Details

The red banners and flags bearing hammer and sickle were impossible to ignore: in the weeks leading up to the fourteenth Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party (CPV), the capital of Hanoi had visibly prepared itself for the major political event. Among foreign observers, there was already intense speculation about who the country’s future leadership would be.
Stefan Mentschel heads the Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung’s Southeast Asia office in Hanoi.
Yet given its enormous significance, the congress — which takes place only once every five years — proceeded without surprises in an overall spirit of unity. This was true both for personnel decisions as well as the overall political direction set. The congress ended on 23 January, two days earlier than planned. This suggests that any internal disagreements had been resolved in advance.
Nevertheless, one of the most frequently discussed issues remains an open question: will the party leader also become the country’s president? At the centre of this debate is CPV general secretary To Lam, who is rumoured to harbour ambitions for both positions. Unlike neighbouring China, Vietnam has so far kept the two offices separate.
Traditionally, the country’s leadership has been divided between four pillars: in addition to the general secretary and the president, there is also the prime minister and the chair of the National Assembly. This model has only been modified in two temporary exceptional cases in recent decades. This also means that the CPV’s general secretary, while de facto the country’s most powerful politician, is not recognized by all other countries as the leading representative of the Vietnamese state.
Political Balance
As minister of public security, To Lam assumed the country’s most important political post after the death of General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong in July 2024. He has now been unanimously appointed to the office for a further five years by the 1,600 delegates to the Party Congress. Prior to this, they had elected the 180 full members of the Central Committee as well as the 19 members of the Politburo, including To Lam as its chairman. The Politburo is the CPV’s highest decision-making body; it determines Vietnam’s political course and formulates guidelines for the government.
Nine of the Politburo members are new, including Bui Thi Minh Hoai, the only woman. She is chairwoman of the influential Fatherland Front, which encompasses mass movements such as the Youth Union, the Women’s Union, and the Trade Union Confederation.
According to Vietnamese tradition, attention is paid to both political and regional representation within these bodies. The military, for example, continues to be prominently represented by Defence Minister Phan Van Giang. The president of the National Assembly, Tran Thanh Man, who hails from the Mekong Delta in the south of the country, was also re-elected. Despite these high-ranking personnel appointments, the region around the metropolis of Ho Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon) appears to be underrepresented, even though nearly 50 percent of Vietnam’s GDP is generated there.
Regardless of who will fill these positions, the party congress adopted several important substantive policy decisions.
It is also noteworthy who is no longer represented in the new Politburo. These figures include the country’s incumbent president, Luong Cuong, as well as Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh. This means that both posts will be newly filled after National Assembly elections on 15 March.
One potential candidate for prime minister is the former governor of the State Bank of Vietnam, Le Minh Hung, who has held several important party positions in recent years. Minster of Defence Phan Van Giang appears to be positioning himself for the presidency. Should General Secretary To Lam prevail instead, however, the political cards in Vietnam would likely be reshuffled.
Targeting Double-Digit Growth Rates
Regardless of who will fill these positions, the party congress adopted several important substantive policy decisions. This is especially true in economic and social policy, where Vietnam’s ambitious goal is to go from being a middle-income country to a high-income country by 2045. The choice of this date refers to the hundredth anniversary of Vietnamese independence, as Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the Socialist Republic on 2 September 1945.
Yet the road ahead remains long. In 2025, official sources put Vietnam’s per capita income at 4,745 US dollars. By 2030 — the hundredth anniversary of the CPV’s founding — that number is predicted to rise to 8,500 US dollars. According to the World Bank, an economy is currently considered high-income at a per capita income of around 14,000 US dollars. To succeed in tripling the per capita income, the party congress resolution stipulates that the country’s economy must grow by ten percent per year from now on.
The socialist-oriented market economy’s motto is “Leave no one behind”.
According to government reports, the growth rate in 2025 was about eight percent. But Vietnam’s model has so far relied primarily on exports. Electronic devices account for the largest share; South Korean firms like Samsung, for example, have most of their goods produced in Vietnam. Suppliers of the US company Apple, too, have recently pushed to relocate production from China to Vietnam.
