SONJA BUCKEL, FABIAN GEORGI, JOHN KANNANKULAM AND JENS WISSEL

THE EUROPEAN BORDER REGIME IN CRISIS

THEORY, METHODS AND ANALYSES IN CRITICAL EUROPEAN STUDIES
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Study commissioned by the Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung
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FOREWORD

Millions of people look to ‘Europe’ with hope. Despite developments to the contrary, they see ‘Europe’ as offering them protection from war and persecution. Every day, the people who cross our militarised borders reinforce the fact that the perspective of another future for Europe remains open. ‘Europe’ also includes the millions who welcome the people arriving on this continent in search of refuge. In welcoming refugees, people in Europe were and are calling for a caring and democratic way of life, and are making a political stand against an individualised competitive society and ‘post-democracy’. Furthermore, ‘Europe’ also includes opponents of the view that there is no alternative to austerity and its authoritarian regime of governance, as well as campaigners for housing, health and education, a healthy environment and guaranteed social and labour rights for all. This Europe, however, is currently being overlooked due to the polarisation between the authoritarian ruling power bloc and increasing levels of radical right-wing populism, the latter radicalising itself as we can see in the Alternative für Deutschland party (AfD). We need to make this ‘third pole’ within Europe more visible and politically effective.

Europe is not something that exists beyond the horizon, nor is it merely a possibility. In fact, many people are already experiencing the reality of ‘real-existing’ Europe. The EU’s institutions and politicians have systematically impoverished entire societies, and they have eroded parliamentary democracy and organised and reinstated the outward isolation of the EU. Moreover, even if its internal conflicts and the variable geography of European processes were to be resolved, Europe still does not seem to be in particularly good shape. For many people, ‘Europe’ has become synonymous with impoverishment and reductions to social and democratic rights. It is therefore clear that Europe does not represent hope for everyone: it also stands for less democracy, fewer social rights and more neoliberalism.

The summer of migration has deepened the political fissures in the European power bloc, and the UK referendum has produced further mistrust. New and variable alliances are emerging; European countries are forming new groupings depending on the issue at hand, and diverse institutional arrangements continue to exist (Schengen, the Eurogroup and the EU etc.). Moreover, they are becoming increasingly fragile. At the same time, a situation has developed in which political camps are divided throughout the entire continent along the lines of certain European questions: ‘What do you think about the EU and the people seeking refuge?’ The European member states, respectively the governments, follow different lines in this regard – with some governments openly rejecting European decisions. These are not the only questions that are currently causing a rift among diverse political camps, and they are also creating strange new connections. So what does this actually mean?

Europe’s political development, it is claimed, is characterised by a single trend: the choice between right-wing populist isolationism and authoritarian neoliberalism. This trend is said to require nothing less than a transnational response and to mean that the left will have to rely on internationalism in order to be well positioned against the new right-wing populist International. But is this really the case?

In general, we do need to be open to rapid societal shifts. The European crisis is far from being solved, and dramatic twists are continually taking place: the coup against the Greek government last summer, the reaction to the summer of migration and the establishment of strong radical right-wing parties in many European countries and in the European Parliament. But against expectations, events showing resistance and democratic renewal and reorganisation are also occurring, and these range from the social democratic winds blowing through Britain to the anti-austerity government in Portugal, the welcome refugee initiatives remaining in place, the protests in France, the municipalist movements and government from Barcelona to Naples etc. These developments are further expressions of the ‘real democracy’ movements of 2011. It seems the ‘third pole’ is still active.

There is no point in deluding ourselves; what will happen in the future is still unclear. Although the inhumane closure of the Balkan route has reduced the domestic pressure on the German government, the deal with Turkey can and probably will unfold with explosive force. Moreover, the Brexit debate is fuelling tendencies towards EU disintegration, and the Catalan independence movement is revealing a crisis within the Spanish state and its role within the authoritarian European austerity regime. As this paper will show, the neoliberal ‘Hegemony project’ and its migration and border regime has entered into crisis. It is unclear as to which direction it will be redirected towards; into a closed Euro-nationalistic authoritarian regime with militarised borders and no respect for human rights, or into a more (neo) liberal model of selective migration and minimum human rights (but also with militarised borders), into further fragmentation of the European Union or into a democratic re-foundation of Europe.

This study gives us the theoretical instruments and methods to understand these processes and reveals the process that led to the actual migration and border regime and its crisis.

Mario Candeias
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Berlin, November 2017
Between 2009 and 2013, the research group known as ‘State Project Europe’ based at the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt and at Marburg University investigated the Europeanisation of migration policies. The inquiry focused on the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and Spain as key examples of EU member states. The following paper summarises the central theoretical and methodological results of this study. The first section develops and unpacks the theoretical premises of a historical materialist theory of the state. The section that follows presents the historical materialist policy analysis (HMPA) approach which has been developed within this context and that allowed us to operationalise the theoretical premises for our empirical studies. The last section analyses the social forces at play in the field of European migration policy in order to show that the project of migration management became hegemonic in Europe and how, since late summer 2015, it has entered into a state of crisis.

The study identifies five ‘hegemony projects’ that fought over the mode of European integration: a neoliberal, a conservative, two social projects and a left-liberal alternative one. In the field of migration policy, the conflicts between these projects condensed into the hegemonic political project of ‘migration management’. This project, driven by demands of corporations, certain capital fractions and neoliberal ‘experts’, aimed at making increased and flexible immigration of workers into and within the EU politically feasible by integrating certain migration policy demands from other hegemony projects – key among them were repressive border controls, protection of genuine refugees and national-social privileges.

The concluding section analyses current dynamics. It focusses on Germany and Austria because these countries are at the forefront of a major conflict about the European migration regime, starting with the ‘Summer of Migration’ of 2015. As a result, the migration management project has entered a period of crisis and readjustment, leading, first, to a partial opening of European borders and then to a temporary renationalisation and extensive expansion of the repressive elements of the border regime.

When the refugees had made it over the borders with self-confidence and found support from a large ‘welcome movement’, which can be attributed to a discursive alliance of the left-liberal alternative and the pro-European social hegemony project, it was possible to shift discourses and practices to the left.

On the basis of decades of mobilisation and not least of self-organised refugee protests, these actors were able to strengthen their position in the migration-political relations of force in Germany and Austria, the main receiving countries in the Summer of Migration. This was ultimately also mirrored in the attitude of the German federal government. The latter can only be grasped in its complexity and inconsistency by concluding that the strategies of the progressive hegemony projects coincided with those of the neoliberal hegemony project: both strategies were linked. The Merkel government was able to rely on influential actors that can be seen as part of the neoliberal hegemony project, including economists, representatives of capital and the neoliberal press. The conservative and national-social hegemony project, on the other hand, fell behind.

The temporary revocation of the asymmetrical compromise of ‘migration management’ by the actors associated with the progressive and neoliberal hegemony projects, triggered a major chauvinistic counter-movement, especially on the part of the racist (völkische) fraction of the conservative project. The growing influence of these forces intensified until March 2016, when the Aegean and Balkan routes were effectively closed and significant restrictions to asylum laws were introduced in Germany and Austria.

The coming years will show whether neoliberal forces will succeed in overcoming their prevalent crisis of hegemony and can re-stabilise the project of migration management by pushing back racist (völkische) actors and by reintegrating other actors of the conservative project. Such integration efforts are already apparent, for example in the support neoliberal actors give to the externalisation of the European border regime. The further direction of European migration policy, however, very much depends on whether there are forces that are able to develop a counter-hegemonic project of transnational solidarity.
1 INTRODUCTION

At the end of August 2015, information emerged from the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (FOMR) that they were suspending, until further notice, the repatriation of Syrian refugees under the Dublin Regulation. As it later transpired, this information was only based on an internal FOMR directive that was not legally binding (see Kasparek/Speer 2015). Nevertheless, the news spread quickly among Syrian refugees who had been held in Hungary for weeks and who now began marching the long route towards Germany; in Austria, the borders were opened for a few thousand people on 4 and 5 September 2015. Although the German government had agreed to close the border and return refugees by bus and helicopter only a week later according to journalist (Alexander 2017) and activist (Speer 2017: 18) sources, this plan was cancelled on 12 September 2015. After the official apparatus came to the conclusion that this decision would not stand up in court, no politician wanted to be responsible for unlawful actions and ‘publicly hardly justifiable images of the Bundeswehr taking action against refugees’ (Die Welt, 5 March 2017). NGOs, social movements and volunteers took advantage of these inconsistencies within the state apparatus; namely, a widespread desire to help foster practices of solidarity, which were quickly coined Wilkommenskultur (welcoming culture). During the course of these events, when central representatives of German capital emphasised the advantages of immigration (see Georgi 2016), Chancellor Angela Merkel had (in)famously already come up with the spin-doctor slogan, ‘We can do this’ on 31 August 2015. However, less than two weeks later, Germany introduced ‘temporary’ border controls at the Austrian border, and in October 2015, the Asylverfahrensbescheunigungsgesetz (Act for the Acceleration of the Asylum Procedure) tightened asylum legislation and classified Albania, Kosovo and Montenegro as safe countries of origin. In addition, the Act, also known as ‘Asylum Package I’, included provisions regarding the prolonged stay of those seeking protection in reception camps, benefit cuts, compulsory language and integration courses as well as stricter regulations for access to the labour market.

At the same time, the racist mob mobilised in Germany and in the backdrop of homes for asylum seekers being burned down, ‘Pegida’ (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident) demonstrations in Dresden and the ascendance of the ‘Alternative for Germany’ (AfD), the Bundestag further tightened asylum legislation with the introduction of ‘Asylum Package II’ in February 2016. Accordingly, asylum seekers from ‘safe countries of origin’ were to be accommodated in special reception centres and their repatriation was to be facilitated. In addition, the entitlement to family reunion was suspended for two years and further benefit cuts were implemented (Pichl 2017). In April 2016, the repatriation agreement with the authoritarian Turkish regime, an agreement that had been under negotiation since October 2015, finally came into force.

What becomes apparent against the backdrop of the hype of German politics is the core assumption constituting our historical materialist state-theoretical approach: the state and its apparatuses must be explained in relation to social struggles and conflicts. The German and European border regimes are in fact specific political responses to global migration. If one wants to respond to the question of how the new European control regime is constituted, then research must begin with the forces the state responds to, or more generally, with the social forces that take hold in its apparatuses (for the concept of the relationships of forces, see Wissel 2010a).

During the last thirty years, the transnationalisation of the state has fundamentally altered the specific spatio-temporal form of the modern capitalist state. This can be seen in the development and crisis of the European Dublin system, in which the countries of the southern European periphery have had to deal with the majority of asylum applications, leaving the European core states in a position to shirk such responsibilities. The so-called ‘refugee crisis’ which became apparent in the ‘Long Summer of Migration’ (Kasparek/Speer 2015) is crucially a crisis of European border and migration policy. In fact, for a long time, European states such as Italy and Greece had been unable to process asylum seekers and their applications in line with European standards. Consequently, Greece not securing its border with Turkey and so rendering Hungary a new European ‘external border’ state was no longer only a Hungarian or Greek matter. These regional conflicts became conflicts about the control of the external border of the European Union as a whole. European and national apparatuses are intertwined in this process, and the inability of European states to implement a ‘redistributive quota system’ or the like as part of the Dublin system, ultimately led the border to Europe being relocated within an authoritarian regime outside Europe.

By and large, the process of reconfiguring European borders that included the Europeanisation of migration and border policies in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam3 and began with the 1985 Schengen Agreement4 on the abolition of inner borders was now complemented by the Europeanisation of the external borders. This

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process is also referred to as ‘re-bordering’: in contrast to the thesis of an emerging borderless world, there is simultaneity with regard to establishing and opening borders (Sontowski 2011: 42). This creates a region of unrestricted inner mobility linked to a massively reinforced external border (Rumford 2006: 131). The purpose of our research project was to investigate this process of transformation backed up by state theory; the theoretical and empirical foundations of which we would like to introduce in this paper.

The transformation of the capitalist type of state raises fundamental questions. Ever since the EEC was founded, European politics have created economic areas, of which the most important was the Single Market. In the course of this re-bordering, the EU acquired a new territorial dimension (Walters/Haahr 2005: 107): not until the Treaties of Schengen and Amsterdam and their respective Regulations and Directives were European borders genuinely created alongside the management of these borders, European identity cards, legislation, databases and surveillance systems aimed at preventing irregular border crossings, ultimately a European visa regime and even its own border protection agency (Walters 2006: 187).

A characteristic of capitalist states is that they try to monopolise the procedures for organising the area within which their regulatory and control mechanisms operate (Poulantzas 2000/1978: 105). Territorialisation proves to be a strategy and technique of rule for enforcing certain interests (cf. Belina 2011: 92). Societal conflicts do not simply take place on a given terrain, in a socially structured space with boundaries, authoritative bodies, etc.; rather, the spatial structure itself is produced or reproduced and transformed in this process. Processes for inclusion or exclusion within territorialisation define and spawn the subjects of political rule; whether they are considered citizens equipped with respective rights, or whether they are completely disenfranchised. Consequently, border and migration controls constitute a core aspect of state policies. If, as a result of European integration, these policies are transnationalised, this would suggest that the apparatus of political rule is undergoing a socio-spatial reorientation. This ‘transnationalisation of the state in the process of the formation of a common European migration policy’ therefore provides the subject of critical state-theoretical research. What is the context of the social changes this transformation takes place in? And how do state and legal apparatuses change in the process? Traditional political science oscillates in its description of this new European constellation between the contrasting conceptions of a ‘confederation’, a ‘federation of states’ or ‘multi-level governance’. At the same time, however, the common denominator for these perspectives is that the state is seen as the body of societal problem-solving for the purpose of establishing collectively binding decisions.

Based on the premise that the state does not embody the ideal common good, but instead is the “material condensation of […] a relationship [of forces]” (Poulantzas 2000/1978: 128), our argument for the case of transnationalisation processes is that, under the hegemony of a neoliberal alliance of forces, a strategic shift occurred away from Fordism as a nation state project – a shift that was meant to overcome the restrictions on powerful capitalist actors imposed by the Fordist compromise (Esser 1982: 85 et seq.; Hirsch/Roth 1986: 78 et seq; Streeck 2013: 45). Attributing the concept of a “national social state” to this form of government (Balibar 2010: 25), Etienne Balibar argues that it was “absolutely indispensable” (ibid.) to regulate the class struggles that destabilised capitalist society in the first half of the 20th century with the help of social policy in order to preserve the national form of the state. On the other hand, this regulation would have never been conceivable “without the process of establishing the nation form, the form of the privileged community” (ibid.). In particular, the autochthonous working class was integrated into this state via material concessions and political representation after decades of struggle (Buci-Glucksmann/Therborn 1982). Furthermore, the first and second women’s movement also gained limited access to the masculinist state apparatus, while it still regarded the state as “the anti-institution” (Sauer 2004: 113) because of its radical exclusion of women and their life experience. After all, it was the migrant struggles long neglected in historiography which succeeded in achieving rights for non-citizens vis-à-vis the national social (welfare) state (Bojadzijev 2008).

