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It has been three months since Péter Magyar formed his government in Hungary following a landslide victory on 13 April 2026. He defeated Viktor Orbán’s far-right Fidesz party, which had governed Hungary consecutively for 16 years, enjoying a two-thirds parliamentary majority for most of that period.
Since taking office at the beginning of May, Magyar and his Tisza Party have moved rapidly. This is hardly surprising: they are under pressure not only because they need to dismantle the institutional framework built by Fidesz over four consecutive terms, but also – and perhaps more importantly – because they need to secure the EU funds that have been withheld from Hungary due to concerns over corruption and violations of the rule of law. To “bring home” the EU funds is essential for the Magyar-government, because the withholding of these resources was a central factor behind Tisza's victory over Fidesz. To understand why, it is necessary to examine how Orbán was able to remain in power for a decade and a half.
Orban's Class Alliance
The electoral coalition that enabled Orbán to secure a constitutional majority in 2010 was composed of domestic capitalists and small entrepreneurs, as well as working-class voters who had become frustrated with the economic policies of the previous social-liberal coalition government. These policies were based on favorable regulations aimed at attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) to Hungary, a relatively capital- and technology-poor country. In this environment, Hungarian entrepreneurs found themselves in a weaker position on the domestic market, while working-class voters felt increasingly left behind due to the dismantling of the relatively generous post-socialist welfare state. The flexibilization of the labour market and the privatization of public services, including state-owned energy companies, contributed to rising living costs while social protection remained weak. It was into this tense environment that the 2008–2009 financial and economic crisis arrived.
To resolve this tension, the Fidesz government segmented the economy. In export-oriented sectors, it maintained favorable conditions for foreign companies (initially German automobile manufacturers, and later East Asian battery producers), while in sectors producing primarily for the domestic market (such as retail, banking, telecommunications, and energy), it supported Hungarian capitalists. To benefit both domestic entrepreneurs and foreign companies, the government introduced a more capital-friendly labour law, dubbed the “slave law” by the mass movement protesting its implementation. At the same time, due to job creation and rising living standards, the working class also became increasingly sympathetic toward Fidesz.
For a long time, the leading powers of the EU tolerated Fidesz’s democratic backsliding and clientelist practices because of the government’s favorable policies toward their companies.
The support of small entrepreneurs was further secured through infrastructural developments, which were largely financed by EU resources. These projects, often prestige investments (such as stadiums), not only benefited companies loyal to the government but also provided opportunities for local entrepreneurs as subcontractors. Through this mechanism, the entrepreneurial segment of the middle class became a rent-seeking constituency of the Fidesz government, whose economic position was indirectly enabled by EU transfers.
For a long time, the leading powers of the EU tolerated Fidesz’s democratic backsliding and clientelist practices because of the government’s favorable policies toward their companies. However, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the resulting energy crisis, they reassessed the distribution of resources and demanded greater discipline from Orbán.
When the economic boom came to an end in the early 2020s and EU resources were withheld, both the working class and the entrepreneurial middle class became increasingly disillusioned with Fidesz. Magyar was able to channel this frustration by promising the modernization of neglected public services (such as healthcare, education, and the railway network) through the restoration of access to EU funds, while simultaneously dismantling the parasitic economic practices of companies connected to the Fidesz political network.
This program had the potential to unite the progressive urban middle class, which had consistently opposed Orbán, with the more rural and conservative entrepreneurial middle class. These groups became increasingly politically active over the past year and were able to demonstrate both their strength and the realistic possibility of political change, thereby convincing broader segments of society.
Magyar's Cabinet
The composition of the Magyar government reflects this coalition of middle-class fractions. The Minister of Education, Judit Lannert, is a recognized education researcher, while the Minister heading the Prime Minister's Office, Bálint Ruff, worked for more than a decade as an adviser to progressive, left-wing politicians, including László Botka, the mayor of Szeged. Ruff later became nationally known as a political analyst on the progressive YouTube channel Partizán, one of Hungary's most widely followed independent media outlets. Several state secretaries and deputy state secretaries were also recruited from the human rights and charity NGO sector. These appointments can be interpreted as an attempt to appeal to liberal urban middle-class voters.
At the same time, other members of the cabinet appeal to the managerial middle class – this time with a more internationally oriented profile than under Fidesz – and represent the incorporation of professional elites into the Magyar government. István Kapitány, the former Global Executive Vice President of Shell, and Gábor Pósfai, the former Managing Director of Decathlon Hungary, embody the corporate-managerial background of this group. Similarly, Anita Orbán, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and a former diplomat and senior executive in the energy and telecommunications sectors, including leadership positions at Vodafone, represents the internationally experienced professional elite that the government seeks to integrate.
