

Creative moments: working culture, through municipal socialism and neoliberal urbanism*

Jamie Peck, UBC (jamie.peck@ubc.ca), April 29, 2009

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Introduction: creative policy mobilities

Policies designed to stimulate the “creative growth” of city economies—usually by way of market-friendly interventions in the cultural sphere, in order to attract or retain elite workers—might be characterized as the most conspicuously successful innovation in the recent history of urban policymaking. “Successful” in the sense that the reach of these policies seems to have become near ubiquitous, even if they are apparently spreading by way of increasingly pale imitation (Peck, 2005; Ross, 2006; Scott, 2006). Catering to the creative class has become, almost simultaneously, a favored strategy, an urgent imperative, and a hackneyed cliché of contemporary urban policymaking. International in scope, the market for creativity policies now extends from the top to the bottom of the urban hierarchy, animated by a pervasive sense of competitive urgency: in an era of knowledge-driven growth, an influential thesis has it that productive potential is carried by a creative *class* of individuals, who will be attracted (only) to cities with “buzz,” cities with a welcoming and sustaining “people climate” (Florida, 2002, 2005, 2008). The idealized subjects of this new urban economy, a hypermobile elite of hi-tech hipsters, crave opportunities to maximize their innate talents in the context of 24/7 experiential intensity. The now-storied creative class inhabits a socially and economically liberalized world, in which the barriers to sociospatial mobility are progressively removed. And its members are the objects of accelerating “talent wars,” amongst both corporations and cities.

Extant urban development models—based, inter alia, on the aggressive pursuit of investment opportunities, city marketing, supply-side inducements, property-led growth, gentrification, commodified culture, and retail revitalization—have been retrofitted around this new vision of creative growth. None of this was a huge stretch. The established strategy of

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manipulating business climates in order to attract mobile investment has effectively been overlaid with the new “creative” approach, of manipulating people climates in order to attract mobile talent-workers. In this new iteration of the urban development game, a refusal to play practically invites competitive failure, at least according to prevailing script. Buzzing cities can anticipate cumulative growth, but staid, hierarchical, and suburbocentric cities, where the buzz is *off*, are sliding into the rustbelt of the knowledge economy. But playing is both easy and relatively cheap, while the distributors of the new dispensation insist that *every* city has a shot at winning, as long as policymaking elites are able to master the alliterative trinity of the three Ts—technology, talent, and tolerance. Creativity has ostensibly become the new (universal) formula for urban growth, just as its accompanying policy routines—of culturally inflected economic development, rebadged promotional strategies, and new-age gentrification—have become decidedly formulaic.

What should be made of this? Is it a mere policymaking “fad”—as transitory as it is trivial? Appropriately perhaps, “entrepreneurialized” city managers seem to have become just as susceptible to fads as their competitively insecure colleagues in the corporate world. But managerial fads, as Abrahamson (1996) and others have noted, may be many things, but trivial they are not. They reflect the anxieties of managing, with limited capacities, in an uncertain environment. The market for urban policy fads happens also to have grown in lockstep with the intensification of interurban competition, and with the shared culture of existential insecurity that this has fostered. The market for bromide, in this sense, reveals more about the psychological needs of the consumers than the (supposed) efficacy of the “product.” This may explain why Allen Scott (2006: 4) chooses to characterize the apparent state of dependency on creativity fixes and instrumentalized cultural policies in the apt language of a “syndrome.” In the process, urban policy quacks of all kinds—from gurus to consultants—have been doing brisk business. And new policy products have been flying off the shelves.

Creative-cities strategies—stylized as readily consumable *models*—have been tailored to these market conditions. Bolstered by exaggerated claims to efficacy, they are framed as enabling policy technologies and packaged in essentialized form, in order to facilitate their portability from place to place and their adaptability to a range of local conditions. And the reach of these market-like systems has been massively extended by the paraphernalia of new communications technologies, from international policy conferences to web-based resource banks, together with a host of marketing, promotional, and consulting techniques imported from the private sector. An

increasingly reflexive network of “fast policy” circuits has been established, in recent years, between cosmopolitan sites of policy learning, experimentation, and emulation. This represents more than a heightened propensity for cities to “borrow” policy ideas and techniques from one another, although this has certainly been a notable empirical trend. It signals conditions of *endemic policy mobility*, the characteristics of which include growing deference to “best practice” models, near-continuous learning from like-minded others, and the blurring of jurisdictional boundaries. In effect, the urban *polycymaking* process has become increasingly relativized; it has become an *interurban* process.

In order to understand what it is that is distinctive—historically, ideologically, and practically—about today’s fast-policy market for creativity makeovers, this chapter will invoke a critical counterpoint in the form of the short-lived wave of “cultural industries” initiatives developed by municipal socialist councils in Britain in the early 1980s. In a sense, these were the modern precursors to contemporary creativity policies, and the audacious cultural strategy of the Greater London Council (GLC) was their “seminal” moment (Hesmondhalgh, 2007: 139). But they were forged under quite different circumstances, with sharply contrasting objectives. Under the vanguard influence of the GLC, cultural-industries policies sought to problematize the conditions of creative production and distribution, while pioneering practice-based alternatives to neoliberalism, then in its monetarist guise. A sketch of cultural-industries *polycymaking* in London, focused on the moment of *policy production*, is then followed by an examination of the *reproduction* of contemporary creativity policies, focusing on the site of the second international creativity “summit,” Detroit. This more recent moment of “cultural-economy” *polycymaking* is appropriately concerned with systemic mimicry and shallow simulation, dominant characteristics of creative-cities *polycymaking*, for all its protestations about grassroots authenticity.

What follows is, then, not so much a conventional comparison of cultural industries/creative cities policies, or two ways of *putting culture to work*, but an attempt to draw a stylized contrast between an historical site of origin-cum-innovation, in early 1980s London, and one (of many) spaces of circulation-cum-emulation, in contemporary Detroit. Beyond the intrinsic differences in the policies mobilized in these two settings, they will each be shown to be indicative of distinctive *polycymaking milieux*, together with quite different “ecologies” of policy formation and mobility. While the London and Detroit cases can both be seen as examples of local states putting culture to work, for the municipal socialist councils this was part of a wider strategy of (disruptive) politicization, whereas today it is associated with a pervasive ethos of (instrumental) economization, not to say

depoliticization. Moreover, while the municipal socialist strategies of the early 1980s were organically embedded in distinctive urban political cultures (see Bianchini, 1989), expressing antagonistic attitudes towards the orthodoxies of both the (new) right and the (bureaucratic) left, contemporary creativity strategies are pragmatically oriented to the globalizing soft center of market-oriented politics, modestly accessorizing orthodox urban-development agendas (Peck, 2009). If, in retrospect, municipal socialism stands as an (ultimately frustrated) attempt to build new forms of local-state capacity, in the service of progressive political objectives, current rounds of creative-cities policies threaten the continued degradation and distortion of governing capacities, in (often futile) pursuit of the sparse compensations of neoliberal urbanism.

