Rising Tensions in Lebanon

On the Monday following the brutal massacre of 1,200 Israelis by Hamas, the Lebanese daily newspaper Al-Akhbar reported on the events extensively. The political spin put forward by the newspaper, which is close to Hezbollah but also has some readership among the left-wing political milieu, was clear: the “Al-Aqsa Flood”, as Hamas’s attack on Israel is known in the Arab world, had proven a success, as the “axis of resistance showed Israel the red line”. The newspaper painted a picture of a political but also emotional turning point in Lebanon and expressed satisfaction and joy at Hamas’s successes and Israel's losses. The myth of the invincible Israeli army had been shattered.

Both the situation on the southern border and the political debate throughout the country have been very tense since. The main players are Hezbollah and allied groups on one side and the government and Christian opposition on the other. Members of the Islamic Jihad militia crossed into Israel from Lebanon during the first clashes on the Israeli–Lebanese border. Hezbollah claimed to have nothing to do with the attack. However, it is unlikely that anyone would reach or even cross the border without Hezbollah’s knowledge.

For its part, Hezbollah limited itself to attacks on Israeli positions around the Shebaa farms area claimed by Lebanon at the beginning of the conflict. Unlike in 2006, however, the situation did not escalate after the kidnapping of the Israeli soldiers. Over the course of November, Hezbollah then also attacked Israeli fighter jets and artillery units outside the Shebaa farms and threatened the border region on the Israeli side. The deployment of a US aircraft carrier in the eastern Mediterranean was also a clear sign that the US recognized the danger of an escalation and sought to prevent one from occurring.

Some Lebanese and many foreigners left the country at the beginning of the clashes, and the majority of residents have left their villages in Southern Lebanon. Lebanon has a large diaspora and normally many Lebanese abroad come to visit for Christmas, but many have now cancelled their trip to Lebanon. The economic cost of the limited military conflict already seems to be high. Added to this is the bombing of many areas in southern Lebanon, the destruction of houses and forest fires, as well as more than 120 deaths on the Lebanese side so far — mostly Hezbollah fighters, but also three journalists and 17 civilians.

It was not until almost a month after the conflict began, on 3 November 2023, that the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, spoke publicly to his supporters for the first time. He said that all options were on the table. He did not mention any specific escalation steps. In his second speech on 11 November, Nasrallah reiterated his tactic that the time had not yet come for Hezbollah to go to war. The population grew cautiously calm and escalation seemed to have been averted.

Given the solidarity of some Lebanese with the Palestinians in Gaza, there is a certain pressure from the street for Hezbollah to become more involved. Nasr Eldin, a political activist, was quoted in the German newspaper nd as saying, “People here understand what is happening in Palestine as a glorious act of resistance after decades of Israeli oppression.” The expectations of many activists — both in the Islamist and parts of the left-wing milieu as well as among Palestinians in Lebanon —were high that Hezbollah, together with Palestinian groups from southern Lebanon, would increase the pressure on Israel and take military action. These expectations have yet to be fulfilled.

Shock and Paralysis

“Official” Lebanon, by contrast, seemed to remain in a state of shock, while the fear of escalation was very real. The measured violence on the border could have been a harbinger of a wider conflagration across Lebanon. The caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati attempted to calm the waters, reassure the various groups, and prevent an escalation of the military clashes. The head of government even developed a peace plan (albeit one that received little attention).

Many Lebanese are exhausted as no political compromises have been reached and the search for solutions is still blocked. There is a complex mood in the country, a feeling of uncertainty as to whether or not there will be a war.

The Christian opposition groups and above all Samir Geagea, chairman of the Lebanese Forces (LF), are vocal critics. Geagea criticizes the military build-up and the fighting of Hezbollah and its allies. However, he did not limit himself to Hamas and Hezbollah. The LF chairman also deplored the fact that the Lebanese authorities, particularly Mikati, the Minister of Defence, and the Minister of the Interior, had failed to take a consistent stance against the military operations on the border with Israel in light of the situation on the southern border and the statements made by Hamas.

The reason for the extremely high tension lies primarily, but not only, in the history of Southern Lebanon, which was the PLO’s base for attacks on Israel in the 1960s and especially the 1970s. Southern Lebanon was named “Fatahland” after Fatah, the PLO’s largest organization. However, the disastrous clashes between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006 also led many Lebanese to believe that a regional conflagration could no longer be prevented. In addition, Lebanon has been in a political standstill since 2019, with a government that has failed to act. Many Lebanese are exhausted as no political compromises have been reached and the search for solutions is still blocked. There is a complex mood in the country, a feeling of uncertainty as to whether or not there will be a war.

