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## **Left Parties in France**

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### **Parties and Social Movements**

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In spring 2002 the French Left performed dismally at the polls. With just over 27% of the votes in the presidential election it fared only marginally better than in 1969. In the parliamentary elections it produced one of its worst results ever in the history of the Fifth Republic that was little better than the disastrous electoral performance of 1993. In 1997, it scored a surprising triumph in the elections that were called following Jacques Chirac's decision to dissolve parliament. In 2002, it was punished severely for its five years in office. Reconstructing the Left is now the order of the day.

## 1. The structural requirements

### 1.1. The long electoral cycles<sup>1</sup>

The outcome of the elections since 1958 can be summarised as follows.

1. After a period of decline in the 1960s and 70s there was a dramatic rise in the number of non-voters irrespective of the election concerned. If non-registered voters are added, the situation begins to look similar to that in the United States. Voter abstention now affects all sections of society and all regions.

2. The Left only had a majority between 1978 and 1981. The Right, meanwhile, found itself in difficulties because of the advance of the extreme Right, since it could not be sure of getting all its votes in the second round. In 1997, the multi-party Left had a majority in the National Assembly, although it received only a minority of the votes. The election result of 2002, however, was its second worst in the whole of the Fifth Republic after that of 1993.

3. The main reasons for this decline are to be found within the Left itself.

- Having dominated the French Left for thirty years, the CPF (Communist Party of France) collapsed. It achieved its best-ever performance in the elections of November 1946, when it took 28.6% of the votes, but that was a success it was never to repeat. Its star rose again in the 1960s only to decline at the end of the decade. In 1981, it was finally outstripped by the Socialist Party. Its demise since then has all the hallmarks of an irreversible downhill slide, leading step by step to its worst-ever result at the polls in 2002 (3.4% in the presidential elections and 4.8% in the parliamentary elections). Its voters have declined in number and are unevenly distributed (the CPF is no more than a marginal factor in some sixty Départements); the party comprises a disproportionately large number of old people (some three-quarters of those who voted for Robert Hue are over 45) and it no longer stands for the political representation of the masses, particularly the workers.
- Since 1981, the Left has been dominated by the Socialists. In the 1970s, the Socialist Party, which had been reorganised at the Congress in Epinay (François Mitterand came in from outside to take over as its new leader), embraced the "new social movements", i.e. feminism, regionalism, political environmentalism and the movement for self-government. It exploited the progress made by the Union of the Left (promoted by the Communist Party since the early 1960s) to enhance its image and present itself as a political organisation that appeared to be both left-wing (anti-capitalism is enshrined in the official party programme) and realistic. Its voters increased and changed as a result. Expanding from its traditional strongholds (Nord-Pas-de-Calais and the south), the party won over more female voters (women made up the majority of the electorate in 1988) and gained a strong foothold among the middle classes. By the early 1980s, the Socialist Party had ousted the Communist Party among the workers. From 1982 on, however, the austerity policy pursued by successive Socialist governments cost it increasing numbers

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<sup>1</sup> See Appendix.

of workers' votes. Since 1995, the Socialists have compensated for these losses by the gains they have made among white-collar staff, middle management executives and senior managers. The outcome of the 2002 elections underlined how fragile these gains were.

- The Greens are the newest political force in the country (the party was founded in January 1984). Over the past twenty years the hallmark of the party has been its indecision. This applied initially to the very nature of its organisation, the French Greens being divided up into advocates of an efficient political grouping (the "parti écologiste" – Environmental Party) capable of playing a role on the political stage, and those who rejected the centralist principle that characterised the traditional political parties (the "confédération écologiste" – Environmental Alliance). On the other hand, there was also uncertainty about the nature of the Greens' political objectives. Having been tempted to establish a separate identity of their own (Antoine Waechter, 1989-1993), they were disappointed by their performance in the 1993 elections and subsequently decided to join the Left (Dominique Voynet, 1993 – 2002). Although they have less than 10,000 members, the Greens have steadily broadened their voter base. Originally rooted among the middle classes and the high-income earners, they succeeded in extending their influence throughout the country and to all income groups despite their varied performance in the different elections. Green voters remain an uncertain constituency, however. In the early 1990s, it looked as if the Greens were poised to take over from the Social Democrats, who were wasted by Mitterand's years in power (14% at the 1992 regional elections). But they flopped in the 1999 parliamentary elections (3.6%) and the 1995 presidential elections (3.3%). They staged a comeback at the 1999 elections to the European Parliament (9.7%), but failed to capitalise on that performance in the parliamentary elections of 2002 (4.5% in 2002 as opposed to 4.2% in 1997).
- For a long time the extreme Left was no more than a marginal phenomenon in the political arena "to the left of the Left" occupied by the Communist Party. Supported predominantly by students, it was split into various groupings (Trotskyists, Maoists and Anarchists) and had a very narrow voter base. The decline of the Communist Party has enabled the two main Trotskyist parties in France to gain ground. The "Lutte ouvrière" (LO – Workers' Struggle), which has connections with the trade unions (CGT - General Confederation of Labour and "Force ouvrière" [Workers' Force - FO], in particular) and draws its support mostly from workers, has profited from Arlette Laguiller's candidacy in all the presidential elections since 1974. The "Ligue communiste révolutionnaire" (LCR – Revolutionary Communist League) has benefited from its involvement in the "social movement" since the late 1980s. In the 1990s, the extreme Left succeeded in turning the radicalisation of this movement, which was triggered by the long period of economic depression during the "neo-liberal" years, to its own advantage. This was reflected in its performance in the regional elections of 1998 (22 deputies in the regional parliaments), the elections to the European Parliament in 1999 (5.2% for the LO-LCR list) and, above all, the presidential elections in 1995, in which the three Trotskyist candidates polled almost 10.5% of the votes and two of them finished well ahead of the Communist Party candidate.

## **1. 2. General conditions**

### *1.2.3. Social conditions*

1. The growth of the Left, first in the 1930s and 40s and later on in the 1960s and 70s, stemmed from the expansion of the working class in the country (in 1906 it constituted 28.3% of the workforce, in 1936 31.3% and in 1975 37.2%) and the gradual spread of contractually regulated working conditions (occupational classifications, collective bargaining agreements). The 1970s

were characterised by the broad advance of the middle classes in society, which paved the way for the rise of the Socialist Party (the share of middle-management executives increased from 8% in 1954 to 20% in 1982). The economic and social crisis in the country interrupted this process (increase in unemployment, occupational uncertainty, growing poverty) and accelerated the drop in the number of workers. Contrary to widespread opinion, however, the workers have not disappeared. There are still some seven million workers in France, and blue and white-collar workers together have made up some 60% of the workforce for the past 40 years. However, the number of insecure jobs has increased and the decline of industry has destroyed both unity among workers and their class consciousness, which were characteristic features of 20th century social history.