Culture as work in progress: municipal socialism and the creative industries

The municipal socialism of local authorities like Sheffield, the West Midlands, and the GLC was a very British creation. A “new urban left” had mobilized during the 1970s as a network of (mostly big-city based) activists and intellectuals critical not only of the ascendant project of Thatcherism, but also of corporatist, bureaucratic, and reformist elements within the Labour Party (Gyford, 1985). The capture and transformation of local government, as an alternative site for political mobilization and experimentation, represented a pragmatic alternative to both the parliamentary and the revolutionary roads to socialism. This targeting of local government reflected both the weakness and the potential of the British left, in this early phase of especially confrontational Thatcherism (cf. Barnett, 1985). Moribund at best, the local state had previously been practically written off, “as an agent of central government and handmaiden of capital” (Green, 1987: 207). With roots in community-development activism, feminist politics, the trade-union movement, and the left of the Labour Party, the municipal socialist project sought to remake the local state as an arena of active resistance to Thatcherism, while at the same time developing working socialist models, ripe for “scaling up.” In this context, what was styled as the “local economy” became a key battleground. While it was clearly understood that the resources of local government were unequal to the daunting tasks of responding to deindustrialization and mass unemployment in a comprehensive fashion, the space was nevertheless opened up for policy interventions that might serve as “demonstration projects,” as “parables” of alternative forms of socialist policy development, and as an incipient “propaganda of practice” (Ward, 1983: 28; Alcock *et al*, 1984).

The proliferation of radical employment and economic-development initiatives at the local scale was conceived, firstly, as a frontal challenge to the Thatcherite conceit that “there is no alternative,” but secondly, and no less importantly, as a counter to the discredited forms of Keynesian corporatism, pursued by Labour Governments at the national level during the 1970s. If monetarism represented a repudiation of Keynesianism from the right, mobilizing market forces as the impetus for restructuring, municipal socialism spurned it from the left, mobilizing local social and political capacities in the interests of *restructuring for labor* (Rustin, 1986). The challenge was to develop new rationales and repertoires for local-economic intervention, in the face of the dogmatic monetarism of the Conservative Government and the late-Keynesian malaise afflicting the opposition benches. In this context, local government provided an opportunity (albeit a highly constrained one) for ideological renewal and grassroots policy experimentation (see Ward, 1981; Blunkett and Green, 1983). Combining modest resources with the energy and commitment of oppositional politics, local-economic strategies could not realistically aspire to the material transformation of the local economy *per se*, but they did seek to enrich and enervate socialist *practice*, knowingly opening up opportunities for political demonstration and mobilization (see Goodwin and Duncan, 1986). The process was turbulent, unruly, and disruptive. In the forefront of this effort, the GLC had “mobilised some of the most innovative political talent [available],” as Stuart Hall (1984: 39) remarked at the time, “unleash[ing] a stream of new political thinking and ideas, even though it has not always known what to do with the talent and the ideas!”

Through the creative use of its circumscribed powers of economic intervention, the GLC confronted the challenge of “restructuring and modernizing London’s industrial core,” by way of the propagation of “real working alternatives” and new practices of economic participation (Ward, 1985: vii, ix). Through the (apparently innocuous) adoption of “detailed sectoral planning,” the GLC intervened directly, but strategically, in productive and market processes, in service of the strategic goal of “reclaiming production” (GLC, 1985: 18). A distant political prospect in any case, a Keynesian reflation alone would clearly not have addressed the structural problems of the London economy—which were diagnosed, in sobering terms, in terms of deindustrialization, urban-economic collapse, and the generalized deterioration of working conditions. Transformative interventions in production, in working arrangements, and in the organization of markets, including a redefinition of “work” itself and the development of socially useful forms of production, would be necessary in this new economics not only of, but *for*, labor. Eschewing a singular master plan, the

GLC initiated a series of strategic forays into different sectors of the capital's economy, from vehicle manufacturing to software, each envisioned as a (distinctive) site of struggle and transformation, rather than merely a space of intervention (Eisenschitz and North, 1986). And military metaphors were invoked explicitly, in what was seen as a multi-front war, waged across a hostile terrain: building alliances with labor unions, community organizations, and social movements, a politicized cadre of municipal officers sought to engineer alternative models in the style of political agitants, rather than experts or technocrats, as "economic craft workers not economists" (GLC, 1985: 2; Wainwright, 1984; Mackintosh and Wainwright, 1987).

Tailored strategies were developed for a wide range of "sectors," spanning both traditional sites of intervention (like clothing, instrument engineering, and information technology) and radically new fields, such as the domestic and caring economies, defense, and the cultural industries. These entailed anything but cookie-cutter replication, but instead were grounded in a strategic (and very much *political-economic*) analysis of each individual sector. In the case of the cultural-industries strategy, this went far beyond the trivial observation that cultural employment represented a significant slice of the London labor market, to embrace the character cultural commodities and production chains, the consequences of monopolization of (both public and private) distribution channels, the structure of risk, the degree of integration in cultural job markets, and the impact of new technologies. More than this, the strategy explicitly confronted the "deep-rooted antagonism towards any attempt to analyse culture as part of an economy" (GLC, 1985: 172), invoking Theodor Adorno and Raymond Williams in a principled rejection of idealist and elitist notions of culture, artificially separated from the everyday, the popular, and the material (Garnham, [1983] 1990; Mulgan and Warpole, 1986). There was a desire to enervate and democratize culture, broadening the access to, and recognition of, a range of vernacular and working-class cultures, all with an emphasis on "distribution and the reaching of audiences," as opposed to "an artist-centred strategy that subsidized 'creators'" (Hesmondhalgh, 2007: 139).

