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Earlier this year, Social Democratic Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen was riding a modest “Greenland bounce” due to the tense stand-off with Donald Trump over Greenland. While this may have prompted her to call a snap election to save her flagging mandate, it is domestic politics that have defined the campaign, and with more than a dozen parties in the mix, the outcome is far from clear.
Duroyan Fertl is a former political advisor for Sinn Féin and the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) in the European Parliament. Since 2021, he has been coordinating the work of the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation’s Brussels Office in the Nordic countries.
The results may also mark an end of Denmark’s traditional bloc politics. Since the 2022 election, Denmark has been governed by an unusual “over-the-centre” grand coalition between the Social Democrats, the liberal Venstre, and the centrist Moderates. This arrangement broke with decades of political custom, as Frederiksen chose to govern alongside her traditional rivals despite having a nominal left-wing majority available. The result has been a — predictably — uneasy and often unpopular government, caught between ideological compromise and a restless electorate.
Political Polarization
If Frederiksen’s centrist experiment was intended to stabilize Danish politics, it failed, and the polarization of Danish politics has continued to intensify. The governing coalition has overseen a noticeable rightward shift on economic, social, and migration issues — including the abolition of a popular national holiday to fund weapons for Ukraine — and this has come at a political cost. In the November 2025 local elections, both the Social Democrats and Venstre suffered heavy losses, while the Moderates nearly collapsed entirely.
The short four-week election campaign has allowed the prime minister to shape the political agenda decisively.
The Social Democrats’ loss of control of Copenhagen — its treasured stronghold for over a century — underscored the depth of the disaster. A fragmented and polarized political landscape emerged. While the government parties experienced a drubbing, gains were made by the green-left Socialist People’s Party (SF), the right-libertarian Liberal Alliance (LA), and the two main parties of the far right, the Denmark Democrats (DD) and the Danish People’s Party (DF).
Both Sides of the Fence
Rather than interpreting these results as a signal to shift clearly left or right, Frederiksen seems to be trying to do both at the same time. On the one hand, her government has doubled down on already strict (and to many critics simply racist) migration and integration policies, that have garnered Frederiksen praise from social democrats — and others further to the right — internationally who wish to emulate her rightward tack on migration. On the other, it has made a clear left turn on material issues, placing more traditionally left-wing economic rhetoric and policy promises at the heart of the election campaign.
In this respect, the short four-week election campaign has allowed the prime minister to shape the political agenda decisively. Three key social issues have been pushed to the forefront from the very beginning, in the hope of stemming the flow of the Social Democrat’s ebbing support to the Left, particularly to SF, which has successfully positioned itself as a credible alternative for progressive voters disillusioned with the Social Democrats and their dalliance with the centre and centre-right.
It’s Just a Jump to the Left…
Two of the campaign’s central themes are familiar to Danish voters. The first is the pension age, a long-running source of political tension. Successive governments have gradually increased the age of retirement, provoking resistance, especially among manual workers. Frederiksen has now proposed capping the pension age at 70, presenting this as a compromise solution. Trade unions are unimpressed: for workers in physically demanding jobs, a retirement age of 70 is (rightly) seen as unrealistic and unjust.
The second major proposal concerns education, where the government has pledged to cap primary school class sizes at 14 students. The National Association of Municipalities have warned that — while the move would be welcome — schools lack both the premises and the teaching staff to make such a reform feasible. Similar promises regarding education, childcare, or healthcare have fallen short in the past, fuelling cynicism around this election pledge.
A New Wealth Tax
The most striking proposal in the campaign, however, is for a modest wealth tax targeting Denmark’s richest citizens. The Social Democrats have suggested introducing a 0.5% tax on assets above 25 million kroner (€3.3 million) for individuals and 50 million for couples. The proposal is not entirely without precedent: Denmark previously levied a similar wealth tax, but reduced it in 1991 before abolishing it in 1997.
What the debate over wealth taxation has done is to allow a debate about greater wealth redistribution to (re)enter the political mainstream, something which the Left can build on in months and years to come.
The reaction from the right was swift and predictable. Wealthy business leaders and right-wing commentators condemned the proposal, threatening capital flight, job losses, and long-lasting economic damage. Yet the numbers tell a different story: while average wealth in Denmark has grown modestly in the past 3 years, the fortunes of the richest one percent have surged dramatically — by as much as 31% after inflation. The ten richest families alone have increased their wealth by over 125 billion kroner (€17 billion) since 2020. In short: they can afford it.
In this context, the proposed tax is much less radical than its critics suggest. Frederiksen has framed it as a measure to “take the edge off inequality” and fund improvements in public services, such as her promises on primary education. Even so, its prospects are uncertain. Structural changes to the tax system typically require broad parliamentary support, and without cross-party backing, the proposal risks being diluted or indefinitely delayed in committee.
