Analysis , | 05/22/2026 : Russia's Unions Under Pressure

On 9 April, what had long been feared came to pass: masked security forces stormed the headquarters of Russia’s second most influential trade union centre, the Confederation of Labour of Russia (Konfederatsiya Truda Rossii, KTR), and the offices of two of its largest member organizations — the Federal Trade Union of Air Traffic Controllers (FPAD) and the Seafarers’ Union of Russia (RPSM). The searches on 9 April were accompanied by a smear campaign via pro-Kremlin Telegram channels, accusing the trade union leaders of subversive activities funded by “enemies of Russia”.

So far, no arrests have been made, nor has anyone even been officially charged. Whether this will remain the case, or whether Russian trade unionists will share the fate of their Belarusian counterparts, who have either been thrown in prison by Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s regime or forced to emigrate, remains to be seen. 

How have the war and the totalitarian evolution of Putin’s regime changed the trade union movement in Russia? Will the movement be able to adapt to the political “winter” and preserve its essence?

The Russian Working Class in the Fifth Year of the War

Despite the protracted and clearly futile war, the Kremlin has long managed to maintain the illusion among Russians of an almost normal life — at least in economic terms. It even succeeded in convincing parts of society that the so-called “special military operation” and the break with the West would improve living standards, albeit at the cost of sacrificing certain comforts and freedoms. 

This belief was fuelled not only by generous payments to military personnel, up to 4 million roubles for signing a fixed-term contract with the army, the equivalent of four to five years’ wages for an average worker. The boom in military production, combined with an acute labour shortage (a consequence of low birth rates, reduced immigration, and the outflow of able-bodied men to the front), has led to record wage growth. According to the tax service, between 2022 and 2024, wages rose by 56 percent, whilst official inflation stood at 32 percent.

Recently the mirage of “military Keynesianism” seems to be beginning to fade. Inflation-adjusted wage growth slowed in 2025 and came to a complete halt in 2026. Talk of tightening belts has begun.

It was not only employees in the defence industry and related sectors who benefited. Civilian employers were forced to enter a wage race with the defence sector and the army in order to retain staff. This growth was certainly extremely uneven and accompanied by intensified exploitation, not to mention the fact that the working class paid for it with their blood. But after decades of neoliberal policies, even this “redistribution of wealth” may have seemed like a blessing.

However, recently the mirage of “military Keynesianism” seems to be beginning to fade. Inflation-adjusted wage growth slowed in 2025 and came to a complete halt in 2026. Talk of tightening belts has begun. Now even one of Russia’s leading oligarchs, Oleg Deripaska, is raising the prospect of switching to a six-day week and a 12-hour working day. 

A key indicator of the looming crisis is the rise in unpaid wages. The issue is cited as the primary cause of widespread worker discontent, typically accounting for around 40 percent of documented labour protests. 

Against this backdrop, an upsurge in labour protests appears likely. In 2025, the Zabastkom project recorded 350 instances of workers defending their rights in the Russian Federation. The overwhelming majority (274) of these took the form of collective appeals to the authorities, as has been typical in recent years. However, more radical forms of collective action have not disappeared entirely: eight disputes involved strikes, 12 involved collective resignations (which can also be regarded as a kind of strike), another eight involved demonstrations, and one resulted in a motorway blockade.

At the same time, as politician and trade unionist Oleg Shein notes in an article on the Rabochaya Politika website, workers have been demonstrating an ability to coordinate and organize themselves, despite the increased risk. For instance, the recent strike by Yandex Go taxi drivers took place simultaneously not only across a number of Russian regions, but also in Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. 

The extent to which these mostly spontaneous protests can serve as a catalyst for trade union development is a matter of debate. On the one hand, trade unions rarely take part in such protests. This is partly due to the precarious nature of the sectors most prone to labour disputes (construction, the service sector, the so-called platform economy), partly to the passivity of trade union leaders, and partly to the caution of the workers themselves and the limited scope of their demands. On the other hand, the deepening crisis and the spread of its consequences to other sectors of the economy could revitalize, at the very least, the least bureaucratized parts of Russia’s fragmented trade union movement.

Trade Unions: The Old…

The trade union movement in Russia is characterized by a divide between the “old” unions (which trace their origins back to the Soviet trade union centre, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions) and the ‘new’ or independent trade unions. The former are united under the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia (Federatsiya nezavisimykh profsoyuzov Rossii, FNPR), whilst the majority of the latter are part of the aforementioned Confederation of Labour of Russia (FTR).

In the USSR, trade unions, whilst they were civil society organizations on paper, effectively functioned as a branch of the social welfare system. As a result, even now many Russians expect trade unions to provide holiday vouchers and New Year’s gifts rather than support in defending their labour rights.