A radical *cultural-economy* policy would therefore necessarily encompass the repoliticization of both culture and economy. The once-sleepy domain of local authority arts policy was reclaimed as a space for transformative investments in, and celebrations of, an entire array of working-class and minority cultures. The cultural-industries policy was not only concerned with interventions in the sphere of production and production politics (bread-and-butter issues across many of the other sectoral initiatives), but more as a means to pluralize the spheres of cultural

distribution and consumption, to broaden access to cultural markets and cultural work, and to recognize the creativity of marginalized social groups (Garnham, [1983] 1990; Eisenschitz and North, 1986). Not infrequently, these public interventions triggered conflict and controversy, though in part they were intended as disruptive policies, opening up ways in which “cultural life [might be] reconstituted as a site of politics” (Hall, 1984: 39). The GLC’s bottom-up approach to cultural policy, which was framed around “communities of interest,” like women’s and gay-rights movements, the Afro-Caribbean and Irish communities, youth, and the disabled, was often associated with a turbulent politics of spectacle, for which the GLC was to be remembered long after its abolition at the hands of an implacably hostile Thatcher Government (Mulgan and Warpole, 1986; Hosken, 2008).

Clearly, there was a political calculus behind this approach, but there was also an economic rationale, since one of the hallmarks of the GLC’s economic strategy was the commitment to work “in and against the market.” In the context of cultural-industries policy, this meant working “against the market’s narrowing commercialising tendencies, but in the market [as] the main site where cultural needs are met or ignored, the site where jobs are created and destroyed” (GLC, 1985: 185). This was translated into a program of investment in the cultural “base,” with an emphasis on targeted assistance to independent producers and small enterprises, and a distinctive orientation to minority and alternative participation, with a view to securing stronger positions within the sphere of distribution. Echoing the Emilian “flex-spec” model, which enjoyed considerable currency at the time (Murray, 1987; Nolan and O’Donnell, 1987; Geddes, 1988), there was also some provision of “common services,” such as marketing, technical assistance, and managerial advice.

The cultural-economy craftworkers at the GLC concluded that the system of cultural distribution represented “the key locus of power and profit” (Garnham, [1983] 1990: 162), suggesting a strategy based less on interventions at the point of cultural production, but targeted instead on (marginally) redistributing risks, flows of reinvestment, and the management of cultural repertoires in the distributive sphere. Left to its own devices, the market was deemed “inadequate” both for the satisfaction of cultural needs and for the generation of sustainable employment opportunities, but neither in principle nor in practice could a comprehensively anti-market position be sustained, given the Council’s limited spending power and the market’s “potential for responsiveness, [its] openness to popular cultures, and its ability to reflect changing cultural needs” (GLC, 1985: 184-185). Moreover, the GLC and its advisors were hardly less critical of previous

public interventions in the cultural realm, taking on the BBC, for example, for its elitism and its patronizing attitude to minority cultures. Classically, public funding had been directed towards the maintenance of “higher” forms of non-commercial culture, while the cultural needs of the masses were left to the market (GLC, 1984). More fundamentally, arts and cultural policy in Britain remained fundamentally framed in idealist terms, separate from (or above) the vulgar terrains of popularization and commercialization. There was a need also to challenge the idealized, romantic notion of the artist, *qua* individual genius, supposedly insulated from worldly concerns and everyday working-class life (see Williams, 1958: 39; Garnham, [1983] 1990), in favor of a materialist understanding of cultural labor. This said, there were tensions between the GLC’s *own* productivist model—based on cooperative forms of employment and clear lines of accountability—and the street-level realities of the cultural industries: in a sector heavily populated by “hustlers, entrepreneurs, sole traders, dole-queue economy wheelers and dealers,” Greenhalgh *et al* (1992: 128) recalled, the vision of a democratized local economy sometimes “fitted as uneasily as a Marks and Spencer polyester suit.”

Ultimately, the GLC’s experiment cultural intervention was to be frustrated. As the political struggle with the Thatcher Government intensified, the authority was progressively stripped of its powers in transportation, planning, and housing, while steps were also taken to rein in its capacity for economic intervention. In this context, cultural policies assumed “considerably increased ... status within the administration” (Bianchini, 1987: 43; 1989), at least until the moment of the Thatcher Government’s audacious abolition of the GLC, along with the metropolitan tier of government across the country, in 1985. One of the legacies of the GLC was the glimpse that it provided of a form of politics “root[ed] in the everyday experience of popular urban life and culture” (Hall, 1984: 39). Its repertoire of local economic strategies, which had “creatively stretch[ed] local authority powers to their limits”, but which never had to face the daunting challenge of longer-term sustainability (Cochrane, 1986b: 193), would later constitute an important plank in Labour’s (unsuccessful) attempt to regain national office in 1987 (Campbell *et al*, 1987; Davenport *et al*, 1987). An important purveyor of this local “jobs plan” approach, the progressive local-authority think tank, the Centre for Local Economic Strategies (CLES), had been established in 1986 with the aid of

“tombstone” funding from the GLC and some of the other metropolitan counties.¹ The impetus for the establishment of CLES was the *absence* of a

national economic policy institute to develop new ideas and approaches, firmly based around the objectives of full employment, equality of opportunity and meeting community needs. [The] various local attempts to develop economic strategies and initiatives needed to be co-ordinated and consolidated ... A detailed and authoritative body of work could then be built up with a perspective which extended beyond the current dominant economic theories (CLES, 1986: 1).

The phonebook-sized *London Industrial Strategy*, published in 1985, on the eve of the GLC's abolition, was likewise intended both as a provocation to the Conservatives in Westminster and as an if-only account of suggestive models, ready for emulation, which could be “sold to the Labour Party [in order that it might] be implemented nationally later” (Cochrane, 1986b: 191). The continuing electoral woes of the Labour Party at the national level meant that project was never scaled up in this way, leaving unresolved a series of searching questions concerning its political-economic sustainability (Nolan and O'Donnell, 1987). These provocative forays into the politics of restructuring may have disrupted monetarist claims to a *de facto* monopoly over policymaking rationality (see Murray, 1983), while pioneering “creative forms of socialist practice” (Jessop *et al*, 1988: 122), but most were to remain demonstration projects and some amounted to little more than tokenistic gestures. Broadly sympathetic critics would later differ on the question of the longer-term prospects of the GLC's somewhat inchoate rendering of progressive post-Fordism, supply-side socialism, and restructuring for labor (see Cochrane, 1986b; Eisenschitz and North, 1986; Rustin, 1986; Nolan and O'Donnell, 1987; Geddes, 1988; Graham, 1992). For Geddes (1988: 95), this incomplete vision of “left post-Fordism” threatened to degrade into a resuscitated form of Keynesianism, into local corporatism, or “into a populism in which ‘anything goes’, as in the GLC's strategy for cultural industries.” In Eisenschitz and North's (1986) deconstruction of the London Industrial Strategy, the embryonic cultural-industries effort was cautiously classified, alongside other *redistributive* initiatives, as a measure primarily aimed at positive discrimination in the job market.