Transnationalisation as an exit strategy from this constellation was a decisive (scalar) strategy. The social-territorial reorientation of national and European apparatuses within the EU took the form of a European ensemble of state apparatuses (cf. Wissel 2010: 88 et seq.; Wissel 2015) within this process, which gradually superseded traditional member states and, at the same time, drove the quest for a genuine European state project – comparable to the ‘old’ nation. The spatial strategy itself became a central element of the transformation facilitating talk of a “state spatial project” (Brenner 2004). The new state project and the emerging European ensemble of state apparatuses open up new spatial (or scalar) strategic options for societal actors in Europe to achieve their political projects.

In the following text, we will outline our state-theoretical approach in three sections (that stand and can be read independently): (I.) the theoretical foundations, (II.) the method for its empirical operationalisation with the concept of ‘hegemony projects’ and the ‘historical materialist policy analysis’ and, finally, (III.) the application of this research programme to the Europeanisation of migration control.

5 This is the title of our DFG-funded three-and-a-half year research project: www.staatsprojekt-europa.eu.
How can we analyse the processes of change that occurred in recent decades from the perspective of state theory? Today, political science largely answers this question from the perspective of the ‘governance approach’ and considers the EU to be a form of ‘multi-level governance’: the EU was an “actor of policymaking which does not have the quality of a state but exercises state functions and thus also transforms the state activities of its Member States” (Tömmel 2007: 13). In Foucault’s sense, the governance approach is the most common, mainstream contemporary theory of government. This means that migration, like any other political phenomenon, is to be taken into account as a subject to be governed by political leadership. While the old theory of control, on which governance research is based, assumes a technocratic predictability of social relations, the current approach differs because it recognises that “the respective object to be shaped is not merely a passive one, an object that is willingly enduring its formation by state policy but one that actively and self-dynamically processes steering impulses” (Benz et al. 2007: 12). So governance research corresponds to the neoliberal approach of ‘migration management’ which is oriented towards fine-tuning and even includes in its calculations the deviant practices of migration movements.

A materialist theory of the state assumes an opposing perspective and focuses on the critique of political rule. In many debates, first within Marxist theory and later also with feminist and poststructuralist authors, critical social analysis was always at the centre of this endeavour. Historical turning points triggered various attempts at reformulation, beginning with the bourgeois revolutions of the nineteenth century, the Weimar Republic, the National Socialist “non-state” (Neumann 2009/1942) through to the Fordist welfare state and finally the transnationalisation of statehood. By dint of these critiques, and challenged and driven by them, the materialist theory of the state developed into a multi-faceted approach that attempts to analyse and criticise political rule from an emancipatory perspective.

Controversy repeatedly broke out with the political science mainstream as in the 1960s and 1970s during the renaissance of research into the state: in the theoretical debate revolving around the reform and planning euphoria of the time, the materialist theory of the state emphasised the limits of politically controlling capitalist societies (for an overview, see Hirsch/Kannankulam/Wissel 2008). The “mainstream of German political science” always struggled “with the materialist theory of the state” (Esser 2008: 203), while similarities exist with Max Weber’s sociology of rule. Weber, too, defined the state as a “relationship in which people rule over other people” (Weber 2004/1921: 34).  

2.1 THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE

2.1.1 The Political Form

If the materialist theory of the state had to answer the question of current research into governance – “what is the state for?” (Beisheim/Börzel/Genschel/Zangl 2011b) – the answer would be clear: the reproduction of capitalist society. As expressed by the West-German state derivation debate about the genesis of the state in the 1970s, by Louis Althusser and Nicos Poulantzas in France, Antonio Gramsci in Italy or by the different strands of regulation theory since the 1990s, the basic assumption is that this historical form of socialisation (Vergesellschaftung) is structurally prone to crisis; after all, it is based on “societal conditions and natural preconditions” that it “can neither produce nor guarantee but rather perhaps even destroys” (Hirsch 1994: 167). This requires an activity, which is directed at the material reproduction, ordering and preservation of society as a whole and is outside of the exploitation process itself (Esser 1975: 157).

The problems to be solved or handled by the state apparatus are fundamental/structural problems, which expose the political process to barely surmountable contradictions and undermine its problem-solving capacities. That is because the state must continuously intervene in the societal reproduction process to stabilise it without being able to change its fundamental structures (Hirsch 1994: 177). In this way, societal antagonisms and conflicts are brought into a form that allows a temporary reproduction of society. “However, this cannot be achieved in the long-term: sooner or later the societal contradictions must become manifest in ‘secular’ crises” (Hirsch 1990: 17). Capitalism therefore develops as a sequence of crises-mediated and internationally uneven historical formations, i.e. temporarily stabilised configurations (ibid.).

In the course of the debate which has continued for decades, it became clear that this activity was not exclusively undertaken by state apparatuses, but that it was also dependent on civil society institutions, modes of subjectivation and reproduction in everyday micro-practices. Therefore, it seemed apposite to turn to the broader concept of ‘regulation’. However, in this respect, the state is not merely a place of power relations among many, which Foucault himself acknowledges, since there was a steady ‘etatisation’ of these relations (Foucault 1983: 224).
If one now considers the public interest, which is at the centre of governance approaches, then – as Marx and Engels already pointed out – the particularity of the capitalist state is that it “takes an independent form […], divorced from the real interests of individual and community”, which as “illusory communal life” becomes an “objective power […] growing out of our control, thwarting our expectations, bringing to naught our calculations” (Marx/Engels 1970: 53).

Characterised by manifold, mutually superimposed antagonisms as well as by anarchic commodity production, capitalist socialisation does not allow for a coherent societal context to emerge. Instead, ‘behind the backs’ it generates alienated and reified ‘bearers’ of social synthesis: ‘social forms’. The value form, the legal form and, hence, also the political form are reified practices; forms which emerge out of the mutual relations of social individuals regardless of their conscious will and action, and which guide direct perceptions and behavioural orientations and, thus, establish a social context in an obscured form. In the value form, this occurs through exchange-mediated commodity production and in the legal form through constitutions, contracts or court decisions. Under these conditions, it is impossible to directly establish a political community that could decide about its general welfare, its ‘problems’, its ‘normative goods’. Instead, the political form creates an entity which is separated from society and “externally opposed to it: the societal common [das gesellschaftliche Allgemeine] as separated from society” (Hirsch 1994: 167). This separation forms the basis of “the characteristic institutional framework of the capitalist State”, i.e. the basis of its materiality (Poulantzas 2000/1978: 19). Only because the state – as a spatial-temporal institutionalisation of the political form – usually acquires by means of its independence vis-à-vis societal actors a ‘relative autonomy’; it is in a position to contribute to reproducing this contradictory socialisation. This is the only way to influence powerful social actors, to establish consensus and to enforce concessions.

The political form is therefore “at the same time the illusory and real form which the community must assume under prevailing principles of socialisation” (Hirsch 1994: 167). In its separation as a social form, the political is the only possible and rational form of regulating common affairs in a generally irrational socialisation, in which the societal context is produced only “at the cost of excessive friction, in a stunted form, and almost, as it were, accidentally” (Horkheimer, 1972: 203). The general interest is real and illusory, inasmuch as it is the only common possible under capitalist conditions: one which would not come about because “each decides the same thing for all and all for each” as the republican, early bourgeois democratic theory claimed (Kant 1991/1797: 125), but in autonomous processes (legislation and bureaucracy) in which an elite of professionalised policy specialists is responsible for the common good – the political intellectuals in the sense of Gramsci.

The general interest is, however, also an illusion, since it is always permeated by social power relations. This can be illustrated by the example of gender relations. The peculiar separation of the state from society creates simultaneously a demarcation between the public sphere of the state and politics, and the private sphere of family, generative reproduction, emotions, forms of relationships and ways of life, and introduces gendered allocations for these respective areas (Ludwig/Sauer/Wöhl 2009: 11). This demarcation is an essential part of the institutional materiality of modern statehood, which shows a gender-specific strategic selectivity. This becomes manifest both in the selective choice of what is to be regarded as the object of public intervention, that is, as a task of the state, and what is regarded as private and thus individualistic and apolitical as well as in the selective access to state apparatuses and, finally, in the basic architecture of the state itself. For example, the closer an administrative department is to the core of the repressive state apparatus, the lower the share of women employed is (Dackweiler 2012: 77; Jessop 2001). ‘Feminist institutional archaeology’ showed how masculinity systematically left an imprint as masculine rationality in state institutions, structures and procedures, and gendered them (Kreisky/Löffler 2009: 76). In sum, the state is a materialised social relationship: a class and gender relationship, and also a relationship between the citizens and their others. It does not simply stabilise a given order but also co-creates the gendered, racialised and class subjects, which appear in governance approaches as fixed and antecedent to the state and are therefore naturalised (Ludwig, 2009). Also, the dyad public/private cannot be assumed to be self-evident and given. Rather, it was “formed under tears and blood in thousands of theoretical and practical contentions […] before it became self-evident” (Virno 2005: 29).

### 2.1.2 The State as a Social Relationship

To think of the state as a social relationship makes it necessary to free it from the character of a subject. It is not a substantial entity but a contradictory and fragmented ensemble of state apparatuses. Each of these apparatuses develops a specific momentum through the separation of politics and economics that is characteristic of capitalism. Thus, the stabilised practical context of the political gains its own materiality and develops mechanisms which “are designed to ensure its own preservation” (Foucault 1983: 222). Claus Offe (2006/1969 et seq.: 130) calls this the “interest of the state in itself”. It is precisely this momentum that leads to “institutional-centric” (Foucault 2009: 116), i.e. to an approach that looks for the origins of the power relations in those apparatuses – and not in the societal relationships of forces.
If social antagonisms are understood as being inscribed into the state apparatus, within these apparatuses, the antagonisms “the form of internal contradictions between […] its various branches and apparatuses, following both horizontal and vertical directions” (Poulantzas 2000/1978: 133). The various social forces refer to different state apparatuses, and these, in turn, have specific relationships to these social forces. The state is thus a strategic field shaped by complex, intersecting, decentralised and antagonistic relations between various sectors of the state (Jessop 1985: 125 et seq.). As a result, the policies of the various state apparatuses are sometimes contradictory and sometimes even diametrically opposed to each other.

This can be elucidated by a glance at current European migration policies. State policies are characterised by anti-immigrant rhetoric and repressive security legislation due to the virulence of nationalism and racism in the immigration countries. At the same time, however, these states pursue flexible and potentially increased immigration (Castles 2005: 21) because of the labour market policies of the national social state. Hollifield (2003: 35 et seq.) even talks about a “liberal paradox” in this context: in the course of globalisation and before the backdrop of increasing international migration since the end of the Second World War, international economic developments – trade, (foreign direct) investment and migration – had, on the one hand, driven states to a further opening, while, on the other hand, the international state system and powerful (domestic) political interests pushed them towards stricter isolation. This paradox can be easily resolved when the state is no longer conceived of as a single monolithic subject but as an ensemble of competing state apparatuses.

The nation state ensemble often showed a coherence that disguised the competition among its apparatuses. This was not due to its constitutionally established structure. Even if competencies are hierarchically determined by state organisation law, this setting can hardly influence the real structures of power (Jessop 1985: 127). The unity and coherence of the apparatuses is, however, decisive for the capacity of the state to establish societal cohesion, i.e. to commit the ruling forces to a shared long-term project as well as to integrate subaltern forces. This unity can only be achieved by specific state projects, which are developed in the various sections of the state (Jessop 1990: 126). The nation and the welfare state formed the central state project of the Fordist state in the global North – the national social state in the sense of Balibar.

2.2. THE INTEGRAL STATE

2.2.1 Hegemony Protected by the Armour of Coercion

To investigate political projects, we turn to Antonio Gramsci’s theory of hegemony. Gramsci triggered a decisive paradigm shift in the theoretical debates inspired by Marx by drawing attention to the political disputes in and around the state. His understanding of the state no longer followed the principles of instrumentalist-voluntarist concepts, such as those presented in Lenin’s The State and Revolution (see Lenin Works 25: 396 et seq.). Rather, he developed “a non-mechanistic relationship of class and state […], an extension of the state, which by no means reduces itself to a simple shift to the general superstructure (or even the cultural field)” (Buci-Glucksmann 1981: 87). By combining the analysis of the state with the analysis of social forces, Gramsci allowed an independent theorisation of the state to emerge and, at the same time, developed an understanding of historical contingency. He did not reduce the state to the repressive core state but conceived of the state as an “integral state”, consisting of the political society (società politica), the state in the stricter sense and civil society (società civile) (in detail, see Demirović 2007).

It was precisely because he was concerned with the analysis of political domination that he rejected an “impoverishment of the concept of the State”, by which politics became a synonym for “parliamentary politics” and which took the state as “the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules […]” (Gramsci 1971: 244). As early as the 1920s, Gramsci had, so to speak, made the transition from ‘government to governance’.

Set against the backdrop of the question as to why the revolution was successful in Russia but failed in developed industrialised countries, Gramsci recognised a new quality of bourgeois rule: unlike in previous periods, it is now primarily based on consensus and political leadership. While the Tsarist regime in Russia collapsed with the storming of the Winter Palace, bourgeois states had a far-flung system of ‘casemates and trenches’ in which the struggle for hegemony took place. The analysis of hegemony was Gramsci’s original contribution to the advancement of materialist (state) theory. As Eagleton (1991: 115) aptly points out “to win hegemony […] is to establish moral political and intellectual leadership in social life by diffusing one’s own ‘world view’ throughout the fabric of society as a whole”. The ‘casemates and trenches’ – the movements that strive for far-reaching changes leading to protracted ‘warfare’ – are located in ‘civil society’. The latter, Gramsci conceptualised as “the totality of all organisms, which are commonly called private”, i.e. churches, associations, trade unions and the mass media (Kramer 1975: 83). Above all, with his attention to the press, which he studied extensively, Gramsci devoted himself “to the immense complex of trenches and fortifications of the ruling class” (Buci-Glucksmann 1981: 102). Civil society is the decisive place for the struggle for hegemony. Remarkably, civil society is in Gramsci’s view an integral part of the state and not opposed to it. “State = political society + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the
armour of coercion", according to Gramsci’s classic formulation (Gramsci 1971: 263). The possibility of the use of coercion is not only ubiquitous; civil society itself is also shaped by relationships of forces and social inequality.

Hegemony, however, does not emerge by itself, but must be organised daily in endless, scattered processes. Here, according to Gramsci, the 'intellectuals' play a central role. Among them are the 'great intellectuals', writers and philosophers in the classical sense, and above all the 'small intellectuals', i.e. party and trade union officials, television presenters and bureaucrats, journalists and think tank employees. They are the technicians of hegemony, who are able to articulate the interest of a complicated alliance system and thereby develop a world view in a decentralised manner from different social places. Despite commanding less attention by Gramsci, political and legal procedures are nevertheless ideal-typical universalisation infrastructures due to their degree of formalisation and the generation of their own 'intellectuals': these intellectuals translate the interests of social forces into the internal structures of the state (Buckel/Fischer-Lescano 2007: 92). Gramsci thus conceived of the state as both an institutionalised result of societal struggles and as a place of societal struggles (for state as both an institutionalised result of societal struggles (for details, see Hirsch/Kannankulam/Wissel 2008: 93 et seq.; Demirović 2007).