2. French communism and socialism were the product of the Keynesian state (to a certain extent it was the French Communists who created the representation of the people that is attributed to the Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian Social Democrats). 1968 marked the climax of the steady increase in the number of fixed jobs, social security and Keynesian redistribution. The Socialist Party profited from this last phase of a development that began in the 1930s. From the late 1960s on, however, the crisis of the welfare state caused problems for both the Socialists and the Communists, which were all the more difficult for the Socialists to handle because they were in power in the 1980s at a time when Europe was dominated by neo-liberalism. The Communists, by contrast, failed to adapt to the new requirements of the working world.

### *1.2.2. Ideological and political conditions*

1. Following the period of radicalisation in the 1960s and 70s, the 1980s were marked by a lack of major ideological issues, on which the Left had flourished. There was a withdrawal into the private sphere, general support for private companies and a decline in community spirit that was accompanied by a wave of neo-liberalism and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The acceptance by Mitterand's Socialists of some features of liberal ideology (the myth of entrepreneurial spirit and of "winners") reinforced this development, which in turn weakened the Left. At the same time the darkening of the clouds on the social horizon paved the way for the emergence and spread of reactionary political movements. The extreme Right, which had never previously succeeded in gaining a political foothold, began its ascent in 1983 (the Front National took 11.4% of the votes in the 1984 elections to the European Parliament, 13.8% in the 1988 regional elections and 15% in the 1995 presidential elections).

2. The crisis in the country and the rise of neo-liberalism were accompanied by a decline in the traditional workers' movement. Following the high point of 1968 and the "new social movements" of the early 1970s, there was a general reluctance in France to engage in industrial disputes (fall in the number of strikes) and a trade union crisis set in. In contrast to Northern Europe there had never been any great extension of the major centres of the workers' movement or of social democracy in France. The progress made in the immediate post-war years was reversed in the 1980s by the drop in membership of the trade unions in general and of the General Confederation of Labour in particular (CGT: 600,000 members and 300,000 senior citizens as opposed to six million at the time the country was liberated). Today France is bottom of the European table with a level of trade union organisation that is below 10% (in an OECD study it ranks behind Turkey and the United States even).

3. There was a clear shift of ideological views in the first half of the 1990s. Whereas the issues emphasised by the Left (nationalisation, public service, community interests, etc.) had met with little interest in the previous decade, it was now liberal values (privatisation, capitalism, free competition, etc.) that fared badly in the opinion polls. At the same time there was a resurgence of involvement in social struggles that initially revolved around the "movement of those without rights" (the unemployed, homeless, those without legal status). This resurgence climaxed in 1995 with the major campaigns of November and December, during which France was paralysed by a

railway workers' strike and huge rallies were held in Paris and the major provincial cities. Since that time there has been increasing use of the term "social movements" to describe the diffuse activities and organisations in which the traditional labour movement (the trade unions) has formed alliances with new organisations.

4. The emergence of these "social movements" weakened the Right, which had returned to power between 1993 and 1995. The Left, meanwhile, triumphed in the 1997 parliamentary elections if only by default. It won even though it did not have a majority of the votes cast, because the Front National put up candidates in numerous constituencies in the second round of voting to spite the traditional Right. In other words, while the Left did not succeed in overcoming its earlier weakness, it did manage to regain its previous balance. The Communist Party benefited only minimally from the new social movements. Its decline was halted temporarily in 1995, when Robert Hue gained 8.6% of the vote (an increase of two percentage points) and in 1997, when it polled just under 10% (compared with a little over 9% in 1993), but it allowed the Socialist Party to regain much of the ground it had previously lost (23.8% as opposed to 17.6% in 1993). While the extreme Left has a very strong presence in the media (the press is fond of talking of the networks run by the "radical Left"), it cannot turn this to effect in the national institutions, where it is outvoted.

## **2. What does the future hold in store for the Left?**

### **2.1. The situation of the political forces in France**

#### *2.1.1. The Socialist Party*

1993 saw the rout of the Socialist Party and the end of the Mitterrand era. The time for a thorough overhaul and reconstruction had come. Michel Rocard initially profited from the weakness of his rivals (notably Laurent Fabius), taking control of the party and "modernising" it in the way he had done between 1970 and 1980, when he was Mitterrand's closest rival. Since the weakness of the Communist Party appeared to give credence to the notion that the Left would regroup around the Socialists, Rocard launched his concept of a fundamental restructuring of the left by means of a "movement for social transformation". However, the concept was short-lived in view of the disappointing personal performance of the former Prime Minister in the European elections of 1994, in which his list gained no more than 14% of the votes.

After a period of uncertainty Lionel Jospin, who had taken over from Mitterrand as party leader from 1981 to 1988, unexpectedly resumed control of the party. He adopted a critical attitude and claimed the "right to take stock" of the Mitterrand era. The position he ultimately adopted was further to the left than the heirs to the "second Left" represented by Michel Rocard would have liked. The 1995 presidential elections reinforced Jospin's command of the party (47.4% in the second round). His triumph in the 1997 elections, which came as a great surprise, stemmed from his insistence on reforms and a clear strategic alliance with the rest of the Left. The day after the parliamentary elections Lionel Jospin found himself at the head of a "left-wing coalition" government together with the Communists and the Greens. He thus achieved his aim of reorganising the party, in the course of which he had freed himself from the shackles of the old movements (only the left wing, making up around a quarter of the party, succeeded in holding its own despite the departure of Jean-Pierre Chevènement to pursue his "republican" ambitions in 1993).

Initially the Jospin government engaged in largely traditional reforms (notably the 35-hour working week), profiting in the process from the favourable economic climate, which mitigated the constraints of budget consolidation imposed by the Maastricht criteria. But the delicate economic situation, the lack of any coherent policy to stimulate consumption and a hesitant approach to reform in several key areas (notably tax policy) made the socialist government so

cautious that its approach began to look strikingly similar to Tony Blair's "Third Way", even though the French Socialists officially reject his policies.