It is undeniably the case that some of the claims in the London Industrial Strategy were hyperbolic, some merely aspirational (see Cochrane, 1986b). But it reflected an approach of inventively targeting *politically* strategic interstices within a restructuring economy. This was not some naive plan to construct a “metropolitan-level elastoplast,” in the face of global restructuring

¹ Michael Ward, chair of the Industry and Employment Committee at the GLC, would later become the long-time director of CLES.

and monetarist (mis)management, but instead was conceived as a series of political incursions: “although the material power was really not so great at all,” Massey (1997: 159) later reflected, “the symbolic impact could be considerable.” The provisional notion of a cultural industry that was folded into this broader political vision bears little relationship with contemporary visions of the creative economy as a site of self-sustaining, superior, or self-organizing forms of growth. Rather, it was seen as an under-appreciated location of potential employment opportunities for marginalized social groups, one enmeshed in the “practice of everyday life.” Significantly, it was also a space of representation and recognition that could be animated by multiple “communities of interest” (GLC, 1985: 169). As a form of economic intervention, the cultural-industries strategy sought to work against tendencies for the monopolization and industrialization of culture. The analysis was sober and materialist, refusing to idealize cultural work and workers (Garnham, [1983] 1990). It sought explicitly to problematize, and grapple with, cultural markets, investing selectively in what was represented as the cultural *base*, in order to improve the positions of groups underrepresented in the formal cultural economies of the public and private sectors.

In policy development terms, the energy and inventiveness of the first half of the 1980s was never regained, drifting towards a “new realist,” proto-New Labour consensus after the Conservative General Election victory of 1987. For a while, organizations like CLES sought to keep the flame alive, enriching the local-economic policy capacities of municipal authorities “from the outside,” through training and information-dissemination activities, through forms of progressive consulting, and through the collaborative sharing of innovative practice, based on “working models.” There was some networking across the remaining cultural-industries initiatives, albeit tempered with an awareness that the boldest experiments had often been the product of the distinctive, *local* political cultures of cities like Sheffield, London, and Manchester (see Alcock and Lee, 1981; Ward, 1983; Quilley, 2000; Moss, 2002). On the other hand, the more “transferable” lessons—almost by definition, less disruptive and radical—began to merge and meld with mainstream urban-regeneration approaches (see Bailey, 1989; Greenhalgh *et al*, 1992). CLES’s position, too, would drift closer to the pragmatic center.

During the late 1980s, cultural-industry themes were gradually reworked into broader strategies for downtown revitalization, retail diversification, and urban arts investment, including the promotion of “cultural quarters,” as designated zones of intensive cultural consumption/production (Bianchini *et al*, 1988). Confirming the suspicions of some skeptics, who had tended to locate

cultural policies on the “soft,” populist fringe of the GLC’s *industrial* strategy, cultural-economy discourse and practice had, by the 1990s, begun to dissipate into conventional urban-development agendas (see Bianchini and Parkinson, 1993; Mommaas, 2004). By the time that the (New) Labour Party formed a national government, under Tony Blair in 1997, a reimagined and expansive creative *economy* had been constructed around the vestigial traces of earlier, cultural-industries efforts, spreading to encompass the high-tech sector and many of the professions, as a funky synonym for the “new economy” (see DCMS, 1998; Smith, 1998; cf. Frith, 2003). A trajectory was duly established in which the self-managing, creative entrepreneur could now be celebrated as a aspirational model for lumpen classes and lagging regions, as creativity became a byword for atomized forms of innovation and 24/7 productivity, and as policymaking began to defer to the “moral prestige of the ‘creative artist’” (Garnham, 2005: 26; Peck, 2005). This amounted to, in Hesmondhalgh’s (2007: 145) words, “the very opposite of the original GLC vision.” In this way, the cultural-industries projects of the 1980s, which had started with a radical, anti-establishment bang, ended with a conformist, utilitarian whisper.

Culture as class distinction: neoliberal urbanism and the creativity fix

Michigan’s Department of Labor and Economic Growth certainly had its hands full during the Bush years. The state’s economic fortunes had been tracking those of its principal industry, automobile manufacture, resulting in the highest rates of unemployment and outmigration in the nation, rolling fiscal crises across all levels of government, and a multi-year “single-state recession” that was beginning to seem unending. For some time, the business community had been demanding action, loudly *naming* the crisis, and insisting on the need to confront the twin challenge of “right-sizing our state and our automotive companies” (Crain, 2006: 14). Structural economic problems, by definition, would not be amenable to piecemeal remedies. A Brookings Institution study was soon reporting that Michigan had a larger share of “economically weak” cities than any state in the nation, with Detroit, East Lansing, Flint, Kalamazoo, and Saginaw crowding the bottom of the league table (Haglund, 2007). But on Valentine’s Day, 2008, there was at last some good news to report. The state’s governor, Jennifer Granholm, announced in a Department of Labor press release that Detroit would, in the Fall, host the second international Creative Cities Summit: “Michigan’s greatest economic successes have always been tied to the creative and productive power of our cities,” the

governor observed, “We are looking forward to hosting leading thinkers and practitioners from around the world to discuss the latest in creative community development” (Granholm, 2008).

The summit’s location was anything but accidental. Michigan had gained national attention for its Cool Cities program, which had siphoned \$5 million from an overburdened state budget in order to support scores of neighborhood-scale initiatives for “creative” development, modeled on Richard Florida’s increasingly ubiquitous development template (Michigan DLEG, 2005). In the hoopla around the program’s launch, the governor had posed in sunglasses, declaring that the state’s future looked “so hip you will have to wear shades” (quoted in Fischer, 2006: C1). The fuse had earlier been lit by the self-styled urban guru, who in a succession of conferences, events, and consultations had been egging on local policy, business, and cultural elites to seize the new creative day. Apparently, “optimism reigned” at Florida’s first Detroit seminar, where the city’s poor performance on the presenter’s own creativity scorecard was the subject of near-Orwellian spin—“Detroit ... has greater potential for improvement” than any other U.S. city, Florida insisted — audience members reporting that they, too, could “feel it ... there is something that is going to happen” (quoted in Crain’s Detroit Business, 2004: 38).

