

The Struggle for Energy Democracy in the Maghreb

Hamza Hamouchene




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Foreword

The Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung is a think tank affiliated with the German Left Party. Globally just, sovereign development for all is amongst our goals; and due to our being a German organisation, related responsibilities of Germany and Europe are our focus.

The European Union and its member states claim that its international relations are guided by values and principles based on democracy and human rights. Countless projects are financed and implemented in this regard. Actual politics speak another language though. The “security interests” of the European Union demand collaboration with undemocratic rulers within societies that prohibit possibilities for free political participation. The governments of such societies are in a bind: required to function in spite of high foreign debt and the repercussions of the conditions enforced by International Financial Institutions, sovereign planning and development are made impossible. In Tunisia, for example, the annual amount for public debt servicing is currently higher than the budgets for education and health combined. The situation of big parts of North African populations is dire and those who (are forced to) migrate to other counties represent just one type of impact.

Europe’s hunger for energy is no exception in this context, and this brochure, authored by Hamza Hamouchene, serves as an introduction to this topic. Hamouchene’s text outlines the blatant disregard for the will of the people in areas of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia that are subject to the production of energy for Europe. The brochure also serves as an introduction for climate activists to these North African countries, providing an overview of the region’s popular struggles for climate justice.

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Executive Summary

Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia are all endowed with rich natural resources and have a huge potential for the development of renewable energies:

- Algeria holds the eleventh-largest reserves of natural gas in the world and the second-largest in Africa. It is Europe's second-largest natural gas supplier outside of the region, after Russia. Gas is supplied either through several pipelines or as Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). It is also estimated to have the third largest recoverable shale gas deposits after China and Argentina.

The country is an OPEC (Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) member and stands as the 15th largest extractor of crude oil in the world. Natural gas and oil account for almost all of Algeria's total primary energy consumption.

- Tunisia is a relatively small hydrocarbon producer. It receives natural gas as a royalty from the Trans-Mediterranean Pipeline, which transports natural gas from Algeria to Italy, passing through its territory. Tunisia is also considered to hold significant shale formations. It imports a majority of the petroleum products it consumes and sources approximately 85% of its primary energy needs from domestic oil and gas resources, acquiring the balance from imported oil and gas.

- Morocco is the only North African country with no natural oil resources and is the largest energy importer in the region, with 96% of its energy needs being sourced externally. It receives natural gas from the Maghreb-Europe Gas Pipeline that transports gas from Algeria to Spain. It has large reserves of oil shale and has signed partnership agreements with global energy companies to test these oil deposits. Morocco plans to reduce its dependence on foreign imports by developing renewable energies to meet domestic electricity needs. Its renewable energy programme is very ambitious as it aims to reach 42% of its total energy mix by 2020.

Who Owns and Controls the Energy Systems and Resources?

Multinationals are present and heavily involved in the energy sector of all three countries, but there are some differences between them. In Algeria, the national oil and natural gas company, Sonatrach, dominates the country's hydrocarbon sector, owning roughly 80% of all hydrocarbon production. By law, Sonatrach is given majority ownership of oil and natural gas projects in Algeria. However, several attempts have been made in the last two decades to open up the hydrocarbon sector and liberalise it further by undermining the 51-49% ownership rule.

In Tunisia, despite an article in the new constitution stipulating state sovereignty over natural resources and transparency in related contracts, not much has changed in the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings due to the power of oil and gas lobbies. For example, British Gas (BG), which is the largest gas producer in the country and supplies approximately 60% of Tunisia's domestic gas production through the Miskar and Hasdrubal operations, holds a 100% interest in the Miskar gas field, the most productive in the country, and sells the gas to the state electricity and gas company at international market values and in hard currency.

As for Morocco, it engaged in an ambitious renewable energy plan in order to break its heavy dependence on hydrocarbon imports. However, a detailed look at the financing and ownership of these huge projects reveals that dependence and a lack of popular sovereignty have been continued in other forms. About US \$9 billion has been invested in the Noor solar power complex in Ouarzazate, much of it private capital from International Financial Institutions (IFIs). For instance, the World Bank has a major funding program in the country that puts an emphasis on promoting the use of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) within key sectors like renewable energies. These PPPs are a euphemism for privatisations carried out for the benefit of the Royal Holding Group and foreign companies.

The Maghreb and EU Energy Policy

EU foreign policy aims to lock North African natural gas and renewable energy into the European grid and is heavily influenced by arms and corporate interests. The priority has always been EU “energy security” and interests with a view towards convergence and more harmonisation and standardisation dictated by this policy. The EU’s aggressive attempts to grab more Algerian – and to a lesser extent Tunisian – gas (be it conventional or unconventional) while ignoring the peoples’ will, and in the case of shale gas, grievances and preoccupation with their water and the environment, could be qualified as “energy colonialism,” especially in a context where the EU is pushing for further liberalisation in the energy sector. Moreover, its plans to increase renewables in its energy mix through imports from Morocco makes it complicit in green grabbing and alienating people from their lands.

Popular Resistance and Energy Democracy

In all three countries, sovereignty with regard to resources is limited and curtailed by the power of authoritarian local elites, the EU, and predatory private companies, domestic and foreign. People in the Maghreb continuously fight to regain control over their natural resources, struggle for redistributive justice and the protection of their environments, take crucial steps to achieve energy democracy, and move towards a just transition, away from fossil fuels and toward renewable energy. It is in this context that we need to understand the huge protests at the end of 2015 by people in Tangier, Morocco against Amendis, a private energy provider – protests expressing their discontent with the privatisation of their energy systems. Similarly, the Unemployed Movement and the anti-fracking uprising in the Algerian oil- and gas-rich Sahara, as well as the insurrection of people in the Kerkennah archipelago in Tunisia, are reflections of public outrage at the fossil capitalism dispossessing them that illustrate their yearning for more sovereignty and democracy.

I Introduction

When you hear about the three Maghreb countries, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, you might think about tourism (mainly in the latter two) or about energy: oil and gas in Algeria and solar power in all three. The Sahara abounds with natural resources, fossil and renewable, and constitutes an important source that feeds the energy systems in these countries. While Algeria derives most of its energy from its oil and gas without a need for imports, Morocco and Tunisia, not as rich in fossil fuels (Morocco is the poorest), end up relying either on imports (including from Algerian pipelines crossing through their territories) or other sources of energy such as coal and solar power. Morocco's ambitious solar megaproject has been praised by mainstream media, which touted its green credentials and its potential to end Morocco's dependency on energy imports, provide electricity to more than a million Moroccans, and export to Europe.

It is not possible to talk about the Maghreb and its natural resources without understanding the subordinate position in which these countries are inserted. Due to an unjustly framed international division of labour, this position provides, on the one hand, a consumer market for dominant Western economies, and on the other, a reservoir of cheap labour and natural resources. Apprehending the crucial matter of sovereignty over energy and natural resources means raising important questions regarding ownership and the preponderant role of multinationals in operations of exploration, extraction, production and transport. The three countries are also strongly tied to EU energy policy, which tends to dictate the directions and choices made by the Maghreb governments. Looking back at the last few decades, one can say with confidence that the EU and various multinationals were complicit with authoritarian and repressive regimes in order to grab as many resources as they could. This grabbing continues today and is being extended to green energy, where solar power is being privatised and financialised. This is the case of the Ouarzazate Solar Power Station in Morocco.

Do the people of these countries get to be included in the decision-making process? Do they have a say in how their resources should be used or allocated? Can they voice their refusal of destructive extractive projects without being repressed or ignored by the authoritarian elites

in the region? The case of the Ain Salah anti-fracking uprising is an edifying example, as tens of thousands of people protested against the plans of the government to explore for shale gas in the Sahara.

Given the rising threat of climate change, which is mainly caused by a global addiction to fossil fuels (historically caused by the industrialised West, which has taken very little responsibility for the advent of global warming), the Maghreb, nevertheless, needs to think seriously about a just transition towards renewable energies. But is it possible for local populations to envisage such a just transition without placing further burdens on the poor and marginalised, without recapturing the commons from the clutches of the markets, and without curtailing the power of rapacious multinationals and domestic private companies?

This briefing will attempt to shed some light on these crucial questions and to give an overview of the energy systems in the three countries, explore the role of EU energy policy in the Maghreb, and finally, emphasise the struggles of Maghrebis for more control over their resources and destiny in order to achieve sovereignty, energy democracy and climate justice.

II Current and Potential Energy Systems/ Resources in the Maghreb

A OVERVIEW

1 Algeria

Gas in Algeria

The Algerian hydrocarbons sector accounts for roughly 60% of budget revenues, nearly 30% of GDP, and over 97% of export earnings. Algeria is one of the closest gas providing countries to the EU (through Liquefied Natural Gas, LNG tankers and pipelines) and is seen as well-positioned to meet the growing demand, as it has the advantage of an abundance of hydrocarbons, existing gas transportation infrastructure, and proximity to southern Europe.¹

- With reserves of 4.5 trillion cubic meters of gas, Algeria holds the eleventh-largest reserves of natural gas in the world and the second-largest in Africa (after Nigeria).
- In 2014, Algeria was the seventh-largest gas exporter in the world. It is Europe's second-largest natural gas supplier outside of the region, after Russia. In 2014, more than 87% of Algeria's pipeline exports were sent to European countries, and the remainder was sent to Morocco and Tunisia as payment in lieu of transit fees.