The government's poor performance in the municipal elections of 2001 was a warning it chose to ignore, even though the Communists and the Greens insisted on a clear change of political direction. The pressure exerted by the social movements on the issues of wages, social security and regulation of the status of immigrants living in France without documents broadened the gulf between the Socialist leadership and the left-wing rank and file. The proximity of the 2002 elections limited internal criticism within the Socialist Party, although the debates on strategy generally used by the political leaders to outline their position did not cease entirely. While the Socialist Left and the group around Henri Emmanuelli continued to advocate traditional left-wing positions, Laurent Fabius and Dominique Strauss-Kahn began to sound increasingly like European "social liberals".

### 2.1.2. *The Communist Party*

The Communist Party has failed to recover from the deep-seated crisis that began with the failure of the Union of the Left in 1978 and was exacerbated by its poor performance in the 1984 European elections. The collapse of the Soviet system despite Mikhail Gorbachev's attempts at reform only made the situation worse. Following the counter-movements launched firstly by the "rénovateurs" ("renewers") in 1984 (Pierre Juquin) and then by the "reconstructeurs" ("re-builders") in 1987 (Claude Poperen, Marcel Rigout) it was the "refondateurs" (re-founders) who refused to accept the decisions of General Secretary Georges Marchais (1970-1994). Even though the "re-founders" – in contrast to their predecessors – succeeded in remaining within the party, they could do nothing in the face of an unreconstructed majority group, which saw the call for renewal, like Gorbachev's attempts at reform, as the germ of destruction of communist ideals.

It was not until 1994 and Georges Marchais' replacement by the head of the parliamentary group, Robert Hue, that a start could be made on an *aggiornamento*. Under the slogan of "change", the new party leader triggered an astonishing process, in which he occasionally appeared to be close to the arguments voiced by the critical "re-founders". His good performance in the presidential elections and partial success in the 1997 parliamentary elections, in which the Communist Party gained some 10% of the vote and entered government, strengthened his position in the party. However, his policy of "change" met with considerable internal resistance. Moreover, its somewhat confused ideological and strategic orientation combined with the constraints of participation in a government increasingly dominated by the Socialist Party meant that the message of the new party leadership largely fell on deaf ears. Despite the setback suffered in the 1999 European elections (6.8%), Robert Hue attempted to preserve the impetus of the process of renewal and advocated the setting up of a "new Communist Party", an idea that was accepted at the party congress held in Martigue in the spring of 2000.

However, the decision proved largely academic because there were simply not the forces within the CPF and on its fringes to build a new party. The latent internal dissent at the congress broke out again in 2001, having been fired by doubts about the benefits to be gained from the "multi-party Left" strategy. In addition, the Communist Party continued to lose members. In 1979, their number was officially put at 700,000. By 2000 that figure had dropped to no more than 180,000 and was in all probability below 150,000 ahead of the 2002 elections. This decline in membership has been accompanied by other negative trends, such as a reduction in the number of party groups (13,000 in 2000 compared to 28,000 in 1978) and in press activities (40,000 copies of *L'Humanité* sold compared to 120,000 in 1982).

The CPF is an ageing party that has come adrift from the ideological foundations of the "Marxist-Leninist" era. It is a party in which the active sections of society are represented only

by their past. In short, the very identity of the Communist Party is in question at the outset of the new millennium.

### *2.1.3. The Greens*

The election of Dominique Voynet as the leader of the Greens in 1993 marked the start of a new phase in the development of the Environmental Party. On the eve of the 1993 parliamentary elections the environmentalists appeared to be an expanding movement with the potential to take over from the Socialists. Their innovative appeal, “grassroots” character and positive image among young people and workers were reminiscent of the dynamism of the “new Socialist Party” in the first half of the 1970s. However, adherence to the “fundamentalist” line laid down by Antoine Waechter (“neither Right nor Left”) prevented the Greens from capitalising on their success in the 1993 elections. This negative experience confirmed the view of those who, like Dominique Voynet, had been working for years to bring the Greens together with the radical Left.

At the outset Dominique Voynet profited from the relative consensus between the Greens active within the “social movements”, on the one hand, and the “left wing” within the environmental movement largely represented by the economist, Alain Lipietz, on the other. However, this consensus was achieved by suppressing fundamental debate among the left wing. It was difficult to find a balance between the alternative environmentalist tradition (embodied for a long time by the Greens in Germany) and the “liberal / libertarian” group, the problem being exacerbated by the participation of the Greens in the government, in which Dominique Voynet was Environment Minister.

What position were the Greens to take? Should they embrace a certain social radicalism of the kind called for by the left wing of the party and the activists in the environmental groups? Or should they strive to become the preferred partner of the Socialist Party and thus assume the role played in the past by the CPF with a view to assuming overall leadership in the long term? This latent conflict surfaced in 1999 with the highly publicised candidature of Daniel Cohn-Bendit. He advocated a clear “liberal/libertarian” environmental policy reconciling acceptance of the European market with the critical stance of the “post-1968” movements. However, despite his relative election success (9.7%), Dany could not assert himself in the French organisation. After vehement internal wrangling of the kind frequently engaged in by the Greens, Noël Mamère was chosen to stand as their candidate in the presidential elections. A deputy from the Gironde, he had three advantages. He knew how to handle the media; he had expressed vigorous criticism of government policies on more than one occasion (notably on security issues); and he was a friend of Cohn-Bendit and supported him in the European elections.

It was on the basis of this unstable balance that the Greens entered the elections in spring 2002. The results were mixed. Mamère succeeded in clearing the 5% hurdle, thus making the Greens the second strongest party in the outgoing government alliance. However, although they did slightly better than in the parliamentary elections of 1997, the Greens now have fewer deputies in the National Assembly.

### *2.1.4. The extreme Left*

Would the Trotskyist groupings be able to build in 2002 on the gains they had made in the previous elections? After the regional elections of 1998, the LCR – Revolutionary Communist League – was convinced that an alliance with the Communists and the Greens was out of the question because of their involvement in the “multi-party Left”. Alain Krivine’s grouping, therefore, decided to join forces with the LO – Workers’ Force – despite the old rivalries and differences between them. The uncompromising radicalism of the LO does not match the open and intellectual approach that has long characterised the LCR.



An alliance between the two rival parties was made easier by their joint rejection of government policy. It was forged in time for the European elections, in which the LO-LCR list cleared the 5% hurdle, thus enabling the extreme Left to enter the European Parliament for the first time. However, the alliance did not last long. The differences between the parties, in particular their diverging attitudes to the social movements, came to a head and the pending presidential elections massaged the LO's wish to be the sole beneficiary of Arlette Laguiller's popularity.