What happened, in fact, was that steps were quickly taken to put in place a creative growth coalition in the city, with the support of all of the mainstream economic-development players, like the Detroit Regional Chamber of Commerce, the Detroit Economic Growth Corporation, the City of Detroit, and Detroit Renaissance, together with a coterie of cultural entrepreneurs, PR and marketing interests, and consultants. Predictably, one of the first moves involved the establishment of CreateDetroit in 2003 (strapline: “bringing the creative class together”), with a remit to energize talent attraction and promotion efforts, mainly through event and web-based initiatives, social networking, and lobbying for various forms of (artsy or funky) downtown investment.² CreateDetroit’s first move was to book one of Florida’s regional transformation workshops, in order to secure Detroit’s position as a “magnet for new economy talent” (Erickson, 2003). The flashy workshop evidently succeeded in propagating the creative buzz, while securing the legitimacy of a rebranded, now-*creative* growth coalition (Peck, 2009). The Detroit Regional Chamber of Commerce did its part by establishing Fusion, a networking group for young and “young thinking”

² A local marketing company decided that it could spare one of its young executives, Eric Cedo, to serve as CreateDetroit’s founding CEO, although he would only stay for a year before moving on to open his own consulting operation, BrainGain Marketing.

professionals and entrepreneurs, the activities of which include public displays of “fun,” schmoozing events styled as *Fusion After 5*, and occasional professional development seminars.³

Detroit Renaissance, the region’s leading business-led economic development organization, moved to commission the consulting firm New Economy Strategies, out of Washington, DC, to revamp the metropolitan region’s vision and strategy—in the spirit (and in the language) of creative growth. An initial benchmarking exercise found Detroit languishing outside the top 40 cities on most key economic-development indicators, including the creative-cities index, recommending that mid-table cities like “Nashville and Atlanta may have lessons to offer” (NES, 2006a: 6). The *Road to renaissance* plan, launched in 2006, candidly documented a series of “challenges to innovation and competitiveness,” including the region’s legacy of fraught race relations; a “geopolitical divide” between the city and suburbs; its leadership deficits; its dependency on the “procurement economy” spawned by the automotive supply chain, with stifling effects on entrepreneurialism and new-firm formation; and a pervasive “entitlement mindset,” reflecting the “impact of the factory town, the entrenched career pathway, the union relationships, and ultimately the false belief that jobs will be available from one generation to the next” (NES, 2006b: 7). The report’s authors bluntly stated that, “If we are going to fix the region, we must change the culture,” which was neatly transposed into an inspirational call for creative mobilization: “If we are to build our region, we *will* create a culture” (NES, 2006b: 6, emphasis added).

The report’s recommended strategic priorities stood on two legs: first, repositioning the automobile cluster as a global center for mobility and logistics; and second, growing the city’s creative community, while securing the talent base. Resting on the contention that the “creative community is a viable economic engine for the region,” the creativity strategy identified undervalued “creative assets” in the visual arts, music, and design; emphasized the need for “unified branding,” along with a redoubling of efforts to stimulate cultural tourism and convention trade; offered support for the City of Detroit’s recent proposal for the establishment of a cultural district; called for the formation of “artistic incubators” and a creative cluster association; and recommended Austin, TX, Orlando, FL, and Providence, RI as sources of best-practice inspiration (NES, 2006b: 17-19).

³ In its efforts “to make the Detroit region more attractive to young talent and businesses,” Fusion acknowledges that it is working against the tide, since the metro area has been identified as one of the top five “Greatest Brain Draining” regions in the country, “which means the city is losing young educated professionals in droves” (www.fusiondetroit.org).

“We aren’t the only region to recognize the value of attracting a creative economy,” Detroit Renaissance (2008: 23) rather superfluously confessed, “Many communities, regions, states and countries are [now] focusing on creative sector industries as an economic growth engine.” Apparently unselfconscious about the evident lack of originality, but at the same time fostering the impression that these are “policies that work,” creativity projects in Philadelphia, Maryland, Ireland, Ontario, Providence, New York, and London were amongst the “many, many more programs [that Detroit] looked at, studied, learned from, stole from” (Detroit Renaissance, 2008: 25). These borrowed ideas took on a more concrete form with the establishment of a plan for a 3.5-mile “creative corridor” along historic Woodward Avenue, combining a “framework for locating and prioritizing real-estate development,” peppered with the usual new-urbanist design motifs of walkability, mixed use, and high density (Gensler and KBA, 2008: 6). The accompanying creativity strategy, a Motown variant of an intensively-replicated package (Lovink and Rossiter, 2007a), includes: a creative business accelerator—poised to “turn Detroit into a magnet for jobs” (Ilitch, 2008: 13A); an expansion of the College for Creative Studies (previously, the College of Art & Design); a creative economy investment fund (contributions welcomed); another rebranding and marketing program; and a new web portal (www.detroitmakeithere) with a mission to “inform, empower and unite the creative community.”

Similar sentiments pervaded the Creative Cities Summit 2.0, hosted in Detroit in October, 2008. The event attracted around 1,000 delegates, twice the number that had attended the first meeting, in Tampa Bay, FL, in 2004—after which its founder, Peter Kageyama, styled as a “co-producer” of Summit 2.0, had effectively franchised the initiative. Between sessions on retaining talent (sponsored by the Detroit Regional Chamber) and building creative community assets (sponsored by a local staffing company), delegates were provided with plenty of opportunities for creative networking. The most intrepid were invited to explore “Detroit after dark,” hobnobbing with entrepreneurs of the city’s nighttime economy, and partaking of “martinis or beer, jazz or house music,” according to taste, before being returned safely to the hotel by 10pm. The highlight of the conference itself was an überpanel of three of the creativity movement’s most energetic proselytizers—Richard Florida, Charles Landry, and John Howkins—who were credited with the concepts of the creative class, the creative city, and the creative economy, respectively. In a wry gesture towards Detroit’s old economy, publicly teetering on the verge of bankruptcy, the session was billed as an audience with the Creative Big Three. The smattering of graduate students who

were listening to this masterclass would even be able to list the event on their transcripts, after the American Planning Association opted to recognize the conference as equivalent to 28.5 hours of continuing-education course credit (PR Newswire, 2008a), reaffirming the intellectual legitimacy of the creativity thesis.

With a characteristic mix of utilitarian economics and new-age libertarianism, the Big Three panel sought to distill the essence of creativity:⁴

Florida: The association between the creative class, or human capital, and rates of innovation and economic growth is just *true*. It's a fact. Whether we like it or not, it's an absolute *fact* of economic growth and development.

