Details
The US government has designated Brazil’s two largest criminal groups, Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) and Comando Vermelho (CV), as foreign terrorist organizations under US law. The action, effective 5 June 2026, allows for the freezing of assets and the imposition of sanctions on individuals and companies deemed to be linked to either of the two groups, even when these links exist outside the United States.
The PCC and Comando Vermelho were born out of Brazil’s prison system, the former originally emerging in São Paulo and the latter in Rio de Janeiro. They both grew through drug trafficking and today maintain networks that extend to different countries and sectors of the economy. Their operations today involve not only the drug trade, but also extortion, money laundering, and the control of local supply chains.
The designation has sparked contention between the two countries over how to tackle organized crime. The Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva administration argued that the US measure represents interference in internal affairs and a threat to Brazilian sovereignty, and concerns were raised regarding joint investigations being undermined and the reach of US authorities extending over individuals and companies operating in Brazil.
This is no longer merely hypothetical risk. On 1 July, the US Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on two Brazilian nationals, three São Paulo-based companies, and one Portuguese company, all identified as having connections with a money-laundering network linked to the PCC. Two days later, Andrei Rodrigues, the Director-General of Brazil’s Federal Police, stated that, due to the timing when the sanctions were announced, Brazilian investigators were forced to bring forward an operation that was being planned, which may have made it easier for one of the targets to escape. The investigation had identified more than R$10 billion (nearly US$2 billion) in suspicious financial transactions.
In this interview with Ana Penido, a professor at the Institute of International Relations and Defence at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, the researcher argues that the problem lies not in recognizing the scale and consequence of organized crime, but in choosing the appropriate tools to tackle it.
As these organizations are driven primarily by profit rather than by any intention to seize political power, Penido says that following the money, identifying money-laundering mechanisms, and investigating the links between the legal and illegal economies is the most effective route to take. But once these groups are designated as terrorist organizations, the United States has shifted the issue from one of public security to a logic of war.
In the interview, the researcher also addresses the history of US influence on Latin American security policies, the militarized responses adopted by far-right governments, and the potential effects of this agenda on marginalized communities, civil rights, and national sovereignty.
What effect does the designation of criminal organisations as terrorist groups have?
First and foremost, the most important point to make is that, generally speaking, criminal organizations involved in drug trafficking among other ventures have multiple business interests in both the legal and illegal economies. These businesses are usually intertwined. There is only an illegal economy because it is intrinsically linked to the legal economy. In some sectors, it is hard to draw a clear line between the two. They are a major problem in Latin America.
You take an issue out of the security sphere and move it into the realm of warfare which creates the conditions for a response that focuses on physical and violent confrontation.
So these designations absolutely affect the implementation of public policies. In a city like the one where I am, Rio de Janeiro, if a woman wants to report a case of violence and she lives in a neighbourhood under the control of an organized crime group, she will do it in a certain way, since these groups exercise a form of police authority. Reporting to the official police may not be a safe option, as it can expose women to retaliation or violence If she is not in that situation, she will report it in a different way. This is not at all about downplaying the extent to which organized criminal groups affect people’s everyday lives, particularly those living on the outskirts.
We must understand that organized criminal organizations’ ultimate goal is economic, to make a profit. Nobody commits a crime unless they can keep the proceeds. One way to tackle criminal activities in which the ultimate goal is financial gain is following the money. It involves understanding which financial mechanisms—whether in Latin American countries or other countries, particularly at the core of the global economy—are being used to launder that money.
On the other hand, when you view organised crime as a terrorist issue, you are saying that these organisations’ ultimate goal is political control; that their aim is to destabilize state power, perhaps even to seize it, whether for religious or ideological reasons.
This may be the main shift: you take an issue out of the security sphere—where you can address it through intelligence and fund-tracing techniques—and move it into the realm of warfare which creates the conditions for a response that focuses much more on controlling territories, with checkpoints, investment in military equipment, and ultimately physical and violent confrontation.
Could this move set a precedent for broader forms of US influence over security policies in the region?
The United States already has enormous, undeniable doctrinal influence and exerts a great deal of influence on both our defence policy and our security policy. There are dozens of security agreements, regular joint exercises, and many military bases operating both in the defence sector in cooperation with the armed forces, and in the security sector in cooperation with police forces.
Latin American armed forces would be used to contain domestic problems while the US would manage relations between the Americas, as they see fit, or between the western hemisphere and the rest of the world.
This designation is a domestic change for the US, not for Latin American countries. For the US, it means that other mechanisms provided for in their new legislation can be used to meddle in our region. In fact, not only in our region, but in other NATO countries as well.