The two parties thus went their separate ways in the election campaign. Initially this appeared to be of advantage to the LO, which enjoyed up to 10% support in the opinion polls. However, the narrow-mindedness and constant repetition of the arguments it advanced cost the LO votes. The LCR, by contrast, nominated a young unknown activist, a postal employee by the name of Olivier Besancenot, as its candidate, thus combining the radicalism of the arguments directed against the "multi-party Left" with a modern touch, which proved attractive to large numbers of young people and workers. Oddly enough, the good performance of the LCR triggered an internal debate within the party, the reason being that not everyone in the LCR appreciated the closer ties with the very sectarian LO headed by Arlette Laguiller. In the 1980s, the LCR had resolved to penetrate the social movement and for many of its followers the alliance with the LO was hard to square with that decision. The fact that Alain Krivine's protégé ended up almost on a par with Arlette Laguiller, who is a strong media performer, confirmed the activists in their view that the sectarianism of the LO was a handicap and that the LCR could achieve greater benefit on its own from the radicalisation of the social conflict.

However, the parliamentary elections that followed shortly after the presidential elections made it clear that, while the Trotskyist groupings had achieved a truly historic election result ending up ahead of the Communist Party even, they still lacked the territorial base from which to consolidate their political influence. Their success in the presidential elections and their disappointing performance in the parliamentary elections rekindled the debate on strategy among the French Trotskyists.

## **2.2. Strategic debates within the Left**

In the 1960s, when the institutions of the Fifth Republic reactivated the split between the Left and the Right, the Communist Party patiently repeated its slogan of a Union of the Left. In the 1970s, this union came into being, but to the detriment of the Communists and the benefit of François Mitterrand. The 1980s and 90s were marked by an unquestioned dominance on the part of the Socialist Party, which had succeeded in turning the symbolic break of 1968 to its own advantage. The defeat of the Left in the 1993 parliamentary elections appeared to herald the end of the Socialist era. The surprise outcome of the 1997 elections gave it a second chance with the "multi-party Left" forged by Lionel Jospin taking power.

The outcome of the 2002 elections has changed the political situation of the Left. The Socialists suffered a humiliating defeat in the presidential elections, although the parliamentary elections showed that, for the moment at least, they remain the dominant force on the left. The Greens were able to hold their own, but failed to take over the position once held by the Communist Party. The extreme Left was out to upset the applecart within the traditional Left, but its narrow territorial base proved to be a handicap, which the 1998 regional elections and 2001 municipal elections did little to change. The Communist Party fell by the wayside, but it has preserved its sound local base and has the trump card of a parliamentary group that will enable it to present its views in skilful manner in the forthcoming debates. Overall, the Left will have to focus on new forces.

### ***2.2.1. The Socialist Party***

1. The Socialist Party has yet to begin reorganising itself, but it must take care not to postpone things too long. Officially, the majority of the party has rejected the "social liberal" path pursued

by the British Labour Party. The “Third Way” recommended by Tony Blair is bound up with the search for something to replace the welfare state that has its roots in the social democratic movement of the post-war period. However, the theoretical ideas of Ulrich Beck from Germany and Anthony Giddens from Britain have yet to convince the French Socialists who, for historical reasons, have to grapple with a resilient, radical political movement that remains largely marginalized in the Anglo-Saxon world. Lionel Jospin has, therefore, cultivated the differences with his British colleague. However, while the debate amongst the French Socialists is different from that conducted on the other side of the Channel, the more “socially” oriented policy of the French government would not appear to be very different from that pursued in Westminster. In the European context Lionel Jospin is perceived by Social Democrats to be a counterweight to “Blairism”. That is not true in France, though, where the objections raised by the social movement have engendered serious doubts about the government’s desire for reform and social commitment. If the choice henceforth is to be between social liberalism and social democracy, what is that choice to be based on?

2. The party that dominated the “multi-party Left” of the past is in upheaval. What happened to the Socialists? Did they govern badly? Yes and no is Henri Emmanuelli’s answer. From 2000 on, the government renounced its reforms and became the mere administrator of “a phase dominated by social-liberal policy” (*Libération*, 12 September). Not true, claimed Alain Bergounioux and Henri Weber writing in *Libération* ten days later (23 September). Reforms had been implemented throughout the legislative period, they said. However, they also felt that the Socialists had failed to embody “the realist utopia, without which the public withdraws into itself”. So what is to be done? There is a long list of replies from the Socialists. In theory, nobody wants to follow the British example. Laurent Fabius refuses to be presented as a Tony Blair clone and Dominique Strauss-Kahn swears to God that he is not a Social Liberal. Yet Henri Weber, who is a Fabius supporter, talks publicly to Jean-Marie Bockel, who makes no secret of his admiration for the British Labour Party leader.

3. In the wake of the elections, which demonstrated in harsh fashion the extent of public disenchantment with the Left, it was not a good idea to be too “right” within the Socialist Party. To date, left-wing groups have enjoyed a tail wind. Henri Emmanuelli, who stood against Lionel Jospin in the 1995 presidential elections, wasted no time in launching an appeal for a “shift in the centre of gravity of the Socialist Party”, adding that it should “be anchored further to the left”. He has been backed by part of the Socialist Left grouped around Jean-Luc Mélançon. Not included in their number is Julien Dray. He prefers to mingle with old “Jospinists” like Jean-Marie Peillon and the popular Arnaud Montebourg with a view to joining them in the call for a “New Socialist Party”. Martine Aubry, meanwhile, has contented herself with launching an honest appeal to the Socialists to “forge an alliance of the excluded, the lower and middle classes”, which for her means reviving the collective spirit that was submerged by liberal “individualisation”.

4. What political content and alliances are needed?

- In general terms, the Socialists have remained true to the internal logic of the prevailing economic system. The questionnaire distributed to its members in early September recalls that the Socialists’ objective is to “manage capitalism”, and even Henri Emmanuelli, while rejecting “the pseudo-revolutionary talk of a break” with the system, accepts “support for the market economy”, although he adds that this should not entail “knuckling under and accepting it without reservations”. But this common approach, which has long constituted the essence of the Social Democratic challenge, comprises various different elements. Having read the theory of social liberalism, the supporters of Fabius prefer equal opportunity to the traditional logic of equal distribution. The left wing, for its part, seems to be geared more towards social redistribution based on the maintenance of a public sector.