Howkins: The opportunity that we have ... is to reassert the individual as the main actor and the sole purpose of the society and the economic system.

Florida: The solution to [the] dilemma, of how you balance the egoistic, utility-maximizing, crass, ambitious, individual with the group is the neighborhood, it's the community, it's the city. It's not the company, it's not the political party ... We need to be smart, and we need to think in those terms.

Notwithstanding such insights, there may have been more to learn outside the conference than within. America's poorest big city, Detroit has been hemorrhaging jobs, businesses, and residents for years, while more than one third of its population and half its children live under the poverty line (Wilkinson and Nichols, 2008). Median incomes, falling across the country since 2000, had been plummeting at more than three times the national average in Detroit (Montemurri *et al*, 2005). And as the financial crisis took hold, "subprime city" would become the mortgage default capital of the country (Ziener, 2007). The travails of the Big Three automakers, meanwhile, only seemed to confirm the status of "Detroit" as a synonym for industrial redundancy and corporate failure. And any sharp-eyed planning student, out on the streets during a conference break, could see that this was a "challenging" environment for creativity strategies, too.

Conventionally, the "success" of such strategies is measured in terms of conspicuous forms of (appropriately fashionable) consumption and flamboyant regeneration, manifest at street level. In Detroit, there have certainly been attempts to cater, often quite literally, to the creative class, but according to one local assessment, many of the "loft projects, bars, restaurants and small retailers [that] have tried to base their livelihoods on this emerging group have ended up failing" (Aguilar, 2008: C1). The occasional hipster haven, like Cafe D'Mongo's Speakeasy—which prides itself on its location "on a deserted section of Griswold"—has been able to hold on, but only opens one

⁴ Richard Florida and John Howkins, Creative Cities Summit 2.0, transcribed from <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=laJqclyrkl>.

evening per week. For all the concerted efforts of local entrepreneurs and agencies, there remains an uneasy feeling that the talent flows are running in the wrong direction. When the marketing organization, Model D,⁵ dispatched a staff member across the Detroit River to interview Richard Florida's chief statistician, Kevin Stolarick, in Windsor, Ontario, the question was bravely posed: *Could a city really die?* "The scary thing," Stolarick disclosed, with a gesture towards Detroit, "is if something like that is going to happen, it's going to happen the other side of that river" (quoted in Parris, 2008: 2). His boss, at least when outside Detroit, has a habit of illustrating the brutal logic of creative-class mobility in more glib terms: Jack White abandoned Detroit because the "scene had become too negative and confining," and the locals had become "jealous of The White Stripes' success" (Florida, 2008: 125).

Back at the summit, some of the more seasoned observers were experiencing flashes of *déjà vu*, in this, "the latest effort by established institutions to transform [Detroit's] image from ruined rustbelt to hip hangout" (Aguilar, 2008: C1). The eager delegation from Model D was on hand, however, to record "the smart ideas." Their decanted lessons, in fact, represented little more than a credulous list of aspirational homilies and neoliberal platitudes.⁶ Something, they recorded, should be done about the fact that Detroit is "a city with a lot of rules," although they were quick to caution: "[W]e're not suggesting creating a lawless city, just one where the rules are modern and make sense and come with a delicious coating of ingenuity." It was time, Model D's creatives suggested, to stop worrying about cuts to public education (as the city embarked on an unprecedented program of layoffs and school closures), and instead seek out "local creatives and even tech companies willing to take on pro-bono work;" after all, "teachers are everywhere." Inevitably, more reasons were discovered to "[b]rush up on marketing 101," responding to the apparently pressing need to position the Detroit Creative Corridor within "the larger D Brand," an increasingly splashy initiative that now has its own annual summit.⁷ Cities, the new thinking went, had to learn to *play* like

⁵ Model D, which hosts a weekly e-zine and web site, was formed with the intention of "creat[ing] a new narrative for Detroit—telling the stories of its development, creative people and businesses, vibrant neighborhoods and cool places to live, eat, shop, work and play."

⁶ Following quotes from Model D Staff (2008: 2-4).

⁷ "The D Brand Summit is a groundbreaking, one-day annual event that brings professionals together to share cutting-edge brand-building skills, resources and insights that can make a real difference in the success of your organization—and the destiny of the D." These efforts are deemed necessary because "competition for new visitors and bright talent is heating up. What strategies and stories are other cities and companies using to stake their claim? How can the D hold its own and even gain new ground? How can your company capture the best talent and avoid the brain drain? What kind of role do you as a marketer

businesses, “[m]unicipalities as head hunters, Mayors as talent scouts, City Councils as fun-makers.” Cities cannot create cool, however, but they are able to *nurture* it, for example, by booking local bands to play at the airport, another idea from Austin that “Detroit could steal” (Model D Staff, 2008).

Detroit’s business establishment seems to have had little trouble embracing the creativity credo, while retaining its long-standing positions on public-sector austerity and market discipline. Less starchy board members of Detroit Renaissance seem to enjoy the buzz generated by the idea of creative regeneration, and the light relief it must provide from the usual grind of business retention efforts. But this bastion of the corporate establishment continues to issue shrill pronouncements of impending financial Armageddon—its “modest proposals” for the restoration of business confidence including a rolling program of government budget cuts, elimination of the Michigan Business Tax, and a \$100 million clawback from the Department of Corrections (Brandon and Rothwell, 2008). Crain’s Detroit Business, fresh from the announcement of its sponsorship of Creative Cities Summit 2.0, as an opportunity to “showcase our creative assets [and] connect with creative thought leaders from around the world” (Michelle Darwish, Crain’s Detroit Business, quoted in PR Newswire, 2008b) was soon back to the old-style business editorializing:

[T]oday’s crisis puts a harsh spotlight on Michigan’s need for dramatic and rapid cost reductions in government ... eliminating the Michigan Business Tax [and] overhauling public employee and retiree benefits and pensions ... Michigan [must no longer stand] for status quo, for protecting public employees at the risk of the public good and for business practices dictated by labor agreements that defy the reality of globalization ... Now, more than ever, the status quo must go (Crain’s Detroit Business, 2008: 6).

