Details
The party led by billionaire Andrej Babiš is called Action of Dissatisfied Citizens (Akce nespokojených občanů) — a name that also serves as its platform. At the same time, the acronym ANO also means “Yes” in Czech, which fits with Babiš’s campaign slogan: in the run-up to the October 2025 parliamentary elections, the newly re-elected prime minister made a promise to voters: “Yes, it will get better!”
Joanna Gwiazdecka directs the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation’s Prague Office.
The main opponent of Babiš’s party was the liberal-conservative inter-party alliance SPOLU (“Together”) led by then-Prime Minister Petr Fiala. In recent years, SPOLU had governed the country in coalition with the Mayors and Independents list (Starostové a nezávislí, or STAN) and, until 2024, with the Pirate Party (Česká pirátská strana).
When the votes were counted, ANO came out just slightly ahead: the party won 80 out of 200 parliamentary seats, while SPOLU and STAN combined won only 74. Together with the far-right parties Freedom and Direct Democracy (Svoboda a přímá demokracie or SPD) and Motorists for Themselves (Motoristé sobě), both of which passed the five percent threshold required to gain seats in parliament, it now has a new coalition with a safe majority of 108 seats — partly because the electoral coalition called Enough! (Stačilo!), made up of Communists and Social Democrats, received only 4.3 percent of the vote and therefore received no parliamentary seats.
Babiš’s Pivot to the Right
Babiš, who was sworn in as prime minister for the second time on 9 December, has long been a colourful figure in Czech politics. This billionaire who has previously been investigated for corruption, conflicts of interest, and fraud, is regarded by voters as the country’s most significant political authority — a view that appears to be largely independent of who he works with. During his first term from 2018 to 2021, he led a minority coalition with the Social Democrats that even tolerated the Communist Party. However, the fact that his former coalition partners failed to make it into parliament led Babiš to form a coalition with the far right in the interest of taking power. Particularly in comparison with his first term, that means a drastic rightward shift.
Babiš regards himself as a prime minister who acts decisively and knows how to pragmatically navigate the democratic process — even with two right-wing populist groups in tow.
By governing together with the far right, Babiš now stands accused of jettisoning democratic values in favour of his own self-interest. That accusation carries particular historical resonance in Czechia. The democratic opposition in Czechoslovakia, Charter 77, the Velvet Revolution of autumn 1989, the political legacy of Václav Havel: these are the foundations for how the state is understood today. Voters are sceptical of politicians who place themselves outside of that tradition. That is why, despite occasionally doing remarkably well in elections, the Communist Party was excluded from government for years — until Babiš rendered it palatable in 2018 as a tolerated member of his governing coalition. Now the newly re-installed prime minister is opening up a new chapter in which he is bringing the far right directly into the government.
The New Cabinet
Babiš regards himself as a prime minister who acts decisively and knows how to pragmatically navigate the democratic process — even with two right-wing populist groups in tow.
Looking at his cabinet, however, there has already been friction since President Petr Pavel said publicly that he would not appoint any ministers who had publicly spoken out against Czechia’s EU or NATO membership. The nomination of Motorists for Themselves co-founder and EU Parliament member Filip Turek as foreign minister has been particularly controversial. Turek was undone by old social media posts in which he made racist and sexist comments as well as positive references to European fascism; he subsequently denied responsibility for these posts.
Babiš then swapped coalition partners: Motorists for Themselves nominated party chairman Petr Macinka as its new candidate for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and wanted Turek to lead the Ministry of the Environment. Nonetheless, Turek was not part of the cabinet that was sworn in on 15 December 2025; the question of his appointment was to be postponed for now. Nevertheless, if he were to become environment minister, Turek could be criticized for having denied climate change and speaking out decisively against EU climate policy. It is hard to imagine that the Motorists for Themselves politician will subordinate himself to European climate goals.
The new defence minister, Jaromír Zůna of the SPD, also created anxiety at first. The minister, whose party wants to collaborate politically with the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), initially spoke in favour of immediately cancelling weapons and munitions deliveries to Ukraine. He later back-pedalled, much to the surprise of the general public. The interests of Czechia’s influential arms industry may have played a significant role in that change of heart.
Zůna’s shift seems to have been approved by Babiš, who governs on the premise that coalition partners who stray from the course he has set will quickly face harsh consequences. A large portion of the Czech public is sticking with Babiš for now, and in any event surveys show that forming a coalition with the far right has not hurt the ANO’s approval rating thus far. However, it remains to be seen if that will continue to be the case in light of other European countries’ experiences of governing with far-right parties.
The Budapest–Bratislava–Prague Axis
Meanwhile, in the EU context, a question has been circulating as to whether or to what extent the Babiš government will now make common cause with Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán and Slovakian prime minister Robert Fico. The authoritarian Orbán regards himself as a national conservative and frequently rails against Brussels, which he believes to be far too liberal. By contrast, Fico thinks of himself as a social democrat, although he has recently shifted towards right-wing authoritarianism.
Orbán and Fico are particularly united in their policies toward Ukraine and Russia, which clearly deviate from the line advocated by Brussels. For the Babiš government, a pro-Russian outlook and criticism of the EU are points where they can find agreement.
The Czech prime minister knows all too well how much the country’s export-oriented economy depends on the EU market and EU integration.
Additionally, there is another important parallel in that all three — Orbán, Fico, and Babiš — are well practised at exploiting political polarization in society for their own populist ends. This is particularly apparent in their perspectives on migration. Irregular migration and immigration are presented as a serious threat to the country and its citizens. Instead of looking for viable solutions, Hungary in particular has been pursuing strict isolation — even from the EU — for years. This hostile outlook even extends to refugees fleeing the war in neighbouring Ukraine.
It seems likely that Budapest, Bratislava, and Prague will now share a platform in Brussels. In any decision that requires unanimity among the member states, Orbán’s frequently used veto weapon has therefore just gotten sharper. In that respect, Babiš’s victory clearly bolsters the EU’s national-conservative flank.
Nonetheless, the Czech prime minister will presumably be more reserved on other issues. He is a wily businessman who knows all too well how much the country’s export-oriented economy depends on the EU market and EU integration. Nonetheless, there are real doubts as to whether he can use this bearing to steer his coalition with the far right toward calmer waters.
Translated by Joseph Keady and Rowan Coupland for Gegensatz Translation Collective.