- With what alliances is this to be achieved? The provisional majority axis represented by François Hollande, who recently came out in favour of a “left-wing alliance” carefully controlled by the strongest party, has certainly not renounced the aim of bringing about an “all-embracing Left”. However, it is reluctant to entertain the concept of a single party, the illusory nature of which was made abundantly clear to the Socialists in late summer. So what can replace the “multi-party Left”? This question begs an answer. Talking at the summer university of his party, François Hollande explained that, for his part, he “would recommend that we concern ourselves with ourselves for the moment”.
- It is the supporters of the “right” wing of the Socialist Party who continue to call for a “grand party of the Left”. In an article published in *Le Monde* on 2 October, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the first Minister of Economics and Finance in Lionel Jospin’s cabinet, explained that it was necessary to choose between “reform” and “radicalism” and to opt for a “party of the left” or a “radical pole”. In doing so he was voicing his fears in the light of a possible alliance between the Communists, the extreme Left, the Greens and a party of the “social movements”.

### 2.2.2. *The Greens*

1. In the post-election period the Greens have been very active in the hope of making ground on the basis of a certain political radicalism. According to Noël Mamère, the decline of the Socialist Party and the CPF has opened the door to the Greens who, as he explained in *Le Monde* of 26 April, “are certainly entitled to play the role of mediator between the political Left and the social Left, between the Left in opposition and the Left in office”. The environmentalists’ candidate occupied a distinctly “radical” position throughout the election campaign. He is intent on making his political movement the pivotal force in a regrouping of “those who are imbued with the spirit of Seattle and Milan”. The Greens reject everything that smacks of a “radical pole”, preferring instead a debate or “forum that would range from Attac to Act-Up”. Indeed, by occupying the ground mapped out by their new candidate they hope to establish themselves as the sole unifying force of the Left and thus provide an ideal negotiating partner for the Socialist Party which, in the words of Noël Mamère, will be “interested in an *aggiornamento*”.

2. The Greens are in an odd situation. All in all, they have every reason to be satisfied with their performance, which was the best they can hope for in elections of this kind. But their small numerical presence in parliament reveals the ongoing chronic weakness of their organisation, which still owes its institutional establishment to the goodwill of its possible partners. Justifiably or not, the environmental movement still has the gnawing feeling that it has been robbed of the leadership it deserves, firstly by the “national republican” hopes of Jean-Pierre Chevènement and later by the breakthrough of the Trotskyist Left. Now, with the door standing ajar once again, the Greens are embroiled in the internal bickering that is their hallmark and which is not always easy to interpret.

3. Overall, the environmentalists are extremely critical of their participation in government. That is undoubtedly the main reason for the voluntary resignation of Dominique Voynet, who did not always meet with approval for her role in government in recent years. The former Environment Minister can call as long as she likes for a fair assessment of the five years’ participation in what she referred to on 27 August as “the most left-wing government in Europe” during the Greens’ summer university. Her followers are simply not prepared to listen, preferring instead to criticise the social liberal thrust of the previous government. What direction should the Greens now move in? Over the past decade they have vacillated a great deal as a result of internal wrangling and regrouping. There was a shift towards the Left in the 1990s (distancing from Antoine Waechter), the quest for a rapprochement with the “critical Left”, “liberal/libertarian” tendencies with Daniel Cohn-Bendit in 1994, followed by participation in the “multi-party Left” in 1997. All that

is now gone and past, leaving the Greens to ponder on what they should do in the future. Where do they go from here?

- Dominique Voynet might well have fancied playing the role of a Joschka Fischer in Germany. She was not in a position to do so largely because such a prospect was ruled out by the absolute claim to leadership demonstrated by Jospin's Socialist Party. In the autumn, she openly avowed her preference for the setting up of a broad left-wing party for a limited period of time that would incorporate the Greens. However, that was rejected by both the left wing of the party and the supporters of Noël Mamère.
- The Greens represented by Noël Mamère clearly wish to be anchored on the left, which puts them in opposition to the security-oriented decisions of both the right and the Socialist Party. They defend the existence of a public sector and are fiercely critical of globalisation and the social liberal tenets that Noël Mamère unhesitatingly attributes to the Socialist Party. He wishes to see the Greens take a stand against globalisation and liberalism. But together with whom? The environmentalists readily refer to the social movement and are unanimously opposed to the predominance of the Socialist Party. But what is their attitude to the other elements of the Left? Here their statements become vaguer. Indeed, there is a marked tendency to make the growth of the Greens the point of departure for a regrouping of the Left. "Be proud to be Greens" was the essence of the message Noël Mamère delivered at the recent summer university. "Go to the local organisations", he said, "and show that you are militant environmentalists". It can be assumed that the success of their fellow-Greens on the other side of the Rhine will help nudge the Greens further in this direction. Despite all the potential alliances the situation of the Greens remains uncertain.
- The left wing of the Greens, by contrast, is pursuing an alternative modelled on the tradition of the German Greens in the 1980s. Underrated at the time of the presidential elections, they appear to have profited from the post-electoral surge. At the end of November, Alain Lipietz, who for a long time was the Greens' official presidential candidate, moved up in the party hierarchy and could well play a key role in the future.

### 2.2.3. *The French Communist Party*

1. The Communist Party is searching for a formula to replace the "multi-party Left" and end the dominant role of the Socialist Party. During the election campaign Robert Hue criticised the balance of power on the Left and stressed the need to find something different, although he did not come up with any alternative proposals. Immediately after the first round of voting Marie-George Buffet suggested setting up a permanent forum aimed at developing a movement of all the forces that would concern itself with the political, trade union, organisational and public aspects of social transformation. She did so in the conviction that the "Left should take the initiative". On the eve of the second round she reiterated her proposal in *Le Monde* (4 May) and rejected any attempt to set up a "collective organisation building on a simple addition of votes or political forces". "What we need," she added "is a new drive for union based on a strong political message".

2. Should the Communist Party not make its strategy more concise and should it not be clearly debating possible perspectives? That is precisely what the "re-founders" are calling for. For years now they have been proposing a fundamental reorganisation of the Left on the basis of a "new balance" that would end the dominance of the Socialist Party and reinforce the left-wing elements. This effort at regrouping, which is expressed by use of the term "radical pole" or "alternative pole", is directed neither at the formation of a single political group of radicals nor at a simple merger of the organisations to the left of the Socialist Party. Resting on the experience of December 1995, the proposal outlined on several occasions by the "re-founders" weekly journal, *Futurs*, seeks to bring together the most "radically"-minded forces so that they can draft

the outlines of a project that will constitute a genuine alternative to liberalism and exploit the momentum of political dissent in elections. This is more than a simple framework for debate, which would leave it up to the individual parties to express their radicalism in political terms, but less than a consistent political movement.