While lobbying for investment in creative real estate, the Detroit business community’s other new idea turned out to be an(other) image overhaul, this one with a marketing budget of \$1.2 million. *DNews* would be trained on the strategic target of “improving where the Detroit region ranks on a plethora of national surveys about livability and economic viability” (Walsh, 2008: B1). It was with the same circular and self-referential reasoning that Detroit Renaissance had pledged to respond to the city’s off-the-charts ranking on indices of creativity, talent retention, and quality of life, by pouring resources into the creative corridor, and into a newly “unified” rebranding effort, with a view to securing “improved rankings in independent cultural assessment surveys” (NES, 2008b: 19; 2008a).

stand to play in helping your region to get ahead — and in helping your organization to get ahead with it?” (dbrandsummit.com)

In such a way, urban rankings have not only become an important register through which intensified interurban competition is played out, subtly canalizing the means and ends of urban development (McCann, 2004; Lovink and Rossiter, 2007b), they also play a crassly instrumental role in rendering (supposedly) calculable the nebulous objectives of creativity makeovers.

The vacuity of these efforts was further revealed when Karen Gagnon, director of Michigan's Cool Cities program, appeared on Carol Coletta's *Smart City* public radio show, to promote the Motown summit.⁸ Responding to a series of softball questions from the show's host, herself a creative-cities consultant, Gagnon conceded that her state had not done "enough of a good job of preparing for" the apparently imminent demise of the local automobile industry, but if there was a silver lining in the crisis, it was that it had generated a new-found "openness to some new ideas ... related to creative place-making [and] the new-economy paradigm [which] the majority of our cities [have] really embraced." Detroit needed a *symbolic* makeover, she claimed, trading in the old image, as the epitome of industrial urbanism, for a more allegorical role in the spatial division of labor, as "a metaphor for ... changing to a new-economy paradigm, meaning not all dependent on the old ways ... Everything is changing." This feat could apparently be accomplished by prepping the creative supply side, establishing "the right environment, to allow people to be creative." The creativity script's prefabricated tropes—appealing, as they do, to new-age urbanism, parochial pride, and can-do optimism—seemed to be adequate to the task of selling on this policy position, that is, until the host posed an obvious, if rather tricky, question:

Coletta: Does the idea of a creative-city have any meaning to the people who make automobiles and auto parts?

Gagnon: I have not sat down [laughs nervously] with the executives of some of the Big Three or Big Four... It's hard for me, you know, to actually say yes or no.

Coletta: But your Governor certainly has, Governor Granholm certainly has ... and you have run her Cool Cities initiative I think since the very beginning ... I'm just curious, when she sits down with automakers, have you ever heard her say if this has any resonance for them?

Gagnon: I know that she has said a few things here and there. There is definitely some resonance. I would like to see more. I think there is always room for more resonance with the Big Three companies.⁹

In light of the predictable shortage of resonance, Coletta really should have known better, for she was hardly new to this territory. As the eponymous director of the consulting firm, Coletta &

⁸ The following quotes are transcribed from *Smart City*, October 2, 2008, accessed at www.smartcityradio.com.

⁹ Transcribed from *Smart City*, October 2, 2008, accessed at www.smartcityradio.com.

Company (now Smart City Consulting), she was one of a handful of key players in the simultaneous mobilization, during 2003-2003, of the creative-cities project as an elite-social movement and as a new-age consultancy product. Her home town of Memphis had ranked dead last on Florida's top-50 chart of creative cities, several places behind other allegedly buzz-free zones, like Detroit, Buffalo, and Las Vegas (Florida, 2002: table 13.3). But rather than alienating or infuriating the stunted hipster class of the Home of the Blues, it spurred them to action. Coletta rushed to convene the Memphis Manifesto Summit, in association with Richard Florida and the city's regular line-up of economic-development players, while also setting in motion what would become the Memphis Talent Magnet Project (see MTMP and Coletta & Company, 2003). Within months, countless other cities were following suit. For example, the Tampa Bay Partnership, the Sarasota County Commission for Economic Development, and the Florida High Tech Corridor quickly got together to commission a copycat "young and restless" study for Tampa Bay, which had also felt the competitive pinch after its mid-table ranking in *The rise of the creative class* (Impresa and Coletta & Company, 2004).¹⁰ This group, too, had formed a creative "front" organization, with the mandatory compressed glyphs, just in case anyone should miss the point: CreativeTampaBay predictably indulges in entirely typical forms of viral rebranding, modish marketing, and cocktail-fueled opportunities for "casual conversations and catalytic networking," together with self-congratulatory events, such as an annual homage to the region's 40 most-creative movers and shakers.

This organization also has its origins in a Richard Florida event, in April 2003, after which four local creatives followed the guru to Memphis, becoming signatories of the Memphis Manifesto (see Peck, 2005). On their return, in addition to establishing their own "grassroots organization," following the formula recommended for other creative wannabes, the Tampa four persuaded the local council to appoint a creative-industries manager, and set about organizing the inaugural Creative Cities Summit. The impresario of this latter venture was Peter Kageyama, self-styled social entrepreneur, marketing consultant, and partner of one of the Tampa four. As president of CreativeTampaBay, Kageyama would develop an increasingly peripatetic lifestyle, peddling the creativity credo everywhere from Perth, Australia to Huddersfield, England. Understandably, the market for recycled creativity policies is much wider at the bottom of the urban hierarchy, where the creative talent pool is supposedly thinner (according to the "theory" itself) and where there is often

¹⁰ Coletta and her collaborators later sold young and restless studies, effectively straight off the shelf, to creative growth coalitions in Providence, RI, Philadelphia, PA, Richmond, VA, and Portland, OR, with identical covers and identical tables of contents (see www.restlessyoung.com).

more than a whiff of desperation in efforts to climb aboard the cool caravan. The medicine show's arrival in Detroit was therefore effectively preordained. "Detroit is interesting as a metaphor," Kageyama opined at the second summit, for what the industrial city had (once) been able to achieve, though clearly it had "now fallen on challenging times" (quoted in Ankeny, 2008: M15). Creative rebirth surely beckoned.

Conclusion: creative policy ecologies

The two moments of "creative" urban policymaking contrasted here, while sharing the broad goal of leveraging "culture" in the service of urban development, are associated with markedly different rubrics, rationalities, and ramifications. During the early 1980s, Labour-controlled councils like the GLC represented localized bulwarks against Thatcherism at the national scale. Their advocacy of cultural-industries policies occurred in the context of an anti-monetarist posture, drawing on the expertise of activist policymakers and favoring provocative, politicized, and practice-oriented forms of interventionism. The municipal-socialist project relied heavily on politically targeted, strategic interventions in metropolitan economies, complemented with a rudimentary system of extralocal policy learning between politically aligned local authorities. The contrast with today's globalizing fast policy "market" for creativity fixes is a stark one. While this is (still) mostly fueled by public funds, it is prefiguratively animated by a distended complex of academic entrepreneurs, consultants, conferences, blogs, and web sites, coalescing into an imitative network of creative growth coalitions at the urban scale. Whereas the GLC's policies were negotiated between county-hall "craftworkers" and a series of unruly external political constituencies, their contemporary successors are more often sold by consultants, promoted through marketing networks, anointed by corporate-establishment agencies, and affirmed at "summits."

