Prison instead of a Presidential Run?

Alexandre de Moraes’s reaction could hardly have been more emphatic. Just a few hours after US sanctions against the Supreme Court Justice were announced, he demonstratively stuck his middle finger up at the camera at a football match in São Paulo. It sent a clear message — he would not be intimidated. Washington claims that Moraes is responsible for an “oppressive campaign of censorship, arbitrary detentions that violate human rights, and politicized prosecutions”. These sanctions are the US government’s response to the ongoing court case against former president Jair Bolsonaro, who is accused by Brazil’s federal prosecution office of involvement in an attempted coup. The US has already imposed hefty punitive tariffs on Brazil, and the legal dispute has long since escalated into a full-blown diplomatic crisis, further deepening the country’s political fault lines.

The Judiciary Bares Its Teeth

In 2018, Jair Bolsonaro celebrated a spectacular election victory following a campaign fuelled by social media, character assassinations, and a radical crusade against the supposedly left-wing establishment. In his inaugural address, he railed against “socialism, political correctness, and upside-down values”, dispelling any doubt that an ideological purge was imminent. 

The notorious anti-democrat and admirer of the Brazilian military dictatorship (1964–85) quickly set about reshaping the state in his own image. Far-right ideologues, evangelical fundamentalists, and conspiracy theorists suddenly found themselves back in the cabinet, as Bolsonaro launched an all-out attack on everything that stood in his way: the left, the media, environmental activists. It is primarily thanks to the Supreme Court that Brazil did not succumb completely to this authoritarian revolution. Throughout Bolsonaro’s term, the court repeatedly set out red lines for the president. During the coronavirus pandemic, it defended the right of federal states and municipalities to introduce their own public health measures, even against the president’s will, and spearheaded investigations into violations of the constitution.

Alexandre de Moraes — known in Brazil as “Xandão” (big Alex) — consequently became a central figure in the institutional resistance. Once known primarily for his ties to conservative parties and hardline approach to left-wing protesters, he emerged as a target for the ire of right-wingers, who regarded his legal rulings as part of a conspiracy. Protests flooded the streets, while the internet was awash with conspiracy narratives.

Yet Moraes did not back down. He was the first to use court powers to counter online networks of Bolsonaro supporters, thus sending a clear message against hate speech on the internet and authoritarian ambitions. He often personally ordered property raids, asset freezes, and travel bans for the accused — at an unusually rapid pace for a judge. Granted, he was sometimes guilty of overreach and the power amassed by his court was excessive. But it remains undeniable that, without Moraes and the steadfast position of the Supreme Court, Brazil could have sunk much deeper into authoritarianism during the Bolsonaro presidency.

Attack on Democracy

On 8 January 2023, thousands of Bolsonaro’s supporters stormed the government district in Brasília, the Brazilian capital. They violently ransacked public institutions, attacked journalists, and left a trail of destruction in their wake. Bolsonaro, who in October 2022 had narrowly lost the run-off election to social democrat Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva, refused to accept defeat. Instead, he stoked doubts about the election result, spread unfounded conspiracy theories, and undermined the legitimacy of the electoral process. 

The fact that a democratic transition of power could nevertheless take place relatively peacefully is in part thanks to international pressure. Then US president Joe Biden was one of the first to congratulate Lula publicly and was swiftly followed by other heads of state. After the Bolsonaro years, an era marked by polarization and democratic backsliding, the international community embraced the pragmatic Lula as a beacon of hope.

The radical core of Bolsonarism was undeterred by its 2022 election defeat.

The ongoing investigation is now revealing just how close Brazil came to democratic collapse. Bolsonaro is suspected of planning a coup reminiscent of a political thriller, including secret arms caches, code names, and an alleged plot to poison President Lula. Moraes subsequently ordered Bolsonaro to be fitted with an electronic ankle tag. After Bolsonaro spoke to his supporters via telephone during a protest in early August, he was put under house arrest. When he allegedly disseminated content inciting the Brazilian population to protest against the court and demanded foreign intervention, the authorities seized his mobile phone and temporarily banned him from using social media. 

A court verdict is expected in September. Observers of the trial are predicting a harsh sentence — a maximum of 40 years’ imprisonment. Bolsonaro has already been stripped of his passive voting rights due to his attacks on the electoral system and is therefore barred from running in the 2026 presidential election. Does this spell the end of the road for Bolsonarism?

Lying in Wait

The radical core of Bolsonarism, especially, was undeterred by its 2022 election defeat. If anything, elements of the movement have since proven time and again that they are willing to utilize political violence. In the past year, a Bolsonaro supporter attempted to detonate an explosive device in Brasília’s government district. His target? Justice Alexandre de Moraes. The attempted assassination failed and the would-be assassin died. 

All the same, the judiciary’s decisive response seems to have paralysed Bolsonarism, at least for the time being. This is illustrated, for example, by protests early this year in favour of releasing the “8 January political prisoners”, which drew far fewer participants than expected. Another reason for the poor turnout was that the Bolsonaro camp is lacking the momentum that swept him to power in 2018. Back then, the country was rocked by several large-scale corruption scandals, the political class was in disarray, and debates on values dominated public discourse, resulting in absurd claims — including the accusation, denied by Lula’s Workers’ Party, that plans were in motion to distribute “baby bottles shaped like penises” to children. 

