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At first glance, the Alternative for Germany (AfD)’s electoral success in Saxony-Anhalt in the Landtag elections of 6 September 2026, when the party won 43,8 percent of the vote, appears to confirm a familiar pattern: an East German region under economic pressure and a strong right-wing party. However, electoral analyses reveal a more nuanced picture. The AfD is not only gaining ground among those who already identify as politically right-wing. It is also particularly strong among the working class, reaching those who fear social decline and tapping into a widespread sentiment—namely, that the realities of their everyday lives are largely ignored in the political sphere.
In doing so, the AfD intertwines social and regional narratives. Economic insecurity, rising costs, and fears of social decline are linked to a narrative about East Germany in which experiences of disadvantage and political alienation persist. Added to this are migration and internal security as key issues. It is precisely this connection that makes the AfD’s success analytically interesting: it translates diverse forms of discontent into a shared political narrative while simultaneously presenting itself as the ostensible solution to these issues.
The AfD’s electoral success is therefore more than just further evidence of the party’s strength. It demonstrates the extent to which the party has now succeeded in merging social conflicts, East German identity and political disillusionment into a project aimed at gaining political power. With almost 44 percent it achieved its strongest result in a state election to date. Compared to 2021, it has more than doubled its share of the vote.
Conditions for the AfD’s Record Win
How did this come about? Three developments are particularly significant: the AfD’s entrenchment outside the major cities; the staging of a self-assured claim to political power centred around its lead candidate, Ulrich Siegmund; and the strategic positioning of Saxony-Anhalt as the first step on the path to further electoral gains in German states and, ultimately, to the federal government.
The AfD is no longer ruling out forming minority government, meaning it is highly likely that the party will provide the next Minister-President of Saxony-Anhalt.
For the AfD, the situation is clear — it has a mandate to govern. As radical as its victory narrative has been in the last months of the election campaign, it now appears to be taking a much more conciliatory approach in its search for partners, seeking to reach out to all other parties that “want to move the state forward” and finally bury the Brandmauer (firewall) the other parties have maintained against cooporation with the AfD. In the coming days, everything will depend on the actions of the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) or, as is being speculated, on individual members within the CDU who could help the AfD secure an absolute majority. The AfD is no longer ruling out forming minority government, meaning it is highly likely that the party will provide the next Minister-President (prime minister) of Saxony-Anhalt.
The election results reveal a clear urban-rural divide. Whilst both Die Linke (The Left) and Die Grünen (The Greens) managed to gain ground in Halle and Magdeburg, the AfD emerged as the dominant political force across the rest of the state at both the district and municipal levels.
Ulrich Siegmund’s Path to Power
The election campaign of lead candidate Ulrich Siegmund therefore relied not only on traditional large-scale events, but also on family gatherings, conversations, barbecues, public forums and trips on the legendary Simson mopeds originating in the GDR. These forms of political communication create an impression of immediate belonging: the AfD presents itself less as a party of the political establishment and more as an integral part of local daily life.
This is strategically significant. The AfD actively intertwines tangible economic and social grievances with a distinct political framework of interpretation. Issues such as wages, energy prices, infrastructure, or the future of rural areas are linked to migration, the perception that the state is being overburdened, and a contrast between “those at the top” and “the people here”. The AfD is now perceived as highly competent in representing “East German interests” as well as in the areas of the economic policy, asylum and refugee policy, and “combating crime”. The party is successfully setting the agenda. Through its strong social media presence, alongside its own local print media, it establishes its own terms, topics, and discourses. During the election campaign, the other parties were often forced to respond to these issues in order to attract attention themselves. This clearly demonstrates that the AfD has become an agenda-setter in both politics and society.
The AfD presented itself not merely as a political alternative, but as a party prepared to exercise state power.
The tone of the election campaign was particularly striking. Siegmund presented the AfD not primarily as a protest party, but as a potential governing party. His friendly demeanour, numerous selfies with supporters, and the personal connection Siegmund intimated in addressing voters created an atmosphere of political momentum and self-confidence for the AfD.
This strategic staging serves a political purpose. It normalizes the notion that an AfD-led state government is not only possible but already to be expected. Siegmund has also repeatedly asserted that the party enjoys growing levels of support within the state apparatus. He claims that civil servants and public-sector employees were telling him “off the record” that they were looking forward to an AfD government and were providing the party with information. These statements are unsubstantiated. Nevertheless, they are politically significant: they convey the impression that the AfD already has access to and support within state institutions.