An approach based on such a theory of hegemony does not conceive of the parliamentary and constitutional procedures of bourgeois democracies, contrary to their own claims, as mechanisms of social self-organisation, but as infrastructures for the organic circulation and reorganisation of hegemony, which at the same time make the occurrence of raptures in social cohesion more difficult (Jessop 2011: 47). In particular, Nicos Poulantzas emphasises the precariousness of these procedures by arguing with Marx, Gramsci and Franz Neumann that at the moment when political and ideological crises cannot be overcome by the regular democratic play of forces, following Jessop, “democratic institutions must be suspended or eliminated and the crises resolved through an open ‘war of manoeuvre’” (ibid.). But beyond such an emergency regime, Poulantzas found a new regular form of the capitalist type of states beginning with the crisis of Fordism, which he calls “authoritarian statism”. He understands the latter to be a state usurping all areas as a result of crisis management – étatisation in the sense of Foucault – with the simultaneous collapse of the institutions of political democracy and the restriction of formal liberties (Poulantzas 2000/1978: 203 et seq.; for more details, see Kannankulam 2008).

2.2.2 Structure/Agency

With their reference to Gramsci, materialist approaches combine their rather structuralist arguments with a focus on the struggles between social forces. With this move, a dialectical understanding emerges of structure and agency, which makes it possible to distinguish different variants of capitalism in space-time on the basis of different social forces, cycles and strategies of struggle. Aspects of societal structure can thus be traced back to social practice. The permanent repetition and reproduction of routinised practice condenses into social structure. Structures constitute silent constraints – “a sociality that has no single author” (Butler 2004: 1), which ensure the longue durée of social conditions. Structures are therefore both the basis for present and the result of past actions (Gerstenberger 1988: 146). Driven by social conflicts and antagonisms, practice reproduces structures and shifts them at the same time, since repetition always causes strategic or unintended shifts. Thus, even social forms turn out to be a raging “bloody battlefield” (Holloway 2002: 91), despite their fetishised immobilisation against change.

In this consolidation of social practice into social structures, its open, contingent and contested nature is forgotten – it is in fact de-politicised (Wullweber 2012: 35). Established practices are no longer questioned and are considered to be the only option. For example, border controls or “policies towards foreigners” appear as evident constants (Karakaşlı 2008: 33). They are “deeply embedded in the social structure, in forms of knowledge and everyday activities” (Wullweber 2012: 38). If we are concerned with structural principles, i.e. those structural aspects which expand most widely into space and time and thus become organisational principles of social totality (Giddens 1984: 17, 181), de-politicisation is most advanced when mechanisms emerge that eradicate any reference to their social construction. Such mechanisms are, above all, to naturalise social conditions – for example, the construction of two sexes – or to reify those conditions into social forms. Consolidated in structural principles, practices exert a deeply anchored hegemony. Political projects based on them are structurally privileged, affirmed and reproduce them at the very same time.

For a long time, materialist theory simply subordinated and ascribed legal procedures to the state. But the law is also a social form with its own institutionalisation, special juridical intellectuals and a relative autonomy vis-à-vis the political form and its institutions, i.e. it provides its own terrain for organising hegemony (see in detail Buckel 2007). The autonomy of both forms could easily be overlooked due to the coupling of the legal and political form particularly since courts, the centre of the legal form, are institutionalised as legal state apparatuses, and laws are formulated in juridical form, and state power is formally based on a constitution. It was not until the era of transnationalisation and the formation of a variety of new courts and quasi-courts beyond the nation state that the relative autonomy of the legal form, which had nevertheless always existed, came to light. The fact that law is an independent social form also means that
it follows its own logic, which can be levelled at the exercise of state power.

2.3 TRANSNATIONALISATION

In the past few decades, processes of globalisation fundamentally changed the nation state. They can be understood in the face of a drastic change in the social relationships of forces since the crises of the 1970s. Against the backdrop of the exhausted productivity potential of a Taylorist organisation of labour, the socio-institutional framework of the Keynesian welfare state increasingly proved to be an “obstacle to the valorisation of capital” (Hirsch/Roth 1986: 80); at the same time, it was also increasingly opposed by both the working class via mass strikes as well as the new social movements. On the other hand, capital pushed for a “new international division of labour” (Fröbel/Heinrichs/Kreye 1977) with the spatial shift and disaggregation of production, which increased the pressure on the Fordist state coupled with the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates (cf. Helleiner 1996). Neo-liberal oriented actors subsequently succeeded in shifting power in their favour within “Atlantic Fordism”, which became also evident in the election successes of Margaret Thatcher or Ronald Reagan (Jessop 2002: 55 et seq.; Kannankulam 2008: 107 et seq.).

States and state policies are not external to these processes, rather, as can be seen in the case of financial liberalisation or the implementation of monetarist policies, political decisions in the Fordist welfare states themselves led to the processes outlined above. The materialist theory of the state highlighted early on that these changes cannot be adequately understood by taking a dualism between ‘external’ and ‘internal’ processes for granted. Gramsci already acknowledged that international social forces always also condense and intertwine within the nation state (1971: 182). The processes of internationalisation in Fordism since the 1990s and transnationalisation rendered implausible a perspective that took domestic processes and global power constellations to be dichotomous. Globalisation processes neither come from the outside to the nation states, nor can the power relationships in the global state system be traced back exclusively to relationships of forces between and within nation states. Both spheres interpenetrate each other allowing internationalisation processes to be interpreted both as an expression of transformed relationships of forces within nation states and as a result of a changed global constellation (Poulantzas 1974; Kannankulam/Wissel 2004; Wissel 2007).

The key constellation, namely the indispensable role of the state in the reproduction of the capitalist society, was not changed by capitalist globalisation. Nonetheless, what has changed is the institutionalisation of the political form (Hirsch/ Kannankulam 2009). A flexible network emerged, consisting of global institutions such as the WTO, the IMF, the International Criminal Court and regional institutionalisations such as the EU, NAFTA or ASEAN – which also exercises regulatory functions given the global (re)production (Brand 2007; Cox 1998; Wissel 2007).

Neo-Gramscian inter- or transnational Political Economy interpreted this development as a new constitutionalism (Gill 2000, see also Bieling 2004: 136). Transnational regulative arrangements, it is argued, were largely removed from democratic control. However, it created a framework which increasingly subordinated political actors to global market discipline. This includes rigid monetarist inspired economic, monetary and financial policies as well as a liberalisation of trade policy. This new constitutionalism is discussed in the context of the transnationalisation of civil society, which is dominated by a new ‘transnational capital fraction’ (Gill 1990; Cox 1987, 357 et seq.).

Processes of internationalisation, which already started in Fordism, have further intensified since the 1990s. The production and accumulation strategies of large corporations have become increasingly transnational. This has also resulted in a change to the international division of labour. The old international division of labour between the global North and the global South has not disappeared, but it has been superimposed by a new, much more complex and transnational form of flexible exploitation of global conditions of valorisation. The global South is by no means only a supplier of raw materials for the North’s manufacturing industries as in Fordism. Instead, high-tech centres have also emerged in the ‘periphery’. At the same time, in some areas of the global North, employment and living conditions have occurred that differ only slightly from those in the South due to illegalisation and the general reduction of wage-earners’ rights.

While it can be observed that some countries in the semi-periphery have risen in the global hierarchy, entire regions are exposed to looting or are entirely excluded from the global economic cycle. Building on the Marxist concept of primitive or original accumulation and Rosa Luxemburg’s analysis of imperialism, David Harvey shows that original accumulation was by no means only a phase in the emergence of capitalism. Processes of direct violent appropriation are, on the contrary, fundamentally connected with the capitalist formation of society. According to Harvey, such processes of ‘accumulation through expropriation’ increased again in neoliberalism after a phase during which capitalism expanded internally (cf. Harvey 2005; Luxemburg 1963, 452 et seq.; see also Dörre 2008).

As an obstinate, relationally autonomous response to these expropriation processes, global migration movements emerged, which constituted a challenge (Benz/Schwenken 2005; Bojadžijev/Karakayali 2007) to the North and its “imperial mode of living” (Brand/ Wissen 2018), since it jeopardised the separation
of the global North from the global South which had previously been stabilised by the border. With the concept of imperial mode of living and production, Ulrich Brand and Markus Wissen describe specific "production, distribution and consumption models that are deeply ingrained in the everyday practices of the upper and middle classes in the global North and increasingly also in the emerging nations of the global South" (Brand/Wissen 2011: 80). The imperial mode of living is rooted in global access to resources and labour and is generalised "through spatially specific classes and gender relations as well as along ethnic and ethnicised lines" (ibid.: 82). With the international division of labour, the division of labour structured by gender hierarchies also changed. In the global North, an integration into the labour market occurred that was structured by gender hierarchies, while global supply chains (Ehrenreich/Russell Hochschild 2003) emerged that transnationalised and commercialised reproductive work (in detail, Buckel 2012: 84 et seq.).

### 2.4 EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

We view the European integration process as a regional response to these internationalisation processes, which assumed a new quality in the 1990s. With regard to the European Union in particular, one can now speak of a process of transnationalisation: "permanent and dense socio-spatial inter-linked structures stretching across several nation state spaces or territories respectively" (Pries 2008: 45). In 1999, Patrick Ziltener was therefore one of the first who conceptualised European integration from the perspective of materialist state theory; he did not regard the EU as an additional level but grasped it as an "increasingly central ‘interface’ equipped with a specific strategic selectivity (Ziltener 1999: 10). European integration was a complex process in which national functions had been partially replaced, abolished or gradually undermined and articulated in competition with other political spaces and regions (ibid.: 206).

We propose an even broader perspective that overcomes the dualism between the EU, on the one hand, and its Member States, on the other hand – without, however, implying a new state: we regard the European Union as a part and special feature of a post-Fordist European state project. By this we mean that if states are not substantial monolithic entities but ensembles of heterogeneous and partly competing state apparatuses, whose coherence has to be organised by a state project, this new configuration can be seen as the emergence of a European ensemble of state apparatuses indicating a transition from a Fordist state project to a new post-Fordist state project. In contrast to the debates over whether Europe is a confederation of states, a federal state or an organisation sui generis (Jachtenfuchs 1997), we are not investigating a state of affairs but a process. We assume that the national ensembles of state apparatuses are not only transformed internally but are also reorganised within the European framework. In this process, the hierarchies among the individual apparatuses change, and new European (quasi) state apparatuses emerge continuously, such as the European Commission, the European Central Bank or Frontex. These various apparatuses stand in a new interdependent relationship, which is not yet united by a stable European state project.

This conception can be exemplified by the edifice of European courts: The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is now "probably the most influential international legal body in existence" (Alter 2001: 229). At the same time, all Member States’ courts were transformed into European courts of first instance through their involvement in the enforcement of European law (Tohidipur 2008: 134 et seq.). The central institutional mechanism responsible is the ‘preliminary ruling procedure’ (Art. 267 TFEU). In this way, lower national courts can circumvent their national court hierarchy, suspend legal cases and submit a genuine matter of European law directly to the ECJ for interpretation. The latter’s decisions are then applied to the national court’s ruling and enforced via national courts. It is therefore no longer essential that the Court cannot resort to a European monopoly on the use of force.

In order to avoid misunderstandings, it should be stressed that here we are not talking about a European state. This would imply a degree of coherence that has not yet been achieved. However, what we can observe is the emergence of a European ensemble of state apparatuses. This ensemble includes national, European and transnational apparatuses, which together try to ensure the reproduction of European capitalism.

The current crisis indicates how unstable this project is. This crisis reveals the conflicts between the different spatial scales of regulation (see Wissel/Wolff 2017). In this context, the European ensemble of state apparatuses underwent its most severe crisis so far. At the moment, a break-up of the EU is still a real possibility. It is not yet clear as to whether this crisis is ‘merely’ a crisis in which the neoliberal orientation of the emerging European state project is further enforced, or whether the crisis will lead to a new integration project. A far-reaching renationalisation is also conceivable. That is because the European dilemma is only an aspect of the greatest crisis of capitalism since 1929. The latter manifests itself not only in a financial crisis but also in sovereign debt crises or the Eurozone crisis respectively but also in the incoherent reactions of the European ensemble of state apparatuses. It is also about a crisis to do with global food availability, a crisis of wage labour and reproduction work, of energy production, climate change and other dimensions of the ecological crisis, such as the loss of biodiversity (Bader et al. 2011; Brand/Wissen 2011; Demirović et al. 2011). In order to manage the major contradictions that become apparent in these crises, it would be necessary to
demand concessions even from powerful neo-liberal actors and to integrate them into a new political project, which would ensure a stable reproduction of capitalist society (cf. Buckel et al. 2012; Georgi/Kannankulam 2012). It is hardly to be expected that the relative autonomy of the European ensemble of state apparatuses is strong enough to tackle this task. The institutional structure of the EU seems hardly capable of dealing with the crisis and, at the same time, it is unrealistic to expect that the Member States would currently tolerate such an expanded role of the European institutions.

2.5 MIGRATION CONTROL POLICIES

The European processes of re-bordering are effects of these transnationalisation processes. That is because immigration and border policies are structurally linked to the capitalist state. They constitute both state space and the governed population – and therefore “non-population” (Meyer/Purtschert 2008: 165). The North-South relationship in the form of the imperial mode of living manifests itself materially in the state apparatus of the border. The latter is a technique of rule which constructs the interior and exterior, population and non-population, citizens and migrants, and by drawing a veil over the unequal, entangled relationship between the global North and South thus stabilises it: that is because the political and economic conditions of each state are in this way reduced to its internal development and not to its position in the process of global accumulation and unequal exchange. In this way, migration controls and borders (re)produce the notion that no one has to take responsibility for the fate of the non-population. The national social state also bestows privileges its members materially so that they develop an interest in its success and stability. It is based on the fact that access is limited to both its territory as well as its social rights and privileges. Thus, racist or nationalist-chauvinist positions in favour of the exclusion of non-citizens and the closing of borders find a basis in the material structure of the state.

The techniques of invisibilisation entailed in the European migration regime operate in the form of a twofold externalisation: first, northern Member States shift responsibility for European border control to southern Member States via agreements such as the Dublin Regulation (Regulation (EC) 2003/343), which then ‘outsource’ control measures to North and West African states.

The immigration controls thus incorporated into state materiality are subject to “perception patterns of deeply anchored orientations” (Brand/Wissen 2011: 91); a deeply anchored hegemony. This is the reason why almost all social forces in the countries of the global North relate strategically to this selectivity of the national social state (cf. the contributions by Georgi, Kannankulam and Wolff 2014). The emerging consensus does not rule out that there is contestation about the degree to which control policies are liberal or restrictive, but the consensus itself is not called into question. Such deeply anchored hegemonic practices must be made accessible to societal contestation by reviving their political, i.e. contingent, origin (Wullweber 2012: 37). This can be seen as the central concern of the No Border movement (cf. Georgi 2013, 2017).