Russia’s transition to capitalism in the 1990s was accompanied by mass impoverishment, catastrophic deindustrialization, and social chaos. The “old” trade unions lost their powers as administrators of the state budget and, it seemed, were supposed to transform into normal Western-style trade unions. This, however, did not happen.

Public opinion polls regularly show that Russians are extremely sceptical of trade unions and know little about their activities.

The trade union bureaucracy’s track record as a force loyal to the state and to employers, and as a paternalistic institution, proved well-suited to the new masters of the Russian economy, who often came from the same nomenklatura circles. In the early 2000s, the FNPR, led by Mikhail Shmakov, signed a cooperation agreement with the ruling party, United Russia, began issuing statements in support of Putin, and even backed the new Labour Code, which effectively banned strikes. For a time, this policy secured the FNPR privileges and a degree of autonomy within the authoritarian system. But the “official” trade unions paid for their passivity and subservience with a narrowing of their social base. Public opinion polls regularly show that Russians are extremely sceptical of trade unions and know little about their activities.

The FNPR’s claimed membership of 19 million people (compared to 54 million in 1993) is met with scepticism by Russian experts close to trade union circles. “The FNPR’s own websites show that the figures are inflated. For example, there is a map showing the percentage of workers covered by trade union membership across the federal districts. If we take Rosstat’s data on the number of workers in the relevant federal district, we get 13 million instead of 19 million,” comments one of our interviewees, who wished to remain anonymous for safety reasons.

… and the New

The history of new or independent trade unions dates back to the Perestroika era, when widespread dissatisfaction with the Soviet system (including the official trade unions) and the weakening of state control fostered self-organization within workplaces. This led, in particular, to the emergence of trade unions representing seafarers, air traffic controllers, and pilots, which form the backbone of the KTR. During the Putin era, their ranks have been bolstered by grassroots organizations, such as the Interregional Trade Union Workers Association (Mezhregionalny Profsoyuz Rabotchaya Assotsiatsii, MPRA,predominantly active in the automobile industry), Uchitel’ (teachers), Deistvie (healthcare), Novoprof (food and service industry). 

The independent trade unions are more likely to enter into disputes with employers and organize more collective actions, and in better times they have publicly criticized the authorities. The ideological spectrum of this faction of the trade union movement has always been diverse — ranging from neutral or pro-Kremlin views, to various forms of left-wing politics and even Navalnyism (for instance, the Alliance of Doctors and Alliance of Teachers trade unions that were crushed by the authorities in the early 2020s.) 

The new trade unions often made up for their limited legal scope through creativity and effective self-promotion in the media. For example, the MPRA’s trademark became “Lesik fans” (named after a trade union activist) — a smart way of circumventing the impractical legal procedure for calling a strike, devised during the workers’ struggle at the Ford car plant near St Petersburg.
Despite its combative reputation, the KTR has always been a small organization compared to the bureaucratic behemoth of the FNPR. Until recently, it claimed to have 2 million members, but the accuracy of this figure is hard to credit. Currently, the confederation’s website mentions only 14 member organizations without specifying their membership numbers.

There are many possible explanations for why the new trade unions have remained in the shadow of the old ones. These include the need to build their structures from scratch, resistance from employers, the lack of effective legal protections for activists, the atomization of post-Soviet society, and deindustrialization coupled with the growth of precarious employment. The large-scale war has added a new factor to this list — the fear of state repression, which is affecting ever broader sections of the Russian population.

How the War Has Changed the Trade Union Movement

The purge of the public sphere, first of open opponents of the war and later of any initiatives not fully under the authorities’ control, has forced both new and old trade unions to confront the question of their own survival.

The FNPR supported the aggression without hesitation and withdrew from the International Trade Union Confederation which had condemned it. The trade union centre’s May Day marches in 2022 took place under the characteristic slogan: “Za мир! Zа труд! Zа май!”, in which the nostalgically tinged Soviet slogan “Peace, labour, May” was combined with the symbol of the Russian intervention — the Latin letter Z. 

However, absolute loyalty to the Kremlin and an oath of allegiance to Russian imperialism did not save the trade union centre from losing its influence and autonomy. Evidence that the former “contract” between the Kremlin and the FNPR is no longer functional can be seen in a series of criminal cases initiated by the Prosecutor General’s Office over the embezzlement of trade union property, including the sanatoriums in the Caucasian Mineral Waters, the Palace of Labour in St Petersburg, and the sports complex in the Krylatskoye district of Moscow. Corruption allegations apparently played a decisive role in the change of leadership at the federation in 2024. Instead of Shmakov, who was 75 at the time and was given a ceremonial post, Sergei Chernogaev was elected chairman of the FNPR.