Also, 84% of Algeria's LNG exports were sent to Europe with the remainder going to markets in Asia and Oceania.²

- Algeria figures in the top 10 biggest extractors of natural gas in the world making it the top producer on the African continent,


¹ Hamouchene, Hamza with Mika Minio-Paluello, Kevin Smith and Emma Hughes, Reinforcing Dictatorships: Britain's Gas Grab and Human Rights Abuses in Algeria. Briefing for Platform London, 09 February 2014. <http://platformlondon.org/p-publications/gasgrab/>

² US Energy Information Administration. Country Analysis Brief: Algeria. March 2016.

accounting for more than 50% of all African extraction.

- Algeria is considered to hold vast shale gas resources, and according to a study sponsored by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) from April 2011, Algeria had an estimated 231 trillion cubic feet, tcf (6,440 billion cubic metres, bcm) of technically recoverable shale gas resources. This was recently revised upwards by the US Department of Energy to suggest a higher figure of 707 trillion cubic feet (19,800 bcm), which would make Algeria holder of the third largest recoverable shale gas reserves after China and Argentina.³

Algeria's natural gas exports, by destination, 2013



Source: BP Statistical Review, 2014

³ US Energy Information Administration. World Shale Resource Assessments. 2015. <http://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/worldshalegas/>

Gas Pipelines from Algeria to Europe

Piped gas reaches Europe via several pipelines:

- The Trans-Mediterranean Pipeline (TransMed) is a natural gas pipeline running from Algeria via Tunisia to Sicily and Italy, constructed in 1978-1983 and 1991-1994.
- The Maghreb-Europe Gas Pipeline is a 1,620 kilometres-long natural gas pipeline running from Algeria via Morocco to Spain.
- In 2011, the Medgaz pipeline was inaugurated. It can transport 8 billion cubic meters per year between the Algerian port of Beni Saf and the Spanish city of Almería.
- Meanwhile the Galsi pipeline, which was built to carry gas directly to northwestern Italy, is on hold. It was planned to be operational in 2014, but its financing has not yet been decided.



Map of existing and planned gas pipelines through Algeria.

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Oil in Algeria

Algeria is an OPEC (Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) member and stands as the 15th largest extractor of crude oil in the world. Production stood at 1.1 million bbl/d (barrels per day) in 2015. Total oil production stands at 1.7mn bbl/d; in addition to crude, it includes condensates and Natural Gas Liquids (NGLs).⁴ Algeria produces essentially Saharan Blend crude, a light crude oil of high quality with very low sulfur and mineral content. Oil exports to the EU represent an estimated 17% of Algeria's total oil exports and less than 2% of the EU's total oil imports.

Algeria holds the world's 16th largest oil reserves. According to the Oil & Gas Journal (OGJ), Algeria held an estimated 12.2 billion barrels of proven oil reserves as of January 2016 – the third largest reserves in Africa (after Libya and Nigeria).⁵ All of the country's proven oil reserves are held onshore, because there has been limited offshore drilling. The majority of proven oil reserves are in Hassi Messaoud, in Ouargala Province, which contains the country's largest oilfield.



Map of Algeria showing major oil and gas fields with associated pipelines.

⁴ OPEC, "Annual Statistical Bulletin." OPEC, 2015.

⁵ "Worldwide Reserves." Oil & Gas Journal, 2016.

Electricity Generation

Algeria relies on its own oil and natural gas production for domestic consumption, which is heavily subsidised. Natural gas and oil account for almost all of Algeria's total primary energy consumption.

Algeria's electricity consumption has increased by an annual average of roughly 8% from 2008 to 2014. Natural gas accounted for 93% of power generation in Algeria in 2013.⁶ Algeria's government is attempting to reduce the country's dependence on natural gas in the power sector by increasing the share of electricity generated by renewable energy. The Algerian Ministry of Energy and Mines has set ambitious goals for electricity generation, aiming to generate 40% of Algeria's electricity from renewable sources by 2030.⁷ But these goals have yet to materialise.

2 Tunisia

Tunisia is a relatively small hydrocarbon producer. Production of petroleum and other liquids has been steadily declining from its peak of 120,000 barrels per day (bbl/d) in the mid-1980s to 60,000 bbl/d in 2013. Tunisia produced 66 billion cubic feet of dry natural gas in 2012.⁸ Plans to increase oil and gas production have been hampered by employment-related protests. The main foreign companies operating in Tunisia are the United Kingdom's BG Group, Italy's Eni and Austria's OMV.

In lieu of transit fees, Tunisia receives natural gas as a royalty from the Trans-Mediterranean Pipeline, which transports natural gas from Algeria to Italy, passing through Tunisian territory. According to a recent report sponsored by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), Tunisia has two significant shale formations located in the southern part of the country in the Ghadames (or Berkine) Basin.⁹ Tunisia's

⁶ International Energy Agency. *Algeria: Electricity and Heat*. 2013.

<http://www.iea.org/statistics/statisticssearchreport/?country=Algeria&product=electricityandheat>

⁷ Algerian Ministry of Energy and Mines, *Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Program* (4).

⁸ US Energy Information Administration. "Country Profile: Tunisia." October 2014.


<https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=TUN>

⁹ US Energy Information Administration. "Country Profile: Tunisia." October 2014.

<https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=TUN>

formations are estimated to hold 23 trillion cubic feet of technically recoverable shale gas resources and 1.5 billion barrels of technically recoverable shale oil resources.

Tunisia has one oil refinery with a crude oil distillation capacity of 34,000 bbl/d, but this is not enough to meet domestic demand, which averaged 90,000 bbl/d in 2013. As a result, Tunisia imports a majority of the petroleum products it consumes. Tunisia has proposed building a second refinery at Skhira with an initial capacity of 120,000 bbl/d, eventually building up to 250,000 bbl/d.



Map of producing and undeveloped oil and gas licences with associated infrastructure in Tunisia.

Electricity Generation

Tunisia sources approximately 85% of its primary energy needs from domestic oil and gas resources, and the balance from imported oil and gas. Until the early 2000s, Tunisia was a net energy exporter. Since then, however, energy demand has grown faster than domestic production, and oil and gas imports have inched upwards.¹⁰

In 2013, 98% of Tunisia's electricity generation came from fossil-fuelled power stations. Currently, only 3% of Tunisia's grid capacity is supplied by renewable sources, mainly through two wind farms. The country adopted the Tunisian Solar Plan (TSP) in 2012 to increase the portion of renewable energy on the grid to 30% by 2030, relying on wind (15%), photovoltaic (10%) and concentrated solar energy (5%).¹¹

3 Morocco

Morocco is the only North African country with no natural oil resources and is the largest energy importer in the region with 96% of its energy needs being sourced externally.¹² The leading supplier of Morocco's energy requirements is Saudi Arabia at 48%. Electricity demand in the country is projected to quadruple by 2030.¹³

Morocco is in a key geographical position that situates it as a regional hub and has an electricity network that is inter-connected with Spain and Algeria.

¹⁰ Moéz, Cherif and Sameh Mobarek, "Tunisia faces tough strategic choices as demand for energy begins to outstrip supply." World Bank, 19 January 2016. <http://blogs.worldbank.org/arabvoices/tunisia-faces-tough-strategic-choices-demand-energy-begins-outstrip-supply>

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Oxford Business Group, "Installed capacity rising to meet Morocco's growing energy demand." <http://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/overview/installed-capacity-rising-meet-moroccos-growing-energy-demand>

¹³ Ibid.

Gas and Oil

Morocco has small quantities of gas in the areas between Rabat and Meknes. A portion of the Maghreb-Europe Pipeline, which transits natural gas between Algeria and Spain, passes through Morocco. In lieu of transit fees, Morocco receives natural gas from the Maghreb-Europe Pipeline every year. Morocco is engaged in some offshore exploration projects for oil and gas with companies like Chevron and BP in the Agadir basin block.¹⁴

Morocco also has large reserves of oil shale and has signed partnership agreements with global energy companies to test these oil shales. According to a 2013 report sponsored by the U.S. Energy Information Administration, Morocco has 20 trillion cubic feet and 200 million barrels of technically recoverable shale gas and oil resources respectively. These resources include those located in the Western Sahara territory and are mostly located in the Tindouf Basin, with smaller amounts in the Tadla Basin.¹⁵

Renewable Energies

With most of its energy needs met by importing hydrocarbons, Morocco plans to reduce its dependence on foreign imports by developing renewable energies to meet domestic electricity needs.

In 2008, Morocco launched the National Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Plan, which aims to develop alternative energy to meet 15% of the country's domestic energy needs and to increase the use of energy-saving methods.¹⁶ Morocco has the most ambitious renewable energy programme in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. It expects 42% (equivalent to about 6,000MW) of its total energy mix to come from solar, wind and hydroelectric sources by 2020. It has more planned wind and solar projects than anywhere else in the region.¹⁷

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ US Energy Information Administration, "World Shale Resource Assessments." Updated September 2015. <https://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/worldshalegas/>

¹⁶ Norton Rose Fulbright, *Renewable Energy in Morocco*. 2012. <http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/66419/renewable-energy-in-morocco>

¹⁷ Ibid.