How is this decision connected to the history of US interventions in Latin America?
Well, regarding the history of interventions there is nothing particularly new here either. Interventions have long been commonplace throughout our history, particularly since World War II, and defence and security issues have always been used as a pretence for this purpose.
Strictly speaking, there is nothing new in the US doctrine for our region following the logic of deploying the armed forces domestically. It has always been their desire that we act internally while they take responsibility for matters of a more regional and continental nature. Latin American armed forces would be used to contain domestic problems while they would manage relations between the Americas, as they see fit, or between the western hemisphere and the rest of the world.
What is the connection between this agenda and the security narrative championed by Trump and Bolsonarismo?
Perhaps what is new is the extent to which Trump-aligned far-right movements across Latin America, including Bolsonarismo, have jointly embraced this militarized approach to public security. This alignment is not limited to Brazil: political figures such as Chilean President José Antonio Kast and Argentine President Javier Milei have also adopted this agenda. I have jokingly described it as a new form of regionalism.
The far-right forces promoting this new doctrine are closely aligned, highly organised, and mobilised around a shared agenda.
There was a great deal of resistance to shifting the use of the armed forces from defence matters to internal security issues, even within the armed forces themselves, because this reduces the level of required skills and changes the type of equipment they require.
The far-right forces promoting this new doctrine are closely aligned, highly organised, and mobilised around a shared agenda. Yet this regional alignment is not autonomous: it operates within a US-led conception of the Western Hemisphere. The drive for autonomy seen under several Latin American governments is losing ground to a contest among the region’s presidents over who can become Trump’s closest ally—or, as I put it, who will be the king’s best friend.
This classification paves the way for economic sanctions against individuals and companies. What contradictions might this create for Bolsonarismo and for the sectors that supported designating criminal groups as terrorists?
The designation opens the door to a number of different types of economic sanctions. Some of these sanctions raise legitimate concerns for the Brazilian state.
There are many companies operating in sectors where it is very difficult to draw a clear line between the legal and illegal economies.
One issue for instance is safeguarding Pix, Brazil’s instant payment platform managed by the country’s Central Bank, as a tool for commercial transactions between citizens. But there are other potential economic sanctions that will primarily affect companies. As I mentioned earlier, there are many companies operating in sectors where it is very difficult to draw a clear line between the legal and illegal economies.
We saw this clearly in 2025, when Brazil’s Operation Hidden Carbon uncovered an alleged PCC-linked money-laundering scheme involving companies throughout the fuel supply chain, as well as fintech companies and investment funds based in São Paulo’s Faria Lima financial district. The case illustrates the potential reach of the US designation: companies found to have dealt, even indirectly, with PCC-linked entities could now face increased sanctions and legal risks.
So, this may well affect and create contradictions with certain sectors that are, in fact, partnered with criminal organizations.
The contradiction has less to do with the fact that these figures were subsequently associated with militias. Rather, it lies in the possibility of facing economic sanctions and having one’s international business interests harmed as a consequence of a policy that was supported particularly by Flávio Bolsonaro when he met with Trump. I personally believe, however, that Trump had already made this decision and was simply choosing what he considered the right moment to announce it. For me, this is the contradiction that will emerge within Bolsonarismo.
How do these steps impact democracy, civil rights, and national sovereignty?
These designations raise number of ways in which ordinary people’s lives could be affected. I think perhaps this should be our main concern in terms of the impacts.
In Brazil, the consequences would be felt particularly by people living in areas where organized criminal groups operate openly and where many civil rights are already routinely denied.
Today there is a conversation happening among progressive circles about public security issues, which was not happening before.
But, from the point of view of state sovereignty, what is happening is a state issuing designations on other countries’ domestic matters in whatever way it sees fit.
One final comment that I think is worth making, and which may be relevant: today there is a conversation happening among progressive circles about public security issues, which was not happening before — and I consider it a positive outcome.
I even believe that the government has presented Trump with a package setting out how Brazil believes organized crime should be tackled: whether by working towards the unification of intelligence services, or by tracking the flow of illegal money being laundered through the economy.
So, I think the upcoming elections will put this on the table: the problem exists. How should we deal with this problem?
We will see a solution from Trump and the far right, which is: militarize, arm as many people as possible, and lock people up.
And there will be a response from the other side: “No, we need intelligence, we need cooperation, and, above all, we need to tackle these money-laundering flows”.
Translated from Portuguese by Aline Scátola