This aligns with the fact that the party was already discussing a personnel shake up of government bureaucracy prior to the election. Siegmund spoke of 150 to 200 positions within the administration and state-owned enterprises that could be newly filled in the event of a government takeover. The AfD thus presented itself not merely as a political alternative, but as a party prepared to exercise state power.
A Launching Pad for the AfD’s Federal Ambitions?
At the same time, this friendly façade must not be confused with a moderation of the party’s programme. Presented as a “government programme”, it characterized by a highly aggressive underlying tone, attributed to Saxony-Anhalt’s chief ideologue Hanns-Thomas Tillschneider, and includes, among other things, far-reaching demands on migration policy and the concept of “remigration”. Even Siegmund’s clear links to neo-Nazi circles and his participation in the infamous Potsdam meeting fade into the background against his public image as an approachable, ever-smiling future “statesman” (Landesvater). The smooth public image of the beaming Minister-President-elect and the radical nature of his programme coexist — a combination that is extremely dangerous.
Saxony-Anhalt into a political testing ground: a place where the AfD can demonstrate that it aims to be not merely a protest force in opposition, but a viable governing alternative.
The AfD itself is turning the election into a matter of national importance. As early as spring, Siegmund declared that Saxony-Anhalt will be the starting point of a political sea change in Germany. Shortly before the election, he explicitly described a victory in the state election as a “first step”. The party’s federal co-leaders, Alice Weidel and Tino Chrupalla, also portrayed the election as decisive for Germany’s future.
This turns Saxony-Anhalt into a political testing ground: a place where the AfD can demonstrate that it aims to be not merely a protest force in opposition, but a viable governing alternative. Its long-term goal, however, extends beyond the state. This strategy keeps other East German states, the federal government and, ultimately, the political order as a whole firmly in its sights.
This also involves the use of parliamentary power. Saxony-Anhalt’s neighbouring state Thuringia demonstrates how the AfD, as a strong opposition party, can put pressure on fragile governing coalitions: while repeated motions of no confidence against CDU Minister-President Mario Voigt failed, they forced the ruling CDU-BSW-SPD coalition to take a stand and laid bare its dependence on other parties. In Saxony-Anhalt, too, the difficult process of forming a government will trigger new debates about political majorities and coalition models – including at the federal level. Less than 24 hours after the election, the AfD’s key messages to the CDU were crystal clear — the “firewall must be a thing of the past” and, “if the CDU wants to survive, it must stop pursuing left-wing policies,” Chrupalla told German public radio on 7 September.
Neo-Nazi Links
Scandals surrounding links to far-right organizations or the employment of former völkischnationalist cadres from the Heimattreue Deutsche Jugend (Patriotic German Youth, HDJ) have failed to put a dent in the AfD’s standing. Nor has the party been harmed by its own “nepotism scandals”. A raid on the banned group Artgemeinschaft, a Germanic neopagan Nazi cult based on racial-völkisch ideology, a few days before the election led to investigations focusing on two AfD politicians. They stand accused of possible involvement in an event linked to the banned organization; both deny the allegations. Former comrades-in-arms of the now-banned HDJ also serve as staff members for the AfD’s parliamentary group and party apparatus in Saxony-Anhalt. In an interview, Chrupalla dismissed these past activities as “youthful indiscretions”, plays down the völkisch and racist nature of the organization and its members. Polls by Infratest dimap offer a clue as to why these scandals fail to hurt the AfD: eighty-seven percent of AfD voters agree with the statement “although there are individual far-right politicians, overall the AfD tends to be centrist.” This narrative of so-called isolated cases is clearly resonating, while at the same time there is also a proportion of voters who are at least willing to accept a far-right profile.
Saxony-Anhalt is thus not the AfD’s destination, but its starting point. Their electoral success is a clear demonstration how protest votes can be transformed into an avenue to political power. The next battles will therefore not be fought solely over the government of this single state—but over the question of whether the AfD can replicate its success in other states and, ultimately, at the federal level.
What’s Next: Berlin, Mecklenburg, and Beyond
Following an election night that delivered a resounding victory for a far-right party in Saxony-Anhalt, it is difficult to offer hope or find words of encouragement. Yet, certain factors can already make a decisive difference for the local population:
- Closely monitoring developments in Saxony-Anhalt: identifying which actors are collaborating, the direction in which politics is shifting, and the key drivers of fascisation
- Using this analysis to support those who live in, work in and are actively involved in local communities. Providing both political and financial backing to local projects, to alternative youth centres, and even the smallest civil society organizations.
- Developing long-term organisational structures and strategies to strengthen and rebuild spaces of solidarity at the local level.
- Focussing attention on Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Berlin, where state elections are scheduled for 20 September.