The Moroccan Integrated Wind Energy Project

The Moroccan Integrated Wind Energy Project was launched in 2010, with an estimated investment of MAD 31.5 billion (approximately US \$ 3.7 billion) and aims to increase the share of wind power in the national energy balance to 14% by 2020. Currently, 280 MW of energy are generated by several wind farms in the country, and this is due to increase to 2000 MW by 2020.¹⁸

The Tarfaya Wind Farm, the newest of four wind farms operated by Nareva (the energy subsidiary of Morocco's royal holding firm, the National Investment Company (SNI)) is the largest wind project in Africa and was put into service in 2014.

Solar energy

With an extremely favourable annual irradiation rate (>2300 kWh/m²/y), which is 30% superior to the best sites in Europe, Morocco is well endowed to harness solar power for its energy needs. Its \$9 billion solar plan aims to generate 2000 MW by 2020, with 10,000 hectares of solar installation divided between five sites (Ouarzazate, Ain Beni Mathar, Foum El Oued, Boujdour, Sebkhath Tah).¹⁹ Two technologies will be used: Concentrated Solar Power (CSP) and Photovoltaic (PV).

Phase 1 (Noor 1) of the solar project, i.e. the Ouarzazate Solar Power Station, was launched by the king in February 2016. The plant is a parabolic trough type with 3-hour storage and a wet cooling system (using up to 2 - 3 million m³ of water per year). It is planned to produce between 125 to 160 MW. Noor 2 is being built as the second part of the Ouarzazate Solar Power Station. It will be a 200 MW concentrated solar power (CSP) project using parabolic troughs, with a dry cooling system and 5-hour energy storage. Noor 3 is being built as the third part of the Ouarzazate Solar Power Station. It will be a 150 MW CSP solar project using a solar tower and 5-hour energy storage. Noor 4 will be a 80 MW photovoltaic solar plant.

¹⁸ Zegly, Btissam, "Morocco's Wind Industry Blooming," Pascale el-Khoury, trans. Al-Monitor, 19 May 2014. <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/business/2014/05/morocco-wind-energy-projects.html>

¹⁹ African Development Bank Group, "Largest concentrated solar plant in Africa reducing Morocco's dependency on external power." <http://www.afdb.org/en/projects-and-operations/selected-projects/largest-concentrated-solar-plant-in-africa-reducing-morocco%E2%80%99s-dependency-on-external-power/>

Thermal energy

In spite of its claimed green credentials, the kingdom is carrying out several thermal energy projects as a response to the increase in electricity demand. One such project is the new coal-fired power station in Safi that will generate 1320 MW.²⁰ Moreover, the Jorf Lasfar power station has been expanded in the last few years to add two more units with a total capacity of 700 MW²¹ (with the cost of investment at \$1.6 billion).

B WHO OWNS AND CONTROLS THE ENERGY SYSTEMS AND RESOURCES?

The question of energy system ownership and control is crucial when we talk about sovereignty. This section will give some information about who owns what and will document some of the involvement of multinationals in this important economic sector.

It is worth mentioning from the start that even if multinationals are present and heavily involved in the energy sector of all three countries, there are significant differences between them, especially between those in Algeria and the other two countries, with respect to the share of foreign investment and ownership in energy projects.

While in Algeria the ownership rule 51 - 49% still applies (despite years of attempts to scrap it in order to further liberalise the hydrocarbon sector), the situation in Morocco and Tunisia broke with this minimal level of energy nationalism decades ago, and in some instances, foreign ownership can reach 100%.

²⁰ El Yaacoubi, Aziz, "Safi Energy secures \$2.6 billion financing to build Moroccan power plant." Reuters, 18 September 2014. <http://uk.reuters.com/article/us-morocco-power-safi-idUSKBNOHDOZC20140918>

²¹ Taqa Morocco, "Jorf Lasfar Energy Company 5&6 (JLEC 5&6), Une extension majeure pour le pays." <http://www.jlec.ma/fr/jlec.aspx?m=2&r=8>

1 Algeria

Algeria's national oil and natural gas company, Sonatrach, dominates the country's hydrocarbon sector, owning roughly 80% of all hydrocarbon production. By law, Sonatrach is given majority ownership of oil and natural gas projects in Algeria.²²

However several attempts have been made in the last two decades to open up the hydrocarbon sector and liberalise it further by undermining the 51 - 49% ownership rule (in spite of being the most minimal form of energy nationalism), which forces foreign companies to engage in minority share joint-ventures with the country's state-owned companies. The culmination of such anti-national politics was reached on 25 March 2005 with the adoption of the Khelil law on hydrocarbons, which called into question the system of production sharing between the national public company Sonatrach and the foreign oil companies, stipulated in the 1986 legislation. Under the old system, 51% of any field discovered was attributed to the Algerian state while the 49% remaining was negotiated, with a right of 25% given to Sonatrach. The foreign companies thus had the right to 24%, on which they had to pay taxes. The Khelil ruling took this system back to pre-hydrocarbon nationalisation in 1971, stipulating that any field discovered by a foreign company could be 100% owned by that company. This law was frozen and amended in 2006, allowing the foreign groups to have a guaranteed share of only 49%, and amendments also introduced a windfall profits tax on international oil companies (IOCs).²³ However, the 51 - 49% rule has found itself on shaky grounds in the last 2 - 3 years as some ruling circles (with their associated business interests) are trying to scrap it.

In 2013, Algeria revised parts of the hydrocarbon law in an attempt to attract foreign investors to new projects. Amid declining hydrocarbon production and stagnant reserves, the Algerian government has stated it needs foreign partners to increase oil and natural gas reserves and explore new territories, such as offshore areas in the Mediterranean Sea and onshore areas containing shale oil and natural gas resources.

²² Sonatrach's website: <http://www.sonatrach.com/>

²³ Hamouchene, Hamza, "Algeria, an Immense Bazaar: The Politics and Economic Consequences of Infitah." *Jadaliyya*, 30 January 2013. http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/9851/algeria-an-immense-bazaar_the-politics-and-economi

The 2013 amendments introduced a profit-based taxation, as opposed to revenue-based taxation, and lowered tax rates for unconventional resources. The amendments also allowed for a longer exploration phase for unconventional resources (11 years compared to 7 years for conventional resources) and a longer operating/production period of 30 years and 40 years for unconventional liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons, respectively (compared to 25 years and 30 years for conventional liquids and gas, respectively). The amendments, however, did not change Sonatrach's mandated role as a majority stakeholder in all upstream oil and natural gas projects.²⁴ Electricity provision in Algeria is still assured by the public company Sonelgaz, in spite of the recent opening to foreign capital, justified by financial difficulties.

International oil companies with notable stakes in oil and natural gas fields are: CEPSA (Spain), BP (United Kingdom), Eni (Italy), Repsol (Spain), Total (France), Statoil (Norway), and Anadarko (United States).

Anadarko

Anadarko is the largest foreign oil producer in Algeria, and its partnerships are currently producing oil from three mega projects located in the Sahara Desert (Ourhoud, HBNS and El Merk) as part of a production sharing agreement that was signed with Sonatrach in the late 1980s. The partnership has discovered more than 3 billion barrels of oil in Algeria.

In 2012, Anadarko and Maersk Oil have settled a multi-billion dollar dispute with Sonatrach over a windfall tax on oil profits (introduced in 2006) that will net the Texas company Anadarko \$4.4 billion over several years, plus an extra \$2.6 billion in net value, as the production sharing agreement tying both companies will be amended to give Anadarko a bigger share of profits from the companies' joint operations.²⁵ This is just an example of the rapaciousness of international oil companies and their ongoing efforts to extract maximum profits.

²⁴ US Energy Information Administration. Country Analysis Brief: Algeria. March 2016.

²⁵ Gonzalez, Angel, "Anadarko reaches resolution with Algeria's Sonatrach." The Wall Street Journal, 9 March 2012. <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204781804577271532688038036>

CEPSA

CEPSA is engaged in oil and natural gas exploration and production in Algeria, with two fields (Rhourde el Krouf, RKF and Ourhoud, ORD) in the Berkine Basin, which are at the core of its activity. ORD is the second-largest field to have been discovered in Algeria and accounts for 17% of the country's total production.

It has also been involved in natural gas exploration in the Timimoun Basin since 2002, and in 2009, the commercial viability of the project was approved, in which CEPSA has an 11.25% holding, alongside Total and Sonatrach. In 2011, CEPSA was awarded the hydrocarbon exploration block at Rhourde Rouni.

Additionally, in 2011, in partnership with Sonatrach and other multinational energy companies, CEPSA opened Medgaz, the offshore gas pipeline linking Algeria and Europe via Spain. This gas pipeline has an initial total capacity of 8 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year and spans a distance of 210 km between Beni-Saf (Algeria) and Almería (Spain).

BP

BP is among the largest foreign investors in Algeria. It holds a 33.15% interest in the Ain Salah and Ain Amenas gas fields.

Ain Amenas is one of the largest wet gas projects in the country, with the extraction of natural gas and gas liquids from fields in the Illizi Basin of southeastern Algeria. First gas was produced in 2006. Ain Salah is one of the largest dry gas joint-venture projects in the country. The venture involves extracting gas from seven fields in the southern Sahara, 1,200km south of Algiers, and has been on-stream since July 2004. It involves significant carbon dioxide capture/reinjection processes.