If re-bordering takes place in Europe now, and migration control is Europeanised, i.e., the apparatuses of the national social state of Europe are woven into a European ensemble of state apparatuses, then this constitutes a massive state transformation process. This process itself is contradictory and prone to crises, as the following analysis of European migration policies will show.

7 The same applies to the Eastern European border which is secured in cooperation with non-European ‘accession states’ at the Eastern European periphery (Forschungsgruppe Transit Migration 2007).


3 HISTORICAL MATERIALIST POLITICAL ANALYSIS: OPERATIONALISING MATERIALIST STATE THEORY

3.1 HISTORICAL MATERIALIST POLICY ANALYSIS

How can the insights of historical materialist theory be translated into empirical research? How can the societal relationships of forces, the potentially infinite actor and power constellations with their myriads of actions, tactics and strategies be precisely analysed? Our preliminary response to this challenge is the development of a methodological approach which, following Ulrich Brand (2013), we refer to as historical materialist policy analysis (HMPA).

3.1.1 Materialist and historical

We talk of analysis of politics and not policy, (although our method is concerned with reconstructing the emergence and reproduction of specific policies) because we place an analytical emphasis on those processes structured by power and hierarchical relations effective within them. This focus on the analysis of rule is almost completely lacking in mainstream approaches to policy analysis (except for Janning 1998; see also Schneider/Janning 2006: 217). Our approach is historical-materialist, since we start from the materiality of social practices and regard capitalist socialisation (Vergesellschaftung) and its inherent surplus of objectivity as fundamental to the analysis of reality. Furthermore, we share the fundamental view of historical materialism that this surplus of social materiality is, from the perspective of societal actors, a constant of all societies hitherto structured by domination, but its real manifestation is subject to historical change caused by the practices and specific struggles of societal actors. “Man makes his own history, but he does not make it out of the whole cloth; he does not make it out of conditions chosen by himself, but out of such as he finds close at hand.” (Marx 2009/1852: 9) The capitalist, sexist and ethnocentric or racist structural principles do not emerge in specific conflicts per se; they do not emerge unmediated. Even if these relationships of domination shape society, they become manifest in specific constellations of forces which, depending on the conflict or policy field, play out in different spatial and temporal contexts. The structural principles materialise in institutions that are “constantly submerge[d]” by societal struggles and conflicts (Poulantzas 2000/1978: 141).

3.1.2 The Concept of ‘Hegemony Projects’

3.1.2.1 Definitions: Hegemonic Projects and Hegemony Projects

Based on these assumptions, we developed a research method that is capable of analysing the dynamics of these constellations of forces that are mediated by fundamental and comparatively stable social structures. In this respect, we were able to draw on approaches that have advanced the insights of Gramsci’s hegemony theory in state theory and European studies (see Bieling/Deppe 1996; van Apeldoorn et al. 2003; for a detailed discussion, see Kannankulam/Georgi 2012).

In addition, in the 1980s and 1990s, Bob Jessop already combined Gramsci’s theory of hegemony with insights from Nicos Poulantzas’ state theory, Foucault’s theories of discourse and concepts from theories of regulation. With regard to societal struggles, Jessop distinguishes three connected spheres in which actors strive to generalise their particular interests, i.e. try to make them hegemonic. Thus, within the economic sphere, different competing capitalist fractions struggle to implement their specific accumulation strategies, conceptualised as specific economic growth models. Looking at society as a whole, the problem within these struggles lies in the fact that different forms in the cycle of capital, such as financial capital, industrial capital and commercial capital, are to be “united” under the hegemony of a specific fraction (Jessop 1990: 198 et seq.). In addition to Jessop, this also includes the specific appropriation of unpaid work in reproduction, including a gender-specific and often racist division of labour. With regard to the sphere of civil society, different social forces aim to implement their interests related to broader social problems as hegemonic projects (ibid.: 207 et seq.). Furthermore, Jessop distinguishes hegemonic projects from so-called state projects. As pointed out above, state projects primarily refer to the specific juridico-political aspect of legitimacy (ibid.: 219, fn.) and to the respective processes within the state apparatus. They aim to bring competing and conflicting state apparatuses into a coherent form and, in addition, to constitute the border between the state and society.

This conceptualisation remains problematic because it leaves unclear the extent to which the different ‘hegemonic projects’ that fight for societal primacy have already succeeded in implementing their strategies and therefore became hegemonic. In fact, hegemonic projects must be distinguishable from those projects that aim at hegemony but have not achieved it yet. We therefore suggest that the (not yet) hegemonic projects should be described as hegemony projects in order to distinguish them from...
and aggregating the innumerable actions, tactics and procedures. Accordingly, various hegemony projects struggle to become hegemonic projects within the integral state. Hegemony projects do not necessarily need to pursue a strategy of accumulation or a real strategy for arranging political institutions. We assume, however, that they need the latter to become hegemonic in society as a whole. In addition to an accumulation strategy, the relation to a state project and the involvement of other actors, what is also required is reference to prevailing institutional selectivities (see Jessop 1990: 209-211).

3.1.2.2 Hegemony Projects as Bundles of Strategies

A central question is what criteria may be used to distinguish the different and competing hegemony projects from each other. Our proposal is to analyse the diversity of societal and political struggles along those strategies that actors pursue in the conflict investigated by the respective researcher. These strategies form on the basis of actors’ respective diagnosis of situations and problems (see below), which, in turn, result in specific political rationalities geared towards achieving their – also longer-term – goals. In order to gradually reach these goals, actors apply specific tactics.

With our focus on strategies, we want to avoid deriving the actions of actors ‘objectively’ from their position within the societal structures of domination. By contrast, strategies can be demonstrated empirically (e.g., through media or discourse analysis). Hegemony projects are thus conceptually developed abstractions, which can indeed include organised alliances such as advocacy coalitions, policy communities or other consciously established networks – but the former can in no way be reduced to the latter. Accordingly, hegemony projects can be summarised as the strategies of actors which partly deliberately relate to each other but also differ from one another and do not conceive of themselves as part of a ‘joint project’, such as the No Border movement and professional refugee NGOs. The decisive distinction criterion is the question as to whether actor strategies significantly coincide in a conflict field, whether they share a certain common direction. Hegemony projects are therefore bundles of strategies that pursue similar goals.

In this way, a potentially indefinite number of actors, practices and tactics are bundled into hegemony projects and combined. Such practices range from activities on the part of small political groups to the lobbying of business associations, investment decisions and legislative proposals of political actors. The question of whether certain societal projects become hegemonic depends not primarily on the specific actions of certain major actors, but primarily on whether their actions are consensually anchored in both the hegemonic ideas and practices within civil society as well as everyday life (cf. Bruff 2008; Brand 2011). “Intellectuals” play a special role in generalising and aggregating the innumerable actions, tactics and strategies linked to hegemony projects. They link the individual parts of a project, rationalise its goals and interests and formulate compromises via specific problem definitions, problem diagnoses and solutions. In short, they work towards creating an overarching political narrative. Part of their effectiveness depends on the extent to which the disparate conceptions of how one’s own goals can be achieved are united in a common strategy. Hegemony projects thus have a dual nature: they are, on the one hand, conceptual constructions and, on the other hand, map real aggregations of actors’ strategies; both levels are in articulative interplay mediated by social practice and refer to one another.

3.1.2.3 Hegemony Projects: Fractions and Dynamics

We see hegemony projects as constellations of forces that transcend individual policy areas. Although they show very similar characteristics in different policy areas, the strategies pursued are specific to different policy fields and conflicts. In other words, the actors of different hegemony projects pursue specific partial objectives in different policy conflicts: depending on the conflict, different actors and parts of the social basis of hegemony projects take centre stage. It is, therefore, quite possible that hegemony projects are divided into fractions in individual conflicts. Hegemony projects are thus not internally uniform and homogeneous – precisely because they link the strategies of different actors, who can apply different tactics in the pursuit of the same overarching goal (see Jessop 1990: 204 et seq.). These fractions within a hegemony project can be class or capital fractions with their specific interests, but also actors with different ideas about gender equality. Moreover, hegemony projects also can splinter into fractions due to a different spatial anchoring of its actors (see Macartney 2009) and, finally, due to an unequal radicality of political strategies. Poulantzas pointed out that the cohesion of the ruling capitalist fractions is always fragile and depends on whether a fraction manages to render its own ideas in a hegemonic way and successfully integrates competing fractions (1990/1978: 136).

Similarly, it can be said that, within a hegemony project too, a fraction needs to bring different protagonists under its leadership and to marshal them with the help of specific compromises and discourses; otherwise one can hardly talk of a coherent hegemony project. This is why it is crucial to avoid conceptualising hegemony projects in a static fashion. They are always aggregations of strategies with which certain forces react recursively (i.e., experience-induced) to specific historical situations.

3.1.2.4 Hegemony Projects and Space

Internationalisation and especially the Europeanisation of the state and the economy relativised the central position of the nation state in economic and political
terms. However, the nation state is still a privileged space where hegemony is organised and developed. This is partly due to the fact that the nation state monopoly on violence continues to play a central role for consensus armoured by coercion. On the other hand, it is virtually a characteristic feature of supranational structures such as the EU that civil society, which is created as a key area within hegemony, exists at best in a rudimentary form.

Nevertheless, all of the hegemony projects identified by us pursue multi-scalar strategies within the European ensemble of state apparatuses (and other transnational structures). Transnationalisation and Europeanisation thus expanded the terrain on which the struggle for hegemony takes place (see Demirović 2001; Wissel 2007).

The territorial link of hegemony projects is particularly important when one examines, as we do, a spatial transformation. The hegemony projects examined by us differ on the question of how to think about Europe’s territorial constitution (primacy of the nation state, confederation of states, supranational or the federal European ‘state’). Accordingly, the spatial dimension of the respective hegemony projects must be taken into consideration: which scalar strategies are followed? Which spaces are strived for/defended? How are actors represented and organised within the multi-scalar European ensemble of state apparatuses?

### 3.1.2.5 Hegemony Projects and Political Projects

In order to become hegemonic, hegemony projects attempt to implement limited specific political projects, which we call ‘political projects’ in reference to Bieling/Steinhilber (2000). We assume that political projects are “special, concrete political initiatives that represent themselves as solutions to pressing social, economic and political problems” (ibid.: 106). Examples are the European Single Market and the Monetary Union but also projects such as the European border protection or the Europeanisation of labour policy. In order to become hegemonic, a hegemony project must succeed in positioning a number of such limited political projects in such a way that they become the politically strategic ‘terrain’ on which a hegemonic project can condense. The hegemony project thereby creates a new selectivity of the ensemble of apparatuses. In the struggle for hegemony, political projects are terrain and vehicles of enforcement at the same time. Analytically, it is crucial that hegemony projects can only be analysed by means of the commitment of their actors in the struggle for real projects.

### 3.1.2.6 Hegemony Projects in the Relationships of Forces

In order to make political projects hegemonic, the actors involved must succeed in combining different dimensions of social and political action: “material interests, strategic orientations, discursive and cultural meanings, ideological convictions, emotions, etc.” (ibid.: 106). These different aspects point to the fact that both the social relationships of forces and hegemony are multidimensional. They cannot be reduced to class relations. Capitalist societies are not characterised solely by commodity production, the appropriation of surplus value and class struggles. In hegemony projects, strategies condense along a wide range of relationships of forces. This multi-dimensionality becomes clear when analysing the power resources that are available to hegemony projects due to their social-structural location and their strategic-relational reference to the existing selectivity of the ensemble of apparatuses, in order to be able to assert themselves in the societal constellation of forces. One challenge of the analysis is to indicate the reasons for these differences, to identify which resources are available to specific actors and hegemony projects within the societal relationships of forces in the context of an enlarged socio-structural context. Similar to Schmalz and Dörre (2014) in their work on trade union revitalisation strategies and their distinction between structural, institutional, social and organisational power resources, we assume that the following resources must in particular be taken into account:

(a) **Organisational Resources**: Bureaucracies, Finance, Military, etc.: first, ‘organisational resources’ can be distinguished, among them bureaucracies (the number and qualification of employees), networks and/or access to the media, state apparatuses, elites (social capital); financial resources; knowledge/cultural capital, but also the ability to threaten or use violence. These different resources are more or less direct characteristics, abilities or attributes of actors themselves, and they can use or mobilise them with comparative ease. The contingent organisational resources also include ingenuity with regard to tactics, the choice of the appropriate point in time and the skill in implementation. Claus Offe (2006/1969: 33) pointed out that societal needs and interests can then be organised, when there are definable groups of people who are interested in the political representation of their specific needs. These needs must also be sufficiently clear and important to their members so they are ready to marshal the necessary resources.

(b) **Systemic Resources**: with systemic resources, we describe the ability of actors to make decisions that have system-relevant consequences. Here, we rely on another argument from Offe (2006/1969: 34) on the notion of “conflict capability”. Accordingly, those actors, who are able of “credibly threatening to withhold a system-relevant service”, are capable of conflict. An obvious example is the capacity of capitalists to make decisions about investments, jobs, site establishment and relocation. Offe argues that, in addition to capitalists, organised labour (trade unions) in key industries is also capable of conflict in this sense because it is able to withhold a system-relevant activity by going on strike. In addition, actors, who are not
Rule does not equate intentional strategies. With his very indirectly related to social relationships of forces. Hegemony, and many practices and actions are only projects. not all actors' actions are geared towards social forces, not all actions, practices and strategies relationships of forces are completely absorbed. not all understood as entities in which the dynamics of social hegemony projects. hegemony projects are not to be scope, i.e. to specify the validity of the concept of finally, it is necessary to specify and limit our analytical practices
directly linked to the capitalist process of production, can become capable of conflict and can nevertheless interfere with the circulation of goods and traffic, for example, the roadblocks by ‘piqueteros’ in Argentina or striking truck drivers. It would also be conceivable that women refuse unpaid reproductive work – which they have done – or that migrant workers resist the racist social structures in which they have to work for bad pay and little recognition (see Bojadžijev 2008; Karakayali 2008). In this way, whole sectors could become paralysed.

(c) Discursive, Ideological and Symbolic Resources: a third group of power resources can be described as discursive, ideological or symbolic resources. By this we mean the ability of actors to combine their concerns, interests, proposals, strategies with accepted recognised discourses equipped with high symbolic capital, such as the human rights discourse. Discursive or symbolic resources describe the ability to articulate one’s own situation analysis, goals and strategies in a way that is accepted by as large a part of society as possible or by key actors, social forces or institutions. If actors succeed in linking their specific political projects with familiar symbols, dominant discourses or mass loyalties, their position in the societal relationships of forces is strengthened.

(d) Institutional or Strategic-structural Selectivities Respectively: another resource is ‘institutional selectivities’. Based on Poulantzas’ concept of ‘structural selectivities’ and Bob Jessop’s adaptation as ‘strategic selectivities’, we argue that the power resources of a project also depend on the extent to which the goals and strategies of its actors correspond to those selectivities that are deeply rooted within social, political and economic institutions. These institutional selectivities must be understood as form-determined material condensation of past configurations of social forces, strategies and struggles. Strategic selectivities can operate on different scales, including the degree to which they are linked to selectivities enshrined in laws, rules, norms, state apparatuses, administrative rules, markets or other institutions. In addition, their foothold in everyday practices and dispositifs, such as heteronormativity or hegemonic whiteness is paramount.

