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The images went viral around the world: following their victory against Australia during the World Cup, the Egyptian national team's head coach Hossam Hassan held up the Palestinian flag and explicitly dedicated Egypt's win to the Palestinian people. The Arab world was ecstatic; briefly, Palestine seemed to be the centre of the (football) world, and it felt like unified Arab solidarity was briefly within reach. The Egyptian coach struck a chord by using his relatively secure media platform for something barely possible on Egyptian streets today: openly expressing solidarity with Palestine.
Middle Eastern countries have long since set their priorities elsewhere. They pay lip service to supporting Palestine and providing humanitarian aid, but in terms of realpolitik they are very careful to comply with US and Israeli interests instead of putting an end to the decades-long oppression of the Palestinian people.
The reality is that public expressions of solidarity – for example taking part in demonstrations against the war in Gaza – are banned in many places, and even posting on social media can lead to arrest in countries such as Egypt.
Palestine as an Emotional Lodestar
Palestine has been regarded throughout the region as a point of kinship and a core element of Arab identity, and the Palestinian struggle is often given centre stage. All Arab states have formally recognised Palestine as a state, voice criticism of Israel to varying degrees, and regularly call for an end to the Israeli occupation of Palestine. The significance of the holy sites in Jerusalem, Islam’s third holiest city, also reinforces its importance in the region. However, strong rhetoric on Palestine is counteracted by realpolitik interests, particularly now that the region is undergoing a geopolitical repositioning of sorts.
Contradictions Between Solidarity and Realpolitik
Looking at the region, it is evident that the tension between solidarity with Palestine and the pursuit of national interests stems primarily from the economic and military ties that various Arab states have with the US.
Direct neighbours Egypt and Jordan in particular receive billions in economic and military aid from the US in return for their long-standing peace treaties with Israel (signed in 1979 and 1994 respectively) and their ‘moderate stance’ in the region. Furthermore, pragmatic arrangements with Jordan allow the US and Israel to use its airspace and military bases for missile defence.
Saudi Arabia is considerably more independent than Jordan and Egypt and pursues its own political interests, ruling out any reconciliation with Israel while the occupation of Palestine continues. Qatar takes a slightly different approach towards Palestine, combining political and humanitarian support with pragmatic, mediation-focused foreign policy.
Jordan’s Uneasy Ties to Palestine
Given its history and demographics, Jordan has the closest ties to Palestine of any other country. More than half of the population are Palestinians, or rather, have Palestinian roots. Refugees of the 1948 and 1967 wars, many of them were granted Jordanian citizenship and were able to integrate well compared to other countries in the region. For Palestinians in the occupied West Bank, Jordan is the only route through which they can leave the country to travel abroad. Jordan’s role as official custodian of the holy sites in Jerusalem is also an important connection. Ultimately, anything political that happens in Palestine has a direct impact on Jordan.
The unresolved Palestinian question is therefore a problem of security for Jordan, not only across the river but at home as well. The trauma of the ‘Black September’ of 1970, when a military confrontation broke out between Palestinian militias and the Jordanian army in Amman and Irbid, still runs deep today. Following those event, the PLO was forced to leave Jordan for Lebanon, and Jordan has since taken great care to maintain a political balance on the Palestine question and prevent an increase in Palestinian influence.
Increased Palestinian immigration is seen as a red line and is consequently tightly controlled. This is one of the reasons why Jordan was so strongly opposed to Trump's earlier plans to transfer people from Gaza to Jordan. Not wanting to be complicit in the ethnic cleansing of Palestine, Jordan rejected the plans – it also has its own underlying historical trauma, as well as a desire to maintain some level of power. Nevertheless, Jordan is strongly committed to supporting Palestinians, particularly through diplomatic channels and by providing humanitarian aid. During the Gaza War, the kingdom organised an air bridge, and has provided medical assistance by bringing hundreds of sick and injured children and their families from Gaza to Jordan for medical treatment.
Egypt’s Unruly Neighbour
Egypt is also trying to balance verbal expressions of solidarity and humanitarian aid with realpolitik interests, though it often regards Palestine as a security risk or – behind closed doors – as a troublesome neighbour. Palestinian immigration, and particular infiltration by Hamas and other Islamist groups in particular, is also a red line for the country. Not only does Egypt tightly control its border crossings, but for many years it has kept the border largely closed, joining Israel in its blockade of the Gaza Strip.
Yet for Palestinians, the Rafah border crossing is the only way to leave Gaza, making its residents completely dependent on Egypt. However, when Israel took control of the border during the Gaza War, it became virtually impossible to cross. It has only started to reopen gradually since the ceasefire in Autumn 2025. Since the start of the war, approximately 130,000 Palestinians have fled to Egypt, and Egypt has allowed them to stay but has not granted them any legal status, protection or social security benefits.
The country uses its good relations with the governments in Tel Aviv and Ramallah, as well as with the Arab world in general, to establish itself as a mediator. It has negotiated the ceasefires in the Gaza War alongside Qatar and Turkey, and is currently working on the disarmament of Hamas. This last endeavour serves its own interests too, as relations between Egypt under General El-Sisi and Hamas are extremely strained. Egypt is, however, organising a large proportion of international aid deliveries to Gaza, and has taken the lead in drawing up the reconstruction plan for the Gaza Strip.