3. In contrast to the situation in the 1980s, the Communist Party saw its participation in the government through to the end. It “occasionally turned up the volume”, to use its words, but it remained in office and adhered *grosso modo* to the rules of the parliamentary majority game. Now, of course, it has to accept the consequences. So how can it get out of the doldrums? On 26 June 2002 at the National Conference held in Gennevilliers Marie-George Buffet returned to the questions she had raised in her closing speech at the end of the previous year’s congress. Is not the fragmentation of forces “who expect something different” the reason for our ineffectiveness, she asked, adding in the same vein, “Should not this demand – that the forces capable of bringing about a transformation of society be given sufficient weight – be made a strategic issue?”

However, the path to that political goal quickly leads to wide-ranging debate in a party in which there appears to be a general desire to put an end to the de facto subordination to the majority decisions enforced by the Socialist Party. Some of the members of the CPF and its leadership are sounding out the possibility of an alliance to the left of the Socialist Party. However, nobody – not even those who favour the setting up of a “radical pole” – appears to be keen to establish a separate alliance with the parties of the extreme Left. The Communists are hesitant about engaging in political mergers. Should they sever their links with the existing parties and try to bring together the millions of people who have expressed their desire for an alternative or who have abstained from voting? This would presume that the Communist Party has the organisational capacity to merge various forces that the others, be they simple members or in positions of political responsibility, would appear to lack. Establishing new relations with the people, working out different approaches to dealing with the various organisations and associations, searching for ways of working together with all the radical groups, including entering electoral alliances with them – these are the goals that should be targeted. However, that presumes an ability to overcome the prejudices that many party members still have and which are a reason for their vehement rejection of the Social Democrats and the extreme Left.

#### 2.2.4. *The extreme Left*

Will the extreme Left be able to capitalise on its success in the presidential elections? The intransigent position of Arlette Laguiller in the second round of voting (she stubbornly refused to recommend that her supporters vote for Jacques Chirac) showed that the election success of the extreme Left has in no way modified the strategic orientation of the very sectarian International Communist Union (ICU). On the evening of 21 April, Arlette Laguiller’s friends merely confirmed that “what will count in the future will be the ability of the different elements of the extreme Left – over and above their electoral performance – to play a growing role in the world of labour and its struggles”. The LCR has been boosted by the unexpected performance of Olivier Besancenot and emphasises that “a new anti-capitalist force, a new party of workers and youth is a matter of the utmost urgency”. In the 1980s and 90s, Alain Krivine’s organisation had attempted to develop a movement that was open to new forms of mobilisation (protest movements such as Ras l’front, Les sans, etc.), but after the 1998 regional elections it renounced the prospect of a political grouping that would incorporate radical elements and returned to a more traditionally “Bolshevist” line that was aimed at using the network of different organisations to reinforce the political avant-garde. What will be the long-term effects of the presidential elections? For the moment the LCR is hanging back, having been stung by the virulent attacks of the LO, which accuses it of having disowned its views in appealing for people to vote “against Le Pen” on 5 May.

2. In the wake of its somewhat disappointing performance in the parliamentary elections the extreme Left has returned to its divisions. The 10% of 21 April has underlined the need for a redefinition of its strategic perspectives, however.

- The question of alliances is hardly likely to bother Arlette Laguiller's friends much, since they now once again prefer to cultivate the solitude of "revolutionaries" in the face of all the others and cannot resist castigating the "petty bourgeois" in the LCR.
- The LCR, for its part, is a little undecided. The activists in the organisation are well aware that their political influence remains limited. For a while they were able to "bank" in elections on the general sympathy for "Arlette". But now they are forced to seek alternative alliances. The question is with whom? For the moment the way forward for the LCR is blocked to a certain extent by the general condemnation of the "multi-party Left" and its assumption of government responsibility. Remarks to the effect that the attitude of certain individuals between 1997 and 2002 should not be an obstacle to joint action in the future are no more than cautious overtures. But the idea of an alliance with the members of the former parliamentary majority remains taboo. The LCR thus officially has a two-pronged approach. There is the call for a "mobilisation of all the democratic forces" (cf. the statement issued by the LCR on 20 August condemning "projects that restrict freedom") and the idea that "there is a need to set up a new anti-capitalist force that will overcome the negative balance of the multi-party Left" (Olivier Besancenot, 10 June 2002).

#### 2.2.5. *Outside the parties*

Since 1995, the "social movement" has witnessed various attempts at autonomous politicisation. Following the strikes of November and December, a meeting was held at the end of 1995 between the movement's activists – often trade unionists, who were either in a minority in their own organisations or members of the new trade union, *Sud*, which emerged from the CFDT – and intellectuals from the extreme Left or adherents of the sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu. The declared aim of this meeting, which was termed "General Estates of the Social Movement", was to bring about political collaboration that would not initially be organised via the parties. However, the project never got off the ground. The participants in this 1995 meeting nevertheless still gather regularly to debate a more far-reaching perspective going beyond the joint activities envisaged at the outset. While these gatherings have not generated any tangible political results, they have at least been of some practical benefit, viz. the setting up of the Copernicus Foundation (Jacques Kergoat, then Yves Salesse), which has set itself the task of acting as a kind of "project laboratory" to the left of the Left comparable to the Saint Simon Foundation for the Right and a part of the Left.

The attempt to politicise the "social movement" failed for several reasons: the conscious or unconscious lack of interest on the part of the political organisations, which continue to claim a monopoly of political opinion within the social movement; the preservation of a certain culture rooted in the "revolutionary trade-unionist" and "anarcho-syndicalist" past, in which there is a fundamental distrust of party organisations that are excessively oriented towards the state; the differences in approach within the movement on what modern radicalism might mean. Bearing this in mind, a merger between the radicalised social movement of 1995 and the existing political structures was out of the question. The gulf separating them became very apparent in the 1997 parliamentary elections. All the attempts to bring about concerted action between the participants in the movement and the "specialist" politicians ended in failure.

In the wake of the 2002 elections there have been numerous appeals calling either for the reorganisation of the entire Left or for the establishment of a political movement to the left of the Left. These appeals, issued by minority groups or former members of left-wing organisations (Communist Party, Greens, Extreme Left), have not yet had any impact on the organisational

situation. But the number of publications and signatories and the relative success of their meetings provides an idea of how wide-ranging the scope of possible politicisation in the radical sphere is and how difficult it is to merge the initiatives launched by the activists with the existing organisations.

