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One of the recurring images from my visit to Congo is the endless procession of trucks carrying cobalt and other minerals out of the country's mining regions. I see them on dusty roads, at border crossings, and along major transport routes, each one beginning a journey that may end in an electric vehicle battery in Europe, a smartphone in North America, or a data centre powering the digital economy. Every day, vast quantities of wealth leave the Democratic Republic of Congo in the form of minerals that have become indispensable to the modern world.
Yet in the same country, millions of people struggle to secure enough food. According to the latest estimates, more than 25 million Congolese face acute food insecurity, which means that Congo is facing one of the largest hunger crises in the world. At the same time, the country possesses immense agricultural potential, with an estimated 80 million hectares of arable land, abundant water resources, and climatic conditions capable of supporting a wide range of crops.
International attention often focuses on Congo's recurring crises. In recent months, headlines have highlighted renewed violence in the east of the country, mass displacement, and another Ebola outbreak. These emergencies are real and demand urgent attention. But they also risk obscuring a deeper question: How can one of the most resource-rich countries on earth remain trapped in poverty, instability, and hunger?
The answer lies not in a lack of resources, nor in some inherent failure of the Congolese people or state. Rather, it lies in a political and economic system that, for more than a century, has been organised around extracting wealth from Congo while investing far too little in the people who live above it. The story of modern Congo is not simply a story of conflict. It is a story of extraction.
How Colonialism Built Congo's Extraction Economy
To understand why so much wealth leaves Congo while so little remains, it is necessary to look briefly into the country's colonial past.
In 1885, what is now the Democratic Republic of Congo became the personal possession of Belgium's King Leopold II. Under the Congo Free State, vast areas of the country were transformed into extraction zones dedicated primarily to the production of rubber and ivory. Villages were subjected to brutal quotas, forced labour, and violent punishment for those who failed to meet production targets. Historians estimate that millions of Congolese died during this period as a result of violence, famine, disease, and social disruption.
Yet the most enduring legacy of colonialism was not only its brutality. It was the economic model it created. Roads, railways, and river transport systems were designed not to connect Congolese communities to one another or to support domestic development. Their primary purpose was to move raw materials from the interior to ports and onward to global markets.
The colony generated enormous wealth for Europe, but little of that wealth was reinvested in building a diversified economy capable of serving the needs of the Congolese population. Agriculture was reorganised around export production, while local development remained secondary to extraction. When Congo gained independence in 1960, the colonial administration departed, but the structures it left behind proved far more resilient.
Congo’s Cobalt and Copper: Who Profits from the DRC's Minerals?
Today, Congo occupies a strategic position in the global economy that would have been unimaginable a generation ago. Beneath its soil lie some of the minerals that power the technologies of the twenty-first century. The country is the world's largest producer of cobalt, a critical component in many rechargeable batteries, and possesses significant reserves of copper and coltan, a mineral used in the manufacture of smartphones, laptops, and other electronic devices.
Too often, the focus falls exclusively on local militias, corruption, or insecurity, while much less attention is paid to the broader economic system that profits from Congolese resources.
As governments and corporations race to reduce carbon emissions, demand for these minerals has surged. Electric vehicles, renewable energy systems, and digital technologies all depend on supply chains that increasingly begin in Congolese mines. In this sense, Congo has become indispensable to the global green transition.
Yet the benefits of this mineral wealth remain unevenly distributed. International discussions about Congo often revolve around the concept of "conflict minerals" – resources extracted in areas affected by violence and armed groups. While these concerns are legitimate, they can also narrow the conversation. Too often, the focus falls exclusively on local militias, corruption, or insecurity, while much less attention is paid to the broader economic system that profits from Congolese resources.
The smartphone in a consumer's pocket, the battery in an electric vehicle, and the servers powering the digital economy are all connected, however indirectly, to the landscapes and communities where these minerals are extracted. This raises an uncomfortable question that rarely appears in discussions about conflict minerals: If Congo is so essential to the modern global economy, who is actually benefiting from its wealth?
What the Green Energy Transition Costs Congo
For many governments, the transition away from fossil fuels represents one of the defining challenges of the twenty-first century. Across Europe, North America, and Asia, ambitious plans are being developed to expand renewable energy, electrify transport systems, and reduce carbon emissions. Electric vehicles have become the symbol of this transformation, promising a cleaner future powered by batteries rather than petrol.
The batteries that power electric vehicles require large quantities of critical minerals, particularly cobalt and copper. As demand for these resources grows, Congo has become increasingly important to the global race for clean energy technologies. At the same time, competition between major powers – including China, the United States, and the European Union – has intensified as governments seek to secure access to the minerals that will underpin future industries.
The transition may be green, but it is not necessarily just.
From one perspective, this represents a historic opportunity for Congo. A country that has long occupied the margins of the global economy suddenly finds itself at the centre of a new industrial revolution.