Total

Exploration and Production in Algeria:

- All of the production comes from the Tin Fouyé Tabankort (TFT) license, in which it has a 35% interest. TFT is a gas and condensate field.
- Total is pursuing development of the Timimoun gas project, in which it has a 37.75% stake.

Repsol

Reggane Project:

This gas project includes the development of six fields in the Reggane Basin, located about 1,500 kilometers southeast of Algiers. Repsol is participating in this project and has a 29.25% stake, operating in collaboration with the Algerian state company Sonatrach (40%), the German company RWE Dea (19.5%), and the Italian company Edison (11.25%).

Boughezoul Block:

Repsol obtained a new area for exploration, which is located in the north of the country, in the Atlas mountain area. In October 2014, an exploration and exploitation contract was signed with the Algerian government. Repsol will be the operating company, with a 51% stake in the exploration phase and 25% in the future development phase.

ENI

Eni has been operating in Algeria since 1981, mainly in the Exploration & Production and Gas & Power sectors.

Activities are concentrated in the Bir Rebaa area, in the central eastern region of the country, in the following exploration and development Blocks:

- Blocks 403a/d (Eni from 65% to 100%);
- Block Rom Nord (Eni 35%);
- Blocks 401a/402a (Eni 55%);
- Block 403 (Eni 50%);
- Block 405b (Eni 75%);
- Block 212 (Eni 22.38%) where exploration discoveries have been made.

In addition, Eni has a 12.25% stake in Blocks 404 and 208 and three exploration permits have been issued for the Timimoun and Oued Mya onshore areas, in the south of the country.

Statoil

Alongside BP and Sonatrach, Statoil has a 15.85% interest in the Ain Salah and Ain Aminas gas fields.

In 2014, Statoil, in partnership with Shell, was awarded the Timissit Permit Licence in the Illizi-Ghadames Basin. Statoil will be the operator, with 30% equity, Shell will hold 19% equity, and the remaining 51% will be held by Sonatrach.

2 Tunisia

Despite an article in the new Tunisian constitution stipulating state sovereignty over natural resources and transparency in related contracts, not much has changed in the aftermath of the 2011 uprising due to the power of lobbies.²⁶

Tunisian Gas Is Sold to Tunisians as if It Were an Imported Commodity!

British Gas (BG) is the largest gas producer in the country and supplies approximately 60% of Tunisia's domestic gas production through the Miskar and Hasdrubal operations. BG Tunisia holds a 100% interest in the Miskar gas field (the most productive in the country), which is 125 km offshore in the Gulf of Gabes.²⁷ Gas is processed at the Hannibal plant and supplied, under a long-term contract, to Société Tunisienne de l'Électricité et du Gaz (STEG), Tunisia's state electricity and gas company, at international market values and in hard currency. The result is that Tunisian gas is sold to Tunisians as if it were an imported commodity.

BG has a 50% stake in the Hasdrubal concession (the remaining 50% is owned by the national public oil company Entreprise Tunisienne d'Activités Pétrolières, ETAP).

²⁶ Hammami, Med Dhia, "Les ressources naturelles en Tunisie entre la nécessité de la transparence et l'influence des lobbies privés," Nawaat, 11th March 2014. <http://nawaat.org/portail/2014/03/11/les-ressources-naturelles-en-tunisie-entre-la-necessite-de-la-transparence-et-linfluence-des-lobbies-privés/>

²⁷ BG's web page for its Tunisia operations: <http://www.bg-group.com/327/where-we-work/tunisia/operations/>

Other Gas and Oil Concessions in Tunisia

The Société Italo-Tunisienne d'Exploitation de Pétrolière (SITEP) owns 100% of the Borma concession (50% of shares owned by Eni and 50% by the Tunisian state). The oilfield is classified as the largest among those in Tunisia.

PA Resources (domiciled in Stockholm) is one of the largest oil producers in Tunisia. The oil is mainly produced from the offshore Didon field in the gulf of Gabes, complemented by three small onshore fields. It has 8 licences in total (including in production (1-4), in exploration (5, 6 and 8) and indevelopment (7) in the table below) and currently owns a majority stake in all of them (going up to 100% in three cases).

PA Resources' licences in Tunisia. (Origin: PA Resources website).

	License	Operator	Partners
1	Douleb	PA Resources (70%)*	Serept (30%)
2	Semmama	PA Resources (70%)*	Serept (30%)
3	Tamesmida	PA Resources (95%)*	Serept (5%)
4	Didon	PA Resources (100%)	
5	Jelma**	PA Resources (70%)	Topic (30%)
6	Makthar**	PA Resources (100%)	
7	Zarat**	PA Resources (100%)	
8	Jenin Centre	Chinook Energy Inc (65%)	PA Resources (35%)

* Operatorship outsourced to Serept.

** ETAP has the right to take a 50% interest in the Jelma licence and 55% in the Makthar and Zarat licences once discoveries have been made on the licence and a development plan has been submitted. Until such time, ownership is shared as shown above.

OMV (an international oil and gas company headquartered in Vienna) owns 50% in the offshore Ashtart oil concession and 49% in other oil concessions such as Cercina, Rhemoura, ELHAJEB / GUEBIBA, and Gremda.

ENI Tunisia owns 50% in the Makhrouga oil concession. Production mainly comes from the offshore Maamoura (oil and gas) and Baraka oil blocks (both operated with a 49% stake) and onshore Adam (gas, Eni 25%, operator), Oued Zar (oil and gas, Eni 50%, operator), Djebel Grouz (oil and gas, Eni 50%, operator), and El Borma (oil, Eni 50%) blocks. It has others: Laarich and Debebach (oil, both 50%).

Petrofac (UK) owns 45% of the Chergui gas concession.

Perenco owns 49% in the BAGUEL gas concession.

On top of the above, there are an additional 21 concessions outside ETAP. Some of the companies involved are: Serinus (Winstar, listed in the Warsaw and Toronto Stock Exchanges), ECUMED (Canadian) and CFTP (Franco-Tunisian).

3 Morocco

Morocco is a net hydrocarbon importer and produces marginal amounts of oil, natural gas and refined petroleum products, which are mainly consumed domestically. In order to break its heavy dependence on hydrocarbon imports, the country engaged in an ambitious renewable energy plan. Looking in detail at the financing and ownership of these huge projects will reveal that dependence and a lack of popular sovereignty have carried on in other forms.

The Role of International Financial Institutions (IFIs)

About US\$9 billion has been invested in the Noor solar power complex in Ouarzazate, much of it private capital from international institutions such as the European Investment Bank, World Bank, African Bank of Development, l'Agence Française de Développement and KfW Bankengruppe and has been backed by Moroccan government guarantees. There is no surprise regarding IFIs' strong support for this

high-cost and capital-intensive project, as Morocco boasts one of the most neoliberal(ised) economies in the region. In fact, Morocco was the first country in the North African region to sign a structural adjustment package (SAP) with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1983.

The aforementioned loans are part and parcel of the strategy of the World Bank and other IFIs for the country, where the former continue to reinforce and justify a core neoliberal orientation and the deepening of pro-market policies. The World Bank has a major funding program in Morocco that covers areas connected to the development of Morocco's "green" capitalism, and its disbursement reached record levels in 2011 and 2012, with a major emphasis of these loans placed on promoting the use of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) within key sectors.

Privatising Renewable Energy: The Royal Holding

As has been well-documented, PPPs are only a euphemism for outright privatization while also providing public funds and guarantees. The Noor-Ouarzazate complex is being built and will operate as a PPP with a private partner, ACWA Power International, a Saudi Arabian company. This is a private venture when it comes to ownership and management and it seems that the Makhzen (a term that refers to the king and the ruling elite around him) is transferring public funds to a private company and giving guarantees to pay the Moroccan Agency for Solar Energy (MASEN) loans in case the latter cannot pay, at the risk of further indebting the country and leading it to bankruptcy.

The private partner is responsible for building the infrastructure, producing energy, and selling it to the Office National de l'Électricité (ONE), and the agreement entails an engagement from the latter to purchase the electricity for a period of twenty to thirty years. PPPs have been extremely costly for Moroccans, including in the energy sector, where private companies (producing more than 51% of electricity in the country) have benefited from generous contracts with ONE since the 1990s.

Additionally, and for the benefit of the Moroccan state, the land on which the Ourzazate solar plant was built was sold by the Makhzen (dividing lines are often blurred between the state and the royal family's holdings) to MASEN. These privatizations in the renewable

energy sector are not new as of 2005, when the royal holding company Nareva was created specifically to monopolise markets in the energy and environmental sectors and ended up taking the lion's share of wind energy production in the country.²⁸

²⁸ Jawad, M., "Projets de développement durable au Maroc: Protéger l'environnement ou protéger les profits?" Ritimo, 25 November 2015. <http://www.ritimo.org/Projets-de-developpement-durable-au-Maroc-Protger-l-environnement-ou-protger>

III The Maghreb and EU Energy Policy

A EU EXTERNAL ENERGY POLICY: GAS GRABBING AND CONTEMPT FOR PEOPLE'S SOVEREIGNTY

1 Algeria

The European Union (EU) considers Algeria a strategic partner because of its oil and gas resources. Thirty-eight percent of Algerian oil extraction is destined for the European market. But the major source of their energy interdependence relates to gas. Algeria is the third-largest source of gas imports to the EU, accounting for 14% of gas imports and 10% of total consumption.²⁹ Given these energy links, many member states have developed strong bilateral relations with Algeria, most notably France, Italy, Spain and Portugal.³⁰ Three gas pipelines link Algeria to Southern Europe and a fourth is being developed with Italy.