In truth, unambiguously positive policy outcomes have been elusive in both of these episodes, but the velocity and scope of contemporary creativity fixes far exceeds their 1980s predecessors. The speed and reach of contemporary forms of "creative policy transfer," and the sheer promiscuity of policy practice in this field, certainly cannot be explained in terms of the intrinsic effectiveness of the policy measures themselves. Rather, they spread because they conform, not because they "work." *Nouveau* creativity policies are carriers for fiscally undemanding forms of market-complementing interventionism; they are minimally disruptive of extant power structures and established interests, and they "accessorize" neoliberal urbanism in a manner

befitting prevailing cultural tropes of competitive cosmopolitanism. The very rationale of the municipal-socialist project, in contrast, was to confront and counter the neoliberal policy orthodoxy of the early 1980s.

The home-grown cultural-industries initiatives of the GLC and the creative-economy packages sold to cities like Detroit should not, therefore, be distinguished merely in the language of “policy choices.” Fundamentally, they derive from different ontologies of the creative economy, different constructions of creative work, and different rationalities of intervention. The municipal socialist strategy was concerned with extending the registers of the economic, in part by valuing (hitherto marginalized) forms of cultural distribution and production. But while the GLC sought to uncover and revalue cultural work in the cracks, as it were, of the formal economy, the Floridian creativity thesis promotes (innate) “talent,” along with associated creative “assets,” as the supply-side drivers of positive (indeed ascendant) forms of urban-economic growth. The GLC’s policies were designed to broaden the field of cultural recognition, while opening up access to livelihood strategies, for marginalized social groups and would-be cultural workers. In contrast, today’s creativity script is an aspirational narrative, celebrating the business achievements and lifestyle choices of creative entrepreneurs, their self-indulgent forms of overwork, expressive play, and conspicuous consumption. Whereas the cultural-industries project of the early 1980s sought to challenge existing distributions of cultural value and cultural labor, formulating progressive policies for cities that flew in the face of political-economic orthodoxy, the creativity script effectively affirms and exaggerates them, thereby relegitimizing and reinforcing regressive social redistributions within the city.

The GLC’s interventions were knowingly strategic and interstitial ones, framed in the context of a materialist understanding of (metropolitan) economic restructuring, and a (generally) shrewd reading of the landscape of political opportunity in the city. In contrast, the creative-city interventions of today are framed by an entirely different calculus, deferring to a new *logic* of knowledge-driven growth with a package of minimally disruptive “add-ons” to extant urban-economic development programs. While the two strategies might both be considered part of the same urban-policy genealogy, Hesmondhalgh (2007) surely has a point in characterizing today’s creativity cults as practically the *opposite* of their municipal-socialist predecessors. In this spirit, stylized distinctions between these two moments in, and “ecologies” of, creative urban policymaking are summarized in Table 1.

While the GLC used culture as a tool of political mobilization within the city, the creativity project is more about mobilizing a new generation culturally tinged growth coalitions across cities, reconstituting external competitive threats in novel terms, and defining new aspirations-cum-responsibilities for a broadened network of urban-policy protagonists. (What, after all, is a “summit,” if not a gathering of elite decisionmakers, focused on the search for a practical solution to an extant crisis?) The “quicksilver adoption” of urban creativity strategies, which has been described by Andrew Ross (2006: 27) and others, must be understood in light of the following conditions: first, their productive conformity with urban growth-machine interests; second, their broad compatibility with selective, supply-side policymaking in image, labor, and housing markets; and third, their fundamental complementarity with the (still-dominant, but always evolving) neoliberal development ethos. Working “in and against the market,” GLC-style, has apparently been superseded by working in *and for* the market. But this has been more than an ideological realignment. It has been accompanied by, and realized through, a transformed apparatus of urban policy formation and circulation. The velocity and promiscuity of creative-cities policies is hardly a product of their efficacy, the returns to which remain elusive, though it surely does testify to the speed and scope of fast urban-policy networks. The creativity script arrives with ready-made rationales, remits, and rhetorics, functioning as a carrier of trendy policy norms, yet requiring only minimal adaption to local circumstances. The forward- and upward-looking script addresses, and readily enrolls, local complexes of knowing creative subjects, assigning lucrative new roles to consultant-entrepreneurs, while reaching deep into established urban-development communities. As a result creative growth coalitions—key nodes in these fast-policy networks—seem to be metastasizing all over the place, where the hunger for rebadged policy formulations seems only matched a pervasive, if not existential, sense of competitive anxiety. The policy craftworkers at the GLC, 25 years ago, would have recognized (and acknowledged) the nature of these competitive threats, though they would surely have been bemused and perplexed by the nature of the contemporary response.

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Table 1 Contrasting policy ecologies

		Municipal socialism	Creative urbanism
Cultural political economy	<i>Goal</i>	Diversity: enrichment of culture	Growth: enrichment through culture
	<i>Impetus</i>	Political demonstration project	Competitive emulation opportunity
	<i>Register</i>	Socialist practice	Market governance
	<i>Restructuring</i>	For labor	For creatives
	<i>Economy</i>	Orthogonal: in and against the market	Complementary: in and for the market
	<i>Redistribution</i>	Positive: social justice	Negative: creatives first
	<i>Ethos</i>	Confrontation	Cool
	<i>Politics</i>	Oppositional	Confirmist
	<i>Subjects</i>	Marginalized producers	Cultural-economic elites
	<i>Claim</i>	Participatory engagement	Just desserts
	Reworking policy space	<i>Authorship</i>	Activist-craftworkers
<i>Analytic</i>		Materialist-radical	Idealist-rational
<i>Locus</i>		Local state	Development regime
<i>Carrier</i>		Local political activists	Creative growth coalitions
<i>Technology</i>		Disruptive	Enabling
<i>Mobility</i>		Innovation/inspiration	Imitation/replication
<i>Impetus</i>		Political push	Policy pull
<i>Currency</i>		Bold practice	Best practice
<i>Repertoire</i>		Experimental-incremental	Reiterative-recurrent
<i>Coordination</i>		Weak: collaborative learning	Absent: competitive leapfrogging