What the debate over wealth taxation has done is to allow a debate about greater wealth redistribution to (re)enter the political mainstream, something which the Left can build on in months and years to come. Supporters of low taxation, corporate interests, and “trickle down” economics have not taken the proposal well.
Further polarizing the campaign, parties on the right — including Venstre and the Conservative People's Party — have responded by proposing significant tax cuts for large businesses, including major financial institutions such as Danske Bank.
… and Then a Step to the Right
If the economic policy debate has taken a tentative turn to the Left, migration policy has moved decisively in the opposite direction. The Social Democrats have long pursued a restrictive line, but recent proposals mark a further escalation. The party’s new foreign policy package announced on 10 March was described by Frederiksen herself as introducing the strictest immigration regime in Europe, accompanied by dangerous rhetoric about national belonging and loyalty while openly identifying migrants of certain nationalities as holding “problematic values”.
Denmark’s right and far right have become more assertive and more radical.
The sensationalist name of the package — “We don’t want those who don’t want Denmark” — encapsulates this approach, signalling a willingness to exclude those deemed “insufficiently integrated”. It seeks to facilitate increased deportations by shifting relevant decision-making from the courts to administrative authorities, undermining the rule of law. Critics argue that such rhetoric risks legitimizing more extreme positions and eroding democratic norms. Worryingly, the language and tone used by the Social Democrats on migration and integration continues to echo — and openly compete with — the increasingly strident tones of the country’s xenophobic and racist far-right.
The broader political context helps explain this shift. Denmark’s right and far right have become more assertive and more radical. The Danish People’s Party (DF) under Morten Messerschmidt has campaigned aggressively on a platform of “remigration,” calling for the large-scale removal of immigrants, particularly Muslims — and for putting tens of thousands of them in deportation camps if necessary. Messerschmidt has also issued an ultimatum that his party would only support a government that commits to actively reducing the number of Muslims in Denmark.
Such positions, once considered fringe, are now part of the mainstream political debate. Other right-wing parties — and the Social Democrats — have competed to adopt tougher stances on migration, including proposals to revoke citizenship under certain conditions or to withdraw from international conventions. With some polls placing their support as high as 10 percent, DF could emerge as the largest party of Denmark’s right, and of a far-right that could total some 20 percent of national votes cast.
While DF appeals to more traditionally urban social chauvinists, the Denmark Democrats (DD) — founded and led by disgraced former Venstre immigration minister Inger Støjberg — has a stronger voter base in the countryside. In addition to the xenophobic rhetoric already mentioned, and calling for an expansion of Denmark’s environmentally harmful pig industry, DD have made opposition to the green transition and renewable energy projects a centrepiece of their campaign – focusing particular ire on what they call “iron fields”: solar farms that they claim destroy rural landscapes, local nature, and agricultural land.
Centre-right in Disarray
As the far-right grow more confident, the centre-right has found itself floundering. While the Conservatives, steady on 7 percent support, have run a cautious campaign — perhaps with an eye to a possible “grand coalition” stitch-up, Venstre leader Troels Lund Poulsen began the campaign on the wrong foot, immediately ruling himself out as a candidate for Prime Minister, before backflipping on social media after internal party pressure. In doing so, however, he effectively ruled Venstre out as a partner for a potential renewed coalition with the Social Democrats and Moderates.
The right-libertarian party Liberal Alliance (LA) has aggressively sought to capitalize on both dissatisfaction with the government, and on Venstre’s woes.
Venstre’s faltering campaign has also seen a return to the party’s core concern: representing Denmark’s influential — and highly polluting — agribusiness sector, as well as business interests more generally. But in a campaign where social justice, a wealth tax, animal welfare, and the dangerous levels of agricultural runoff in much of Denmark’s drinking water have featured heavily, Venstre seems dangerously out of step with the public debate.
The right-libertarian party Liberal Alliance (LA) has aggressively sought to capitalize on both dissatisfaction with the government, and on Venstre’s woes. Party leader Alex Vanopslagh presented himself as a youthful and uncompromising alternative for Prime Minister, calling for the privatization of Denmark’s national broadcaster DR, and joining in the far-right’s escalating xenophobic rhetoric. Among other things, he has called for the strict investigation and policing of “values” held by all new citizens, creating individual “risk profiles” of their potential to hold “anti-democratic” values — something that critics say amounts to the “mind control” of migrants and their descendants, and is an attempt to make it even harder to secure Danish citizenship. For a while LA seemed on track to overtake Venstre as the largest party of the right, but Vanopslagh admission that he used cocaine while in office seems likely to harm its vote.