With North Sea gas reserves dwindling dramatically and with the Ukrainian crisis, guaranteed access to Algerian gas has been identified as an economic and strategic priority for the EU, explaining why the country features heavily in EU energy policy. An EU-Algeria Memorandum of Understanding for cooperation on oil and gas was signed in July 2013 between the European Commission's President José Manuel Barroso and Algerian Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal. Barroso emphasised the potential to further deepen the relation between Algeria and the EU and declared: "Energy is a priority area of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership... Algeria is a key partner for the EU. Natural gas is a strategic issue for both parties: Algeria is a major supplier to Europe, while Europe is by far

²⁹ Hamouchene, Hamza with Mika Minio-Paluello, Kevin Smith and Emma Hughes, Reinforcing Dictatorships: British Gas Grab and Human Rights Abuses in Algeria. Briefing for Platform London, February 2014. <http://platformlondon.org/p-publications/gasgrab/>

³⁰ Lagatta, Martina, Ulrich Karock, Manuel Manrique and Pekka Hakala, Algeria's underused potential in security cooperation in the Sahel region. European Parliament Policy Briefing. Brussels: European Union, 2013. [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/briefing_note/join/2013/491510/EXPO-AFET_SP\(2013\)491510_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/briefing_note/join/2013/491510/EXPO-AFET_SP(2013)491510_EN.pdf)

the largest customer of Algeria.”³¹

EU foreign policy aims to lock North African natural gas into the European grid and is heavily influenced by arms and corporate fossil fuel interests.³² **By pushing for long-term exports of gas in a context where the Algerian public is excluded from decision-making and benefits are largely reserved for the regime’s elite, the EU is pursuing a “gas grab.”**

The European Commission is preparing a “diplomatic energy action plan” to diversify the EU’s natural gas supply sources, with plans for tapping Algeria’s huge unexploited reserves and a comprehensive LNG strategy in 2016.³³ Miguel Arias Cañete, Commissioner for Climate Action and Energy, has agreed on a “coherent approach” with the EU’s foreign affairs chief, Federica Mogherini, in dealing with gas supply countries such as Norway and Russia. “For the time being, we have been concentrating a lot of efforts on the Mediterranean,” Cañete told a small group of Brussels-based journalists in May 2015, underlining Algeria’s “enormous possibilities.” “We Europeans are not investing much in Algeria for the moment and the pipelines are either underused or not being used at all. This could be a secure supply source for the EU, so we should have a closer relationship,” Cañete added.³⁴ This offensive is part of the Energy Union, a project which received political impetus following the conflict in Ukraine, exposing the EU’s dependence on Russian gas imports.

Words like “cooperation”, “integration”, as well as expressions such as “tapping Algeria’s huge unexploited reserves” and “diplomatic energy action plan” are all euphemisms for the EU’s aggressive attempts to grab more Algerian gas (be it conventional or non-conventional) while ignoring the Algerian people’s will and, in the case of shale gas, their grievances and preoccupations regarding their water and environment. This may qualify as “**energy colonialism**,” especially in a context where the EU is pushing for further liberalisations in energy contracts, as it takes

³¹ European Commission, “President Barroso visits Algeria and signs a memorandum on energy.” 11 January 2014. http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/president/news/archives/2013/07/20130707_1_en.htm

³² Ibid.

³³ Simon, Frédéric, “EU plans major offensive to diversify gas supplies.” EurActive, 2 June 2015. <http://www.euractiv.com/sections/energy/eu-plans-major-offensive-diversify-gas-supplies-315019>

³⁴ Ibid.

issue with Algeria's preference for long-term contracts and, more importantly, Algeria's ownership rule of 51 - 49%.

Multinationals Are Profiting from and Underwriting Repression

The 1990s Algerian experience was not only one of horrific civil war but also of forced economic liberalisations through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Algeria was opened up to world markets, facilitating a scramble for oil, gas and influence. Following increased deregulation of the all-important energy sector, Western companies and the EU wooed the regime, signing a series of lucrative contracts to secure a stake in the country's precious resources.



Police crackdown on protests in January 2011.
Photo: Magharebia / Creative Commons

Such moves, paving the way to more *infatih* (neoliberal opening) and outside control would have been anathema in the 1960s and 1970s.³⁵ But by the mid-1990s, the Algerian regime, desperate for international credit, submitted to the World Bank and the IMF. In order to entice would-be investors, the government created a special exclusion zone around the oil and gas fields in the south. Thus on 23 December 1995, BP finalised a contract worth \$3 billion, giving it the right to exploit gas deposits in Ain Salah in the Sahara for the next 30 years. Total completed a similar deal worth \$1.5 billion one month later, and on 16 February 1996, the American firm Arco signed a contract for a joint venture to drill in the Rhourd El-Baguel oilfield. In November 1996, a new pipeline supplying gas to the EU was opened: the Maghreb-Europe Gas Pipeline through Spain and Portugal.

These contracts undoubtedly bolstered the regime as it exerted systematic violence across the country at a time of international isolation. Tied to Algeria through huge investments, these companies and the EU had a clear interest in making sure that the repressive regime did not go under. The oil and gas revenues enabled heavy militarisation and the operations of the repressive police and intelligence apparatus. The EU and IOCs favoured their own economic interests and acquiesced to the Algerian regime's "Dirty War" of the 1990s. The same approach has continued ever since.

2 Tunisia

Tunisia was the first Mediterranean country to sign an Association Agreement with the EU in July 1995 representing the legal basis for bilateral relations.³⁶ The current agenda of EU-Tunisia political cooperation is spelled out in Action Plan 2013-2017.³⁷

³⁵ Hamouchene, Hamza, "Algeria, an Immense Bazaar: The Politics and Economic Consequences of *Infatih*." *Jadaliyya*, 30 January 2013. http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/9851/algeria-an-immense-bazaar_the-politics-and-economi

³⁶ See the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Tunisia, of the other part.

³⁷ EU/TUNISIA ACTION PLAN 2013-2017.
http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/action_plans/tunisia_enp_ap_final_en.pdf

This action plan sets out a broad range of priorities in areas falling within the scope of the Association Agreement. Amongst them are:

- The development of conditions conducive to foreign direct investment, growth and sustainable development;
- Improving the climate and conditions for the development of competitive businesses and entrepreneurship;
- Implementing the Memorandum of Understanding on the gradual integration of the electricity markets of the Maghreb countries into the EU's internal electricity market;
- The development of networks.³⁸

The action plan emphasises the need to “step up energy cooperation with a view to gradual convergence, taking account of the characteristics of the Tunisian market, towards the objectives of EU energy policy” and to “develop the gas sector” by strengthening “programmes and measures for the development of Tunisian gas resources, including intensification of exploration, the development of transit and export capacities, and increasing the safety of gas installations [emphasis added].”

It seems that the EU external energy policy towards Tunisia is no different from the one towards Algeria. The priority is always EU “energy security” and interests with a view towards convergence and more harmonisation and standardisation dictated by this policy. In other words, the interests of Tunisians (and Algerians) are subordinated to those of Europe, which wants more energy exports from these countries.

European oil and gas companies also participate in undermining people's sovereignty over their resources and are often complicit with state repression and human rights abuses. Oil and gas companies continue to garner obscene profits and enjoy impunity in Tunisia, while local communities continue to shoulder the burden of the externalised social and environmental costs of this industry.

The reality is that the oil lobby is extremely powerful in Tunisia; moreover, the influence of the fossil fuel industry is so pervasive that opacity and unaccountability have become trivial matters in this sector.

³⁸ Ibid.

For example, no one knows if the exploration or exploitation of shale gas is taking place in the country; similarly, the actions of this industry in southern Tunisia are unclear – from Tataouine to the closed military zone (apparently not closed to oil and gas companies).

B RENEWABLE ENERGY: THE NEW ENERGY GRAB

Morocco

Morocco is the largest recipient of EU funds in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The Association Agreement, which entered into force in 2000, represents the legal basis for EU-Morocco relations. With the launch of the ENP in 2004, Morocco gradually became a privileged partner of the EU in the field of political and economic cooperation as well as trade and technical and development cooperation.³⁹

Action Plan 2014 - 2017⁴⁰ focuses on reinforcing job creation by improving public sector investment in areas like renewable energies and technologies favouring “green growth” while at the same time improving economic performance in terms of exports.

