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The war waged by the United States and Israel against Iran has brought back into focus a long-overlooked component of the Kurdish question: Iranian Kurdistan, also known as Rojhelat in Kurdish. While the outcome of the conflict remains uncertain, it seems that the Kurds of Iran could become an increasingly important political and strategic actor in the reshaping of the country.
From Historical Core to Strategic Margins
Over the past three decades, Kurds in Iraq, Turkey, and Syria have gained varying degrees of international visibility and new political opportunities. By contrast, Iran’s Kurds have remained largely on the margins of regional and global developments. This marginalization is all the more striking given the central role that Iranian Kurdistan has played in Kurdish history and collective memory.
Asso Hassan Zadeh is a Kurdish scholar from Iran. He earned his PhD in international law from the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies and the University of Geneva. Zadeh is currently a lecturer at the Catholic University of Lyon.
As the second-largest Kurdish region by both territory and population, Iranian Kurdistan has long been a core area of Kurdish political life. Kurdish historical narratives often link the Kurds to the Medes, one of the earliest empires of the Iranian plateau. It is also in Iranian Kurdistan that modern Kurdish nationalism first took organized form with the creation of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) in 1945. Taking advantage of the political vacuum created by the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran during World War II, the PDKI proclaimed the Republic of Kurdistan in Mahabad in 1946, the first and only Kurdish state-like entity in modern history. Although short-lived, it left a lasting legacy: the execution of its president, Qazi Mohammed, in 1947, the anthem “Ey Raqib,” (O enemy!) and the figure of the peshmerga continue to resonate across all parts of Kurdistan.
Why, then, has such a central region remained largely absent from contemporary developments in the Kurdish question?
Foundations of Kurdish Political Exclusion in Iran
First, the trajectory of the Kurdish question itself played a decisive role. Before the rise of modern states, Kurdish regions were organized into semi-autonomous principalities within larger empires, namely the Ottoman and Safavid empires. The Battle of Chaldiran (1514) marked an early division of Kurdish lands between these two powers. However, it was only after World War I, with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, that the Kurdish question became internationalized. The Treaty of Sèvres (1920) briefly raised the prospect of a Kurdish state, but this was abandoned with the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), which confirmed the division of Kurdish populations among Turkey, Iraq, and Syria. Kurdish regions in Iran, not having been part of the Ottoman Empire, remained outside this formative moment and, therefore, largely outside the internationalization process that followed.
A second factor relates to the nature of the states governing Kurdish populations. In Iraq, under the British mandate, the Kurdish question was internationalized early on through the League of Nations, with some degree of recognition of the Kurdish language and identity. In Turkey, despite decades of assimilationist policies, a partially open political system and ties to Europe gradually created space for Kurdish expression and visibility. In Iran, by contrast, the modern state (consolidated between 1906 and 1925) developed along strongly centralist lines, built around the primacy of a Persian national identity. This approach, consistent under both the Pahlavi monarchy and the Islamic Republic, involved the exclusion of the Kurdish language from public life and education, deliberate underdevelopment of Kurdish regions, heavy militarization of Kurdish provinces (officially designated as West Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, Ilam, and Kermanshah), and tight restrictions on foreign media access. Together, these policies contributed to the long-term invisibility of Iranian Kurds.
“Airstrikes and internal protests appear insufficient to bring about systemic change in Iran. Iranian Kurdistan thus emerges as a plausible strategic variable. Reports in early March pointed to unprecedented contacts between US officials and Iranian Kurdish parties, as well as interest expressed by Donald Trump in the possibility of a Kurdish ground offensive.”
A third factor lies in Iran’s demographic complexity. Unlike the more binary configurations seen in Turkey or Syria, Iran is a multiethnic country with significant Azerbaijani, Baluch, Arab, and Turkmen populations. Within this mosaic, Kurds, who make up around 10 percent of the population and live on roughly 7 percent of the territory, have had more limited leverage in national political dynamics.
Finally, internal political openings have been very rare in Iran. After the fall of the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad, the only real window of opportunity came with the 1979 revolution. For a brief period, Kurdish forces, notably the PDKI and Komala, managed to control large parts of the Kurdish territories. But this moment was quickly crushed. Despite initial negotiations, Ayatollah Khomeini, the Iranian Supreme Leader, issued a fatwa, i.e a religious decree, declaring jihad (the holy struggle) against the Kurds, and the Revolutionary Guards reasserted control through widespread violence against civilians.
