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The Hungarian left did not run in the parliamentary elections. Not only was the radical left absent, but no formation that could be described as left-wing was in the race. Many hope that after the elections, new opportunities may open up. Until then, they are biding their time. But in 2026, who exactly is on the Hungarian left, and what can they hope for?
Left-wing organisations, meanwhile, either offer Tisza strictly verbal support, hoping that a new left-wing movement would have a better chance amid the democratising reforms brought about by a new government, or simply stay away from the election.
In this situation, the few remaining parties that could loosely be called left-wing announced, one after another, that they would not run in the election because they did not want to take votes away from Tisza and stand in the way of Viktor Orbán’s defeat. Left-wing organisations, meanwhile, either offer Tisza strictly verbal support, hoping that a new left-wing movement would have a better chance amid the democratising reforms brought about by a new government, or simply stay away from the election.
Ferenc Kőszeghy writes for the independent left-wing media portal merce.hu.
Thus, Hungary’s small left-wing activist community has chosen to be left out of the largest grassroots movement since the fall of state capitalism. More than 50,000 activists are now supporting the Tisza campaign outside of the party, but this self-organisation has happened without the participation of left-wing communities and institutions. While Hungarian society is clearly mobilizing, and tens of thousands of previously apolitical people have begun to take action, left-wing communities that have been engaged in politics for decades have become passive, since they see the movement around Tisza as part of the evolution of the Hungarian right.
No parliament for the left
In addition to the two major parties, the ballot will feature three others: two with left-wing elements — the Hungarian Two-Tailed Dog Party (MKKP) and the Democratic Coalition (DK) — and one almost openly fascist: Mi Hazánk - Our Homeland (MH). Our Homeland’s slogan is «security», and the biggest highlight of their campaign is the launch of the vigilante group «Crime Hunters», whose viral videos show them luring and exposing thieves and criminals, accompanied by racist remarks from the narrator. They are sure to make it into parliament again this time, and in fact, a 10% result is not out of the question for them, making them the third and most radical right-wing party in the next National Assembly.
The Democratic Coalition is the successor party to the successor party of the state party. Despite their name, the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) had long since embraced Tony Blair-style third-way neoliberalism. Up until 2010, they were one of the dominant parties in Hungarian politics, but in the elections that year, they suffered a major defeat, resulting in Fidesz’s first two-thirds majority victory. The following year, the former MSZP prime minister, the scandal-plagued Ferenc Gyurcsány, founded the Democratic Coalition with his wife, Klára Dobrev, who gradually became the public face of the new party. Although there was a time when the DK, which continued to pursue neoliberal policies, was the leading force of the opposition, the party became completely irrelevant following the formation of Tisza two years ago. It is questionable whether they will even make it into parliament. In 2025, Ferenc Gyurcsány stepped down from the party leadership and left politics altogether, also announcing his divorce from Klára Dobrev. Since then, he has embarked on a career as a writer, publishing a crime novel under the pen name Kate Vargha. The party is currently attempting to position itself as social democratic, yet has plastered the country with posters stating that they would take away the voting rights of dual citizens living abroad, such as Hungarians in Transylvania.
The Hungarian Two-Tailed Dog Party started out as a joke party, and in a sense has remained so to this day. Its main platform is drug liberalization. However, they have now secured several key municipal positions, and their party structure faintly resembles that of the historical labour movement. They prioritize direct action and involving people in local issues, and they are building their community — which is fundamentally liberal in its values but open to the left — accordingly. Vilifying the party for not stepping aside in favour of the current major opposition force is a mandatory element of every campaign period, and 2026 is no different. But this time it is conceivable that in the heightened atmosphere voters will punish them, and they will achieve an even worse result than ever — they have never managed to enter parliament before.