Chernogaev was a top executive at Russian Railways (a state-owned monopoly in the rail transport sector), where he was responsible for social affairs. He was also a member of the School of Governors, which trains leaders of the regions. “Chernogaev is now taking measures to replace Shmakov’s people,” another expert familiar with the situation notes.

Grassroots organizations of industry-wide trade unions are increasingly being forced out of workplaces. This happens particularly frequently in the defence sector, where trade unions are effectively banned.

The appointment of a career civil servant , instead of a puppet of the trade union elite itself to the head of the FNPR has made the union even more compliant. Whereas previously the federation managed to secure concessions in the Russian Trilateral Commission for the Regulation of Social and Labour Relations with representatives from trade unions, employers and the Russian government., today it prefers to “stay under the radar”. As a result, openly anti-worker initiatives, such as the draft law to increase the overtime limit from 120 to 240 hours a year, or the legalization of so-called platform work, meet with almost no opposition.

But even this does not spare the FNPR from political harassment. Grassroots organizations of industry-wide trade unions are increasingly being forced out of workplaces. This happens particularly frequently in the defence sector, where trade unions are effectively banned. In addition, trade unions are being driven out en masse from agricultural holdings, where they had previously, however tentatively, been making demands.

In the early days of the full-scale war, the KTR issued a cautious statement calling on the parties to pursue peace and negotiations, whilst avoiding naming those responsible for the war (the text is currently unavailable on the website, as even mild criticism of the so-called “special military operation” is considered unsafe). Some leaders and activists of the confederation, such as its then vice-president Oleg Shein, unequivocally condemned the aggression. For this, he was declared a foreign agent and forced to leave the country.

Nevertheless, until very recently, the new trade unions had been spared repression. Unlike many NGOs, which were designated as “foreign agents” or “undesirable”, the KTR structures retained their legal status, participated in the Trilateral Commission, and even received a small subsidy from the state budget. 

Strict self-censorship and a focus almost exclusively on legal matters have become essential for survival. Whereas the KTR used to position itself as a fairly politicized trade union centre, social-democratic in persuasion and proud of its international connections, today there is not a hint of politics to be found on its official website. Dry legal topics dominate: court rulings, reviews of legislative changes, rules for calculating various payments and so on. 

According to experts, this is not only due to the fear of possible repression, but also to an attempt to avoid a split within its own ranks, where there are both opponents and supporters of the war.

Some of the new trade unions have organized actions that could be interpreted as veiled criticism of militarism. For instance, Uchitel’ activists in various regions used the propaganda-style extracurricular programme “Conversations about Important Matters”, introduced with the aim of indoctrinating children with a pro-war spirit, to speak to children about labour rights. In doing so, they were also protesting low wages in the education system. At the same time, some local branches of KTR-affiliated trade unions are participating in pro-war volunteering on their own initiative. 

The fear pervading Russian society could not fail to affect the numbers of the new trade unions, and workers’ willingness to join their ranks. However — at least until the April “crackdown” on the KTR — the overall picture was not entirely bleak.

“In some places, membership is stagnating, whilst in others it’s growing slightly. For example, new local branches are being set up within the Deistvie healthcare workers’ union. They are working with the most proletarianized section of the healthcare workforce — nurses, nursing assistants and ambulance crews, who literally have nothing to lose … Not everything is stagnating, but for the most part we have to survive, to maintain the structure. Sometimes — in a reduced form,” one of our interviewees said. 

Legal strikes in Russia have virtually disappeared — Rosstat usually records between zero and one such action per year.

A rise in trade union activity is likewise being observed in the sector of so-called platform-based employment. For instance, last year saw two waves of taxi drivers’ strikes; trade unions have also become more active in courier services and marketplace delivery services.

The existential challenge for trade unions is not so much the risk of persecution itself, but the impossibility of collective action. Holding legal strikes has been practically impossible since the early 2000s. The Labour Code adopted at the time made the procedure as difficult as possible and also banned workers in many sectors, including transport and public utilities, from striking. As a result, “legal” strikes in Russia have virtually disappeared — Rosstat usually records between zero and one such action per year.

The new trade unions have always found loopholes to circumvent restrictions. However, in recent years, both trade union leaders and ordinary workers have been forced to exercise extreme caution. After all, against a backdrop of military paranoia, any collective action can be interpreted by the security forces as an act of “extremism”. As a result, the most common form of labour protest since 2022 has been collective complaints to state bodies or recording video appeals to the authorities in the hope of getting the boss to back down.