### **3. General thoughts**

#### **3.1. The end of an era**

1. Seen in overall terms, the French Left and all its various groupings now face a situation that is characterised by several radical changes of historical dimensions.

- The end of “Fordist” capitalism. “Globalisation” goes hand in hand with general liberalisation and a restructuring of wage relations; it weakens at one remove both the nation-states and the welfare state; it exacerbates global inequality and unsettles the balance brought about by the victory over fascism and the outcome of the Cold War. The advent of this new situation simultaneously upsets the prevailing forms of leadership and the classical alternatives. Neither traditional social democratic redistribution and the “radical Keynesianism” of the post-war period (i.e. the left-wing models of social democracy and the Communist project of the 1960s) nor the seizure of state power along Bolshevik lines are appropriate to the reality of contemporary capitalism.
- The end of the cycle of engineering production and the workers’ movement. The technological revolutions and the advent of the information age have led to a relocation of the production processes – in the advanced capitalist countries at least. They have dissolved work teams and altered the classical foundations on which the labour movement rests (the link between large-scale industry and the cities). It is far from being the case that the workers have disappeared. However, the end of the expansion of the working class and the profound transformation of the industrial fabric have put an end to the myth of the class that was put on a par with the people and whose liberation was destined to be that of society as a whole. The emphasis on the individual, which should not be confused with individualism as the essentially capitalist response to the new role of the individual, and the awareness that social alienation and exploitation, while indivisible, are not necessarily welded together have relativised the traditional collective struggle of the proletariat and given greater scope for different forms of criticism of the old ruling order. The decline of the “labour movement” has paved the way for the advent of the “social movement”, at whose heart the “movement for an alternative globalisation” provides for universal expression on a worldwide scale. What this social movement – the global project of emancipation – needs is a political structure of the kind that made up the driving force of the workers’ movement of the 19th and 20th centuries and which it has yet to acquire.
- The end of representative democracy. This model of the democratic representation of the people established itself in the 18th and 19th centuries. Its first serious crisis came with the emergence of the “mass phenomenon” that was accelerated by the Great War. 1945 saw a revival of the model when it took on a more “social” dimension. Now, however, it is confronted by an unprecedented structural crisis, of which there are numerous causes. Post-war society has undergone radical change (wages, urbanisation, feminisation, globalisation, individualisation, etc.) without its institutions being adapted accordingly. The traditional dividing lines between the economy, the social sphere and culture no longer reflect the complexity of contemporary society. Public participation, which is the basis of democratic cohesion, no longer has any place in the traditional territorial structures and at the national level, in particular. Present-day democracy suffers from its inability to open up adequately to the supranational, to the world of labour and, more

generally, to “society at large”. It will not be able to do so by means of the representative system alone.

- The end of the “Union of the Left”, which began in the early 1960s when the Communist Party made it the focal point of its response to the establishment of the Gaullist regime of the Fifth Republic. It experienced two highlights: in 1972, when Mitterand’s Socialist Party accepted the proposal for a union and signed the common government programme together with the Communist Party and the radical Left: and in 1981, when François Mitterand formed a government comprising Communist ministers for the first time since 1947. The Socialist Party subsequently supplanted its Communist rivals and allies. The recent government of the “multi-party Left” was undoubtedly the final episode in this historical era.

This does not mean, of course, that the French Left need no longer face questions concerning its leading political role and the majorities that make it possible. The “Union of the Left”, which rested on an alliance of several institutionalised parties (primarily the Communist Party and the Socialist Party), was in conformity with a period in time that was marked by wage bargaining agreements, popular representation and the welfare state. The search for an alliance between the institutionalised parties was in line with the theory that Keynesian redistribution could be organised and improved by means of a presence in the various authorities and government offices. In the 1970s, the Socialist Party was concerned to prolong the reformist tradition of the welfare state. The Communist Party, by contrast, wished to engage in a bold programme of democratic reforms (nationalisation and codetermination rights for workers) to prepare the public for socialist/communist-style structural reforms. The balancing act they attempted is no longer relevant given the transformation of society that has taken place in the wake of globalisation, the crisis of political representation and contemporary forms of emancipation.

### **3.2. The basis for reorganisation**

The Left, therefore, has to address challenges that involve a restructuring both of the parties themselves and of their component parts.

#### *3.2.1. The Left must review its relations with the people.*

As long as it was in a position to give concrete expression to the expectations of the people (thanks to its active involvement in “society”) and was the driving force behind measures to improve its lot, it was able to present itself as the “representative” of the people. This took the form of social democratic redistribution policies and a detour comprising a mixture of Soviet utopia and practical realism (once the strength of French Communism), which was articulated in urban campaigns and the mobilisation of the trade unions. To re-establish the contact with the people that it has lost the Left must find a new basis (concentrating on the present forms of socialisation and popular struggles and not with a nostalgic look back to the past). On the other hand, it must be capable of formulating a project for society which guarantees its different sections the place which the welfare state granted them in part and which was largely eliminated by neo-liberalism.

#### *3.2.2. To be popular the Left must regain its forward-looking and alternative function.*

The Left’s political defeat has numerous objective and subjective causes. Its historical difficulties appear to be determined by the simultaneous collapse of the Soviet regime and the demise of social democracy.

- New contemporary projects of “Marxist” origins will only reinforce the basic dualism that is so typical of France. The Left is divided into two camps. There are those who



adapt to capitalism, because they consider it to be insurmountable and therefore try to correct its “excesses” ; and there are those who consider that the creation of inequality is in the very nature of capitalism and, therefore, consider that social transformation requires the “overcoming” or “abolition” of capitalism in the interests of justice. This dualism is a characteristic feature of the country.

- However, a reorientation is not going to come about simply by “going back to basics”. Neither social democratic adaptation nor a “revolutionary” spirit will be able to survive by simply repeating the slogans of the 20th century. The Social Democrats will have to choose between new, realistic forms of redistribution and the “soft” version of social liberalism. The radical or alternative path will have to find alternatives to liberalism that offer more than the traditional focus on the state. The Soviet regime provided an appalling example of where such a path can lead. The Communists will have to find a modern expression of the old idea – but one which has been forgotten over time – that the struggle for emancipation requires harmony between the collective and the individual, the rejection of liberalism and a critique of state socialism. This is what distinguishes the revolutionary (or radical) approach from the social democratic solution and the “republican” debate. At the same time it needs to be clearly stated that the logic of “overcoming” capitalism helps to avoid any merging of the social democratic path with the dead-end street of a Soviet-style regime – an option that still appears attractive to the extreme Left.