From Armed Resistance to Strategic Retreat
Throughout the 1980s, Kurdish parties waged an armed struggle against the Islamic Republic, partly shaped by the broader context of the Iran–Iraq War. Yet despite its intensity, this conflict received little international attention. By the end of the decade, a combination of internal divisions, the end of the Iran–Iraq War, and targeted assassinations of Kurdish leaders weakened the movement. In particular, Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, KDPI’s Secretary General, widely seen as the most charismatic Kurdish leader of his time and a figure who could have brought the Iranian Kurdish question onto the international stage, was assassinated in Vienna in 1989 during negotiations with Iranian officials.
While the end of the Cold War opened new international space for many national movements, Iranian Kurds entered a period of deeper marginalization. The fall of Saddam Hussein did not benefit their cause; instead, it strengthened Iran’s influence in Iraq. To preserve the fragile stability of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, Iranian Kurdish parties gradually suspended their armed struggle and relocated their bases deep inside Iraqi Kurdistan. What followed was a long phase of strategic retreat, marked by indirect support for civil activism inside Iran, in the face of continued repression and militarization.
Yet this marginalization did not lead to the disappearance of the movement. Despite internal divisions, Kurdish parties maintained organized armed structures and strong ties with local populations. Since the mid-2010s, efforts toward reunification and coordination have gained momentum. Joint calls for strikes, especially in response to Iranian attacks on Kurdish bases or in the context of the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement, have consistently been met with significant participation in Iranian Kurdish areas. The recent formation of the Coalition of Iranian Kurdish political forces, announced just before the current war, reflects this ongoing reconfiguration.
A Strategic Variable in Regional Conflict
In the context of the current conflict, these dynamics take on new significance. The prolonged nature of the war, combined with Iran’s strategy of regional escalation, has contributed to a growing alignment between US and Israeli objectives. Beyond military pressure to weaken the regime, the possibility of its overthrow is now openly evoked.
In this context, the search for an internal actor capable of shifting the balance becomes crucial. Airstrikes and internal protests alone appear insufficient to bring about systemic change. Iranian Kurdistan thus emerges as a plausible strategic variable. Reports in early March pointed to unprecedented contacts between US officials and Iranian Kurdish parties, as well as interest expressed by Donald Trump in the possibility of a Kurdish ground offensive. Even if such scenarios remain unofficial and appear to have been tempered, they signal a clear shift in perception. Iranian Kurds are no longer seen solely as a marginal actor, but as a potential lever in an indirect ground strategy.
Several factors explain this reassessment. Iranian Kurdish forces operate in proximity to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, where the United States maintains a military presence, offering a potential logistics corridor. They have longstanding combat experience and deep familiarity with mountainous terrain that is difficult for conventional forces to navigate. Politically, despite some weaknesses, they retain a degree of social legitimacy, and recent coordination efforts have strengthened their overall credibility.
“Iranian Kurdistan’s future role will depend as much on the decisions of external powers as on Kurdish actors’ ability to seize a rare window of opportunity. Otherwise, Iranian Kurdistan might again be pushed to the margins, even as the region undergoes a potentially profound transformation.”
At the same time, major constraints remain. Iran continues to exert constant military pressure on Kurdish bases in Iraq, regularly targeting them with drone and missile strikes. Kurdish forces lack the capacity to operate effectively without external support. Perhaps most importantly, past experiences of abandonment have fostered deep mistrust. Kurdish parties are demanding concrete guarantees, such as a no-fly zone, which have not been forthcoming.
This has given rise to a strategic debate within the movement: Should Kurdish actors wait for explicit US backing, or act independently? A unilateral move could generate internal momentum, but it would also carry significant risks, especially in a global context far less favourable than in the early 1990s, when Iraqi Kurds benefited from international protection.
At the same time, Iranian Kurdish parties remain engaged in the broader Iranian political arena. Most advocate a democratic, pluralist, and federal vision for Iran, combining recognition of collective rights with commitment to democratic principles. While the right to self-determination remains part of their discourse, the dominant approach focuses on transforming the Iranian state rather than pursuing immediate secession. In this sense, they are active participants in various opposition coalitions seeking to build an alternative political future without aligning with monarchist forces in exile. In late March, an attempt to bring together a broad coalition of Iranian opposition forces took place in London under the name Iran Freedom Congress, with the participation of the main Kurdish political parties.
Iranian Kurdistan thus stands as a strategic variable, yet uncertain. Its future role will depend as much on the decisions of external powers as on Kurdish actors’ ability to seize a rare window of opportunity. Otherwise, Iranian Kurdistan might again be pushed to the margins, even as the region undergoes a potentially profound transformation.