Amid this fragmentation, the Moderates — led by former prime minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen — have staged an unlikely, if modest, comeback. After last November’s local election, the Moderates crashed to only 1.3 percent support nationally, electing only a handful of councillors and standing on the brink of irrelevance. Since then, however, the party has benefitted greatly from Rasmussen’s high-profile role as Foreign Minister, and his leading role in handling the Greenland dispute with the United States.
On the left, the Socialist People’s Party, Denmark’s main green party, has been one of the biggest beneficiaries of Social Democrat’s decline.
Now polling at a healthy 7 percent, the Moderates — and Rasmussen — may once again hold the balance of power in Denmark. Their centrist positioning, and rejection of any alliance with “extreme” parties of the right or left, makes them a potential partner for multiple government coalitions, and reinforces the sense that Denmark is moving beyond traditional bloc alignments – something Rasmussen has been arguing for since 2019.
What’s Left?
On the left, the Socialist People’s Party, Denmark’s main green party, has been one of the biggest beneficiaries of Social Democrat’s decline, with polls giving them around 13 percent support, while the Social Democrats have been struggling to remain above the 20 percent mark. Under leader Pia Olsen Dyhr, SF has also signalled a clear willingness to enter government with the Social Democrats and the Social Liberals, as well as with other parties of the centre and centre-right.
Further left, the radical left Red-Green Alliance (RGA) has positioned itself as a guarantor of a genuinely “red” government, refusing to support arrangements that drift too far right. Such concern is justified. Unlike the RGA, SF has shown a willingness to compromise with the government on issues such as defence, as well as the Social Democrat’s rapid march rightwards on migration. Instead of building a left alliance with the RGA to take full advantage of social democracy’s shift rightwards, SF seems content to simply enter government as a “responsible” support strut for the Social Democrats.
While a right-wing government remains theoretically possible, internal divisions and the lack of a clear prime ministerial candidate make this outcome increasingly unlikely.
Nevertheless, RGA will not be unhappy with the election campaign’s focus on social and economic issues. Shortly before Frederiksen called the poll, Denmark agreed to reduce VAT on food — a demand raised by the RGA, who have been campaigning on the slogan “For a Denmark you can afford”. Likewise, the call to re-introduce a wealth tax in Denmark is one the RGA has been making for some time, along with groups like Oxfam Denmark. Election results are another matter, however, and the polls suggest little growth in RGA support, long floating in the 6-8 percent range. Dissatisfied Social Democrat supporters are turning instead to the more moderate SF, seen as a safer bet.
Prospects for Government
With a party system in flux, this election’s outcome is unusually difficult to predict. Polls suggest a highly fragmented parliament, with neither traditional bloc commanding a clear majority. Several scenarios are plausible, with polling numbers currently favouring a centre-left government comprising the Social Democrats, SF, the Social Liberals, and the Moderates, with the support of the Red-Green Alliance (and — if they re-enter parliament — left green party The Alternative).
Another possible outcome is yet another unwieldy centrist coalition involving the Social Democrats and Moderates, this time without Venstre — who have effectively excluded themselves — but expanded to include SF, and potentially the Conservatives and Social Liberals. There is little doubt that such coalitions are now Frederiksen’s preferred form of government, but whether the numbers — and the political will — are there for such an arrangement after election day remains to be seen.
For Danish voters on 24 March the choice is not simply between red, blue and purple. It is also between competing visions of Denmark’s future.
While a right-wing government remains theoretically possible, internal divisions and the lack of a clear prime ministerial candidate make this outcome increasingly unlikely. Finally, in the event of prolonged deadlock, Denmark could see the formation of a much broader national unity government involving most parties except those on the far left and far-right, justified by international crises such as the war in Ukraine.
The End of Bloc Politics?
Even if this election leads to a new “red bloc” government of the Left (plus Moderates), one conclusion seems increasingly unavoidable: Denmark’s era of largely stable “red v blue” bloc politics is evolving into something new, built around the emergence of a “purple” bloc of more or less centrist parties that is opposed not only to the far-right, but also to the radical Left. As in other countries where similar political changes have occurred, this new bloc has adopted more of the far-right’s outlook and policies than it would like to admit, further legitimizing such extremism, while helping prevent the emergence of a coherent political alternative to the Left.
For Danish voters on 24 March the choice is not simply between red, blue and purple. It is also between competing visions of Denmark’s future: a more equal society with stronger public services and shared wealth, or a market-dominated model with lower taxes and higher pollution; a more open and welcome country that respects international conventions and human rights, or a more restrictive, xenophobic one; a global leader on renewable energy, or a country that privatizes its national energy company and replaces solar farms with pig farms. The result will not resolve these tensions, but it will reshape the arena in which the political struggles over these tensions are fought out.