This model’s vulnerability has been highlighted by US president Donald Trump’s erratic tariff policies. To its credit, Vietnam was able to drive the rate of export tax to the United States down to 20 percent. Rising labour costs, however, are further reducing the country’s traditional advantage as a production location for global corporations.
“Leave no one behind”
Recognizing this, the government plans to make significant investments in infrastructure and future technologies in the coming years. “Science and technology, innovation, and digital transformation are the driving forces of Vietnam’s [economic] breakthrough,” affirmed Minister of Science and Technology Nguyen Manh Hung. The party congress also emphasized the importance of the private sector for the development of innovative cutting-edge technologies, as well as the need for an efficient administrative state to implement the country’s growth targets. In the past, Vietnam’s bureaucracy has often been considered a major obstacle to growth.
The party congress reaffirmed its commitment to an independent and multilateral foreign policy.
To remedy this, To Lam introduced extensive administrative reforms back in late 2024. The number of provinces was almost halved from 63 to 34, and numerous government agencies and ministries were merged. More than 100,000 civil service employees lost their jobs or were forced into early retirement. While German economists lauded these reforms as a step in the right direction, observers nevertheless expect that it will take some time before the new jurisdictions and procedures are able to function smoothly.
What distinguishes Vietnam from many neighbouring countries is its social policy. The socialist-oriented market economy’s motto is “Leave no one behind”. Accordingly, a million social housing units are scheduled to be built by 2030. In the economically less developed border region, approximately 250 secondary schools are planned in order to raise the population’s education level. Healthcare provision in the country is also to be improved.
“More Friends, Fewer Enemies”
In terms of foreign policy, Vietnam is maintaining the course it has set over recent decades. The party congress reaffirmed its commitment to an independent and multilateral foreign policy. At a press conference, To Lam stated that no nation can overcome global challenges on its own; all are responsible for solving problems together. He emphasized that international cooperation is indispensable.
More than 200,000 people of Vietnamese descent live in Germany today, further strengthening the close ties that have grown over decades.
At its core, these principles correspond to the well-known concept of “bamboo diplomacy”, even though this term is no longer used in official parlance. Ho Chi Minh, the country’s founder, summed it up as “more friends, fewer enemies”.
Trying to live up to this claim, Vietnam currently maintains strategic partnerships with over 40 countries. Fifteen of these even have the status of “comprehensive strategic partners”; this list includes the US, the People’s Republic of China, Russia, and, as of late January, the European Union. Vietnam would also like to upgrade its strategic partnership with Germany, which has been in place since 2011. But Berlin is reportedly in no hurry to make this happen. Most recently, there were disagreements after two Vietnamese journalists living in Germany were sentenced in absentia to prison terms in their native country.
Germany and Vietnam
All in all, however, relations between the two countries are good. Both have a common interest in strengthening the rules-based international order, which has started to slip. Germany is also interested in good relations with Vietnam for economic reasons. Within the EU, Germany is Vietnam’s largest trading partner, with a trade volume of just under 20 billion euros. More than 500 German companies currently have branches in Vietnam, and German investments have created 50,000 jobs. Moreover, in late 2025 the German government promised Hanoi roughly 185 million euros for sustainable economic development.
Last year also marked the fiftieth anniversary of diplomatic relations between Vietnam and the Federal Republic of Germany. After the end of the war against the US, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam was officially recognized by Bonn in September 1975. The GDR had already done so in 1950, and opened the first German embassy in Hanoi in 1955.
Around 70,000 Vietnamese people were trained or educated in the GDR. To this day, they still form “a bridge, unique within Asia, between Germany and Vietnam”, according to the German embassy. More than 200,000 people of Vietnamese descent live in Germany today, further strengthening the close ties that have grown over decades. One important forum for international exchange is the annual dialogue between the CPV and Die Linke, the next iteration of which is set to take place this fall. By then, it will also be clear who, alongside General Secretary To Lam, will hold the other top positions in the country.
Translated by Anna Dinwoodie and Hunter Bolin for Gegensatz Translation Collective.