3.1.2.7 Hegemony and Non-Hegemony-oriented Practices
Finally, it is necessary to specify and limit our analytical scope, i.e. to specify the validity of the concept of hegemony projects. Hegemony projects are not to be understood as entities in which the dynamics of social relationships of forces are completely absorbed. Not all social forces, not all actions, practices and strategies can conceptually be subsumed within hegemony projects. Not all actors’ actions are geared towards hegemony, and many practices and actions are only very indirectly related to social relationships of forces. Rule does not equate intentional strategies. With his concept of habitus, Bourdieu rightly pointed out that there are strategic practices that are carried out largely unconsciously and implicitly (cf. Bourdieu, 1984: 174).

Societal actors can react differently to a hegemonic constellation they reject. We have identified four possible sets of behaviours:

(a) Counter-Hegemonic Strategies: this denotes an attempt to achieve an alternative form of hegemony in society. A project of radical reformism, in which fundamental social structures are to be discussed and changed, could be located here. However, any strategy to establish an alternative hegemony, whether progressive, conservative or reactionary, is counter-hegemonic.

(b) Anti-Hegemonic Strategies: this denotes strategies that principally reject hegemony as a form of bourgeois rule. Hegemony implies political leadership and thus a hierarchical relationship. Anti-hegemonic movements must nevertheless move in the mode of hegemony, if they want to become politically relevant and generalise their own position. These are, for example, radical critical, anarchist strategies that refuse to comply with the procedures of bourgeois politics and instead try to establish alternative spaces, ways of life and practices of production and reproduction outside of capitalist society (subsistence economy, communes, social centres, and exchange rings, etc.). These struggles can be described as anti-hegemonic struggles for hegemony. This manifests the old problem that ‘enlightenment’ attempts to dismantle hierarchies but itself implies a hierarchical relationship. It is about leadership without leading to “change the world without taking over power” (Holloway 2002).

(c) Escape Strategies: in addition to such political targeted anti-hegemonic strategies, there is a variety of (everyday) practices which refuse, avoid, paralyse or undermine a hegemonic order, its rules and constraints without aiming at generalising these practices deliberately and politically. In our field of investigation, the focus was on migrant practices of mobility, their “waywardness” or Eigensinnigkeit (Benz/Schwenken 2005) and the relative “autonomy of migration” (Bojadžijev/Karakayali 2007) respectively, with which migrants cross borders, acquire rights and organise their survival. The movement of migration does not attempt to universalise their interests and a specific world view or to implement political projects. They do not act politically against migration controls. Papadopoulos, Stephenson and Tsianos (2008) capture this with the term ‘escape’: “Escape is not opposed to or against the regimes of control in which it emerges; escape betrays the regime of control by carefully evacuating its terrain” (ibid.: 75). It is crucial that such practices do not enter hegemony projects.

9 This denotes demonstrators who want to draw attention to their dire economic situation through blockading roads and companies. The central forms of action are the ‘piquetes’, illegal roadblocks.
directly but are nevertheless powerful by forcing social forces and their hegemony projects to react: “People’s escape, flight, subversion, refusal, desertion, sabotage or simply acts which take place beyond or independently of existing political structures of power force sovereignty to respond to the new situation which escaping people create, and thus to reorganise itself” (Papadopoulos/Stephenson/Tsianos 2008: 43).

(d) Resignation: finally, large sections of the population can react to a hegemonic order with passivity. They are no longer part of the active consensus of hegemony; but as passive elements they act to stabilise hegemony (see Adolphs/Karakayali 2007). These are the ones that can neither be found in a hegemony project nor in one of the other strategies.

Since the focus of our empirical research is on the struggle for state policies, the concept of hegemony projects focuses attention on hegemony-oriented and counter-hegemonic strategies. Anti-hegemonic practices, escape strategies and resignation are not the focus of our discussion. These limitations must be taken into account so as not to overtax the scope and meaning of the term.

3.2 OPERATIONALISING HMPA

Starting with the concept of hegemony projects, the question emerges as to how to harness this complex theoretical concept for empirical research – how to operationalise it. This is a problem which should be familiar to many who (wish to) work empirically with materialist state theory. Concepts of critical social theory lead to the fundamental problem of overcomplexity in empirical research. How exactly can the social relationships of forces, the potentially infinite actor and force constellations, the innumerable actors with their myriads of actions, tactics and strategies be conceptualised and analysed? A central problem for the further development of materialist state theory is thus to find a productive, heuristic approach to the complexity of social relations in empirical research.

A preliminary result of discussing this problem previously is our approach of a historical materialist political analysis or HMPA (see also Brand 2013). This approach operationalises the empirical analysis of political conflicts in three steps: the analysis of context, actors and process.

Depending on the respective focus, different social areas with their specific selectivities and inherent logics are at the centre of an investigation: societal relationships of forces, apparative condensations in political apparatuses and the state or in the juridical apparatuses. An HMPA needs to adapt to these analytical focal points, i.e. the three steps of the HMPA change depending on the focus of investigation. If social relations are at the forefront, material condensations in the political and juridical apparatuses are part of the context. If political apparatuses are at the centre of attention, the societal and juridical condensation and conflicts are part of the context of the investigation, and so on. As explained, the context can be reconstructed based on secondary literature and analysis.

The analysis of actors and processes changes depending on the focus. When analysing debates in the political apparatuses, other actors and processes will be investigated compared to an analysis of legal disputes or societal relationships of forces.

3.2.1 Context Analysis

The first step of an HMPA is the context analysis. The purpose of context analysis is to elaborate the historical dynamic and structural context of the investigated conflict. It is about identifying those elements of a historical situation to which social forces and political actors react differently and opposed to each other. The analysis of context must render understandable the form-determined and institutional path dependency, which does not determine but co-constitutes and structures the strategic responses within conflicts. Its goal is to reveal the deeper historical and structural layers of the conflict under investigation, in which, for instance, ‘migration policy’ is fundamentally linked to the existing regulation of the North-South relationship and by no means only caused by abstract ‘push and pull factors’.

The central impetus of an HMPA is the critique of domination. Its prerequisite is that relations of power and domination become visible. A positivist research concept that considers policy fields in isolation would contradict such an ambition by neglecting historical and material contexts. But it is not simply a matter of addressing domination but also of showing that domination, as much as it is based on societal structures, is also the result of contingent social conflicts; meaning that things could have developed completely differently. “This twin-tracked attitude”, which takes society to be determined by structures and demystifies them at the same time, “provides the key to understanding Marxism as a critical theory” (Adorno 2006: 118).

In order to achieve this goal within the context analysis, we propose several steps. First, those dynamic historical situations that have created the conflict under investigation need to be reconstructed, thus positioning it in its wider historical, economic and social context. For example, research questions could be: out of which contested dynamic did the political project of the European Monetary Union arise? To which historical situation did actors react with the political project of Union citizenship? What were the situation and dynamics in the early 1990s to which actors in Germany reacted with different strategies of migration and asylum policy?

We are therefore stressing the significance of a dual contextualisation, in which the analysis of structural contradictions is combined with an analysis of conjunctural dynamics. In doing so, the effectiveness of fundamental social structures needs to be made apparent, while, at the same time, the conflict under
The opposing strategies with which social forces and political actors react in opposing ways to this situation, to the ‘problem’ it posed. Put in simple terms, the actor analysis investigates what social actors said and did with regard to the investigated conflict, thus working out existing and conflicting strategies in the conflict. The challenge here is to capture the ‘inner heterogeneity’ of actors, such as trade unions, associations or political parties. For example, the progressive position regarding migration policy of trade unions (or the respective departments) is at odds with their (tacit) support for restrictive migration controls in the overall economic context. The allocation of actors’ strategies to hegemony projects must take account of this heterogeneity. This may mean that different actors within an organisation have to be assigned to different hegemony projects. Based on this, the analysis of actors identifies and analyses several constellations, implicit coalitions or links of social forces that were relevant in the conflict under investigation. The immediate goal of the actor analysis is to reduce complexity. The analysis of actors formulates hypotheses about the specific constellation of social forces, which meet, confront, fight and compromise within a specific context.

3.2.2.3 Analysing Hegemony Projects
Third, the identified hegemony projects must be analysed and described along a number of categories:

1. First of all, the specific situation diagnosis of a hegemony project has to be sketched out, i.e. the elements of a specific discourse that describe what and who is actually a problem, and what is identified as the cause of the problem. This includes the question of the spatial reference level at which the problem is meant be solved. Thus, the analysis focuses on the specific ‘knowledge’ of actors. (2) The basic strategic objective of the hegemony project must then be worked out. By this, we do not mean the tactical goal within the conflict under investigation. For example, the neoliberal project aims at a liberalised migration policy, but ultimately this is only a means for providing flexible and cheap labour. (3) Based on the situation diagnosis and the basic objective, the central strategy of the hegemony project becomes clear. Thus, an individual political rationality emerges, which refers to the conflict under investigation and the chosen scalar orientation. Analytically, the central strategy of a hegemony project becomes apparent in the political projects pursued by important actors in one or several policy areas. It is this conflict-related strategy that ultimately determines the ‘belonging’ of an actor to a particular hegemony project. ‘Strategy’ here denotes the central reaction...
of forces to a problem, a specific historical situation elaborated in the context analysis. (4) Finally, the central actors of a hegemony project should be listed, i.e. groups, organisations, associations, parties or groups or associations within parties, social movements, the media, think tanks, networks, companies, capital fraction and their spokespersons. With regard to the outline of the situation diagnosis, objectives and strategies, the classification of these actors must be justified and substantiated.

The issue of the (central) actors of a hegemony project also encompasses the problem of spatial and political fragmentation within such a project. Within a hegemony project, there will in each case be different situation diagnoses and to a certain extent also distinguishable objectives. It is likely that such differences will outline different ‘fractions’ within a hegemony project.

3.2.2.4 The Analysis of Relationships of Forces

Fourth, in analysing the actors, the aim is to develop an assessment of the relative position of the hegemony projects within the societal relationships of forces for the conflict under investigation. The power resources of the hegemony projects play an important role here. This is analytically difficult due to a number of reasons. The position in the relationships of forces is always a relational one, dependent on and related to other forces and the specific conflict as well as on the relationships between different actors and hegemony projects. In spite of the prominent position of the concept of ‘relationships of forces’ in materialist approaches, hardly any systematic investigation has been carried out that would elucidate the sources of these forces, or how exactly the relational position in a power relation can be determined. Gramsci already highlighted this problem:

“One often reads in historical narratives the generic expression: ‘relation of forces favourable, or unfavourable, to this or that tendency’. Thus, abstractly, this formulation explains nothing, or almost nothing – since it merely repeats twice over the fact which needs to be explained, once as a fact and once as an abstract law and an explanation. The theoretical error consists therefore in making what is a principle of research and interpretation into an ‘historical cause’” (Gramsci 1971: 180).

As shown, hegemony projects and their actors ‘possess’ very different power resources, and their positions in the societal relationship of forces are unequal. In light of this, a challenge of the analysis is the way in which these inequalities are expressed, and the mechanisms and dynamics that have led to the fact that some actors have a stronger position in the relationships of forces, while others are marginalised. In short, the researcher must judge, evaluate or assess the position a hegemony project occupies within the social relationships of forces. Such a judgement can be based on an analysis of ‘power resources’ and on the results of a historical materialist ‘context analysis’ introduced above.

3.2.3 Process Analysis

The third aspect of an HMPA is the process analysis. The process analysis combines the first two steps in a reconstruction of the dynamics of the investigated conflict. The process analysis reconstructs the complex processes of struggle, in which a conflict develops in different phases. Different factors and dynamics must be taken into account in classifying the various phases of conflict: recursive-strategic actions; the practices and tactics of the protagonists of the conflict; the significance and specific ‘manifestation’ of structural conditions identified in the context analysis; and, finally, insights into the relative position of hegemony projects involved in the conflict in the relationships of forces.

Depending on the chosen perspective and the specific purpose of the investigation (social, political or legal level), the process analysis must assume different forms. The focus can therefore change: from different problem definitions of actors involved in the conflicting political projects to their solutions and the resulting conflicts to the provisional and then more or less stable consolidation of the relationships of forces in institutions, laws or state apparatuses in the respective conflict.

3.2.4 Practical Research Limitations

In the preceding sections, we tried to present the results of our discussions of a historical materialist policy analysis. Initially, this approach is not concerned with the resources available to a researcher or research project. However, we are aware that many of the proposed analytical steps fail in practice due to limited resources. To this extent, they should be considered as suggestions, which must be implemented according to the chosen perspective and available resources or must be set aside for future clarification. This also applies to our own research. We could not investigate all of the outlined steps with the desired depth and detail. It is up to future research projects to remedy this situation.
4 HEGEMONY PROJECTS IN THE BATTLE FOR MIGRATION POLICY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

The aim of our research is to make the political and institutional changes in the field of migration policy understandable by interpreting them as an expression and result of social struggles and dynamically shifting relationships of forces. At the centre of the following sections is the analysis of the five hegemony projects that played a central role in these struggles.

In this study, we pursue two objectives: first, we want to illustrate our points about the method of HMPA and its operationalisation and to show what kind of knowledge and arguments can be developed with it. Second, we aim to deepen the understanding of the social and political struggles for migration policy in Europe and the process of European integration. But before we elucidate the respective hegemony projects, it is important to outline the historical dynamics and the economic and social context – in the sense of a ‘context analysis’ – to which the described hegemony projects reacted.

4.1 CRISIS AND GLOBALISATION AS CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND EUROPEAN MIGRATION POLICY

The key questions addressed in the migration policy conflicts we investigated were whether and how EU Member States should Europeanise the different areas of their national migration policies. Since migration policy always concerns core issues of other policy areas (such as border, labour market or social policy), these conflicts also concerned the form and direction of European integration as a whole.

From a historical materialist perspective, the process of European integration in its predominant form of the competitive state (Wettbewerbsstaat) was a strategic response to the transnationalisation of production and trade in the crisis of Fordism since the mid-1980s (Ziltener 1999). The way in which Europeanisation took place depended on the social and political struggles for the European project (Statz 1979: 21). Bastian van Apeldoorn, a proponent of the ‘Amsterdam school’ of transnational historical materialism (see van Apeldoorn 2000; Overbeek 2004), therefore distinguishes between three ‘integration projects’, which struggled for the form and direction of European integration in the conflicts over the European Economic and Monetary Union in the 1980s and 1990s. First, the neo-liberal project aimed “at freeing […] the productive’ market forces from the shackles of government intervention” by opening up to the world global market, deregulation and privatisation (van Apeldoorn 2000: 200). Second, the neo-mercantilist project aimed, through a large European single market, at countering the introduction of key conglomerates as “Euro-champions” and the larger “economies of scale” in the Triad competition (ibid.: 200 et seq.). Third, the social-democratic project that attempted “to implement a supranational framework of social regulation” in order to defend the “European social model” (ibid.: 201).