The Moroccan monarchy has framed its renewable energy plan as not only an economic development initiative, but also as a potentially export-oriented policy that would further liberalise its economy.⁴¹ There are also expectations that this will draw the country closer to the EU by helping increase the percentage of renewables in the EU’s energy mix. It is no coincidence that, “the Moroccan government

³⁹ “Morocco.” European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations. European Commission. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/morocco/index_en.htm

⁴⁰ Programmation de l’Instrument Européen de Voisinage (IEV): Cadre Unique d’Appui pour l’appui de l’UE au Maroc (2014-2017). European Union. http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/financing-the-enp/morocco_2014_2017_programming_document_en.pdf

⁴¹ Ministry of Energy, Mines, Water and the Environment, Loi n° 57-09 portant création de la Société «Moroccan Agency For Solar Energy.» Kingdom of Morocco, June 2010. <http://www.mem.gov.ma/SiteAssets/PdfDocumentation/LoiMASEN.pdf>


designed a new energy strategy in 2009, mostly aligned with the EU's energy trinity of energy security, competitiveness and environmental sustainability."⁴² Morocco has joined a number of global and regional renewable energy institutions and programs, including the International Renewable Energy Agency and the Mediterranean Solar Plan. It has also stated its interest in joining the MENA region Desertec project.

The Desertec Project

To understand the thinking behind Desertec, some history needs to be considered. Between 1998 and 2006, a set of Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements were formed between the EU and Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine and Tunisia. Their stated aim was the "gradual liberalisation of trade" in the region and the establishment of a Mediterranean free trade area. A project with similar goals called the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) was championed by the French President Nicolas Sarkozy starting in 2008 to strengthen "interdependence" between the EU and the southern Mediterranean.

Promoting a renewable energy partnership was seen as a core priority project towards achieving these goals. It is within this context of pro-corporate trade deals and a scramble for influence and energy resources that we should understand the Desertec project and especially its industrial arm, the Dii. Desertec could play a role in diversifying energy sources away from Russia as well as contributing to EU targets of reducing carbon emissions. And what better region to achieve these aims than MENA?

⁴² Beard, J, *Green Rentier State: A Case Study of the Renewable Energy Sector in Morocco*, (13). 2013.



Map of the most cost-effective distribution of renewable energy sources in 2050, based on simulations run by the Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research in Karlsruhe, Germany.

The Desertec project has stalled, but its vision continues with projects in Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria.⁴³ Despite its stated ideals about powering Africa, the Desertec Foundation is backing the TuNur solar project in Tunisia, a joint venture between Nur Energy, a British-based solar developer, and a group of Maltese and Tunisian investors in the oil and gas sector. It explicitly describes itself as a large solar power export project linking the Sahara desert to Europe that will dispatch power to European consumers starting in 2018.⁴⁴ Given that Tunisia depends on its neighbour Algeria for its energy needs and that it faces

⁴³ Zafar, Salman, “Renewable Energy in Algeria.” EcoMENA, 10 March 2016. <http://www.ecomena.org/renewables-algeria/>

⁴⁴ TuNur’s website. <http://www.nurenergie.com/tunur/>

increasingly frequent power cuts,⁴⁵ it would be outrageous to proceed with exports rather than producing for the local market. According to Med Dhia Hammami, a Tunisian investigative journalist working in the energy sector, the project seeks to take advantage of new Tunisian legislation allowing the liberalisation of green energy production and distribution, breaking the monopoly of the state company STEG and opening the way to the direct export of electricity by private companies.

Meanwhile, the Moroccan government, with help from Dii consortium members, has attracted funding from international lenders to develop the world's largest concentrating solar power (CSP) plant at Ourzazate. It was originally envisioned as an export project, but it failed to secure Spanish government support for an undersea cable. The project is now promoted as a means for Morocco to increase its own renewable energy supply.

The Ouarzazate Solar Plant: Green Grabbing and Privatising Nature

The fact that the CSP project in Ouarzazate involves the acquisition of 3000 hectares of communally owned land to produce energy, some of which will be exported to Europe, lends itself to the notion of “green grabbing” as a frame of analysis.⁴⁶ Green grabbing is defined as the appropriation of land and resources for purportedly environmental ends. It implies the transfer of ownership, use rights and control over resources that were once publicly or privately owned – or not even subject to ownership – from the poor (or everyone including the poor) into the hands of the powerful. This is facilitated by another environmental narrative that labels the lands of the rural south as marginal and underutilized and therefore available for investment in green energy.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ “Major power outage hits Tunisia cities.” *Al-Arabia*, August 2014.

<http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/africa/2014/08/31/Major-power-outage-hits-Tunisia-cities.html>

⁴⁶ Rignall, Karen, “Theorizing Sovereignty in Empty Land: the Land Tenure Implications of Concentrated Solar Power in Pre-Saharan Morocco.” Paper presented at the International Conference on Global Land Grabbing II, October 17-19, 2012. Organized by the Land Deals Politics Initiative (LDPI) and hosted by the Department of Development Sociology at Cornell University, Ithaca, NY.

⁴⁷ Hamouchene, Hamza, “The Ouarzazate Solar Plant in Morocco: Triumphal (Green) Capitalism and the Privatization of Nature.” *Jadaliyya*, 23 March 2016. http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/24124/the-ouarzazate-solar-plant-in-morocco_triumphal-gr

Residents of the surrounding communities were never informed about the process of site selection and the terms of sale carried no mandated procedure for consulting with residents. As such, ordinary people were unaware of what was taking place when the topographers arrived. The first public meeting on the solar installation took place in November 2010, a month after the king's announcement of the project in Ouarzazate. Such meetings masquerading as a "consultation with the people" were only designed to inform the local communities about a fait accompli rather than to seek their approval.⁴⁸

People were not happy with this sale and thought the price was very low. As if things were not bad enough, the duped local population were surprised to find out that the money from the sale was not going to be handed to them, but that it would be deposited into the tribe's account with the Ministry of Interior. The Makhzen sold the land to MASEN, thus effectively privatising and confiscating historical popular sovereignty over land. This is in reality a land grab for supposedly green goals.

Moreover, the idea that Morocco is taking out billions of dollars in loans to produce energy, some of which will be exported to Europe, though the economic viability of the initiative is hardly assured, raises questions about externalising the risk of Europe's renewable energy strategy to Morocco and other struggling economies around the region. This can be dubbed "green colonialism," as it ignores entirely what has come to be called "climate debt" or "ecological debt" that is owed by the industrialised North to countries of the global South, given the historical responsibility of the West in causing climate change.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

IV What it Means to Fight for Energy Democracy in the Maghreb

A STRUGGLES FOR SOVEREIGNTY OVER ENERGY: THREE CASE STUDIES

1 Algeria: the unemployed movement in Ouargla and the anti-fracking uprising in Ain Salah

The uprisings and the social movements that the Sahara witnessed over the last four years are in a way an insurrection by the victims of fossil capitalism, of extractivism and its logic of the development of underdevelopment and accumulation by dispossession. The people of the Sahara have suffered from decades of underdevelopment, more than any region in Algeria, and simple observations and comparisons between cities in the north and the south suffice to reveal the extent of economic disparity between the two regions, which is very ironic given the fact that Algeria's wealth stems mainly from the Sahara, from its oil and gas.

Hassi Messaoud and the Unemployed Movement

Since 2012, there has been growing discontent among and mobilisation by the unemployed movement CNDDC (National Committee for the Defence of the Rights of the Unemployed), especially in the oil- and gas-rich Sahara.

The unemployed movement that started in Ouargla (85km from Hassi Messaoud, one of the wealth poles of the country and the first energy town in Algeria, where all the big oil and gas companies have offices and bases) succeeded in mobilising tens of thousands of people in huge demonstrations, demanding decent jobs and protesting against economic exclusion, social injustice and the underdevelopment of their region.



A 2013 protest in Ouargla by the CNDDC, the National Committee for the Defence of Unemployed Rights.

The unemployed of Ouargla rightly wonder why they were not the beneficiaries of the oil wealth that is situated beneath their feet. How come they continue to suffer from unemployment and political and economic marginalisation while multinationals thrive and plunder their resources? As expected, all attempts have been made by the authorities to crush, discredit and co-opt the movement, but it continues to fight. The movement has played an important role in bringing an anti-imperialist dimension to the anti-fracking uprising that started in January 2015, following the Algerian authorities' announcement at the end of December 2014 that drilling would begin in the first pilot shale wells in Ain Salah, within the Ahnet Basin, by a consortium of three companies: Sonatrach, Total, and Partex.⁴⁹

In fact, Ouargla was the first town in the Sahara to move against the regime's fracking plans back in June 2013, well before Ain Salah. They did so to express their rejection of yet another project that would rob them of their resources, that would allow multinationals

⁴⁹ Economic Voice Staff, "Protests sweep Algeria targeting fracking by Algerian regime and multinationals." *The Economic Voice*, 21st January 2015. <http://www.economicvoice.com/protests-sweep-algeria-targeting-fracking-by-algerian-regime-and-multinationals/>

to plunder their riches, and that would maintain a corrupt caste at the head of a state that should serve them rather than bring destruction to their livelihoods. Their struggle has been for more jobs for the disenfranchised and economically disempowered youth as well as to confront the contemptuous authorities and challenge them in order to bring about some kind of justice.

Shale Gas: Another Form of Energy Colonialism and Environmental Racism

France has banned Total and other companies from using fracking on its territory but it is pushing for it in its former colony Algeria, and it is likely that Total or GDF Suez will have a stake in exploiting shale gas in Algeria in the future. This is just another example of energy colonialism and environmental racism.