However, raw materials continue to leave Congo largely unprocessed, while most manufacturing, technological innovation, and value creation take place elsewhere. The result is that the countries consuming the minerals often capture far greater economic benefits than the countries producing them.
This is the paradox at the heart of the green transition. The world is seeking solutions to the climate crisis, but too little attention is being paid to the unequal economic relationships embedded within the supply chains that make those solutions possible. The transition may reduce carbon emissions, but it does not automatically reduce inequality.
The transition may be green, but it is not necessarily just.
Food Insecurity in the DRC: Why Congo Cannot Feed Itself
When people speak about Congo's wealth, they almost always mean minerals. The conversation quickly turns to cobalt, copper, gold, or coltan. Far less attention is paid to another form of wealth that is arguably just as important: land.
The Democratic Republic of Congo possesses some of the most favourable agricultural conditions in Africa. The country is home to vast areas of fertile land, immense freshwater resources, abundant rainfall, and climatic diversity capable of supporting a wide range of crops. Agricultural livelihoods remain the primary source of income for millions of Congolese households, particularly in rural areas.
Yet despite this potential, food insecurity remains widespread. Millions of people struggle to access sufficient food, and the country continues to import significant quantities of products that could potentially be produced domestically. This raises an important question: Why has agriculture remained so marginal in national development strategies despite its enormous potential?
That logic did not disappear with independence. Over the decades since independence, mining continued to attract political attention, foreign investment, and international interest in ways that agriculture rarely did. Governments, corporations, and external actors consistently viewed Congo's mineral wealth as a strategic asset, while the country's agricultural potential remained largely underdeveloped.
Conflict has further deepened this imbalance. Repeated cycles of violence and displacement have disrupted farming activities, forced families from their land, and weakened local markets. In many rural areas, farmers face enormous challenges in accessing roads, storage facilities, irrigation systems, agricultural inputs, and financial services. For many communities, producing food is often less difficult than transporting and selling it.
The result is a striking contradiction: Congo exports strategic minerals while importing food it could produce itself. The country helping to power the world's electric vehicles possesses enough agricultural potential to transform food security across much of Central Africa. Yet for millions of Congolese families, the promise of that potential remains unfulfilled. Congo's challenge is, therefore, not only about how minerals are extracted. It is also about what kinds of development are neglected when extraction becomes the organising principle of an economy.
Why Humanitarian Aid Alone Cannot Fix Congo's Crisis
The consequences of Congo's extractive economy are often most visible through the lens of humanitarian crisis. Over the past decades, millions of people have been displaced by conflict, communities have faced recurring food shortages, and outbreaks of diseases such as Ebola have placed additional strain on already fragile public services.
In response, a vast humanitarian effort has emerged. International and local organisations provide cash, food assistance, emergency healthcare, protection services, and support for displaced families. These interventions save lives every day and remain indispensable for millions of Congolese. Without them, the human cost of conflict and displacement would be far greater.
Yet humanitarian action operates within an important constraint. Its primary purpose is to address immediate needs rather than transform the structures that produce them. Food assistance can help families survive a failed harvest or displacement. Emergency programmes can support communities affected by violence. But they cannot, on their own, resolve the deeper economic conditions that leave populations vulnerable in the first place.
The international community invests considerable resources in responding to crises after they occur, while far less attention is devoted to addressing the long-term patterns of extraction, underinvestment, and rural neglect that contribute to those crises.
Resource Sovereignty: Can Congo Reclaim It’s Wealth?
If Congo's challenges are rooted in an extractive model of development, then the question is not simply how to extract resources more efficiently. It is whether the country's wealth can be organised around different priorities altogether. The challenge facing Congo is not a lack of resources, but a lack of control over how those resources are used and who ultimately benefits from them.
This raises a broader idea: resource sovereignty. At its core, resource sovereignty is about ensuring that the wealth generated from natural resources contributes to national development rather than primarily serving external interests. It means asking whether minerals should leave the country only as raw materials, or whether more value can be created through domestic processing and regional industrialisation. It means asking whether revenues from extraction can support investments in education, healthcare, infrastructure, and productive sectors of the economy.
The challenge facing Congo is not a lack of resources, but a lack of control over how those resources are used and who ultimately benefits from them.
It also means recognising that Congo's future cannot be built on minerals alone. Food sovereignty and rural development must be part of the conversation. A country endowed with vast agricultural resources should not remain dependent on food imports while fertile land remains underutilised and rural communities lack basic support.
Ultimately, the debate is not only about economics. It is about democracy and power. Who decides how Congo's resources are used? Who benefits from the wealth generated beneath its soil? And can Congo move from being a source of raw materials for the world to becoming a country that uses its extraordinary wealth to build prosperity for its own people?
These questions do not have simple answers. But they point towards a future that looks very different from the extractive model that has shaped Congo's past.