According to these analyses, it can be said that the neoliberal hegemony project succeeded with its central political projects – the Single Market, Monetary Union, competitiveness – during the 1980s and 1990s, and despite repeated crises (see Deppe/Felder 1993), its protagonists managed to universalise their particular interests and thus form a hegemonic project. The hegemonic neoliberal project thus structured the basic framework within which the Europeanisation of other policies, including migration policy, was pursued. On this basis, the process of European integration led to a situation in which, despite the EU not having been constituted as a new state, the network and integration of national and European institutions and state apparatuses had become so strong through many small and some major political projects (the Single Market, European Monetary Union, Schengen, the enlargement to the East, Maastricht/Amsterdam/Lisbon) that one needs to refer to a multi-scalar and fragmented ‘European ensemble of state apparatuses’ characterised by a dominant neoliberal form of integration.

In the course of the dynamics of the Single Market project and its regulation, it is also possible to identify elements of a ‘state project Europe’ linked to this complex ensemble of apparatuses. One part of the efforts to bring the European apparatus ensemble into a (reasonably) coherent shape is the attempt to Europeanise migration and border policy. The backdrop of these efforts as a superordinate context are four historical dynamics that have driven and structured the conflict about a Europeanisation of migration policy (see Georgi 2013).

The first historical dynamic had its roots in those mobility practices with which subaltern population groups from peripheral areas reacted to (civil) wars, social disintegration and crises often linked to processes of expulsion and expropriation and caused by the neo-liberal push for globalisation from the end of the 1970s onwards, including the debt crisis, IMF structural adjustment programmes, privatisation, land grab, overfishing, etc. (see Harvey 2005). These processes are the most recent consequences of the imperial mode of production and living.

The second historical dynamic emerged from the generally rather restrictive responses to the relatively autonomous practices of refugees, migrant workers and other migrants immigrating in larger numbers into the EU in the 1980s. Strong social forces in (Western) Europe and a large part of the EU population advocated a restrictive policy towards this mobility (see contributions by Georgi, Kannankulam and Wolff).
2014). Based on and triggered by a deeply anchored hegemony regarding the existence and necessity of borders, the national-social dynamic for securing the imperial way of life determined and structured these restrictive responses of different social forces to the new migratory dynamics; whereas the specific form and spatial shape remained disperse and disparate.

Third, the Europeanisation of migration policies was driven and structured by conflicts about labour policy. On the one hand, efforts were made to react to low growth rates and to find opportunities for the profitable utilisation of over-accumulated capital via changes in labour policies. Triggered especially by capital fractions affected by labour issues, their supporters in civil society and state apparatuses, this political dynamic pushed for increased and flexible immigration, regulated openness and the use of controlled migration managed on the basis of utilitarian-economic criteria. On the other hand, domestic work provided by migrant women became the world’s largest labour market (Lutz 2008: 11) because of the growing demand for cheap services in private middle class households in the global North and rich households in the global South. This is usually organised illegally in private households (see Buckel 2012, Ressel 2014).

Finally, the fourth dynamic emerged from the process of European integration itself, from EU institutions and states and from those European nation states that increasingly felt that migration control policies could not be left to individual nation states under the conditions of the European Single Market and its four freedoms. Striving to expand and enhance their influence by increasing the number of communitised policy areas (among other things immigration policy), the momentum and inherent logic of European bureaucracies were significant here. The self-interest of the European state apparatuses, the desire to grow the initially small bodies and EU institutions involved in immigration policy triggered a dynamic in which the communitisation of migration policy intensified.

In summary, the subaltern mobility into the EU, the deeply anchored hegemony of borders and the national-social dynamics of restriction, immigration-oriented labour policies and the dynamics of EU institutions – these four dynamics above all constituted the historical situation in which the struggles over European migration policy took place from the 1990s onwards. However, the emergence of a European migration policy cannot be derived from such a context analysis. For an understanding of its form and direction, it is necessary to analyse the social and political forces which, in this context, were wrangling over the European state project as a whole and the Europeanisation of migration control policy in particular. These can be conceptualised as five different hegemony projects: a neo-liberal, a conservative, a national-social and a pro-European social as well as a left-liberal alternative hegemony project.

4.2 HEGEMONY PROJECTS IN THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND A EUROPEAN MIGRATION POLICY

The hegemony projects are outlined below along five dimensions: (1) their strategy of Europeanisation; (2) their social basis; (3) the implementation of their general strategy in the field of migration policy; (4) their central actors; and (5), finally, the power resources of these actors.

4.2.1 The Neoliberal Hegemony Project

In the course of the crisis of Fordism in the 1970s, the neoliberal hegemony project replaced the then hegemonic Keynesian national-social hegemony project as a successful counter-project. This was due to a restructuring of Fordist economies and a relatively successful discursive offensive, which focused on public debt, rampant mass unemployment, increasing labour disputes and the emergence of new social movements (see Gamble 1994; Saage 1983). The internationalisation of production coupled with increasing financialisation due to the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system with its fixed exchange rates and capital controls offered political and economic power to this hegemony project, which had been on the defensive since the global economic crisis of the 1930s and ‘hibernated’ in networks like the Mont Pelerin Society (Helleiner 1996; Walpen 2004; Kannankulam 2008: 107-131).

Having had a major influence on the European integration process since the 1980s, the basic strategy of the neoliberal hegemony project is the restructuring of almost all sectors of society and government under the primacy of economic growth, high profit rates and competitiveness. In the context of European integration, the neoliberal hegemony project succeeded in implementing the political project of the Single Market and the stability-oriented Monetary Union. Political guidelines were the flexibilisation of (re-)production and working conditions, the financialisation of the economy and the dismantling of state regulations. The core issue is the internationalisation of capital, trade, production and supply chains, and the mobility of the production factor of labour within the context of a neo-colonial international division of labour.

The key sectors of the globalised, post-Fordist regime of accumulation form the social base of the neoliberal project: the “exclusive male clubs” (Young/Schuberth 2010: III) of the financial sector and the large transnational corporations and their networks (see van Apeldoorn 2009). Added to this are privileged and highly qualified workers, the self-employed as well as parts of the state bureaucracy and the wealthy (Gill 1998: 12 et seq.). The neoliberal hegemony project is supported by European and partly transnationalised interior bourgeoisie, which have emerged from the transnationalisation processes of the past two decades.
of recruitment policies with elements of a traditional repressive migration policy to integrate conservative forces into their labour strategy: if one were to “flood the labour market, indeed, this could have devastating political consequences. [...] Now, to say, once and for all, to tear down all walls and to look what’s happening, well, society and collective mentalities are too fragile for such an endeavour” (Interview BITKOM 2010).

On the basis of the particular demands of certain corporations and capital fractions for much more flexible immigration, experts of the neoliberal hegemony project developed the political project of a comprehensive ‘migration management’. This regime aimed at making the economically driven migration of workers politically feasible by integrating certain migration policy demands of other hegemony projects (e.g., repressive border controls, protection of genuine refugees, national-social privileges).

Central actors in this concretisation of neoliberal strategies in migration policy are industry associations of individual capital fractions, European as well as migration think tanks, international organisations, such as the IOM, OECD, ICMPD and the European and partly global networks of experts, in which the migration policy community is organised (e.g., the Metropolis network). However, there are several divisions between actors of the neoliberal hegemony project with regard to migration policy. First, there is a difference in the sector-specific needs for ‘low-qualified’ labour as opposed to ‘highly qualified’ labour, which requires different policies, some of which are contradictory. Second, there is the question at what scale neoliberal migration policies are primarily to be implemented. While most employers’ associations, like in the United Kingdom and Germany, support a national regime, neoliberal forces in the European Commission seek a European regime (supported by individual industries, such as the IT industry, and actors from peripheral EU countries, such as Spain). International organisations such as the IOM strive in the long run to regulate the “allocation of labour” in a binding, global migration regime (see Georgi 2010: 65). In the case of the European Blue Card, this led to the fact that the neoliberal political project of the Blue Card was ultimately a compromise because of the scalar fragmentation of the neoliberal hegemony project, which allowed nation states to set the number of those granted entry with a Blue Card to zero (see Georgi/Huke/Wissel 2014). These divisions with regard to the issue of scale point to fundamentally different ‘territorial references’ – to the different national anchoring of neoliberal fractions, i.e., to the schism in the neoliberal hegemony project between ‘national-neoliberal’ and ‘euro-neoliberal’ fractions. It is these cleavages that escalated during the ‘Long Summer of Migration’ in 2015 (see Hess et al. 2017). National-neoliberal, conservative and national-social tendencies opposed the project of migration management and overall the project of the European Union.
The power resources of the neoliberal hegemony project are extraordinarily high. The project is supported by a large number of influential intellectuals in think tanks, academia and the media, among others, the (economic) editors of the FAZ, Welt, Financial Times and El Mundo. Due to their position, many actors who pursue neoliberal strategies are in a position to make decisions about jobs, working conditions and investments dependent on the acceptance of their demands. They also possess the largest material resources. The turnover of transnational corporations equals the gross product of middle-sized national economies (Gill 1998: 7), which invest their resources not least in extensive lobbying networks with offices in Brussels and other European capitals capable of influencing aspects of state policies. However, the fragmentation is a structural weakness of the project in terms of the relationship between financial capital and industrial capital as well as their different scalar strategies: while the German industrial structure is made up of many small and medium-sized industrial enterprises apart from large global corporations (Vester 2013: 12) and based on grown networks of producers, suppliers and industry-oriented services (Allespach/Ziegler 2012: 10) making Germany the global industrial export champion (Vester 2013: 12), the United Kingdom is now characterised by a dependency on financial capital and became a loser in the competition for economic development, exports and jobs due to its strategy to build a post-industrial service society. In Spain, on the other hand, capital investors had speculated on the real estate market, where now potent buyers are missing (ibid.: 26). Some economies, such as Austria, are almost exclusively dominated by national capital fractions, while others like Ireland are almost exclusively dominated by transnational interior bourgeoisies. With the global financial crisis, and particularly the Euro crisis, the neoliberal hegemony project entered a state of crisis. With regard to Europe, a schism between pro-European neoliberalists and national neoliberalists becomes increasingly apparent (cf. Buckel et al. 2012; Kannankulam/Georgi 2014). This schism also led to a crisis of migration management.

4.2.2 The Conservative Hegemony Project

Since 2014, it were primarily actors of the conservative hegemony project that underwent a dynamic, offensive development. As Andrew Gamble (1994) demonstrated for the United Kingdom, since the 1970s actors of the conservative hegemony project often entered into alliances with the neo-liberal hegemony project in the course of the counter-offensive against the crisis-hit Keynesian national-social project and the Fordist national welfare state. Under the dictum of a free economy which was to be enforced by a strong state it was possible to strategically unite the two hegemony projects (ibid.). However, the conservative hegemony project is often opposed to European integration, which can also be seen clearly in the case of the United Kingdom. The basic reference point of this project is the strong state and the nation, which are understood as ends in themselves and an intrinsic value – not as a means to establishing a community of solidarity that enables justice as in the case of the national-social project (see below). The conservative project associates the nation with ethnicity, common language, history, culture and certain traditional-conservative values such as the family, traditional gender roles, security and Christianity. In the United Kingdom, it gave rise to the debate on ‘British values’, in Germany to the comparable discourse on a lead-culture (Leitkultur) and on integration. To the extreme right of these strategies, actors explicitly use xenophobic and racist resentments to mobilise against a supposedly ‘inundation’ with foreigners, ‘Islamisation’ or the ‘loss of sovereignty’ of nation states. The basic strategy in the European Union is, therefore, essentially a vehement rejection of a deepened European process of integration. The conservative hegemony project remains primarily linked to national territory and is sceptical or opposed to deepened integration. Instead, the respective actors advocate a ‘Europe of sovereign nations’.

The conservative project’s social base can often be found in the agricultural sectors, some small and medium-sized enterprises and sectors which are primarily or exclusively oriented nationally or even locally and have no or only a weak international connection. Furthermore, there are parts of the autochthonous working class and the lower middle class, which have been threatened by social decline or have already slipped into the ‘lower classes’. This includes former supporters of social democracy as well as the classical milieus of conservative parties, including religious-conservative milieus and finally actors at the margins that move towards the extreme right.

Conservative actors see the migratory political situation as being characterised by too much immigration. From their point of view, traditional national values are threatened by foreign cultural sets of beliefs. In addition to culturalist motives, conservative actors perceive the loss of national-social privileges as a central danger caused by high immigration. They fear that ‘immigration into the social systems’ could put the national population at a disadvantage. Since the 1980s, both motifs coincided in a series of migration ‘crises’, in which protagonists of the conservative hegemony project succeeded in staging ‘moral panics’ and anchoring their situation diagnosis and strategies broadly in society, including the ‘asylum debate’ in Germany from 1991 to 1993, the ‘Sangatte crisis’ in the United Kingdom and France in 2001/2002, the ‘Cayuco crisis’ in Spain in 2006 (see Georgi; Kannankulam; Wolff 2014) and, of course, the European Summer of Migration of 2015/2016 (cf. Kasparek/Speer 2015; Georgi 2016; Hess et al. 2017). More recently, the conservative actors’ diagnosis of
the situation is more rigidly structured by antimuslim racism; for instance, Germany, beginning with the Sarrazin debate in 2010 and the advent of the Pegida movement at the end of 2014.

If one investigates the vision the actors of the conservative hegemony project have with regard to migration policy, then a Europe emerges with effective and strict border and migration controls, where external and internal migration is to be fundamentally reduced, if not completely prevented (‘Germany is not a country of immigration!’). In this context, the objectives of migration policy range from ‘zero immigration’ and the ‘repatriation of foreigners living here’ at the extreme right of the project to positions that want to reduce immigration by ‘tens of thousands, not of hundreds of thousands’, as suggested by British conservatives. According to the former Bavarian Minister of the Interior, Günther Beckstein, ‘more of those we benefit from and less of those that short-change us’.

In order to achieve these goals politically and on the ground, many nationally anchored conservative actors pursue European scale strategies, i.e. the implementation of repressive migration policies at the European level, including Frontex, the Dublin regime, high-tech systems such as the fingerprint database Eurodac, the biometric entry-exit system and the EUROSUR border surveillance system, encompassing, among other things, drones and satellites. From a conservative point of view, it is crucial that this common European border policy is controlled by the national governments and that no sovereignty is transferred to the EU Commission, for example. This national orientation is evident not only in the closing off to the outside world. Conservative protagonists also often oppose a strengthening of the social rights of Union citizens. In the field of labour migration policy, they mostly count on national regulations.

Important in terms of positioning the conservative hegemony project regarding its migration policy are right-wing populist parties and groups, in the United Kingdom the right-wing think tank ‘Migration Watch UK’ and the Eurosceptic UK Independence Party, in Germany especially the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD, Alternative for Germany). In contrast to other countries, this right-wing potential became in Germany relatively late with the AfD beginning in 2013, while in Spain, as of yet, it has not been able to consolidate itself in any relevant right-wing parties.11 The conservative hegemony project finds an influential base in the repressive state apparatuses, the national ministries of the interior, the police, border guards and immigration authorities. Certain conservative positions rest so much on the deeply anchored hegemony of the border that they hardly need explicit articulation, for example, that social services and jobs are first to be given to those who possess the ‘correct’ citizenship.