This controversial issue was on the agenda of the French President Hollande's visit to Algeria in December 2012, as an accord has been given to France and its companies to explore shale gas.⁵⁰ The French Foreign Affairs Minister, Laurent Fabius, on his return from a trip to Algeria in June 2014, also declared his support for French companies that explore shale gas elsewhere.

Some observers and campaigners have compared this with France's Reggane nuclear test series, (a group of four nuclear tests conducted in 1960-1961 in the Algerian desert) whose deleterious environmental and health consequences we still see today. The slogan they created: "L'Algérie n'est pas une terre d'essais et d'expérimentation pour le gaz de schiste." (Algeria is not a land for tests and experimentation for shale gas.)⁵¹

For the anti-frackers, the latest oil and gas bidding round (launched in January 2014, with results announced on 30th September) was music to their ears: None of the 15 permits considered to have shale potential

⁵⁰ Hamouchene, Hamza, "Algeria, an Immense Bazaar: The Politics and Economic Consequences of Infitah." *Jadaliyya*, 30 January 2013. http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/9851/algeria-an-immense-bazaar_the-politics-and-economi

⁵¹ Balvet, Jacqueline, "Gaz de schiste en Algérie : après les essais nucléaires, le traumatisme de la fracturation hydraulique." *Maghreb Emergent*, 22 April 2014. <http://maghrebemergent.com/contributions/opinions/item/36753-le-gaz-de-schiste-en-algerie-et-la-remise-aux-calendes-grecques-de-la-transition-energetique.html>

were bid for.⁵² Obviously, for the International Oil Companies, Algeria's fiscal terms remained unattractive, despite financial incentives for shale exploitation, introduced by amendments to the hydrocarbon law passed in January 2013.

Despite this good news, Algerian authorities announced at the end of December 2014 the drilling of the first pilot shale wells in Ain Salah. In reaction to this announcement, Algerians have been protesting in tens of thousands since the start of the year (2015) all over the country (Ain Salah, Tamenrasset, Ouargla, Ghardaia, Illizi, Adrar, Timimoun, Bordj Baji Mokhtar, Algiers, Ain Beida, Oum El Bouaghi, Bejaia, and Oran) to oppose the exploitation of shale gas in Ain Salah, an oasis-town in the heart of the Sahara desert in Algeria and home of the largest dry gas joint-venture projects in the country (BP, Statoil and Sonatrach). The scale of public opposition took the government by surprise and threatens future fracking plans by multinationals, including Total and Shell.



Anti-fracking protest in Ain Salah, February 2015. Photo credit: BBOY Lee

⁵² "Algeria Bid Round Flatters to Deceive." Middle East Petroleum and Economic Publications, 3 October 2014.

While the peaceful protests and marches in the Sahara were allowed to proceed, the sit-in in Algiers, planned to take place on 17 January 2015 in solidarity with the growing resistance movement, was suppressed, and a dozen people were arrested.⁵³

The huge protests that have erupted in several towns in the Algerian Sahara and beyond were sustained for more than five months (from January till May) without interruption, despite the Algerian authorities' repressive and co-opting measures.⁵⁴ The people demanded the halt of all operations of exploration for shale gas, sending a moratorium to the government asking for a national debate around the issue, something that should have happened before passing amendments to the hydrocarbon law in January 2013 in a climate of total opacity.⁵⁵

Despite the government's announcement in January 2016 that it will halt exploitation due to very low oil prices, the people of Ain Salah and other regions remain vigilant and determined to protect their environment, resources and livelihoods.

2 Tunisia: fossil fuels, discontented fishermen, unemployed university graduates, and disgruntlement with lack of transparency

Kerkennah is a group of islands lying off the east coast of Tunisia in the Gulf of Gabes, around 20km off the mainland city of Sfax. The islands witnessed protests and some violent events in the first few months of 2016, all related to the fossil fuel industry.

⁵³ Omar, Yacine, «Alger: une heure dans la peau d'un militant anti-gaz de schiste embarqué par la police,» *Algérie Focus*, 18 Janvier 2015. <http://www.algerie-focus.com/2015/01/alger-le-rassemblement-anti-gaz-de-schiste-avorte-par-la-police/>

⁵⁴ Lamri, Rachida, "Shale gas in Algeria: anger mounts as the government lies by omission." *openDemocracy*, 5 February 2015. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/rachida-lamri/shale-gas-in-algeria-anger-mounts-as-government-lies-by-omission>

⁵⁵ "Le Collectif pour un moratoire sur le gaz de schiste appelle à un débat national à In Salah." *El Watan*, 24 Avril 2015. http://www.elwatan.com/archives/article.php?id_sans_version=293169

Thyna Petroleum Services (TPS) and the Discontented Fishermen

In March 2016, some fishermen on the archipelago protested a significant oil spill, and according to them, the leakage originated from a submarine pipeline. The British company TPS denied the allegations, declaring that it was from a leak in a wellhead on one of the offshore drilling platforms.⁵⁶



Oil leak on Sidi Fraj beach in Kerkennah. Photo Credit: soseau.net

The fishermen were angry at what had happened, not just because it was killing fish, endangering marine biodiversity and thus threatening their livelihood, but also because TPS attempted to underestimate the impact of the spillage and even to cover it up. Apparently, this was not the first, but rather the third or fourth time this had occurred.

⁵⁶ Tunisia-tn, "Thyna Petroleum Services Explains Kerkennah Oil Spill." Tunisia-tn, 22 March 2016. <http://tunisia-tn.com/thyna-petroleum-services-explains-kerkennah-oil-spill/>

Petrofac and the Unemployed University Graduates: from Corrupt Concession to Causing an Uprising

Ten years after acquiring the Chergui gas concession in Kerkennah through a corrupt deal,⁵⁷ and five years after Tunisia's uprising for bread, freedom and social justice in 2010/2011, the British oil and gas company Petrofac faces growing discontent on the island. In the first two weeks of April 2016, Kerkennah was the scene of violent police repression of protests against the company.⁵⁸

The wide protests and the repression that ensued (including allegations of torture) came after the police violently dismantled a two-month peaceful sit-in held by Kerkenni unemployed university graduates, represented by a national union (Union des Diplômés Chomeurs, UDC) in front of Petrofac's gas factory. The purpose of this sit-in had been to pressure the British company to resume contributions to an employment fund that ensured their meagre salaries, and the closure that resulted in hundreds of people losing their jobs.



Sit-in held by unemployed graduates, affiliated with l'Union des Diplômés Chomeurs (UDC), in front of Petrofac's Chergui gas field in Kerkennah. Photo Credit: Nawaat.

⁵⁷ Hamouchene, Hamza, "Kerkennah: on the frontline of resistance to the fossil fuel industry in Tunisia." openDemocracy, 4 June 2016. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/hamza-hamouchene/kerkennah-on-frontline-of-resistance-to-fossil-fuel-industry-in-tuni>

⁵⁸ Mekki, Thameur, "Reportage à Kerkennah: Les raisons de la colère." Nawaat, 19 April 2016. <http://nawaat.org/portail/2016/04/19/reportage-a-kerkennah-les-raisons-de-la-colere/>

After the police repression subsided, young, unemployed graduates showed their determination to obtain their rights by resuming the sit-in outside the Chergui gas field. At the time of writing this report (June 2016), negotiations with Petrofac have not borne fruit and gas production is still halted as Kerkennis call for the creation of a development fund (to be funded by oil and gas companies), for an end to corruption, as well as for the dismissal of Petrofac's director Imed Derouich and the accountability of oil and gas companies.

The Winou el Pétrole? (Where is the Oil?) Campaign

The "Winou el pétrole?" (Where is the oil?) campaign started in May 2015 on Facebook. It began to draw media attention when citizens took to the street brandishing the slogan on signs, banners and empty gasoline containers. It gained considerable visibility in June 2015 when demonstrations in the capital and in the south of the country (Kébili and Douz) turned into violent confrontations between protesters and security forces.⁵⁹ Such campaigns are only a reflection of public outrage at the opacity and unaccountability of fossil fuel companies as well as at the plunder of their natural resources, accompanied by unemployment and regional underdevelopment.

⁵⁹ Szakal, Vanessa, "Where's our oil?": the continued confusion of politics and resource management in Tunisia." Nawaat, 16 June 2016. <http://nawaat.org/portail/2015/06/16/wheres-our-oil-the-continued-confusion-of-politics-and-resource-management-in-tunisia/>



Image from the Winou el Pétrole? protest. Source: official Facebook page, 12 June 2015.

3 Morocco: resistance to private energy companies and polluting industries

Resistance Against the Private Energy Company Amendis

For a few weeks during October and November 2015, tens of thousands took to the streets in Morocco's northern city of Tangier to protest against prohibitively priced energy and water. These protests were the nation's largest since the onset of the Arab uprisings in 2011, when a large movement (the 20 February Movement) erupted in Morocco, demanding political and economic reforms.⁶⁰

Protesters chanted slogans like: "Amenadis, go home, Tangier is not yours! Enough is enough" and "Shame, shame, they sold us out to colonialism." The "Revolt of Candles," as it was nicknamed in Tangier, called on residents to cut electricity from 8pm till 10pm every night and to use candlelight instead.⁶¹

⁶⁰ "Révolte des bougies' à Tanger contre Amendis." *Telquel*, 25 October 2015. http://telquel.ma/2015/10/25/revolte-bougies-tanger-contre-amendis_1467639

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

Water, wastewater and electricity businesses in the cities of Tangier and neighbouring Tetouan have been operated since 2002 by Amendis, an affiliate of France's Veolia Environnement.⁶² Redal, another Veolia subsidiary, operates in the capital Rabat, in Sale and in the municipalities of Temara and Bouznika.