Because of the genuine expertise of many members of the government, many hope that political decisions will now be made on a more professional basis. However, it remains an open question what the internal power relations within the cabinet will look like.
The government's modernization agenda, which aims to unite different segments of the middle class and other supporters of Tisza, is also represented by figures such as László Gajdos, the former director of the Zoo of Nyíregyháza, who became the first Minister of Environment, a portfolio that previously did not exist as a separate ministry. István Hegedűs, the new Minister of Health, brings experience from leadership positions in hospitals in the United Kingdom – a country that occupies an almost mythical position as a symbol of development and modernity in the Hungarian public imagination. Finally, Dávid Vitézy, the Minister of Development and Transport, represents a technocratic form of expertise that transcends partisan divisions. Although he previously worked under Fidesz, he is widely recognized for his professional knowledge and has developed a significant public following of his own.
Because of the genuine expertise of many members of the government, many hope that political decisions will now be made on a more professional basis. However, it remains an open question what the internal power relations within the cabinet will look like, which projects will receive funding, and which of them will ultimately be implemented. What can be expected is that the government will be more receptive to social pressure than its predecessor. Nevertheless, it would be naive to assume that Tisza will fundamentally transform the way governance is conducted by introducing genuine forms of social consultation, as it has promised to do.
Restructuring Institutions
What is certain is that the institutional architecture left behind by Fidesz will not constitute a major obstacle, as the Tisza government has begun dismantling it at remarkable speed. The President of the Republic and other state officials have been removed through constitutional amendments. The Constitutional Court has been reshaped by introducing new age restrictions for judges. However, the quality of these measures – particularly the codification of legal texts – and their political style evoke memories of how Fidesz began restructuring state institutions after 2010.
In an attempt to prevent the concentration of power associated with Orbán's rule, the Tisza government introduced term limits for the Prime Minister (two terms) and members of parliament (three terms), but these measures were clearly aimed at preventing Orbán's re-election and limiting the ability of other established politicians to remain in office for extended periods.
In the case of the economic model, we should not expect a fundamental transformation under Tisza, but rather a process of adjustment.
In the case of the economic model, we should not expect a fundamental transformation under Tisza, but rather a process of adjustment. Since the party does not have an established political organization or long-standing connections with specific business groups, there is reason to expect a move away from clientelist practices and greater reliance on market mechanisms. However, due to Hungary's position in the global economy, the government will remain dependent on attracting foreign direct investment (FDI).
In this regard, we can expect a more Europe-oriented approach compared to Fidesz, which placed significant emphasis on diversifying the sources of foreign investment arriving in Hungary. A telling example is the meeting between Bavaria’s Minister-President Markus Söder and Péter Magyar, during which they reaffirmed cooperation between Bavaria and Hungary in the automotive sector. They also announced that they would lobby for more favorable EU regulations regarding internal combustion engines.
The most significant change is therefore likely to concern the direction of development rather than the underlying economic model itself. It is already visible that, instead of prestige projects, the government intends to focus on developing the country's infrastructure, with particular emphasis on public transportation.
Regarding the government's relationship to the rule of law, we can draw conclusions from the constitutional changes discussed above. However, it is reasonable to hope that the treatment of minorities will improve and that they will not become direct targets of political campaigns, as they were under Fidesz. One important exception is migration policy. In this area, Magyar and his government fit into the broader trend of the European mainstream shifting continuously towards more restrictive positions associated with the far right.
Magyar Staying Fidesz' Course on Migration
At his first international press conference, Magyar announced that Hungary would not participate in the EU relocation system for refugees, but would instead contribute to addressing migration-related challenges through strengthened border security. While the government has avoided the explicit dehumanization of migrants that characterized Fidesz's rhetoric, it has simultaneously tightened regulations on guest workers and restricted the employment of third-country nationals.
Under the Magyar government, permanent campaigning has not come to an end. However, without the continuous direct targeting of particular social groups, this is the first summer in a long time when people do not have to engage with politics on a daily basis.
Under the Magyar government, permanent campaigning has not come to an end. However, without the continuous direct targeting of particular social groups, this is the first summer in a long time when people do not have to engage with politics on a daily basis – at least not because they are directly affected by political campaigns. In this sense, Hungary appears to have moved from authoritarian capitalism towards a more “ordinary” form of capitalism, where the impact of politics on people's lives is mediated primarily through systemic mechanisms, such as extreme heat and water scarcity.
This situation, however, can only be maintained until the next crisis emerges. The attacks on particular social groups and the dehumanizing campaigns of the previous government functioned as a form of crisis management. The current period of goodwill is temporary and will eventually come to an end, since there are still few signs of a fundamental change in Hungary's exposure to global economic processes.