In the conservative hegemony project, the lines between the fractions run mainly along national borders. Therefore, we should rather talk about the linking of national-conservative projects than a joint Euro-conservative project. The national division become apparent when conservative actors from southern Europe reject the Dublin system, and those from Germany, the United Kingdom and Scandinavia passionately support it. It is precisely because conservative hegemony projects are strongly anchored in ‘their’ nation states, that their specific goals and resentment against internal ‘minorities’ and different ‘immigrant groups’ differ. In general, the conservative hegemony projects consists of fractions, spanning from the liberal-conservative to the extreme right.

The power resources of the conservative project as a whole mainly rest on its anchoring in the repressive state apparatuses, a national conservative-traditionalist milieu and the ability to mobilise the latter through right-wing populist campaigns, election campaigns and debates, not least due to the support of various newspapers (FAZ, Welt, Bild and other Springer newspapers in Germany, Daily Telegraph, Daily Mail and The Sun in the United Kingdom, La Razón and El Mundo in Spain). But also the economic resources and the tactical scope of the project must not be underestimated. On the one hand, it receives direct support from regionally and nationally oriented capital fractions; on the other hand, close ties are being established in many countries between conservative parties and foundations and actors of the neoliberal hegemony project and benefit from its resources. Thus, in the three conservative parties in Germany (CDU/CSU), the United Kingdom (Conservative Party) and Spain (Partido Popular), a neo-liberal ‘economic wing’ and more national-conservative tendencies can be found.

The Summer of Migration led to a reorganisation of this conservative hegemony project in Europe. Conservative actors had been in crisis for some time (Keil 2015) because of the supremacy of the transnational neoliberal hegemony project. In 2015, the supposed loss both of border controls and the identity of the state and the ‘people’ in combination with the crisis of the neoliberal state and the long-established discourse of antimuslim racism since 9/11 mobilised diverse forces of this project. This applies in particular to the racial (völkische) fraction, which in Germany finds political manifestation in the AfD, civil societal manifestation in PEGIDA and similar movements, is supported by right-wing media, and finally entertains links to the pogrom-causing mob, including the terrorist-network of NSU (‘National Socialist Underground’). This constellation has grown throughout Europe, including in Greece, Austria, France, Italy, Denmark and the Netherlands.

11 In other EU Member States, strong right-wing populist parties exist, e.g., in Austria (FPÖ, BZÖ), France (Front National), Belgium (Vlaams Belang), the Netherlands (Partij voor de Vrijheid), Hungary (Jobbik), Denmark (Danske Folkeparti), Italy (Lega Nord) and Finland (Perussuomalaiset or True Finns) (cf. Forschungsgruppe Europäische Integration 2012).
and has already found entrance to governments in Eastern Europe, especially Poland and Hungary. The theoretical question is open and requires further discussion as to whether one must assume that this fraction has now developed into a separate right-wing hegemony project across Europe.

4.2.3 The National-social and Pro-European-social Hegemony Project

For the social hegemony projects, social balance and social redistribution are the focus of their political strategies. What is crucial to the actors who pursue welfare state strategies is to defend the European social model with its relatively high welfare standards, corporatist arrangements between capital and labour and a generally consensus-oriented culture of political debate. However, in the face of the counteroffensive and dominance of the neoliberal hegemony project and its successful strategy of weakening working conditions, trade unions and withdrawing social rights, these actors have been on the defensive. National arrangements were undermined using the core tactics of the neo-liberal project, the internationalisation and Europeanisation of production, trade and labour strategy. This resulted in a division: the fractions that pursue social strategies are so fundamentally divided with regard to the scalar political direction the defence of the European social model should take that two social hegemony projects have emerged: a national-oriented one and a pro-European one.

According to our analysis, the socio-structural base of both projects consists of those social forces that had been incorporated into the Fordist compromise due to the struggles of the labour movement in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: via the expansion of social rights, social mobility for the lower classes, the asymmetric integration of women and migrants into the labour market and a broad culture industry. Public employees and the unionised core staff of skilled workers benefited from both corporatist structures, gender equality in the division of labour and close contacts with regional and national governments. Through the ‘neo-liberal counterrevolution’ (Milton Friedman), their working and living conditions have changed fundamentally, meaning that large segments of the social base of the project now live in precarious conditions. Temporary and part-time workers, the marginally employed and recipients of social benefits are largely female and migrant. Their interests collide in part with those skilled workers that can still benefit from corporatist arrangements.

For the actors pursuing welfare state strategies, the situation in the field of migration policy is characterised by contradictory developments: on the one hand, many trade unions and social organisations reject the repressive European migration policy because it violates the human rights of refugees and grants too few social, cultural and economic rights even to many ‘foreign’ workers who have been living in the EU for a long time. On the other hand, they point more strongly to problematic aspects of migration, including ‘unfair’ competition on the labour market (low wages, poor working conditions) and the (potential) overloading of social systems than the left-liberal alternative project outlined below.

Like their situation diagnosis, the visions actors of the social hegemony projects have for migration policy are characterised by two elements. On the one hand, this is the ideal of a fair and open migration policy that protects refugees, grants extensive rights to migrant workers and, in the spirit of international solidarity, gives people from developing countries the opportunity to work in Europe. In trade unions in Spain, the United Kingdom and Germany, the principle was asserted that unions have to stand up for the rights and against the discrimination of ‘foreign’ workers in different ways. On the other hand, trade unions, social organisations, etc., support the deeply anchored hegemony of borders; they act, as it were, as representatives of the national-social compromise. Based on this, they pursue projects directed against neo-liberal European (migration) policies like wage dumping and the race to the bottom in working conditions as a result of the EU Services Directive or the Posting Directive. In addition, they call for human rights-compatible modifications to border and asylum policies (Frontex, Dublin) and strong social rights for all EU citizens.

In the social hegemony projects, central actors in the field of migration policy are departments and initiatives of larger organisations, such as the ‘migration and integration’ units of trade unions and social organisations, the networks of migrant workers within and outside the trade unions as well as community-based groups, such as care workers or Sans Papier in various industries (Respect Berlin in Germany, Kalayaan in the United Kingdom, Servicio Doméstico Activo in Spain). While the support of illegal workers in the United Kingdom and Spain has been established for some time, a network of support centres has emerged in Germany only from 2009 onwards; here, established trade unions and antiracist activists cooperate. The social basis of these actors lies indeed in the above-mentioned sectors of former Fordist mass production; nevertheless, the relevant units and departments within trade unions and parties often operate against latent and open resistance ‘from the bottom’ and the ‘shop floors’. Faced with this constellation, the respective experts often function as organic intellectuals within their organisations, who try to transform the particularist “corporate-economic” consciousness of the members into an “consciousness […] of the solidarity of interests” (Demirović 2007, 30; Gramsci 1971: 181).

The differences between the fractions become especially prominent when one looks at the essential differences about scalar strategies meaning that one can actually speak of two hegemony projects. The
central conflict revolves around the question of where the general as well as migration policy objectives of the project can be successfully implemented: at the national scale or at the European scale. For some protagonists, the reference to Europe is not only a tactical-strategic one, but an expression of a ‘territorial reference’ that leaves the national state behind in favour of Europe. A further cleavage are class-specific and industry-specific interests and dynamics, such as the degree of the ‘race to the bottom’ in wages and labour standards by foreign subcontractors in the construction industry. Moreover, there is a schism between a more progressive and moderate internationalist trade union bureaucracy and stronger racist and chauvinist positions at the base. The respective constellation determines how trade unions and other actors act in a field structured by the tension between internationalism and chauvinism.

The different strategies of the two hegemony projects unfold as follows: the national-social hegemony project does not possess an overall European perspective based on a diagnosis that takes the European Union to be structured and dominated fundamentally by neoliberal forces and policies. Rather, it adheres to existing national systems to defend the compromise of the welfare state described by Balibar, which was fundamentally based on integrating the national working class into this “form of a privileged community” (Balibar 2010: 25; see also idem. 1991: 92). In view of existing neo-liberal globalisation and Europeanisation pressures, this hegemony project sees action at a national level as the best option for protecting socio-political achievements. The reason for this scepticism against the European scale is not a fundamental anti-European or nationalist attitude, but the assumption that a strategy of Europeanisation would have hardly any prospects for success. The central terrain of the project is the national welfare state, national labour legislation, state support for local companies, including subsidies, foreign trade policy, etc., as well as corporatist structures. In the field of migration policy, this hegemony project supports the ‘sadly necessary’ strict controls on access to the labour market and social systems in order to secure the privileges of one’s ‘national’ base in the globalised economy.

On the other hand, a contradictory project can be identified – the pro-European social hegemony project, whose strategies, based on the same diagnosis of a threat to the European social model by neo-liberal policies, assumes that only a pan-European social policy offers a solution. Its tactics and strategies condense into a pro-European social fraction. Unlike the national-social, the pro-European social hegemony project places less emphasis on the national state. The basic assumption is that the crisis of the welfare state in the context of neoliberal globalisation can only be countered by the Europeanisation of economic and social policies and a European tariff policy. If capital actors internationalise, and political and economic processes already unfold at ‘scales’ above the nation state, then, the thrust of the argument is that an egalitarian social policy could not be confined at the national level. The pro-European strategy is seen as a way out of the weak position the nation state is in. A ‘social Europe’ is brought in position as an antithesis to the neo-liberal process of integration. It is the left-wing of this pro-European project which is serious about the struggle for a European – gender equal – social policy, while the radical left-wing does not strive for a mere replacement to neoliberal policies. Its aim is to overcome capitalist socialisation by pushing forward its critique within the current crisis.

Since the crisis of Fordism, the resources of both projects have been characterised by the weakening of the organised labour movement. While new transnational actors emerged with NGOs such as Attac and the social forum movement, trade unions were subject to a “comprehensive erosion of their power resources” (Urban 2012: 26): a declining membership and thus also lower financial resources, a decline in the anchoring of trade union in factories and businesses, which also led to reduced trade union negotiation and lobbying power (Deppe 2012). In addition, the EU employer associations refuse to introduce co-ordination rules for wage policy, while the “trade unions remaining in national-social arrangements hinders the transnationalisation of trade union policies” (Urban 2012: 27). Finally, precarious working conditions (especially in Germany as the largest European economy) weakens the mobilisation capabilities of trade unions. In particular, for trade unions, associations and social movements therefore a strategic problem exists: in spite of their generally pro-European stance, these actors are forced to act largely at the national scale through existing political structures; there are no European collective bargaining agreements, there is hardly a European public and many competencies and opportunities to take influence remain at the national level. For this reason, the continuously highlighted European perspectives are relatively weak in the daily battles over collective bargaining agreements, legislative proposals, welfare cuts and public campaigns. Nevertheless, the actors of these projects are still capable of conflict, are supported by the editorial line of numerous media (among them the Frankfurter Rundschau, Neues Deutschland, The Guardian, The Independent, El Público and partly El País), trade union apparatuses, think tanks and their own magazines and continue to find support within the left or worker-oriented wing of social-democratic, socialist and even conservative parties.

4.2.4 The Left-liberal Alternative Hegemony Project
Finally, on the basis of our research, a left-liberal alternative hegemony project could be identified. This project encompasses a liberal normative as
well as political approach to citizenship. Political liberalism intends to combine tolerance with human rights as well as civil rights with minority rights and social equity. Our thesis is that within the left-liberal and alternative hegemony project, the tactics and strategies of those civil societal forces condense that are not primarily concerned with economic questions in the stricter sense. These are the strategies of political liberalism, on the one hand, and the New Left, on the other: actors that originate from the third wave of the women’s movement, working for anti-racism, environmental protection and the rights of children, the disabled or elderly. The fact that these actors do not primarily focus on the production process, but tend to represent post-material interests does not mean that they are indifferent to economic arguments. It is precisely because redistribution and social rights are not their core demands that they can enter into alliances with the neoliberal project. In addition, this project also possesses relevant economic actors, namely the “green capital fractions” (Haas/Sander 2013) consisting of those alternative companies which were explicitly established as political projects to implement an alternative economy, especially in the field of renewable energies. However, the ‘cultural revolutionary’ changes resulting from ‘1968’ and the associated movements and milieus form the central social base of this project. According to the post-national and post-material values of these milieus, its actors pursue a distinctly pro-European strategy, which views the EU as a constellation of post-national citizenship and tries to implement progressive changes through European Directives, e.g. in the area of anti-discrimination, which would not be possible at the national level.

Left-liberal alternative actors perceive the state of migration policy as one characterised by an inhuman closing off policy, which systematically violates the human rights of migrants. The latter are the victims of eradicating refugee protections in Europe by means of military border protection, third-country regulations, Dublin II and restrictive visa administration, i.e. by ‘fortress Europe’. On the other hand, they emphasise that migration is the norm, a historical constant; that it is understandable and lawful for refugees to come to Europe. They regard transnationality, mobility and cultural diversity as positive values.

The left-liberal alternative vision for European migration policy is a cosmopolitan Europe, which focuses on fundamental rights and the human rights of refugees and migrants. Although the focus of left-liberal alternative actors is on the area of asylum and the closure of borders, they are open to a liberalised labour migration policy and emphasise how a ‘rights-based’ migration policy could create a win-win situation. At the same time, they introduce questions of international development (brain drain, etc.) into the debate. They want strong asylum legislation, liberal regulations for migrant workers who contribute to the development of their countries of origin by working in Europe (circular migration; development by migration) and development work and an international trade and economic policy that combats the deeper causes of poverty migration. At the same time, the majority of left-liberal actors does not fundamentally question borders but tries to establish legal and human rights protections. Based on such a diagnosis of the situation and such objectives, they pursue (migration-related) political projects that are implicitly or explicitly based on a ‘rights-based approach’: to abolish Frontex or to control it via the European parliament or to monitor it publicly; to undo the Dublin system and to give people the right to apply for asylum in the EU country of their choice; an EU citizenship with full social rights for third-country nationals who live long-term in the EU. The left-wing of this project, the No Border movement, left-wing intellectuals and refugee lawyers as well as individual activists in various pro-migrant NGOs go further and demand a ‘global freedom of movement’ or ‘open borders’.

Within migration and border struggles, a large number of groups, movements and NGOs exist that can be attributed to the left-liberal alternative hegemony project, including Pro Asyl in Germany, the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (JCWI) in the United Kingdom and the Comisión Española de Ayuda al Refugiado and SOS Racismo in Spain. These organisations are anchored in various milieus, from liberal church groups, the humanist bourgeoisie to the left-wing movement spectrum and are supported by critical migration researchers. Compared to the conservative as well as to the social hegemony projects, the left-liberal alternative project has strong European links. Capable European NGO networks such as ECRE, PICTUM and Amnesty International are evidence of this. Nevertheless, there are national differences: such as the degree of dependency on state financing; the anchoring in grassroots movements; the schism between migrant self-organisation and primarily ‘autochtonous’ organisations, which primarily consist of people who mostly possess the same legal rights status as citizens. And while many large and highly professional organisations campaign for the rights of ‘refugees’, this is far less the case for illegal workers and other migrants (cf. Georgi 2009a; Georgi/Szczepanikowa 2010).