The Interests of Hezbollah and Iran

The Lebanese are not the only ones who fear the consequences of a conflagration in the region. A destabilisation of the region is also dangerous for the Iranian regime, which is already under pressure from years of domestic political unrest. It does not look as if Iran is endeavouring to de-escalate, but the mullahs' regime is not escalating either. They would rather contain the situation because they are primarily concerned with their own survival. A regional war would jeopardize Iran.

Kim Ghattas, a journalist from Beirut, puts it this way: “Iran’s priority is the survival of the regime and Hezbollah as a key line of defence. … They don’t want to be in a situation where they waste that card for the Palestinians.” The conflict in Gaza has “revealed the complex and contradictory forces that shape Iran’s behavior and interests in the Middle East, which are driven by both ideology and pragmatism”, according to Sina Toossi. In this sense, Iran probably wants to not only demonstrate its strength and deterrent capability to Israel and the US, but also avoid a direct confrontation — aspects that Hezbollah’s current tactics also take into account.

Hezbollah’s tactical restraint also has a domestic political dimension. Palestine, or rather the liberation of Palestine and resistance against Israel, are certainly Hezbollah’s most important demands. Lebanon’s foreign policy orientation and its relationship with Israel was a priority for the group’s politics. Nevertheless, a certain pragmatism can be observed with regard to alliances within Lebanon’s sectarian political system.

Many Palestinians were disappointed by Hezbollah’s reluctance to engage on the border. Many, especially young men, were prepared to fight against Israel from Lebanese territory and had assumed that Hezbollah would declare war on Israel.

To a certain extent, Hezbollah takes the overall structure of Lebanese society into account and is part of Lebanese confessionalism. Its cooperation with Lebanon’s second major Christian party, the Free Patriotic Movement (FPB), which has existed since 2006, is an example of this. In light of the fragile situation in Lebanon, it seems appropriate for Hezbollah to enter into coalitions across sectarian lines.

The FPB have openly spoken out against the military escalation by Hezbollah. Southern Lebanon should not become a “Hamasland”. FPB party leader Gebran Bassil, a Hezbollah ally, put it this way: “Lebanon has rights and its ‘national resistance’ against Israel empowers it to defend itself, but the creation of a Hamasland in the south weakens it.” This political card, the alliance with one of the two major Christian groups in Lebanon, is also not to be jeopardized by a war against Israel, according to Hezbollah’s tactics.

Hamas and the Palestinians in Lebanon

According to a 2017 census, around 190,000 Palestinians live permanently in Lebanon. However, the number of refugees officially registered by UNRWA currently stands at almost 490,000. Their history in Lebanon is complex, and the role of the PLO and the Palestinians in the civil war is controversial. Hamas is in direct competition with the PLO. It is highly visible and enjoys relatively high popularity. Its popularity has also increased as a result of the “Al-Aqsa Flood” and it has grown bolder.

Yet the relationship between Hamas and Hezbollah is not as straightforward and harmonious as some would have us believe. Differences between them and other Iranian-backed groups have flared up repeatedly, especially since 2011 during the Syrian civil war, when the majority of Hamas supported Sunni opposition groups in Syria. But ultimately, and despite these differences, “over the past five years, relations improved at a fast pace”, says Qassim Qassir, a Lebanese analyst close to Hezbollah. The rapprochement largely took place via Lebanon. Hamas activist Saleh al-Arouri, based in Beirut since 2003, is said to be the one who intensified the contact and (military) cooperation. Arouri, who comes from the West Bank, was also the founder of the Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas.

Nevertheless, many Palestinians were disappointed by Hezbollah’s reluctance to engage on the border. Many, especially young men, were prepared to fight against Israel from Lebanese territory and had assumed that Hezbollah would declare war on Israel.

At the beginning of December 2023, Hamas announced the founding of the “Al-Aqsa Flood Youth” in Lebanon. This caused a great stir. Gebran Bassil declared that he categorically rejected the establishment of this unit by Hamas and said. “We believe that any armed action from Lebanon is an attack on national sovereignty.” On his X account, he denounced the weakening of Lebanon in favour of a Hamas state in the south. The Hamas representative in Lebanon, Ahmad Abdel Hadi, quickly rowed back and said that it was not a military unit. Here, too, Hezbollah appears to have put the brakes on Hamas.

The rhetoric is loud and expectations are high. However, the situation on the border and the complex structure of Lebanon, as well as in the region, seem to prevent a military escalation. Only an extreme incident on the border or an aggressive Israeli offensive strategy in Lebanon could persuade Hezbollah to abandon this tactic.

Translated by Loren Balhorn.