Saudi-Arabia's Dual Strategy
Saudi Arabia also takes a two-pronged approach to Palestine, albeit in a less obvious manner. Beyond just its economic position, it seeks to maintain its own dominance in the region. In the wake of the Iran War, when the US attempted to put pressure on Saudi Arabia to conclude a bilateral defence and nuclear agreement on the condition that it normalised its relations with Israel, the kingdom refused. Unlike other countries in the region, it has ruled out normalisation with Israel without a clear roadmap for the establishment of a Palestinian state. Unsurprisingly, it has no diplomatic relations with Israel and officially keeps its distance.
However, the two countries do cooperate indirectly behind the scenes. Saudi Arabia invests in Israeli cybersecurity and tech startups, coordinates its security policy with Israel and grants flyover rights. Israel and Saudi Arabia are also united in their opposition to Iran and its proxies in the region. Yet Saudi Arabia is charting its own course and sending a clear message with the recent Mecca Agreement with Turkey and nuclear power Pakistan.
Saudi Arabia provides substantial support to Palestine, with financial aid to the Palestinian government in Ramallah amounting to tens of millions of US dollars per year. In doing so, it is saving the West Bank government from impending financial collapse. Additionally, millions of US dollars are being channelled to Gaza and UNRWA as humanitarian aid through the state-run King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre. However, Saudi Arabia’s aid payments to Gaza are subject to conditions. First off, payments will only be made once Israel has withdrawn from Gaza. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia categorically rules out funding Hamas and other militant Islamist groups acting as proxies for Iran. Along with France, Saudi Arabia is strongly committed to a two-state solution demonstrating pragmatism and an attempt to play a political role in the conflict.
Qatar As Hamas’s Sponsor
In contrast to Egypt and Jordan, Qatar is not under any geographical or demographic pressure regarding Palestine. Unlike Saudi Arabia, which approaches the Palestine issue from the position of a major regional power pursuing its own political ambitions, Qatar seeks to maximise its influence primarily through diplomacy, mediation, and its ability to sustain contact with opposing parties. It has used its ties with the US, Hamas and, indirectly, Israel to position itself as a key mediator, particularly in ceasefire and hostage negotiations in the Gaza Strip.
Qatar has close ties to Hamas, which it supports politically and financially on a large scale. Hamas’ political leadership has been based in Doha since 2012, which is also home to Al Jazeera, a television broadcaster considered sympathetic towards Hamas, particularly in its Arabic-language programming.
Through Al Jazeera, Qatar wields enormous influence in the region. As one of the few broadcasters with an international reach remaining in the Gaza Strip, Al Jazeera conveys the Palestinian perspective on Gaza and the war, which has attracted both a huge following and a great deal of criticism.
Qatar explicitly supports the establishment of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital. It also provides substantial financial humanitarian aid to Palestine. Since the Gaza War it has evacuated hundreds of wounded and sick Palestinians and their families to Doha, where many of them are receiving medical treatment, rehabilitation and long-term care.
Strong solidarity with Palestine was particularly evident during the 2022 FIFA World Cup, when Qatar provided an unusually open platform for demonstrations of support for Palestine. Palestinian flags, symbols and pro-Palestinian messages featured prominently in stadiums and public spaces throughout the tournament.
However, Qatar's policy also reflects a clear approach to realpolitik. Rather than directly confronting Israel or the US, the country uses its ability to maintain relations with opposing powers to strengthen its diplomatic influence. For Qatar, Palestine is both a key issue for Arab solidarity and a crucial arena for its broader foreign policy and power dynamics, which are geared towards mediation.
Solidarity With Palestine Among Arab Communities
Regardless of government policy, solidarity with Palestine continues to be strongly upheld in communities throughout the region. On the streets of the Arab world, Palestinians are celebrated as freedom fighters, heroes, and martyrs. Grief and anger over the many victims of war, occupation, and daily violence are widespread. Palestinian flags and Keffiyeh are on sale everywhere, while watermelons, a symbol of solidarity with Palestine, have become a popular accessory. The internet is full of stories, video clips, statements, and pictures relating to Palestine. Anything too dangerous to express on the street is said online. Yet there is fear of repression in the Arab world too: there has been an increase in arrests for comments or likes on social media in the last three years.
People in Saudi Arabia have a particular way of showing their solidarity and avoiding repression – they use their purchasing power. More and more American and Western brands that cooperate with Israel are losing their customers, while local ones are booming. For example, the American and Canadian coffee chains Starbucks and Tim Hortons have been replaced by Saudi brands Barns Coffee and Half Million. The fast food sector is now dominated by Albaik and Kudu rather than McDonalds, KFC and Pizza Hut. Similar trends can also be observed in Jordan.
Governments in West Asia understand just how much the Palestinian question can mobilise their communities and how quickly it can also lead to their own power being questioned. After all, the watermelon has become a symbol of the political struggle against oppression worldwide. The Egyptian coach's behaviour has caused a lot of anger – Egyptian television was full of criticism while death threats were broadcast in Israel. Palestinians reacted to all of this with a shrug. As many of them are all too aware, imperialism and Zionism are not the only threats. Arab regimes also count among Palestine’s biggest enemies.
This article was first published in German in Neues Deutschland
