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When 34-year-old Ibrahim Traoré became Burkina Faso’s president in October 2022, he was the world’s youngest head of state. Just a few years into his tenure he has already made history. He expedited the pull-out of French troops stationed in Burkina Faso; under his leadership, the country withdrew from the regional union ECOWAS and, along with neighbouring Mali and Niger, founded the Alliance of Sahel States (Confédération des Etats du Sahel, AES). In economic and social policy, too, Traoré has implemented sweeping reforms.
Traoré is a polarizing figure — in Burkina Faso, within the pan-African and internationalist left, and across the Black Diaspora. Some celebrate him as a beacon of hope auguring a new pan-Africanism, the long-overdue end of French neocolonialism in West Africa, and African countries’ striving for more sovereignty. Others call attention to the military regime’s authoritarian tendencies and the repressions of trade unions, critical civil society actors, and the media.
Traoré’s political projects and the sheer speed with which he implements them are remarkable. This makes him popular, especially with young people. The younger generation is frustrated with decades marked by France’s neocolonial dominance and a gerontocratic political system that has proven to be incapable of reform. But the question remains in how far a military government represents an alternative and what a sustainable vision of equitable socio-economic structures and political rule may look like.
A Coup Against Terrorism
On 30 September 2022, Traoré organized a coup d’état against Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, himself a putschist who had just assumed power in January 2022. Neither Damiba nor Traoré stepped into their office with a fully developed programme. Both justified their coups with the previous government’s failure to resolve the country’s security crisis. Attacks by jihadist groups had been massively on the increase since the late 2010s. Several thousand people die each year in attacks and counter-attacks; schools and medical facilities may have to remain shut and more than two million people — almost 10 per cent of the population — were temporarily displaced within the country.
Given that “the fight against terrorism” was Traoré’s key objective when he assumed power, few would have expected him to implement far-reaching reforms within just three and a half years. For many years, radical social movements, especially those associated with the students’ movement, have been mobilizing against French neocolonialism. In the late 2010s, this mobilization began to spread far beyond the core of radical activists. Traoré has been able to harness this growing anti-French sentiment to generate support for his government. As early as January 2023, he demanded that France withdraw its remaining forces. Many people in the region, and particularly in Burkina Faso, welcomed the departure of the 400 French soldiers. Given the rapidly deteriorating security situation, it seemed obvious that this heavily equipped special unit was incapable of fulfilling its official mission of supporting the fight against jihadist groups.
Geopolitical Shifts
It is not only the relations with France that have changed under Traoré. The same applies to neighbouring Benin and Côte d’Ivoire as well as the West African economic union ECOWAS. The latter had suspended the memberships of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger following the military coups there. Following an army takeover in Niger in July 2023, ECOWAS and France exerted pressure on the new military government to reinstate the ousted president, Mohamed Bazoum. Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, and Senegal signaled their willingness to deploy troops to Niger. The military governments in Mali and Burkina Faso, which also feared an intervention, proclaimed their solidarity with Niger and their readiness to offer military support to their neighbour if needed. It thus came as no surprise when Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger announced their withdrawal from ECOWAS in January 2024.
In September 2023, these three countries signed the Liptako-Gourma Charter, thereby laying the groundwork for the foundation of the AES in July 2024. The AES was primarily established as a mutual defence pact in reaction to external pressure during the crisis of July/August 2023. It has evolved since then, for instance with the establishment of an investment and development bank as well as a common television channel; that said, security and defence policy continues to be the union’s focus. December 2025 saw the inauguration of a joint military force of 5,000 soldiers.
Authoritarian Measures
The most prestigious infrastructure project of Traoré’s government is the construction of a motorway between the country’s two largest cities, Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso. As for undertakings to strengthen Burkina Faso’s economic sovereignty the most prominent include the opening of two (largely state-funded) tomato processing plants in 2024, and a reform to the mining law that was passed in July 2024, granting the state the right to acquire shares in mining projects. There are efforts to boost local processing of resources and to formalize artisanal mining. The state’s mandatory stake in an industrial mine has been increased from 10 to 15 per cent. In August 2024, the government acquired two gold mines for 90 million US dollars (of a nationwide total of 15 mines; the remaining 13 are run by multinational companies).
