobilization, weak institutional capacities, and a dominance of personalities over ideology that emanates from the nature of the Ugandan political system. Establishing a level playing field in a country with a weak democratic culture and against the NRM that is fused with the state remains a serious challenge that rises to the fore when the county heads for elections.
Unmet Demands and Divided Loyalties
Uganda counts one of the youngest populations globally, with over 78 percent of citizens under the age of 30. This demographic reality stands in stark contrast to the political system dominated by Museveni and a ruling elite widely perceived to be out of touch. In this context, the most potent issue of the campaign so far has been the question of democratic governance and political succession.
Already in power for almost four decades, President Museveni’s continued candidacy epitomizes what critics term his “lifetime presidency” project. The NUP has centred its campaign on the demand for a “peaceful transfer of power”, highlighting that Museveni’s controversial son and army commander, General Muhoozi Kainerugaba is widely seen as next in line for the presidency.
Another vital factor in campaigning has been the lived reality of young people, confronted as they are with soaring unemployment, a cost-of-living crisis, wanton corruption, International Monetary Fund-imposed austerity due to the country’s huge public debt, and the effective collapse of the public sector. The Uganda National Population and Housing Census of 2024 estimates that 50.9 percent of youth (15–24) are not in education, employment, or training, leading to frustration and reliance on low-paying informal work, substance abuse, and criminality. This structural discord has created fertile ground for political discontent, manifesting primarily in episodic, often explosive public demonstrations in Kampala and other major cities. Consequently, young people have coalesced around popular figures like Bobi Wine who promise a “new Uganda”, promoting a focus on industrialization for jobs, restoration of public order, and democratic governance.
Yet despite this widespread dissatisfaction, the Ugandan opposition faces a familiar and potentially fatal weakness. For although the NUP consolidated its role as the main political opposition in 2021, the forces arrayed against Museveni’s decades-long rule remain deeply fragmented. To begin with, almost none of the internal party elections have been free of disputes, with factions emerging in all the major opposition parties.
The opposition political parties have been distracted by inter-party competition and struggles for dominance within the opposition. A political falling out among the ranks of the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) saw the emergence of the People’s Front for Freedom (PFF). Within the NUP, a rift between the then Leader of the Opposition Hon. Mathias Mpuuga and the central leadership of the party has escalated to him quitting the organization and forming the Democratic Front Party. Unlike the previous elections, efforts towards forming a joint opposition alliance have not even been discussed. Meanwhile, the DP, a moderate conservative party, and the UPC, generally perceived as a centre-left force, have increasingly opted to not only cooperate but also ally with the ruling NRM.
The electoral process is heavily tilted in NRM’s favour. Nevertheless, the campaign itself functions as a critical barometer of the national mood.
The inability of the various factions to coalesce around a single candidate or a common platform provides a significant strategic advantage to the NRM, effectively diffusing anti-incumbency sentiments across multiple competing parties and personalities. The lack of an officially sanctioned “unity candidate” means opposition votes will be split across at least eight presidential contenders, virtually ensuring that President Museveni will secure a seventh term.
Although currently incarcerated, Kiiza Besigye and his supporters argue that participating in a Museveni-organized election would merely legitimize a fraudulent process, and instead call for a complete boycott. The NUP and the centre-right FDC, although deeply critical, have expressed support for participation, arguing that the struggle must be waged on all fronts, including within the limited political space provided.
On the other hand, aligning with Bobi Wine’s NUP offers a larger platform but comes with significant risks. The NUP’s politics are not socialist — its leadership is primarily interested in replacing the NRM at the top of the state, not in transforming the capitalist and patriarchal foundations of the state. Unfortunately, there is not a progressive Left party in this election. Meanwhile, the progressive individuals who aligned with the NUP face the constant risk of their radical demands being diluted or co-opted for populist appeal.
Politics beyond Elections
Excluding an unexpected calamity, the outcome of Uganda’s 2026 presidential election is a foregone conclusion: General Museveni and the NRM will be declared the winners. After all, the electoral process is heavily tilted in their favour. Nevertheless, the campaign itself functions as a critical barometer of the national mood. Demands for accountable governance, economic justice, and generational change will not disappear after the polls close on 15 January. Indeed, these issues are symptomatic of a deep-seated structural crisis that will continue to shape Uganda’s political trajectory long after 2026, ensuring that the country’s period of intense political contestation is far from over.
Ugandan political commentator Henry Kasacca notes that turnout for this election is likely to be low due to voter fatigue and a fear of violence on election day. More strikingly, there has been a lack of civic education due to limited government support — the Uganda Electoral Commission receives only about 70,000 euro annually to carry out civic education across the country. This situation is compounded by that fact that civil society and donors are gradually withdrawing from democratic governance initiatives due to excessive state scrutiny. Therefore, the real contest in Ugandan politics will not be over the result, but over what happens next.
Similar to neighbouring Tanzania, the level of post-election violence will depend on the perceived margin of the NRM’s victory and the ability of the NUP to mobilize its base in the face of state violence. We can expect widespread arrests of the youth and opposition politicians, a crackdown on civil society, and a further tightening of the authoritarian screws. The Tanzanian experience acts as both a cautionary tale and an instructive case for Uganda, where the relationship between the state and opposition has often proven volatile. As the country moves towards a decisive election, the primary focus for civil society and other stakeholders is to continue pushing state institutions to be accountable despite what is likely to be a flawed voting process.