Hungary’s green party, Politics Can Be Different (LMP) has won seats in every parliamentary election since its formation in 2009, and once had a strong left wing. By now, however, it has effectively ceased to exist. The party has undergone several splits over the years. In recent times, it was led by Péter Ungár, the son of Mária Schmitt, one of Fidesz’s chief ideologues — the son is strongly oppositional, but this connection is often brought up by his critics. None of this matters anymore, because Ungár also retired from politics in 2025, but unlike Ferenc Gyurcsány, he has become a poet, rather than a fiction writer. He recently published his first collection of poems, titled «Repeatedly Getting Lost». The party is not running in the election and, for organisational reasons, most of the party's members have left and the funds have also run out - would likely be unable to do so anyway.
Neither will the green social democratic party Párbeszéd, which split from LMP, and whose main face is Karácsony Gergely, Budapest’s supposedly left-wing mayor. Párbeszéd has never run independently, but as a result of various coalition manoeuvres, it has several members of parliament. Not for long. And even though they will hold onto their municipal positions until the 2029 municipal elections, the big question is how they will survive the demise of the old opposition, to which they are so closely tied. After all, Tisza did really wash away everything from that world.
The Szikra Movement, also founded by former LMP members and young people from the radical left, will not be running in the elections either. The Movement, of which I was a member from 2021 to 2024, got one person to the parliament in 2022 as part of the opposition coalition. However, András Jámbor is not running this time, and is instead urging everyone to vote for Tisza instead. Jámbor has severed all ties with Szikra, as has Nóra Schultz, one of the movement’s former founders. Schultz has since shut down her relatively high-reach left-wing podcast, and claims to have «moved beyond» left-wing ideas altogether. The Szikra Movement, though its membership has dwindled, still exists, and is currently engaged in issue-based politics.
However, this «new beginning» for the left will have to happen in a country completely dominated by the right.
Given this, there is a very good chance that the National Assembly will consist of three right-wing parties: Fidesz, Tisza, and Our Homeland. The question is whether staying away will actually carry the already battered left-wing parties and/or politicians through to after the elections — as they hope — or whether this move has sealed their death sentence. If their strategy — of which András Jámbor is perhaps the greatest advocate — is correct, then after the elections, the best-case scenario would be a formation of a new left-wing party from the old ones. However, this «new beginning» for the left will have to happen in a country completely dominated by the right.
Movements, communities
The small but existing Hungarian left is divided. Some hope that the social democratic elements of Tisza’s program — reforming state welfare systems, a wealth tax, and improving on the state ability to protect women and children from abuse, and support the survivors — can really be implemented. Even if they do not trust Tisza’s promises, others, like András Jámbor, believe that after 16 years, the mere possibility of replacing the government could bring a breath of fresh air and re-politicize society. And in this new situation, Tisza will be less likely to openly hinder the left by abusing state power.
However, there is no guarantee that the Tisza government will be any less ruthless than Fidesz. Even if that were the case, it remains to be seen how much room there would be for left-wing alternatives to emerge, with Fidesz being forced into the same oppositional space in which left-wing alternatives are supposed to flourish after the elections. And if Fidesz does remain in power, then the left is guaranteed to face increasingly harsh conditions. Thus, the growing electoral apathy among left-wing communities stems from the very real possibility that 2026 may not yield a favourable outcome for the left. An increasing number of people argue that it is not necessary to choose the lesser evil (Tisza): one can also stay away from the elections altogether.
Those within the left-wing community who have always argued for staying out of parliamentary politics can consider their concerns justified: after years of work, the parliamentary left is in a worse position than ever. Those who stayed out of election politics continue their slow-burn institution-building: co-operatives, trade unions, media outlets. However, with the total failure of electoral political projects, the Hungarian left-wing community increasingly presents the image of a closed subculture that does not wish to break out of its isolated position. Furthermore, we are increasingly vulnerable to the whims of political power. After the 2026 election, we will have no allies left in parliament, and at the level of local government, it is questionable how long politicians sympathetic to the left-wing communities, but affiliated with the old, defeated opposition, will be able to hold onto their positions.
This time, it seems that the Hungarian left has truly hit rock bottom. Yet the embers still smoulder. «The Left is dead! Long live the Left!», as we often say. But perhaps the situation is better described by that age-old Hungarian motto of resignation, made famous in the classic 1982 film Time Stands Still: «Well, I guess we’re living here then».