Freedom of assembly in Russia was effectively crushed during the pandemic. Temporary bans on street protests introduced in Moscow and a number of regions have become de facto indefinite (even though other anti-Covid measures were lifted long ago). Penalties for participating in gatherings not authorized by the authorities have become extremely harsh. For instance, Kirill Ukraintsev, an activist with the independent trade union Kurier (which is not part of the KTR), spent almost a year and a half in prison for calling on striking couriers at Mail.ru to gather outside their office.

Whereas previously the authorities reacted less harshly to rallies and pickets without political demands, now any protest, including labour protests, can be brutally dispersed. “Today in Arkhangelsk, there was a spontaneous work stoppage by construction workers due to unpaid wages. The OMON, the Russian special military police, arrived and detained two workers who had barricaded themselves in a crane,” one of the interviewees gave as a recent example.

What Does the Future Hold for Trade Unions?

The FNPR is unlikely to be able to prove its worth once again to a system that increasingly views any form of public activism — even that which is loyalist and pro-government — as a potential threat. That said, the “old” trade unions may continue to exist for some time simply through inertia, particularly in the public sector. Occasionally — as in the case of the recent strike at the Smolenskavtodor plant — their grassroots organizations are still capable of mobilizing workforces to fight. However, it is difficult to imagine such cases becoming a broader trend.

The activities of independent trade unions are increasingly reduced to providing legal support to their members. “There is a significant risk of trade unions turning into human right organizations. But such a transformation, given the dwindling number of more or less independent media outlets, biased courts, and the fact that the authorities are could not care less about international pressure, is becoming increasingly ineffective. For a trade union, this spells death,” a Russian expert is convinced.

Both of our interviewees are convinced that the future of the free trade unions depends on whether they can “‘collectivize’” their work. Trade unionists are organizing actions like flash mobs on social media, signing petitions, filing mass lawsuits in the courts and thereby turning routine procedures into acts of protest, and so on. Ideas such as workers submitting mass resignation letters, stating that the resignation will be withdrawn once certain demands are met, are also being discussed. 

A more dramatic — and, unfortunately, increasingly plausible — scenario is the violent suppression of trade unions. The April attack on the KTR appears to be a prelude to such a turn of events.

Officially, it is a response to a conflict between the leadership of the Federal Trade Union of Air Traffic Controllers and one of its roughly one hundred local branches. What began as a typical internal union dispute over the division of powers and the terms of a collective agreement at one of the enterprises ended with the expulsion of the “rebellious” branch from the union. One of its former officials later filed a complaint with the police.

The KTR itself has cautiously stated that the searches took place as part of a criminal investigation into fraud. The pro-government Telegram channel Baza reported the “misappropriation” of funds collected as part of voluntary aid for the front (despite the confederation’s neutrality, some of its member organizations are involved in such “philanthropy”). Former KTR vice-president Oleg Shein later clarified in a Facebook post that the sum in question is a paltry 52,000 roubles (around 500 euros), which the expelled local branch had planned to use to purchase medicines for Russian soldiers.

The leaked footage from inside the KTR office and the accusatory tone adopted by the propagandists leave no doubt that the security services’ interest in the trade unions goes far beyond mere financial disputes.

Videos have been circulated on pro-Kremlin Telegram channels in which a police officer accuses the KTR chair of acting on behalf of foreign donors, citing old publications produced with USAID support. Links to the German Friederich Ebert Foundation and Rosa Luxemburg Foundation have also been mentioned.

Against the backdrop of attacks on other institutions symbolic of Russian civil society that took place on the same day — Novaya Gazeta and Memorial — the authorities’ message is unmistakable. 

Historian and political philosopher Ilya Budraitskis commented:

All these actions are driven by the same logic: the eradication of the last remaining structures that serve as a reminder of democracy (and thus of the complexity of Russian society, which cannot be reduced to a model of totalitarian unity). If Memorial represents the memory of [Stalinist] repression, which called into question the state’s absolute moral authority … and Novaya Gazeta undermined the sanctity of power in the present through its investigations, then independent trade unions, by the very fact of their existence, serve as a reminder of class antagonism and the deep divisions within a society that Putinism seeks to reduce to total “national unity”. 

[Translation by Gegensatz Translation Collective]

1. ^ The tactic involves making several demands simultaneously and planning a series of strikes for each demand. As soon as a strike is prohibited by a court order, the trade union informs the company of the next strike only in the evening — outside the courts’ business hours. As a new court order is not issued for one to two days, the protest can continue even though the previous individual strikes have already been declared illegal. (Translator’s note)