A protest against the private energy company Amendis in Tangier in November 2015. The placard reads: "The people want to overthrow Amendis."

Amendis was forced to revise the energy bills from the previous months and King Mohamed VI called on the head of the government and the Interior Minister to pay a visit to Tangier and meet with Amendis in order to find a solution.⁶³ Although the more radical demands of the population, consisting of taking over and nationalising Amendis, were ignored, the protests signalled growing popular discontent with privatisation of the energy system, which has been subject to a new phase in what is called Private Public Partnerships (PPPs).

⁶² Amendis' website: <http://www.client.veoliaenvironnement.ma/Tanger/Pages/Tanger.aspx>

⁶³ "Manifestations à Tanger Contre Amendis: le gouvernement a commencé à régler les irrégularités enregistrées." Med1TV, 5 November 2015. <http://www.medi1tv.com/fr/manifestations-%C3%A0-tanger-contre-amendis-le-gouvernement-a-commenc%C3%A9-%C3%A0-r%C3%A9gler-infos-48410>

The Coal-Fired Power Station in Safi

Safi could be described as a victim of Morocco's "development" and "industrial" policies – a kind of a sacrifice zone. It harbours one of the most polluting industries in the country: the Phosphate Chemical processing factory (Office Chérifien des Phosphates, OCP).⁶⁴ Local populations suffered from the negative effects of this industry for decades as water and air pollution severely impacted their health, agriculture and fish resources.⁶⁵

Another destructive project is being planned for Safi, which represents an ecocide-in-waiting: a coal-fired power plant is being built and should be functional by 2018.⁶⁶ The project cost around \$2.6 billion and is expected to cover 25% of Morocco's electrical energy needs. The promoters of this plant are l'Office National de l'Electricité et de l'Eau Potable (ONEE) and Safi Energy Company S.A. (SAFIEC). The later is a consortium composed of Nareva (royal holding), International Power (UK), GDF SUEZ (France) and Mitsui & Co (Japan).

The plant was scheduled to be built in the southern coastal town of Agadir, but after being refused by its population, it was moved to Safi. There were some protests in 2014 against this project, highlighting the potential ecological catastrophe that it could unleash.⁶⁷ However, these were either repressed or ignored, and the project is going ahead nevertheless. What is baffling about this plant is the glaring contradiction between the avowed green credentials of the Makhzen and such a highly polluting fossil fuel project.

⁶⁴ OCP's website: <http://www.ocpgroup.ma/>

⁶⁵ "Safi, ville polluée, lutte pour sa survie écologique." *Telquel*, 30 July 2014. http://telquel.ma/2014/07/30/safi-ville-polluee-lutte-survie-ecologique_141027

⁶⁶ "La station thermique à Safi, un écocide en préparation." *ATTAC MAROC*, 18 October 2015. <http://attacmaroc.org/fr/2015/10/18/la-station-thermique-a-safi-un-ecocide-en-preparation/>

⁶⁷ "Safi, ville polluée, lutte pour sa survie écologique." *Telquel*, 30 July 2014. http://telquel.ma/2014/07/30/safi-ville-polluee-lutte-survie-ecologique_141027

B ENERGY DEMOCRACY IN THE FRAMEWORK OF CLIMATE JUSTICE

Energy Democracy: Towards a Definition

“Energy democracy” and “Energy justice” mean creating a future in which energy is fairly distributed, democratically controlled and managed, and our energy sources and transmission systems are in balance with the environment and the needs of future generations. Whether fossil fuelled or renewable, energy schemes that don’t benefit the people where the energy is extracted, that serve to prop up authoritarian and repressive regimes, or that only enrich a tiny minority of voracious elites and transnational companies are scandalous and must be resisted.

This is even more important when we think about the context of the Arab uprisings and the demands of the revolutions: bread, freedom, social justice and national sovereignty. Projects involving large multinationals tend to take a top-down approach, increasing thus the risk of displacement, land-grabbing and local pollution. Without community involvement, there is no guarantee that such schemes will help with alleviating poverty, reducing unemployment or preserving a safe environment.

Therefore, any project concerned with producing energy (sustainable preferably) must be rooted in local communities and geared towards providing and catering for their needs (including knowledge and technology transfer). Rather than embracing gargantuan projects (such as Morocco’s solar plan), we might instead support decentralized small-scale projects that can be democratically managed and controlled by local communities that promote energy autonomy.

At the centre of this are meaningful forms of local engagement and proper consultations where communities and populations are free to give or deny their prior and informed consent.

Sovereignty over Natural Resources and Climate Justice

The violence of climate change is not natural and is instead driven by a set of choices made by those in power, namely the choice to keep burning fossil fuels, which is made by corporations and by western

governments together with domestic elites and militaries of the global South, including in the Maghreb. Climate change is only one aspect of the imperialist logic of plundering nature and people, and the fossil fuel industry plays a crucial role in causing this phenomenon. It is responsible for what may be termed “energy colonialism,” i.e. the attempt by these corporations to grab more resources in order to maximise their profits. They are unconcerned with the ecological and social ramifications of their policies, including the degradation of the environment and the further dispossession of people in the global South.

Recovering sovereignty over natural resources and breaking away from the clutches of market mechanisms are indispensable steps in the effort to mitigate and adapt to climate change. This is particularly true if the aim is climate justice, where the focus is on minimising the burden placed by climate change on the marginalised, dispossessed and vulnerable. Gaining democratic control over these resources is another vital step in the march towards a just transition, away from fossil fuels and towards renewable energy. After all, how can such important decisions on the nature, structure and purpose of our energy systems be taken without the input of the people concerned?

Yet, democratic, ecological and redistributive control over our energy sources cannot happen as long as oil and gas multinationals control the lion’s share of our resources as well as maintain considerable influence over future economic decisions. It cannot happen while multinationals and authoritarian states work in tandem to heartlessly accumulate capital in favour of a tiny minority at the expense of the majority.

Every year, the world’s political leaders, advisers, and media gather for another United Nations Climate Conference of the Parties (COP). But despite the global threat, governments allow carbon emissions to rise and the crisis to escalate. Corporate power has hijacked the talks and promotes more profit-making “false solutions.” The Paris COP (COP21) in December 2015 received much attention, but the political leaders failed to deliver the necessary cuts to ensure survival.⁶⁸ In this respect, the COP22 that will be held in Morocco in November

⁶⁸ Chivers, Danny and Jess Worth, “Paris deal: epic fail on a planetary scale.” *New Internationalist*, December 2015. <https://newint.org/features/web-exclusive/2015/12/12/cop21-paris-deal-epi-fail-on-planetary-scale/>

2016 won't be any different. In fact, it will be an opportunity for the Makhzen to embellish its "green" facade and enhance its international standing by attracting more political and strategic rents at the expense of democratic and radical change.

V Conclusion

As we've seen throughout this briefing, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia are all endowed with rich natural resources and have huge potential for renewable energies. However, popular sovereignty over these is very limited and constrained, on the one hand by domestic authoritarian and corrupt elites and on the other by the actions and policies of the EU and private companies, local or foreign.

EU foreign energy policy is marked by repeated collusion with dictatorships and ruthless governments in order to secure certain energy and geopolitical interests, including in the Maghreb. In shaping a common European external energy policy, the EU is also prioritising principles of asserting its control over greater fossil fuel reserves and renewable energy, even when this means enabling increased brutality and repression combined with ecological destruction.

In Algeria (and to a lesser extent in Tunisia), the EU's desire to lock in greater gas reserves leads it to endorse the silencing and disenfranchisement of people. Moreover, its plans to increase renewables in its energy mix by imports from Morocco makes it complicit in green grabbing and confiscating people's sovereignty over their lands. In the pursuit of oil and gas as well as renewables, EU external energy policy has become increasingly focused on corporate profiteering and hobnobbing with authoritarian regimes.

Climate change is already a reality in the Maghreb, and it is undermining the socioeconomic and ecological basis of life in the region. The effects of the climate crisis are compounded by environmental degradation and the exhaustion of natural resources caused by a productivist model of development based on extractivism, a mechanism of colonial and neo-colonial plunder and appropriation. This model, as we have seen in the various struggles documented in this study, is based on accumulation by dispossession, the development of underdevelopment and socio-ecological violence. This is the paradox of extractivism under capitalism, where sacrifice zones are created in order to maintain the accumulation of capital.

People in the Maghreb have long-standing grievances and sometimes these burst into uprisings. These peoples have not been silent, passive bystanders in the face of all the injustices and violence visited upon

them. They resist and fight in order to recapture their environment and resources from the greed of markets, domestic elites and multinationals. Ultimately, recasting the debate around issues of justice, accountability and the collective good is a necessary step in the design and implementation of a just transition away from fossil fuels. Such a transition cannot be imagined without curtailing the oil and gas industry and holding it to account, and it cannot be put into action without moving away from the logic of capital that compartmentalises, commodifies, and privatises our livelihoods and our lands.

The Author

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