### *3.2. 3. The Left must thus reorganise by formulating two premises*

*1. The establishment of ties between the social movement and political organisations.* The classical model of relations (social democratic and Communist-style subordination: segregation of the “revolutionary-syndicalist”) is no longer appropriate to modern times, in which economic, social and political issues are intertwined, the classical model of representation that gives political parties a monopoly of political expression is discredited, and relations between the individual and the collective have to be put on a new footing. (The main contradiction is not so much between the individual and the collective, but rather between individuals who are isolated on the one hand but who give and receive solidarity on the other, between individuals and joint-stock companies and between individuals and societies whose members are jointly responsible for human development). In the period ahead, therefore, new types of relations will have to be established between the different participants in the social conflict. The trade unions, organisations and parties must learn to develop projects together while maintaining their functional differences.

*2. The establishment of new relations between the elements comprising the two poles (adaptation to capitalism or overcoming it) and between the poles themselves.* These new relations presume that it will be possible to move away from the classical model of association (in which each class and each major political movement has its own party) and to replace it by a model of co-operation based on networks. In this respect, project-based co-operation will replace co-operation between structures (which does not exclude more or less long-term political groupings, but implies their existence primarily in dealing with the institutions).

Since the early 1930s, the Left has experienced several approximately 15-year cycles of “moderation” (1947-62; 1978-1993) and of “radicalisation” (1934-1947; 1962-1978). Following the decline of the neo-liberal years, a new cycle of radicalisation may have begun around 1993. Will this cycle see a shift to the left and will it give fresh impetus to the popular movement? How can the “social movement” and “anti-globalisation movement” be given political clout in France and in Europe? Will it be possible on this basis to build up a movement that will be able to bring about change like the labour movement did in the past? Will the radicalism of this “movement” be able to make an impact on the national and European institutions? These

questions will dominate the period ahead, just as the Union of the Left was the key issue during the past thirty years.

## APPENDIX

### 1. Abstentions since 1958

(Parliamentary elections – in France - in %)

Elections	1st round	2nd round
23 and 30 November 1958	22.8	23.7
18 and 25 November 1962	31.3	28
5 and 12 March 1967	18.9	20.2
23 and 30 June 1968	20.0	22.2
4 and 11 March 1973	18.7	18.2
12 and 19 March 1978	16.8	15.1
14 and 21 June 1981	29.1	25
16 March 1986	21.5	
5 and 12 June 1988	33.9	29.8
21 and 28 March 1993	30.5	32.3
25 May and 1 June 1997	31.5	28.5
9 and 16 June 2002	35.8	
Average 1958-1978	21.4	21.2
Average 1981-2002	30.4	28.9
Average 1958-2002	25.9	24.3

## 2. The Left in parliamentary elections in the Fifth Republic

	1958	1962	1967	1968	1973	1978	1981	1986	1988	1993	1997	2002
Communist Party	18.89	21.87	22.51	20.02	21.41	20.61	16.13	9.7	11.32	9.18	9.88	4.82
Socialist Party	15.48	12.43	18.9	16.54	19.1	22.79	36.05	30.8	34.76	17.59	23.83	24.11
RAD/MRG/PRG	5.75	4.95			1.72	2.16	1.48	0.8	1.11	0.89	1.49	1.54
DVG	5.12	2.47		0.74	0.41	1.37	0.7	1.2	1.65	1.79	2.86	2.29
Greens											4.17	4.51
Total Left	45.24	41.72	41.41	37.3	42.64	46.93	54.36	42.5	48.84	29.45	42.23	37.27
Extreme Left		2.02	2.21	3.96	3.2	3.27	1.22	1.5	0.36	1.77	2.23	2.69

## 3. The Left in presidential elections in the Fifth Republic

	1965	1969	1974	1981	1988	1995	2002
Communist Part.		21.27		15.35	6.76	8.6	3.37
Socialist Party	31.72	5.01	43.25	25.85	34.09	23.3	16.18
MRG/PRG				2.21			2.32
DVG							
Greens			0.75		3.78	3.3	5.25
Extreme Left		4.67	2.7	3.41	4.38	5.3	10.44
Left (second round)	44.8		49.19	51.76	54.02	47.36	

**4. The development of the relationship between the Left and the Right since 1958  
(Parliamentary elections – in France – first round - in %)**

Elections	Left	Right	Gap (in points)
23 November 1958	43.6	56.4	12.8
18 November 1962	43.8	56.2	14.4
5 March 1967	43.6	56.3	12.7
23 June 1968	40.5	58.9	18.4
4 March 1973	45.8	54.2	8.4
12 March 1978	52.2	47.5	4.7
14 June 1981	55.6	43.2	12.4
16 March 1986	45.6	54.6	9.0
5 June 1988	49.4	50.4	1
21 March 1993	35.3	57	21.7
25 May 1997	46.2	51.2	5.0
9 June 2002	38.8	56.1	17.3
Average 1958-1978	44.9	54.9	10
Average 1981-2002	45.2	52.1	5.6

## 5. Breakdown of the votes for each candidate in the first round of the presidential election (21 April 2002)

The table should be read as follows : the votes for Arlette Laguiller were divided equally between men and women (50% each); 18 to 24-year-olds made up 9% of the votes, 25 to 34-year-olds 20%, etc.

	Arlette Laguiller	Olivier Besancenot	Robert Hue	Lionel Jospin	Jean-Pierre Chevènement	Noël Mamère	Jacques Chirac	Jean-Marie Le Pen
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Gender								
Male	50	50	57	45	54	47	49	57
Female	50	50	43	55	46	53	51	43
Age								
18-24 years	9	21	2	7	6	19	5	10
25-34 years	20	22	8	15	10	26	12	15
35-44 years	25	19	16	19	17	21	13	20
45-64 years	30	26	32	33	31	24	35	35
65-74 years	16	3	15	12	13	5	19	13
75 years and over	2	7	27	14	22	5	16	8
Profession								
Intermediate professions	12	20	10	12	15	18	9	13
White-collar workers	24	18	14	19	11	18	15	18
Workers	27	15	16	9	9	17	11	19
Pensioners	18	13	45	32	37	8	35	21
Unemployed	3	4	2	3	1	3	3	6
Political proximity								
Communist Party	8	11	65	2	7	1	2	2
Socialist Party	21	18	10	63	17	18	2	4
Greens	5	7	0	3	4	47	1	2
Right	8	4	1	2	13	2	63	17
National Front/MNR.	0	2	0	0	1	0	1	37