Nowadays, economic issues dominate the agenda, and it is more difficult for Bolsonarism to score the same kind of points in the culture war. Yet the recent tariffs dispute has the potential to reunite the formerly divided camp. At the beginning of August, far-right deputies brought congress proceedings to a halt by taping their mouths shut in protest at Bolsonaro’s house arrest. Almost simultaneously, thousands took to the streets in Brazil’s big cities. Their message? Solidarity with the ex-president and gratitude to the United States. 

The Brazilian right saw Donald Trump’s punitive tariffs not as an affront, but as proof of the ideological affinity between their camp and the Trump regime. One key player in this transnational network is Eduardo Bolsonaro, son of the ex-president. These days, Bolsonaro Jr lives in Florida, the headquarters of the Latin American right, and is a self-styled strategist and adviser to the Trump movement. His stated goal is to export the US radicalization strategy to Brazil. 

Political developments in Washington are often felt directly in Brazil. There are high hopes that Brazil can learn from events in the US, which demonstrate how re-elected authoritarian presidents can undermine the democratic system in the long term. This explains growing fears in Brazil ahead of the election in October 2026, which could once again serve as a barometer for just how stable democracy in Latin America’s largest country really is. 

Who Will Succeed Bolsonaro?

Although it is still too early to predict with any certainty, many names of potential Bolsonaro successors are already circulating among the Brazilian far right. The Bolsonaro-affiliated politician Ciro Nogueira has emphasized that he is unwaveringly loyal to the ex-president — “to the very end”, in his own words. But, in light of Bolsonaro’s conviction by the electoral court and possible imprisonment, this end could soon become reality. A replacement must be found.

Currently, the best-placed candidate looks to be Tarcísio de Freitas, governor of São Paulo, Brazil’s most populous state. He is politically experienced and well-connected, but not radical enough for many hardline Bolsonaro supporters, especially given his half-hearted criticism of the Supreme Court’s investigation into the former president. Without an explicit electoral endorsement from Bolsonaro, Freitas’s campaign is unlikely to make any headway. 

Pragmatism could ultimately prevail once again. Not out of enthusiasm for Lula, but due to fears of a Bolsonarist revival.

For this reason, many are looking to Bolsonaro’s inner circle: his family. Bolsonaro’s wife Michelle is a name that surfaces repeatedly. She lacks political experience and is often overlooked by the male-dominated right wing, but she is popular at the grassroots level. Her greatest asset is her status as an evangelical, which allows her to represent one of the most important and fastest-growing groups in Brazil’s electorate. Michelle Bolsonaro’s significance is so great that, at her behest, her husband recently fired one of his communications advisers who had been critical of her potential candidacy.

Bolsonaro’s sons — Carlos, Eduardo, and Flávio — are also being floated as alternatives, but all three are themselves knee-deep in criminal investigations and scandals. The far right thus faces a dilemma — the judiciary is forcing it to become more moderate. Even Bolsonaro himself is now striking an unusually conciliatory tone, one that is more controlled, more statesmanlike. This could win back middle-class voters but threaten the radical grassroots mobilization that remains crucial for the upcoming electoral campaign. At the same time, right-wing copycats are likely to emerge at the federal level — politically uncompromised but aligned with Bolsonaro in terms of rhetoric and talking points; free from political baggage but pursuing the same strategy. 

Lula’s Last Chance

One thing seems clear: despite his age, at 79 years old, Lula intends to run again. His greatest advantage is his name recognition, a decisive factor in Brazil, where personality often counts for more than manifestos. As the incumbent president, he also benefits from increased visibility in the media, and he took a strong stance in the recent tariffs dispute with the US. He refused to buckle under US pressure and made it crystal clear that Brazil is no “banana republic”, a position which gave him a slight boost in the polls.

However, many Brazilians are dissatisfied with Lula, and there is disappointment in leftist circles, too. One reason for this is the parliamentary dominance of the right, which very often blocks or waters down government bills. Yet Lula and his associates share some of the blame, especially when it comes to climate policy and the environment. His flip-flopping, considered by some a political strategy, will become clear yet again in November 2025 (if not before), when the COP international climate conference is due to take place in the Amazonian city of Belém. On one hand, Lula styles himself as a green president, for which he is applauded on the global stage. And it is true that he has managed to reduce deforestation in the Amazon significantly and rebuild environmental protection agencies. On the other hand, he has caused controversy on several occasions, for example with his support for contentious oil drilling operations in the Amazon region. 

Lula’s fate in the 2026 election will hinge on how broad a political coalition he can build. Above all, it was the support of the centre-right that gave him the decisive edge in the last election. Politically starved after years of irrelevance, the centrists may now sense an opportunity and attempt to position themselves as a third major player. Their history urges caution, though. In particular, the controversial impeachment proceedings brought against Lula’s fellow party member Dilma Rousseff in 2016 — in which Rousseff’s deputy, Michel Temer (who later became interim president) was one of several allies to side with the right-wing opposition — showed that loyalty rarely triumphs over opportunism in these circles. At crucial moments, they can switch sides and stab former partners in the back.

At the same time, the middle-class centre lacks charismatic leaders. In spite of their political experience, there is nobody with the ability to mobilize voters and hold their own against Lula or the Bolsonaro camp. And so pragmatism could ultimately prevail once again. Not out of enthusiasm for Lula, but due to fears of a Bolsonarist revival. 

This article first appeared in nd.aktuell in cooperation with the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation. Translated by Rose Wellbrook and Eve Richens for Gegensatz Translation Collective.