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On 22 May, Senegal’s President Bassirou Diomaye Faye dismissed his party colleague and Prime Minister, Ousmane Sonko, along with his government. His successor, Ahmadou Al Aminou Lô, formed a cabinet consisting primarily of figures who had already served in previous governments. This de facto counter-revolution, the opposite of the promised “sovereignist revolution”, is at odds with the ongoing demand by many Senegalese for fundamental change. The question is: who will prevail?
The Senegalese presidential election in March 2024 was as gripping as a crime thriller: ten days before polling day, the Secretary-General and the Chair of the Executive Board of the PASTEF party (African Patriots of Senegal for Work, Ethics and Fraternity), Faye and Sonko, were released from prison. A spectacular election campaign ultimately ended with Faye’s victory, yet it was Sonko who had not only given the party a face but had also mobilized an entire movement. PASTEF and Sonko successfully conveyed that they stood for policies in the interests of young people — for job creation, a self-assured stance towards Western governments and large corporations, and for far-reaching state reform. However, because Sonko’s presidential candidacy was not approved as he was facing legal charges, Faye stood for election and, once elected president, appointed Sonko as head of government.
The new government faced enormous challenges. The fact that virtually no member of the cabinet had any experience in government made it difficult to take over the reins of power. The most serious problem, however, was that the government had very little room for manoeuvre in the face of a global recession and Senegal’s high national debt.
But the government has been using the little wiggle room they have wherever possible. In the capital Dakar for example it halted all construction projects along the coastline. The area had not been approved for construction due to the threat of coastal erosion but the previous government had nevertheless distributed land to members of the economic elite to shore up its power.
At the same time this underscores the resistance the government is encountering: halting construction has left tradespeople without work and their families without an income, which is particularly acute given the dramatic rise in the cost of living. Such cases are by no means confined to Dakar; in its efforts to tackle corruption and mismanagement the government has also halted numerous construction projects elsewhere, with similar consequences.
Instead of creating jobs, the country’s economy is stagnating. Surprisingly, despite their unmet expectations, young people have not yet staged mass protests. This is largely because Sonko has repeatedly succeeded in blaming the previous government for ongoing problems. Another key factor is that the government is using subsidies to cushion the global rise in food and oil prices.
It is doing so even though President Faye and Prime Minister Sonko have had to acknowledge that the previous government under Macky Sall left them with an even greater mountain of debt than anticipated. Public debt currently stands at 132 per cent of GDP. This is particularly problematic because Senegal’s currency, the CFA franc, is pegged to the euro and tied to conditions over which Senegal has no direct influence. The fact that the government must comply with the European Central Bank’s requirements further restricts its legroom.
Against this backdrop, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) recently demanded that Senegal restructure its debt, a process that would also involve deregulation and suspending subsidies. The Senegalese government rejected these conditions with good reason, which left the country unable to secure any new loans. As a result, investment in job creation and social infrastructure has continued to stagnate.
Faye versus Sonko
During the election campaign two years ago, PASTEF campaigned under the slogan “Diomaye moy Sonko, Sonko moy Diomaye” (Diomaye and Sonko are one and the same). Since then however, it has become clear that the two politicians are nowhere near as inseparable as they led the public to believe at the time.
As Prime Minister, Sonko has been acting neither diplomatically nor strategically; instead, he is prone to public confrontations, even targeting his party colleague Faye. Conversely, Faye is not holding back but exercising the authority of presidential power. Critics describe him as a “grosse tête”, someone who is no longer willing to cede power. In view of the increasingly open conflict between the two leaders there has been speculation about a rift.
The conflict rests on the assumption that Faye is doing everything in his power to secure re-election in 2029—rather than advancing PASTEF’s programme. The differences between Sonko and Faye have become particularly apparent on issues such as managing the budget deficit, an urgently needed judicial reform, and the lack of transparency surrounding so-called “political funds”. These are secret accounts used to finance certain government expenditures; they are administered by the president and are not subject to parliamentary scrutiny. It was precisely these accounts that Macky Sall and his predecessor Abdoulaye Wade exploited in their cronyism. Abolishing them was a key PASTEF election pledge. Instead, the president’s budget has increased, which suggests that Faye is preparing for his next term by building patronage networks.
Faye dismissed Sonko in mid-May, shortly after the latter had publicly called on the president to finally ensure transparency in the use of these accounts. Faye appointed Ahmadou Al Aminou Lô, the former Senegalese National Director of the West African Central Bank, as Sonko’s successor – a move that brought back into power many figures who had shaped the previous neoliberal government. This presents a classic counter-revolution against PASTEF’s plans for a “sovereignist revolution” and a step toward Faye consolidating his power.
The new cabinet also includes Interior Minister Mouhamadou Makhtar Cissé, who previously served as Minister for Oil and Energy under Macky Sall where he negotiated the contracts with the corporations seeking to invest in Senegal’s oil and gas production. These are precisely the contracts that PASTEF had sharply criticized during the election campaign and demanded be renegotiated.
However, PASTEF is no longer part of the Lô administration; the four remaining ministers who hold party membership are not acting on behalf of the party. And although Prime Minister Lô emphasised the importance of the rule of law, transparency and “economic and cultural sovereignty” in his inaugural speech, this rhetoric appears to be more of an attempt to verbally contain the open conflict and suggest stability.
The cabinet reshuffle took place shortly before a meeting between Senegalese government representatives and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in mid-June. Following a downgrade of Senegal’s credit rating, the government made two early loan repayments in an effort to halt its downward spiral on the capital markets. However, this proved insufficient; Standard & Poor’s sent a clear message: without a new loan the credit rating could not be upgraded.
This highlights the limitations of governance—particularly within the CFA franc zone. Furthermore, loans from regional banks are scarcely viable, as they would jeopardize the credit ratings of neighbouring countries, which are equally dependent on international funding. However, the mid-June meeting appears to have yielded a rapprochement, even though, according to the IMF’s communiqué, several questions remained unresolved. It remains unclear which IMF conditions will be enforced and whether they will be accepted by parliament. The example of Tunisia demonstrates that governments tend to remain more stable without IMF loans, while the harsh experiences of the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s sparked mass protests.
PASTEF in Opposition
Meanwhile, the dispute between Faye and Sonko in parliament is entering its next phase, after the latter decided to take up his seat as a member of the National Parliament following his dismissal. However, the legality of his acceptance remains disputed as Sonko was already serving as Prime Minister at the time of the November 2024 legislative elections—a position which, according to the constitution, he is not permitted to hold concurrently with a parliamentary seat. Consequently, critics allege that his mandate lapsed the moment he took office.
Sonko himself takes a different view, citing the written request he submitted to suspend his parliamentary mandate. He has since been elected speaker of parliament with the votes of PASTEF—and has vowed to maintain a confrontational stance toward the new cabinet as leader of the opposition. With its large parliamentary majority (130 out of 165 seats), PASTEF is therefore well placed to keep the government on its toes.
Since Sonko was confirmed as party leader at the beginning of June, his leadership remains undisputed for the time being. According to Félix Atchadé, a member of the party congress’s scientific committee, the party has decided to continue along its chosen path, namely to pursue “a democratic, popular and sovereign revolution” with the aim of achieving “a productive economy, economic sovereignty [and] greater democratic control”. Speculation suggests that a general election could be called before the end of this year. However, Sonko currently enjoys considerable support, and PASTEF would likely emerge as the strongest force. In this respect, the pressing question remains how this restructuring of the state can still succeed under such challenging political, economic and fiscal conditions.
Translated by from German by Übersetzerzentrale München