The economic resources of the actors of the left-liberal alternative hegemony project are, on the one hand, the resources of the green capital fractions (Haas/Sander 2013: 27) as well as the technology and creative industries. However, these economic potentials are less relevant in the field of migration policy. The main resources are the substantial social and cultural capital and the support of a large number of organic intellectuals in academia, art education and the media (among others the Süddeutsche Zeitung, taz, Der Freitag in Germany; The Guardian and The Independent in the United Kingdom; El
Público in Spain). In addition, these strategies already materialised in international apparatuses (such as the UNHCR, the European Court of Human Rights, the respective UN committees and, in some cases, the European Commission).

4.2.5 Minority Report: The Radical-Leftist Hegemony Project

While working on our research project, we have repeatedly discussed the question as to which hegemony projects are to be distinguished in the conflicts we investigated, and which strategies or actors should be seen as belonging to which hegemony project. At an important juncture, despite intense debate, we were unable to reach a consensus: is it necessary to identify a ‘radical leftist’ or ‘communist’ hegemony project in the societal struggles for the EU in general and the European migration policy in particular?

A majority considered such an argumentative move as unwarranted. First and foremost, the social forces representing radical leftist and anticapitalist positions in Europe have too few organisational resources. Because of that, they do not constitute a distinctive hegemony project. Instead, according to this view, it is appropriate, as has been done above, to conceive radical actors such as the No Border movement, the ‘Interventionist Left’, the Spanish ‘Indignados’ and the respective intellectuals as the extreme left of the left-liberal alternative or pro-European social hegemony project. On the other hand, a minority argued that it was not only possible but necessary from an analytical point of view to conceptually distinguish a radical leftist or communist hegemony project. This minority position is outlined in the following section.

The strategies that can be bundled into a radical leftist hegemony project are based on the various currents of the revolutionary workers movement in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, on anarchist, communist and left-wing socialist movements that reacted to the global victory of industrial capitalism and its crises with the goal of a radical emancipatory and revolutionary transformation of society. Nowadays, left-wing actors are influenced by movements emerging from the ‘global 1968’ which are critical of all relations of domination; these movements fundamentally criticise societal relations with nature and between North and South over and above other relations of domination, racism, sexism.

Based on these traditions, the actors of the radical leftist hegemony project are not only (but also partly) concerned about reforms and improvements within the framework of the existing order. Among other things, their concern is to overcome the capitalist mode of production and a form of production and reproduction based on new relationships with nature; a radical democratisation of society and the economy, far beyond the form of the state; a completely different form of gender relations, which overcomes heteronormativity or even the normalising matrix of two sexes; an anti-racism that combats symbolic, institutional and structural articulations of racism. The field of immigration policy examined by us is analysed by radical leftist actors with terms like ‘global apartheid’ – as a system exerting brutal control over the subaltern mobility of refugees and internationally mobile workers, which is driven and structured by basic capitalist dynamics (labour policy) and the inherently racist nation state order. The protagonists of the No Border movement react to this by fundamentally questioning the profound hegemony of borders and unequal citizenship and by proposing the counter-project of a ‘global freedom of movement’ (see Georgi 2017).

The social forces that pursue such strategies are small minorities in all European countries. Undoubtedly, the social power of these actors is weak and their position in the relationship of forces is marginalised. From an analytical point of view, three arguments suggest nevertheless that these social forces should be conceptualised as pillars of a distinctive radical leftist hegemony project.

First, it would be undifferentiated to construe radical groups such as Ums Ganze in Germany, the Spanish Indignados, British No Border groups and Greek anarchists as the left margin of the reformist left-liberal alternative or pro-European social hegemony project. The political differences between radical leftist and established left-liberal forces are much greater than between left-liberal and social (democratic) oriented or even conservative actors. If one is serious about differentiating analytically between hegemony projects along the political strategies of their actors, one must recognise that the strategies of leftist actors are so fundamentally different from those of left-liberal forces that it would be grossly misleading to conceptualise both as part of the same hegemony project.

Second, the majority position underestimates the social relevance of leftist forces. In most European countries, these radical minorities entertain a complex infrastructure of organisations, their own places and spaces, diverse publications and networks. They constitute a social milieu which, despite all precariousness, is deeply rooted in initiatives of the non-parliamentary grassroots left and is as a minority also present in trade unions, universities, foundations, left-wing parties and NGOs. The massive social protests in recent years, including in Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal and France, were facilitated and made possible by the forces and milieus of the extra-parliamentarian and trade union radical left, which must therefore be conceptualised as a powerful and independent factor in the societal relationships of forces.

Third, on the level of research strategies, it seems indispensable to look more closely at the radical leftist hegemony project. If radical leftist forces are not conceptualised as constituting a distinctive
hegemony project and thereby put at the centre of critical research, their societal isolation is reproduced – which fundamentally contradicts the goals of critical scholarship.

4.3 THE POLITICAL PROJECT IN THIS CONSTELLATION OF FORCES

In our view, it was ‘migration management’ as a hegemonic political project, which defined the main thrust of European migration policy that emerged out of the struggles between the hegemony projects outlined so far. A hegemonic political project must succeed in presenting a ‘solution’ to a situation of crisis that combines as many strategies, discourses and subject positions as possible – especially those which are supported by opposing strategies. These elements must be bundled into a coherent project and separated from other possibilities by an antagonistic rupture. This is what ‘migration management’ achieved.

4.3.1 Migration Management

Since the crisis of Fordism, which became manifest in immigration policy as a halt to the recruitment of ‘guest workers’ in Europe, national migration policies have become the arena for massive social conflicts. The gradual Europeanisation of migration policy in the 1990s was a reaction to the resultant “crisis of migration control” (Castsles 2005: 16). The governments of Europe proposed to shut off the societies of the North. The technocratic planning enthusiasm of Fordist states, which let them believe that their attempts at regulation could directly influence the behaviour of the ‘objects of control’ and allowed migration to “be opened and closed like a water tap by appropriate policies” (Castsles 2005: 13), turned out to be misguided. Migration has “a moment of independence vis-à-vis policies that intend to control it” (Andrijasevic et al. 2005: 347).

And, in particular, the fundamental socio-economic differences brought about by the imperial mode of living called into question such policies of a complete stop to immigration. “Looking at the prosperity gap, the broad flow of information and the good transport connections that now exist between the world’s regions, the question is why so few people move globally, as opposed to the question of why people migrate across borders at all” (Pries 2005: 20).

In this situation, a strategic reorientation of migration policy was achieved in Europe, which was based on two dynamics: on the one hand, Europeanisation and, on the other, the replacement of the logic of closure by a much more flexible, utilitarian strategy. Before Europeanisation started in 1999, a specific discourse gradually succeeded in presenting the nation state as unsuitable terrain for solving this problem. At the same time, international organisations, notably the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the OECD, shaped the concept of ‘migration management’. Thereby, they shifted the discourse from the conservative perspective of the issue of migration as a threat to security, national identity and prosperity towards a neo-liberal framework, which, after decades of the control paradigm, combines migration policy with an economic rationale. As in the post-war period, closing borders appears to be economically inefficient. Instead, it was important to fulfil growth potential: migration is seen as positive, if and when it is economically useful (Georgi 2010: 153 et seq.; cf. Georgi 2007).

Gradually, both the concept of migration management and the corresponding practices became seen as self-evident in most European migration policies. This political rationale ultimately shaped discourses, institutional practices, laws and even the majority of academic studies of migration in Europe: ‘migration management’ or ‘gestión de flujos migratorios’ had suddenly found its way into nearly all texts and official statements. Thus, it was the hegemonic political project of ‘migration management’ that, as a result of previous struggles, entailed a gradual strategic readjustment of European migration policy. Its rationale – transnationalisation plus utilitarian management – was attributable to the strengths of the neoliberal hegemony project. They succeeded in presenting a ‘solution’ in a situation of crisis, a discursively constructed ‘emergency’, which combined many strategies, discourses and subject positions. Hereby, the strategy of the neoliberal hegemony project determined the governance mode of migration. At the core of migration management is a utilitarian labour strategy, which focuses on recruiting (highly) qualified labour and the exploitation of illegalised workers. When it comes to the policies of this core area, i.e. the policies of the global labour market, the actors and strategies of the neoliberal hegemony project are present with political demands, campaigns and legal interventions. On the other hand, our research shows that they are much less active in the other areas of migration policy, i.e. asylum policy, border regime and social rights. These strategies succeeded in combining the utilitarian labour strategy with the demands of the conservative as well as the national-social project for stronger controls of irregular migration and in the area of the simplified immigration with those of the left-liberal project. This happens mostly because they leave the field of conflict in these areas to other competing strategies.

The utilitarian rationale of migration management aims at enabling and preventing mobility at the same time. It still seeks to prevent the mobility of all those who are not easily usable in an economic sense (Georgi 2010: 153). The border is therefore conceived as a filter that allows ‘useful’ or ‘desirable’ people to pass while denying access to all others. Those immigrants who are rendered illegitimate by the border regime fall under “a hard regime, which does not merely regulate ‘gently’ and steers indirectly, but tries to prevent acts directly and forcibly” (Meyer/Purtschert 2008: 157).
By assessing EU policies, the implementation of migration management can be dated back to the year 2000. This year, the European Commission officially ended its ‘zero labour migration policy’ with regard to non-OECD countries. Against the massive resistance of the Member States, it has since been trying to implement European recruitment strategies for non-European migrants. According to the commission, Europe was dependent on migration because its low birth rate would cause social systems and the economy to collapse without immigration in the next few years (European Commission 2011). Migration management thus breaks with central ideas of the conservative worldview, such as the independence and cultural homogeneity of nation states. However, the abrupt change to a post-migrant worker regime (Karakayali 2008: 203), after decades of closed border-discourses ran the risk of negative reactions from the European public (Hansen/Jonsson 2011: 264). The Commission therefore ensured that the new strategy would go hand in hand with a stringent implementation of stricter measures against illegal immigration (e.g. European Commission 2002: 8; Hansen/Jonsson 2011: 264). Like the OECD and the IOM, the European Commission can be seen as a key actor of the migration management project. These actors connect contradictory political strategies and thus facilitate the emergence and institutionalisation of the hegemonic political project.

4.3.2 A Hegemonic Project is Eroding
Since the Summer of Migration of 2015 at the latest, this project has been entering into crisis which has led to a renationalisation as well as a massive expansion of the repressive elements of the border regime: first, when the refugees had overcome the borders self-confidently and found support from a large ‘welcome movement’, which can be attributed to a discursive alliance of the left-liberal alternative and the pro-European social hegemony project, it was possible to shift discourses and practices to the left. On the basis of decades of mobilisation and not least of self-organised refugee protests, these actors were able to strengthen their position in the migration-political relationships of forces in Germany and Austria, the main receiving countries in the Summer of Migration (see Georgi 2016). The cautious easing of residence requirements, bans on work and the principle of benefits in kind for refugees in the context of the ‘asylum compromise’ of 2014 is an indication of this (cf. sueddeutsche.de, 22 September 2014).

This ultimately also showed in the attitude of the German Federal Government. The latter can only be grasped in its complexity and inconsistency by including in the analysis that the strategies of the progressive hegemony projects coincided with those of the neoliberal hegemony project – the strategies linked. Second, the Merkel government was able to rely on influential actors that can be seen as part of the neoliberal hegemony project, including economists, representatives of capital and the neoliberal press. Over sixty per cent of German managers believed their companies would benefit from the rapid integration of refugees (SZ, 24 September 2015). BDI President Ulrich Grillo said: “We have a demographic problem in the future. That is, we have a shortage of labour. This shortage can be reduced” (Grillo 2015). Despite the fact that many immigration programmes for highly qualified workers were implemented in the 2000s, such as the EU Blue Card (see Georgi/Huke/Wissel 2014), neoliberal experts in national and international forums showed disappointment that the economic potential of ‘managed’ migration could not be used fully due to the ambivalent attitude in the global North (cf. IOM 2012: 14).

The conservative and national-social hegemony project, on the other hand, fell behind. This, if you will, dropping out of the asymmetric compromise of ‘migration management’ of the past decade by the other three hegemony projects triggered a major chauvinist counter-movement of these projects, especially on the part of the racist (völkische) fraction of the conservative project. The growing influence of these forces intensified until March 2016, when a significant restriction of asylum legislation was introduced in Germany and Austria, including the definition of Albania, Kosovo and Montenegro as safe countries of origin. The countries along the so-called Balkan Route responded with the construction of fences and (para) military border controls (see Speer 2017). Schengen border controls were temporarily reintroduced, the external borders agency Frontex got more funding, new competences and even a new name: ‘European Border and Coast Guard Agency’. According to plans by the European Commission, the Dublin Regulation is also to be tightened up significantly.
5 CONCLUSION

In this paper, we tried to present our method of historical materialist policy analysis. Based on the premises of historical materialist theory of the state according to which the state needs be explained by societal struggles, we conceive of the state as those activities beyond the process of exploitation that are directed at the material reproduction of capitalist society as a whole. Our question focused on how the Europeanisation of the national-social states of Europe could be analysed as a result of changing relationships of forces. As a field of investigation, we chose migration control policy because it solidifies fundamental aspects of modern statehood: population, territory, the monopoly on the use of force and borders.

Our thesis was that, under the hegemony of the neoliberal hegemony project, a strategic rupture occurred with the nation state project of Fordism. Transnationalisation can be understood as a scalar exit-strategy from the crisis of Fordism, the effect of which is the development of a multi-scalar European ensemble of state apparatuses. We have, therefore, raised the question as to whether the state project Europe made decisive progress by means of these struggles, and if so, in what way. Ultimately, this question can only be answered empirically and not theoretically.

That is why we have developed the HMPA research method as an operationalisation of an analysis of relationships of forces. The challenge was to render the assumptions of historical materialist state theory productive for empirical analysis. The HMPA consists of the three steps of an analysis of context, process and actors. The central category of our study was the concept of ‘hegemony projects’, as a bundle of strategies by socio-structurally located actors.

For the process of European integration, we were able to identify five hegemony projects that fought over the mode of European integration: a neoliberal, a conservative, two social projects and a left-liberal alternative one. In our field of investigation, the conflicts between these projects condensed into the hegemonic political project of ‘migration management’. In the ‘Summer of Migration’, the latter entered into a crisis. The coming years will show whether neoliberal forces succeed in overcoming their general hegemonic crisis and can stabilise the project of migration management by pushing back racist (völkische) actors and by reintegrating other actors from the conservative project. Such integration efforts are already apparent, for example, in labour strategies, which focus on the integration of the arriving into the labour market. However, the further direction of European migration policy very much depends on whether there are forces that are able to develop a counter-hegemonic project of transnational solidarity.

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