Social movements and radical civil society organizations have long since called for better control of the mining sector and more domestic value creation. There is a certain irony in the fact that these demands — just like the rejection of France’s neocolonial dominance — are being taken up by a government that applies repressive measures against these very movements and activists. On 2 April 2025, Traoré proclaimed a “progressive people’s revolution”. At the same time, however, new restrictions have been imposed on the movements, activists, and media that have long been campaigning for economic and resource sovereignty and the end of neo-colonial influence.
The most recent example is the country’s leading student union, Union Générale des Etudiants Burkinabè (UGEB), which has played a leading role in social struggles ever since it was established in 1960. On 26 May 2026, a ministerial decree banned the UGEB from engaging in any activity whatsoever for the duration of three months; the union’s chair and other student activists were arrested. This came after the UGEB publicly criticized the restrictions on basic rights during “fight against terrorism”. As a consequence, it now faces accusations of “glorifying terrorism”. The student union is the most prominent case to date, but it is not the only one; other organizations were dissolved or had their activities suspended in April and May 2026. This was possible due to the new law on the freedom of association, which had been amended in July 2025 — officially to curb money laundering and the financing of terrorism by non-governmental organizations.
On an institutional level there is currently barely any space for opposition; the media, social movements, and civil society organizations only have limited breathing space to voice criticism. Freedom of assembly, speech, and the press have already been curtailed under the civilian government of Roch Marc Christian Kaboré (president from 2015 until he was ousted by Damiba’s coup in January 2020), who cited the threat of terrorism as a reason to curtail constitutional liberties. The policy of “general mobilization” of 2023 now allows the government to confiscate resources to fight terrorism and to conscript individuals into the army. On these grounds, several representatives of civil society organizations, trade unions, and media have been deployed to frontline anti-terror missions.
In March 2025, the ministry for Territorial Administration dissolved the Association of Journalists of Burkina Faso (AJB). The chair and vice-chair as well as a number of other journalists were arrested without a court order. Some were conscripted to fight against jihadist groups. Several critical journalists have disappeared; others, along with artists and social media activists, now live in exile.
The media operate under intensive scrutiny, which is why reliable information is difficult to access. The country’s most important independent radio channel, Radio Oméga, was taken off-air in August and September 2023 after it had broadcast an interview about the coup in Niger. In August 2025, it received a three-month suspension for describing the government as a “junta”. In March 2026, the newspaper Courrier Confidentiel was banned for three months. The role played by social media is both crucial and problematic. While reporting by independent media remains restricted, social media is being used intensely to garner support for the government. Traoré became a social media star very quickly. The reliability of the claims and the origin of the images in these posts, however, remain hard to verify. It is certain that some are AI-generated, including hymns celebrating Traoré by Beyoncé, Justin Bieber, and Rihanna, as well as a message by the Pope.
This social media hype, the lack of reliable information, and the deep longing, especially among younger generations, to see a fundamental transformation in the political and economic structures have combined to cast Traoré as an icon of revolutionary hope.
The Long Shadow of Thomas Sankara
This image of an iconic president brings to mind another ambitious young officer who became president through a coup d’état. Thomas Sankara, who came to power in 1983, is still remembered as a pan-Africanist and for his campaigns to strengthen the local economy and agriculture, to combat corruption, and to promote women.
In 2023, Traoré’s government was the first to declare the anniversary of Sankara’s assassination, 15 October, a national holiday, and it renamed Ouagadougou’s Boulevard Charles de Gaulle to honour Thomas Sankara.
In fact, Sankara had been rehabilitated and proclaimed a “national hero” as early as 2000, under the government of Blaise Compaoré (who was responsible for the coup that ousted Sankara and his assassination). Similarly, the planning and commissioning of the Memorial Thomas Sankara, designed by Burkinabe-German star architect Francis Kéré and unveiled by Traoré in 2025, dates back to 2017 — Kaboré’s first term in office.
Traoré faces different conditions today than those encountered by Sankara in the 1980s. In particular, Sankara did not have to deal with threats posed by terrorist groups. Unlike Sankara, who stood up to the conservative religious and traditional elites, Traoré’s rule is based on their support. Aside from the question wether Traoré is the new Sankara: the debate is deeply polarized already, and a cult of personality does nothing to facilitate critical engagement with political strategies and visions. For such an engagement to take place, however, it is essential that critical voices within Burkinabe civil society have spaces where they can speak freely.
